Kant y Apel: el problema de la fundamentación trascendental de la moral
Abstract
This paper compares Kant’s arguments against a transcendental deduction of the moral law with Apel’s attempt to carry out a transcendental-pragmatic foundation of a “fundamental ethical norm.” Inspite of his improved conception of transcendental arguments, Apel seems to mistake the logical constriction and the normative obligation, effacing the kantian difference between theoretical and practical reason.Downloads
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