Asentimiento y “lo que depende de nosotros”: dos argumentos compatibilistas en el estoicismo antiguo
Keywords:
Stoicism, Determinism, Assent, Compatibilism, Naturalism,
Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to analyse two stoic arguments (one of them preserved by Cicero and Aulus Gellius, the other by Nemesius and Alexander) frequently interpreted as a defense of compatibilism. We shall present an alternative interpretation of both arguments, focusing on the naturalistic context provided by early Stoic metaphysics and ethics. The two notions we will mainly deal with will be the concept of “assent” and the distinction between that which “depends on us” and that which doesn’t.Downloads
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Published
2009-03-17
How to Cite
Sebastián Braicovich R. . (2009). Asentimiento y “lo que depende de nosotros”: dos argumentos compatibilistas en el estoicismo antiguo. Revista de Filosofía , 33(2), 131-160. https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/RESF0808220131A
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