Normatividad, razones semánticas y razones instrumentales

Abstract

Alexander Miller has claimed that Kripke might not deploy the thesis of the normativity of meaning at the service of the critique of dispositional semantic realism, by a route analogous to the Humean rejection of moral realism, because semantic reasons could be at most hypothetical reasons. I will begin displaying a Humean argument against moral realism. Then I will explain why Miller thinks that Kripke could not an analogous argument against reductive semantic realism. From Miller remarks, I will distil an argument to the conclusion that a kind of conditionals, which I call RAS-DA conditionals, could sustain only non-categorical obligations –or in a more clear terminology, instrumental obligations. Finally, I will argue that the attempt to fit RAS-DA conditionals in an instrumental template denaturalizes the ontology and the phenomenology of semantic intention.