Ningún hombre es una isla.* Meditación en torno a la (im)posibilidad de la responsabilidad moral
Keywords:
Philosophy of Action, Moral Responsibility, Agent, Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Determinism, Free Will, Social Identity,
Abstract
The Strawson’s Basic Argument is the stronger against moral responsibility in Philosophy of action. One should be responsible of his identity to be moral responsible of his actions, but then nobody could be never responsible. In this article I criticize orthodox solutions to Strawson’s sceptical challenge and show how they share with the Argument the same theological notion of monadical agent. A new solution needs a new conception of agent..Downloads
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Published
2006-02-14
How to Cite
Raga Rosaleny V. . (2006). Ningún hombre es una isla.* Meditación en torno a la (im)posibilidad de la responsabilidad moral. Revista de Filosofía , 30(2), 193-213. https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/RESF0505220193A
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