Coherentismo versus confiabilismo
Abstract
Recently, a number of epistemologists has adopted some sort of reliabilism. According to them, we must reject classical types of internalism such as foundationalism and coherentism. Here, I will resist this tendency of contemporary epistemology by defending a version of coherentism. My strategy will consist in demonstrating that the latter offers a more satisfactory answer to the problem of how the epistemic justification of our best belief systems relates to their supposed truth.Downloads
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