El realismo interno de Putnam y la ciencia empírica
Keywords:
Putnam, Internal realism, Physics, Model-theoric argument, Scientific realism
Abstract
The paper investigates various arguments in favour of Putnam's internal realism with respect to the empirical sciences. In Models and Reality (1980), Putnam applies his model-theoretic argument to physics in order to defend a pragmatist view of truth. But this view of truth depends on the God's Eye View which Putnam criticizes with the same argument. In addition, it seems to be incompatible with any realistic account of science. In Realism with a Human Face (1990), Putnam introduces the distinction of meta-language and object lenguage. This distinction permits him to maintain the correspondence view of truth, and supports the actual pluralism of the empirical sciences. In Words and Life (1994), his internal realism is supported by anti-reductionist arguments which confirm the disunity of science.Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
Article download
Crossmark
Published
2005-01-10
How to Cite
Falkenburg B. . (2005). El realismo interno de Putnam y la ciencia empírica. Revista de Filosofía , 29(2), 117-132. https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/RESF0404220117A
Issue
Section
Articles
License
In order to support the global exchange of knowledge, the journal Revista de Filosofía is allowing unrestricted access to its content as from its publication in this electronic edition, and as such it is an open-access journal. The originals published in this journal are the property of the Complutense University of Madrid and any reproduction thereof in full or in part must cite the source. All content is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 use and distribution licence (CC BY 4.0). This circumstance must be expressly stated in these terms where necessary. You can view the summary and the complete legal text of the licence.
