El debate sobre el realismo científico: confirmación, éxito predictivo y probabilidad

  • Manuel Comesaña
Keywords: Scientific realism, Probability, Underdetermination, Auxiliary assumptions, Common sense realism

Abstract

The underdetermination of theory by evidence prima facie generated by the empirical equivalence between rival theories constitutes a threat to scientific realism, a threat that cannot be overcome “pragmatically.” The part allegedly played by auxiliary assumptions in the generation of hypotheses does not seem to be of any help in blocking this underdetermination either. The most convincing argument in favor of realism is the one that disallows objections to knowledge of unobservable entities that also affect the knowledge of observable entities.

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Published
2005-01-10
How to Cite
Comesaña M. . (2005). El debate sobre el realismo científico: confirmación, éxito predictivo y probabilidad. Revista de Filosofía , 29(2), 59-71. https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/RESF0404220059A
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Articles