Autoconciencia y contenido no-conceptual.
Abstract
José Luis Bermúdez ha defendido una explicación no-circular de la autoconciencia en virtud de contenidos no-conceptuales de primera persona, explicativa y ontogenéticamente básicos. En este artículo se argumenta que los contenidos no-conceptuales explicativamente básicos caen en el mito de lo Dado; mientras que los contenidos no-conceptuales ontogenéticamente básicos, aunque lo evitan, no constituyen la mejor explicación de la adquisición de capacidades cognitivas.Downloads
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