On the senses of the world in Being and Time

Abstract

In Being and Time we find contradictory positions on the genesis of science and the homogenization of space. Regarding the former, the contrast between a model of private nature, characterized as a process of depriving the world of its worldhood, which allows one to learn things in their substantiality, and another, projective, which presents mathematization as a positive way of thematization. In this article we would like to argue that these differences are connected with the fact that Heidegger uses two definitions of “world”, and with the contrast between a transcendental phenomenological foundation of the ontological-categorical sense of the world from the ontologicalexistential sense in § 4, and, from § 19 on, a historical-hermeneutic description of the process in which the ontological-existential sense is derived from the ontological-categorical sense.