The universalist trap of Rawlsian theory of justice: contributions from feminisms for the recognition of structurally disadvantaged subjects
Abstract
Following a brief reconstruction of John Rawls’ theory of justice as impartiality, an exploration is conducted into some of the most significant critiques of said theory from a feminist perspective, recognizing and highlighting their various nuances and proposed solutions to address the deficiencies of moral universalism. The analysis then proceeds to examine whether critiques stemming from different theoretical positions within feminism can have extendable effects towards other structurally disadvantaged, underrepresented, and marginalized individuals overlooked by the epistemological proposal of universalism. Finally, a conclusion is drawn regarding the incompatibility of the Rawlsian theoretical proposition with the complexity and plurality of contemporary societies.
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