Sartre’s criticism of the Hegelian concept of recognition (Anerkennung) in Being and Nothingness
Abstract
This article seeks to analyse Sartre’s praise for and criticisms against Hegel’s concept of recognition in the essay Being and Nothingness. First, it shows the relevance of this notion to overcome solipsism; then, it expounds the criticism of the ontological and epistemological optimisms of the Hegelian theory of intersubjectivity. As a conclusion, it makes clear the differences between the dialectic and idealistic approach of the Anerkennung (Hegel) and the lived-experiential and existential approach of the reconnaissance (Sartre) in these philosophical thoughts about interpersonal relationships.
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