Imitation and identification in Spinoza’s theory of affects
Abstract
Insofar as Spinoza does not explicitly name the mechanism for identification, the latter is often confused with the imitation of affects. While the imitation of affects, as defined in the third part of Ethics, is a mechanism by which men feel the affections of others, without alienating themselves, identification is a form of voluntary alienation that consists in appropriating the customs of others to the detriment of one’s own. This article aims to demarcate the mechanism of identification, rather than imitation, and define its role.
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