Justification and error in Descartes: a pragmatist argument in the Cartesian validation of the clearness and distinctness’s criterion
Keywords:
Descartes, metaphysical certainty, clearness and distinctness, justification, skepticism, error, pragmatism
Abstract
The clear and distinct perception is the element on which Descartes’s metaphysical certainty is justified. However, the exposition of the skeptical arguments referred to the Cartesian methodical doubt has shown that is necessary to find another justification for the clearness & distinctness criterion. From attempts based on indubitability of the perception or warranty arising from the divine goodness, it will be defended a pragmatist alternative justification.Downloads
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Published
2016-03-15
How to Cite
García Rodríguez S. (2016). Justification and error in Descartes: a pragmatist argument in the Cartesian validation of the clearness and distinctness’s criterion. Revista de Filosofía , 41(1), 97-109. https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_RESF.2016.v41.n1.52109
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