Ortega and Wittgenstein: Not so far
Keywords:
Ortega, Wittgenstein, metaphysical realism, subject, meaning, authenticity.
Abstract
This article aims to analyze to what extent the philosophies of Ortega and Wittgenstein share a common philosophical horizon. In this sense we note, although with different nuances, the following common elements: the rejection of metaphysical realism and scientism, the abandonment of the substantialist conception of the subject, the emergence in philosophical discussion of meaning or sense as something that needs understanding or clarification, the urgency of solving the problem of authenticity.Downloads
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Published
2014-11-19
How to Cite
Defez A. (2014). Ortega and Wittgenstein: Not so far. Revista de Filosofía , 39(2), 81-100. https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_RESF.2014.v39.n2.47305
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