Epistemic Commitment in Structuralist Approach of Theories
Abstract
The idea that the Structuralist Program is completely neutral in epistemological matters is widely extended. On the contrary, the article’s purpose is to show that while it is true that structuralism is neutral in the epistemological debate between realism and antirealism, structuralism supposes an epistemic commitment in thefoundation of theories. This epistemic commitment has the characteristics of a coherentism and two structuralist thesis lead precisely to that: scientific theories are contrasted through its intended applications and the intended applications of a theoryare described only in non- theoretical concepts relative to theory.Downloads
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