Natural Kind Terms: Has Kripke Misinterpreted Mill’s Theory?
Abstract
In a famous passage of Naming and Necessity Kripke summarizes the core of his criticism to the description theory of natural kind terms, taking into account the theory of general terms proposed by Mill, insofar as it is applied to natural kind terms, as a paradigm of that sort of theory. The aim of this paper is to argue that Mill’s generic theory on general terms does not coincide with his theory concerning the sort of general terms that natural kind terms are and that the main thesis of the latter is not subject to Kripke’s objections put forward in the aforementioned passage.Downloads
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