Agencia racional e ilusión de libertad

Abstract

The social sciences face the problem of giving a comprehensive explanation of the subject’s illusion of thinking that its action derives from a propositional and conscious action. The notion of freedom is part of this conceptual complex in opposition to the one that faces the notion of determinism, the meta-theoretical foundations of a scientific explanation. The experience of consciousness, of behaving as a subject provided with free will is a creation of the brain and the mind. If the neuronal and psychological mechanisms are responsible of behavior, the notion of a subject that resolves the action, simultaneously free and caused, vanishes or is revealed as an illusion. The econometrical analysis of the behavior, in the experimental economy, has showed that the phenomena of investment based on preferences in time and the inconsistency of his choices question the notion of a rational agent, understood as an agent provided with free will. The actions of an individual have sense in a social game. The positions of the actors in the social structure determine which actions can be expected from them depending on the type of communicative interaction that associates rewards and punishments with certain patterns of action, shaping habits. The rational agent is satisfied with its experience of success or failure with regards to this pattern of rewards and punishments provided by actors of a corporate nature. In this contribution we discuss from the perspective of neuroscience and cognitive science, the notion of subjectivity, as well as the relations between virtual agency and rational agency.