Análisis del contrato de agencia bajo los fundamentos económicos de la teoría principal-agente

  • Juan Antonio Gaviria Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana Medellín (Colombia)
  • Ricardo Santana Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana Medellín (Colombia)
Keywords: Law, contracts, agency contract, agent, efficiency, economy

Abstract

This article approaches the study of the agency contract using the methodology of the economic analyses of Law, in particular the principal-agency microeconomic theory. In order to do so, the principal-agent relationship in between the parties is shown and studied on account of the asymmetric information and the economic problem of moral risk that they face during the contract execution. Later on a mathematical pattern to maximize the system of incentives, level the interests of the parties and thus to improve the transaction’s efficiency is penned. The conclusions that follow are faced to the rules which govern the agency contract, as they appear in the Colombian Merchants Law.

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How to Cite
Antonio Gaviria J. y Santana R. (2017). Análisis del contrato de agencia bajo los fundamentos económicos de la teoría principal-agente. FORO. Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales, Nueva Época, 19(2), 141-186. https://doi.org/10.5209/FORO.55369
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Researches