Is the Agustinian response to the problem of evil a theodicy in the way of Leibniz?

Abstract

The problem of evil has tormented human beings since time immemorial. Therefore, reflections on this question and its compatibility with the existence of an almighty, omniscient and good God have always been a part of our human existence, especially in the Judaeo-Christian world. Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, among others, contributed to the building of a philosophicotheological response to that question that was considered for a long time as a proposal that, even though it didn´t solve the problem entirely, at least shed light on it. However, after Kant, many thinkers have radically rejected the possibility of a theodicy, conceived as a speculative reflection of a metaphysical basis for the problem of evil and its relation to God. In this rejection, whose main object is the Leibnizian justification of divine innocence, are often included other responses like the Augustinian position. This essay tries to analyze both stances in order to reach a conclusion, in the light of the traits that Ricoeur considers as essential to every theodicy, as long as the objections commonly posed to Leibniz, also affect the Augustinian approach.