In what way is it possible to be a sceptic?
Keywords:
Doubt, Scepticism, Transcendental Arguments, Silence and Nonsense.
Abstract
The concern of this paper is to analyse what kind of replay to the problem of the philosophical scepticism we can expect from the so-called transcendental arguments. The general conclusion is that transcendental arguments are not able to neutralise the sceptical doubts considered as verbal formulations of logical possibilities. Now, provided that the sceptic cannot meaningfully present his doubts, it seems that he has only three options: to doubt with the aid of a mystical silence, to doubt using the words in a metaphorical or evocative sense, or to doubt using the words with literal sense, but being conscious that he is saying a nonsense. To sum up: the sceptical doubt can never have the value of a real doubt.Downloads
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Published
2012-10-30
How to Cite
Defez Martín A. (2012). In what way is it possible to be a sceptic?. Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica, 45, 211-222. https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_ASEM.2012.v45.40413
Issue
Section
Cuestiones de ontología y epistemología
License
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