The new problem of demarcation: the axiological criterion and the right no epistemic values
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the nature of the new demarcation problem in philosophy of science, and the strategies presented by it, and in more detail, the axiological strategy, which promises to distinguish right non-epistemic values. To accomplish this objective, I would like to emphasize that the uses of non-epistemic values will be correct if scientists consider ethical justifications. From this perspective, and to elaborate those ethical justifications, I propose the use of the notion of amplified diversity, that rely on the partial union already articulated by Intemann (feminist standpoint empiricism) between the point of view theory and the critical contextual empiricism theory. In this context, the text offers a critical review of the mentioned articulation and of its applicability when offering a solution to the axiology strategy.
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