Equity: a Fairer Type of Justice
Abstract
The term epiqueya was introduced by Aristotle in his book Nichomachean Ethics (V, 4) in order to improve a general or abstract law that applies in a given case where, with no distinction whatsoever, it would end up being contrary to justice. Such idea has gone down in history, particularly when opposing ius strictum, in need of adequacy and ius aequum. Nowadays equity is considered to be the justice criteria which does not only take into account the legal system but also the specifics of the given case and which aims at bringing an answer within a more moral and human sense and not just within a legal one. On the same lines equity tends to be considered a spin off of the wording in order to focus on its essence. And yet we should not forget that on the foundations of the latin word aequitas there is an element of equality, particularly important in cases of justice of distributive justice; let alone the importance of equity in Saxon American Legal systems, where Equity is source of Right.Downloads
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