La importancia del futuro lejano: un examen de algunas de las principales objeciones al largoplacismo
- Dayrón Terán Pintos Universidad de Santiago de Compostela https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7928-6472
Abstract
Según el largoplacismo, los efectos a largo plazo de nuestras acciones son un aspecto crucial de las mismas. Esto se debe a que el futuro, dada su extensión, presumiblemente contendrá a la mayor parte de los seres que alguna vez existan. Hay, sin embargo, distintas objeciones que cuestionan la viabilidad de la propuesta largoplacista, señalando que tendríamos razones para priorizar el corto plazo. Estas objeciones apuntan a problemas relacionados con la representación de individuos que todavía no existen, la situación de las generaciones futuras o la incertidumbre acerca de lo que ocurrirá en el largo plazo. Este artículo examina dichas objeciones y argumenta que ninguna de ellas supone una razón decisiva para rechazar el largoplacismo
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