Objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva
Keywords:
Objectivity, Absolute conception of reality, Physicalism, Conceptual pluralism
Abstract
order to defend Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. Consequently, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed. This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view without perspective. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams’ works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of the paper is the following: first, Williams’ physicalist program is described. Secondly, the article presents some objections to Williams’ physicalism. Thirdly, some reasons are given against the notion of objectivity as a point of view without perspective inFormat
Crossmark
Published
2010-02-15
How to Cite
Kalpokas, D. (2010). Objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva . Revista de Filosofía , 34(2), 29-47. https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/RESF0909220029A
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