Wittgenstein, McDowell and the skeptical challenge
Abstract
In this article the following thesis is defended: Wittgenstein “exorcises” skeptical arguments by showing a conception of language and knowledge which has come to be characterized as naturalism and quietism. And this article distinguishes between Wittgensteinian quietist and naturalistic approaches, on the one hand, and McDowell’s own naturalism, the minimal empiricism, on the other. Unlike the latter, the Wittgensteinian proposal offers us the possibility of rejecting the skeptical challenge.
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