Activist realism revisited: reality, truth, and pluralism beyond Hasok Chang's internalism

Abstract

Hasok Chang’s activist realism has introduced a pragmatist turn in the debate on scientific realism. In this paper, I argue that, despite succeding in moving beyond some of the difficulties of the classical debate, Chang's proposal faces three main limitations: ontological internalism, which undermines the role of reality in enabling or constraining epistemic practices; veritative internalism, which portrays science as an epistemically self-justifying and self-referential enterprise; and an overly permissive pluralism toward obsolete or incompatible entities and theories. To address these limitations, I propose three complementary strategies: an ontology of constraints, a conception of truth as epistemic calibration, and a differential and selective pluralism. In short, I advocate a sufficiently modest form of realism, one that avoids the pitfalls of traditional realism while remaining robust enough to overcome the difficulties associated with Chang’s activist realism.