Causality and Determinism: Tension, or Outright Conflict?

  • Carl Hoefer
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Schlagwörter: Causality, Natural laws, Determinism, Nomic necessity

Abstract

In the philosophical tradition, the notions of determinism and causality are it is assumed that in a world of deterministic laws, causality may be said to reign supreme; and in any world where the causality is strong enough, determinism must hold. I will show that these alleged linkages are based on mistakes, and in fact get things almost completely wrong. In a deterministic world that is anything like ours, there is no room for genuine causation. Though there may be stable enough macro-level regularities to serve the purposes of human agents, the sense of “causality” that can be maintained is one that will at best satisfy Humeans and pragmatists, not causal fundamentalists.
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Veröffentlicht
2005-01-10
Zitationsvorschlag
Hoefer, C. (2005). Causality and Determinism: Tension, or Outright Conflict? Revista de Filosofía, 29(2), 99-115. https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/RESF0404220099A
Rubrik
Artículos

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