Simetrías en la teoría combinatoria de la actividad pública de Leviathan

Abstract

For the first time, I believe, public choice is dealt with from the point of view of combinatorial theory. The starting point is a batch of good describing the nature and the amount of goods and public activities, which can be presented in a wide range of menus. Each menu is a specific combination of the goods in the batch. Leviathan is considered to know all the menus, that is, the universe of possible combinations. Yet the citizens do not necessarily know them. At this point, the concepts of symmetry: andsasimetry are introduced in the market. Simmetry occurs when an economic agent has hall the necessary available information, as does the order market agent. Assimetry is present in this work because Leviathan knows all the information, and in order to avoid this he intensively supplies the market that does not have it is with this information. As a result of simmetry, adverse choice and moral risk are likely to happen in the market. Such is a consquence of the existence of a principal and an agent not always sharing the same interest. The principal is the sovereing people and the agent is Leviathan.