The EU´s MDW Strategy and the Chemical Weapons: Cooperation at the Crossroads

Abstract

On 12 December 2003, the European Union adopted the Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Strategy) that has been materialized under the principle of "effective multilateralism". Regarding the proliferation of chemical weapons, the EU initiatives have been carried out mainly within the regime established by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use, and on their Destruction (CWC) through contribution agreements with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, the security context has evolved considerably since the entry into force of the CWC regime in 1997. Moreover, the regime established by the CWC has vulnerabilities, due to structural or implementation reasons, which may question their effectiveness. The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution (or lack thereof) of the EU policy on chemical weapons proliferation consistent with the WMD Strategy in view of both, the security context evolution and the vulnerabilities of the CWC regime. This analysis leads us to conclude that, to the extent that the EU has entrusted its policy of chemical weapons to the OPCW, becomes dependent on the vulnerabilities and the evolution of the CWC regime, which can become detrimental to the its own main strategy on WMD.