A Different Kind of Knowing: Pedagogical Rationality and Educational Research

Abstract

This essay makes the case that, first and foremost, a different kind of knowing than that of the empirical sciences is proper to educational reseach and action.  The opening section begins with the suggestion that in a digital age, a residual positivism infuses educational policymaking internationally and is also influential in educational research. It is shown how this development  tends to exclude heart of educational practice itself from research. The second section reviews the historical dominance of research models based on empirical sciences. It traces the efforts of prominent thinkers like Dilthey,  Husserl and  Ortega y Gasset to challenge an empiricist rationality in research endeavours more widely and to chart new approaches. The contribution of hermeneutic philosophers, particularly Gadamer, is examined in the third section, highlighting the merits of a conversational rationality in disclosing the  richer textures of human experience.  The fourth section then explores the  singular appropriateness of a conversational rationality for educational thought aand action: for elucidating and justifying a pedagogical rationality, properly so called. Finally, the promise of pedagogical rationality for educational research is explored in the concluding section, including its more illuminating ways of knowing and its more inviting possibilities of engaging practitioners and researchers alike.