Intentionality without biological naturalism
Keywords:
functionalism, John Searle, intentionality, computational theory of mind
Abstract
The Chinese Room argument is a variant of Turing’s test which enables Searle to defend his biological naturalism, according to which computation is neither sufficient nor constitutive of the mind. In this paper, I examine both strands of his anticomputationalist stance, argue that computation is constitutive of natural language understanding and suggest a path toward the physicalist reduction of intentionality for propositional speech acts.Format
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How to Cite
Hannikainen, I. (2012). Intentionality without biological naturalism. Revista de Filosofía , 36(1), 139-153. https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_RESF.2011.v36.n1.37635
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