Un examen de los argumentos contra la teoría descriptiva de la referencia de los nombres propios
Keywords:
Reference, Description theory, Proper names, Ignorance and error
Abstract
This paper aims at examining the main arguments presented against the description theory of reference for proper names. It will especially focus on the arguments exposed by Kripke in Naming and Necessity, with the object of outlining a description theory which is not affected by such arguments.Format
Crossmark
Published
2003-01-01
How to Cite
Fernández Moreno, L. (2003). Un examen de los argumentos contra la teoría descriptiva de la referencia de los nombres propios. Revista de Filosofía, 28(1), 77-106. https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/RESF0303120077A
Issue
Section
Articles
License
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