Do not become the servants of men
A critical review of the Kantian concept of duty to oneself
Abstract
In Kant’s texts on duties to oneself we can distinguish two different argumentative lines: one in the Lectures on Ethics of 1784/1785 (Moralphilosophie Collins), and the other in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). This article defends the argumentative line of the Lectures on Ethics and claims a duty to oneself: the duty not to allow ourselves to be used by others. Subsequently, some objections that have been formulated or that can be formulated against this concept are analyzed.
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