Malebranche y su crítica de la eficacia de las causas segundas. Las refutaciones del concurrentismo y del conservatismo

Abstract

My purpose is to examine Malebranche’s refutation of Medieval and Late-Scholastic theories on efficient causation by drawing attention to the authors referred to by him. First, I present his criticism of the general thesis on the efficiency of second causes. Second, I show his objections to concurrentism and conservatism. In refuting second causation Malebranche uses both an epistemological and a theological-hermeneutic criteria. According to the first one, all theories on the efficient causation of second causes are equally wrong. Nevertheless, according to the theological-hermeneutic criterion concurrentism is thought to be agreeable with occasionalism by means of an “ocassionalist” redefinition of the concept of divine concourse.