NATO’S IMPACT ON THE SPANISH ARMY 
& FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract:
The crucial influence, both direct as well as indirect, that NATO has had on all the Spanish Army’s activities needs to be recognised, especially in terms of the change in mentality of its members; organisation, transformation and planning; doctrine, operations and intelligence; preparation and training, along with its leadership and logistic support. The important change in mentality that the Army has undergone as a consequence of entering the Alliance has fundamentally been in the field of operational structures, force projection, knowledge of languages, leadership, joint and combined spirit and multinationality. Some of the permanent references for the Army, with the horizon of 2025 in sight, include: the human factor (of the combat soldier), professionalism, the command structure, joint action, a Comprehensive Approach to conflicts, a continuous and dynamic need to evolve, constant improvement and an intelligent dissemination of the institution’s values. Definitely, the Army in the first quarter of the 21st century is a tool of the State, one that is modern, agile, flexible, perfectly represented in NATO and the international environment, which is prepared in its mentality, and in staff and material terms, to respond with the greatest solidity, credibility and efficiency to safeguard and defend Spanish interests.

Keywords: NATO, Spanish Army.

Resumen:
Es preciso reconocer la importantísima influencia, tanto directa como indirecta, que la OTAN ha tenido en el Ejército de Tierra en todas sus actividades, especialmente en el cambio de mentalidad de sus integrantes, la organización, transformación y planeamiento, la doctrina, operaciones e inteligencia, preparación y adiestramiento junto con su liderazgo y apoyo logístico. El importante cambio de mentalidad que ha sufrido el Ejército de Tierra como consecuencia de su entrada en la Alianza, se ha manifestado, fundamentalmente, en el terreno de estructuras operativas, proyección de fuerzas, conocimiento de idiomas, liderazgo, espíritu conjunto y combinado y multinacionalidad. Algunas de las referencias permanentes del Ejército de Tierra en el horizonte del 2025 incluyen al factor humano - el soldado combatiente -, el profesionalismo, la estructura de mando, la acción conjunta, el enfoque integral de los conflictos, una continua y dinámica necesidad de evolucionar, una mejora permanente y una inteligente difusión de los valores de la institución. En definitiva, el Ejército de Tierra del primer cuarto del siglo XXI se constituye como un instrumento del Estado, moderno, ágil, flexible, perfectamente incardinado en el entorno OTAN e internacional, mental, personal y materialmente preparado para responder con la mayor solidez, credibilidad y eficiencia a la salvaguarda y defensa de nuestros intereses nacionales.

Palabras clave: OTAN, Ejército Español.

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1. Introduction

Spain’s entry into NATO took place when the Spanish flag was raised at the headquarters of the Alliance, in Brussels, on 5 June 1982, notwithstanding a referendum later held in 1986 with the subtle formula of “Yes, but no”, arguing that Spain belonged to the Alliance, but not to its military structure.

That situation forced the drafting of Co-ordination Agreements to implement participation by the Spanish Armed Forces in the Alliance. Six Agreements were drawn up: three for air and naval operations arising from the former Co-operation Agreements, within the framework of U.S.-Spanish relations and on the use of the joint bases; another was added for operations in the Strait of Gibraltar and its accesses; a logistic agreement, the Foxtrot; and the Alfa, that referred to the Army’s employment.

The Treaty of Washington required subordination of military structures to civil power as an indispensable condition for membership. This implied the opening of the military to missions abroad and collective defence, whereas previously it had been concentrated largely on defending national territory, this implicitly boosted its modernisation as it had to adopt the standards of the allied Armed Forces².

In particular, this new external orientation, both with regard to missions in general as well as to collective defence, amounted to a new, modern field of action for the majority of the members of the Spanish Army, which was surprising as well as attractive.

It was surprising, due to the change the new doctrines, rules and procedures involved, and attractive, because it allowed the Spanish military to establish contact with professionals in other countries with whom they could exchange opinions, knowledge and experiences. This, in turn, permitted verifying the state of our Army, with regard to efficiency, structure and operation, both in the European and international context.

It is true that by the year 1982, NATO had already gathered more than thirty years of experience and most of the military forces in the member countries enjoyed a high level of effectiveness and efficiency. Nevertheless, it is also true that the Spanish military was involved in a permanent process of evolution and adaptation driven by an exemplary determination to improve professional standards.

The entry into the Atlantic Alliance came about during this process of improvement and adaptation at our barracks, facilitating prompt assimilation of the new currents in the fields of planning, organisation, operations, doctrine, logistics or intelligence that existed within NATO.

The moment we joined NATO thus coincided with a good professional situation among our soldiers, while our training, preparation and spirit of initiative and innovation were really positive factors in that integration.

From the Co-ordination Agreements in 1983 until full integration in NATO in 1999, other events took place that also contributed, in parallel with the process of full integration in the Alliance, to opening up all kinds of new trends in the fields of security and defence, in the context of our Armed Forces and, thus, within the Spanish Army.

Among them, there was commencement of participation in multinational operations under the UN mandate, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These activities powerfully changed the outlook and the national concept of security and defence.

One went from being a mere spectator in the field of contribution to international peace and security to being a player with an important qualitative specific role due to the major achievements made by Spain and, in particular, by the Army, in that field, especially in Africa, in Latin America and in the Balkans.

Thus, when Spain fully joined the integrated military structure of NATO in 1999, achieving full membership status, it fully took on board the concepts of shared security and collective defence, beyond any doubt. That is, it became yet another partner among equals, which gave rise to full participation in all the Alliance’s bodies, decisions and activities.

Thus, this logical process of exposure ranges from the first steps of Spain’s entry into NATO, at the beginning of the 1980s, up to the present day, emphasising the many aspects of the impact that the Alliance had on the Army and that had an intense influence on the latter’s adaptation, evolution and modernisation.

In this line of analysis, starting with the situation of the Army in the early 1980s, we emphasise the most significant evidence in the change in mentality of its members; organisation, transformation and planning; doctrine, operations and intelligence; preparation and training, along with its leadership and logistic support.

The author has selected these aspects since he considers them to be the most remarkable ones since, on the one hand, they form part of the very essence of the Army as an institution and, on the other, they constitute essential elements of the evolution of modern Armies, such as the change in mentality, operations, leadership and transformation in general.

2. The Army’s Situation in the 1980’s

In this context, it is necessary to refer to milestones that had a strong effect on the Spanish security and defence model before and in the first half of the 1980s.

Firstly, establishment of bilateral relations with the United States in the mid 1950s amounted to the first step within the framework of international defence relations, thus going beyond a mere national conception of these. Contact with the U.S. Army was an opportunity for opening up the Army to the outside world, towards the worldwide military community, involving awareness of the doctrines, practices and organisation of other Armed Forces.

From then on, defence began to be considered from a double viewpoint, the national one, related exclusively to our sovereignty, and the international one, as members of a worldwide defence community responsible for guaranteeing international peace and security.

In order to prepare and adapt the Armed Forces for entry into NATO, the Organic Law 6/1980 was approved. Later it was amended by Organic Law 1/1986, regulating the basic criteria for National Defence. The military organisation clearly established the appropriate concepts and definitions, as well as the powers and responsibilities of the different authorities and services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Those laws permitted Spain to join International Security and Defence Organisations, especially NATO.
The referendum on NATO, in 1986, allowed the introduction of a new security and defence model in which collective defence was considered as one of the most important Euro-Atlantic reference frameworks, which had to be progressively adapted. As we shall see, the Spanish Army began to act within that new scenario, based on the international experience it already had, through co-operation with other Armies in our area, mainly the United States army, as already mentioned.

As an example, we shall see what the situation of the Army was in the early 1980s, especially for the purposes of planning, through the Army Modernisation Plan (META), while the Spanish Armed Forces started their experience in the Atlantic Alliance.

Indeed, in the 1970s, during the transition to the democratic regime, Spain had a very large conscript Army, with territorial organisation, aimed at defending the country, with very small overseas involvement and very old equipment.

In order to undertake the two main objectives of adjusting the Army as an institution to the limited financial possibilities and recruitment capacity, and to rationalise the existing structures inherited following the Spanish Civil War, at the end of the decade the Army Modernisation Plan (called the META Plan) was adopted. The most important measures of this Plan were as follows:

Reduction of the number of Military Regions, from nine to six. It is important to emphasise that the Field Marshals who headed the Military Regions had, at that time, operational powers.

Secondly, the number of units was reduced, going from 24 to 15 Brigades. That reduction was fundamentally performed to the detriment of the Brigades of the General Reserve, as the 5 Operational Divisions were maintained. With regard to personnel, 9,000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers were lost (22%) and 74,500 enlisted soldiers (30%)\textsuperscript{3}.

Grouping support units in specific commands also began, to reduce the scope of control of the General Chief of Staff. The Coastal Artillery and Engineers Commands were created.

Lastly, an important landmark during this period was the transformation of logistics, from services logistics to functional logistics, with the implementation of the Logistics Support System. This system brought about the beginning of the systematic reorganisation of the Army that was subsequently carried out.

On the other hand, in 1986, reduction of Compulsory Military Service from 18 to 12 months was decreed, that led, for the purposes of structural design, to a decrease in available human resources.\textsuperscript{1}

3. Change in Mentality

Spain’s entry into NATO led to a major change in mentality for the Army, fundamentally departing from territorial defence of Spain to collective defence in a context of shared

security, from being a territorial Army to an expeditionary Army and projection of forces – recovering an old, yearned-for capacity of our Army – in parallel with the evolution of NATO.

Based on the conviction that our security is inseparably bound to that of our neighbouring countries, to those which share the same model of society and to others located in areas of our strategic interest, Spain and its Army are fully committed to achieving a more stable and secure international order, based on pacific coexistence, on defence of democracy and human rights, and respect for the rules of International Law.

This commitment is materialised by belonging to international organisations, especially NATO, and this was made apparent by our presence and determined participation in Peacekeeping Support Operations. In this context, the ethical code has constituted and continues to constitute a permanent reference guide for actions by the Army in the new times, in which the values of freedom, justice and solidarity are fundamental.

The 3 Spanish Armed Forces in the 90s were characterised by widespread participation in Peacekeeping Support Operations, which gradually came to condition the organisation of the Armed Forces, in general, and the Army, in particular. Such intervention, which coincided with the first years after we joined NATO, has also had a considerable repercussion in the change of mentality of our soldiers, as stated above, who share experiences with professionals from other nations, establish relations of close collaboration with them and obtain a closer knowledge of their way of working.

In this period, Spanish opinion increasingly questioned Compulsory Military Service, which led to widespread conscientious objection and to shortening military service to 9 months, bringing further reductions in Army numbers and thus making the staffing of units more difficult.

Because of the new concept of national strategy in the context of collective security and international defence organisations, a possible stand-alone situation for the Army was inconceivable, rather it was necessary to set it within a joint scope or, fundamentally, joint-combined.

In this sense, due to the dynamic and evolutionary nature of crises and conflicts, only at the first moments of these is a purely national response expected, then it proceeds, without possible alternatives, to the international – multinational scope.

Furthermore, it has been necessary to undertake defence of allied territory on the basis that defence of our national security interests are perfectly in keeping with defence of the collective interests of the Alliance, all within the scope of an international framework that embodies the principles and universal criteria of the United Nations.

Moreover, joining NATO has facilitated definition of a joint military strategy; on the understanding that the joint nature does not mean that the internal or external features inherent to each one of the Armies will disappear. Quite to the contrary, their diversity and even competition among them is necessary, although not rivalry, because only efficiency in the capacity inherent to each one may provide the trust and mutual comprehension that are required.
As an obvious sign of this evolution, Organic Law 5/2005, dated 17 November, on National Defence, states that the Armed Forces are the essential defence element and constitute a unique entity that is conceived as an integrating compound for the specific types of action of each one of the components thereof, namely: the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

Faced with the need to be prepared and to be able to react to any event, Spanish strategic conception was based, on one hand, on maintenance of its own defensive capacity, which constitutes the ability to provide a truly national response and a deterrence factor; on the other, on collective defence and shared security with our partners and allies.

In such a line, within the joint military strategy, the uniqueness of land forces participation as the support and main element of the scope determined by the Army’s resources and way of acting, takes on special importance when one considers the aspects listed below:

- Land space is settled by the different human societies that reside there, forming the international community;

- Most future military operations will take place at the lowest levels of conflict, at those called “non-warfare”, where one has to deploy in the field, contact the population and provide for elementary needs. In a word, actions will be carried out especially on land;

- All this is quite independent of the scenario envisaged, whether asymmetrical, conventional or criminal, which requires an integral approach with a modern, effective and forward-looking doctrine for the actions of the Armed Forces in forthcoming years;

- The present military operations carried out on land space have great credibility due to their decisive nature. Until land forces were able to reach the Persian Gulf or Kosovo, a definitive solution to the conflicts did not begin.

- It is highly probable, in the near future, that the majority of conflicts will arise and be resolved, due to their inherent nature, within land spaces, as has already been happening in the last 40 years, with highly occasional exceptions, such as Granada or the Malvinas/Falklands.

The performance of real missions under the NATO umbrella, quite different from that of the UN, particularly with modern rules, doctrines and procedures whose effectiveness has been verified, meant a really substantial leap forward for the Army, which involved not only operating with other Armies in the multilateral field, thus showing our own effectiveness, but also verifying our operational efficiency along with our possibilities for interoperability.

Joint, combined work along with bilateral and multilateral actions, common activities in the Alliance, also led to opening up to all kinds of trends, sharing concerns and advances in different fields, mainly the doctrinal, operational and logistics ones, through the lessons learned and their application once their feasibility and efficiency were proven.

Undoubtedly, the use of English as a usual tool in any of the Alliance activities, from the most simple contacts and co-ordination relations to the establishing of agreements or internal operating criteria between the allies, even the most complex ones in the operational field, led to great progress. This was both in the intellectual arena as well as in technical
terms, particularly in its use as a Command and Control (C2) tool in activities by the Army, both beyond the national level and internationally.

One of the strongest or most important impacts arose in the field of leadership. Indeed, due to the continual contact and exchange of ideas between the different Armies that led to joining the Alliance, *inter alia* new military leadership was emphasized. In this field, the Army designed the principles of the New Command Style in 1997\(^4\) that constituted a true and brilliant novelty in its time.

### 4. Reorganisation

As previously stated, the META Plan had already begun its implementation in the late 70s and early 80s, before Spanish entry into NATO.

In the late 80s, the Army Restructuring Plan, RETO Plan, was prepared to adjust the Army’s staff, and thus increase the degree of coverage and availability of units. Among the objectives of this Plan, there was also that of lightening units, modernising their material and making them more interoperable with the countries in our area.

Between 1993 and 1994 a new Plan was conceived, the New Army Organisation Plan, known as NORTE Plan, which strongly boosted modernisation. The aim was to improve the projection capacity of the Army, for its use in operations abroad, making it more flexible and efficient so a systematic organisation was designed, combining the traditional pyramidal organic structure with a functional structure that allowed the working procedures to be expedited.

The NORTE Plan also aimed to adapt the Army to the increasing joint vocation of our Armed Forces and systematisation of the planning process with a design of a stepped set of annual objectives to be fulfilled.

Among the measures recorded in this Plan, one could emphasise a new reduction of units, with a decrease in the number of Brigades to 12, among which 4 were in the Mobilisable Reserve, with a low level of coverage, some of which were subsequently dissolved.

The Plan also led to the creation of the Training and Doctrine Command, with duties related to such important areas as Doctrine, Organics, Material, Teaching, Instruction and Training, Evaluation and Research.

The territorial structure was reduced again, going from 6 to 4 Military Regions. The Heads of the Military Regions also lost their operative powers, maintaining only their duties of a logistic, administrative and territorial nature.

Lastly, a functional structure was designed based on a set of co-ordinated systems that regulated the relations between the different bodies that performed commitments related to the same functional areas, regardless of their status within the organic structure.

\(^4\) See Addendum 1.
At that moment, we had a mixed troop model, with both conscript and professional soldiers, a model designed to make use of professional troop resources for the Armed Forces overall, ranging from 102,000 to 120,000. The Army would have about 84,000. In this situation, suspension of Compulsory Military Service was decreed, bringing the number down to just 48,000 soldiers, all of them professional.

In 2002, the Ministry of Defence ordered the definitive elimination of the territorial structure, with the exception of the non-mainland territories (the Canary and Balearic Isles, and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla). This meant the last Regional Commands disappeared, the administrative duties they carried out being taken over fundamentally by the new Inspectorate General of the Army.

In this ongoing process of reorganisation of the Army in order to adapt to the new challenges, the impact of NATO was especially noted in the preparation of the Instruction for Organisation and Operation of the Army (IOFET)\(^5\), at the end of the 90s, with its continual subsequent adaptation. The Army introduced new structures in its organisation such as the High Readiness Forces Headquarters (HQ HRF), as well as that of a national nature made available to NATO. In addition, a permanent assignment of Army personnel, either through the command structure, or through the structure of its forces, was contemplated.

In addition to this, regardless of the conception of the systemic Army considered in the IOFET that was one of the most original initiatives made by the Army, the introduction of organic elements belonging to the Army, both at national as well as allied level, was considered. In this context NATO was to be used when necessary once prior appropriate approval at governmental level was given, and this has given rise to total integration and symbiosis with the Atlantic Alliance, facilitating an approach to the community of interests and doctrine considered fundamental to attain greater allied cohesion.

Thus, the Spanish Army forms an essential instrument for that cohesion, considered of vital importance for the existence, credibility and operation of the Alliance.

Within the NATO Command Structure (NCS), which is a structure belonging to the organisation itself, with its own chain of command, on the Spanish mainland at Pozuelo (Madrid), the SubRegional Southwest Headquarters of NATO was set up, whose name and functions were quickly changed to NATO’s Land Component Command (LCC) HQ (Madrid). The Alliance’s continuous transformation has yet again changed its name to Force Command HQ Madrid. Its staff members exceed 450, of which a quarter are Spaniards, mainly from the Army, and the others from 15 allied countries.

The HQ of the Southern Land Component Commando of NATO was, until 2009, a land HQ that was intrinsically capable of projection and operation anywhere in the world. It was one of the Land Component Commands of the NATO Command Structure – the other, with the same size and design, is deployed in Heidelberg, Germany – with a capacity to command 3 Army Corps. It is under the permanent command of a Lieutenant General of the Spanish Army.

Its general mission is to constitute a Land Component Command of a Joint Principal Operation with a land component size of up to 3 Army Corps, as well as being able to

establish two deployable elements at the Operational Headquarters located in Brunssum, Naples and Lisbon.

As Force Command HQ Madrid, its function is to provide command and control capacity at the operational level, projectable in a Theatre of Operations. This is achieved via the two Deployable Joint Chief of Staff Elements (DJSE) that constitute it.

At the level of the NATO Force Structure (NFS), which is a structure whose elements belong to the nations integrating the HQs and the forces available to the command structure by means of specific agreements of command and control, the High Readiness Force HQ (HQ HRF), deployed in Bétera (Valencia), is a national organisation that will be made available to NATO according to the relevant agreements and memoranda. It is open to voluntary participation by the personnel of the Armed Forces of other States who are party to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The HQ HRF may be used as a command structure in specific or joint land operations with a purely national scope, or with the scope of collective Security and Defence organisations, without any further limitation than the provisions in that regard considered in the relevant agreements and memoranda.

It is a body at Army Corps level with capacity to lead multinational land operations and, when appropriate, the Land Component of a joint organisation within an allied context.

The HQ HRF, with the presence of allied personnel, and when available to the Atlantic Alliance, constitutes the Headquarters of the Rapid Deployment Corps of the Atlantic Alliance, with the official name, within it, of “Headquarters NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Spain” (HQ NRDC-SP) and while that situation remains, it will have International Headquarters status.

As HQ NRDC-SP, it must be able to operate through an ample spectrum of NATO missions, from low intensity, such as HQ of the Army Corps (AC) at the orders of a Land Component Command, designated by the Command Structure of the Alliance in an operation of one or several Army Corps, or as a Land Component Command of a Joint Combined Force in an operation up to AC, under the authority of the HQ of a previously designated Combined Joint Force or Joint Force.

It is a multinational HQ with an approximate staff size of 400, somewhat more than 320 of whom are Spaniards, the rest belonging to 9 allied nations. This HQ has the following “affiliates”: a Division HQ and 8 Spanish Brigades, 1 Portuguese Brigade and a Greek brigade. If one adds the “dedicated” Spanish units, the maximum contribution of forces to the HQ NRDC-SP may amount to somewhat more than 50,000 service staff.

On the other hand, also within the NATO Force Structure, the Army contributes somewhat less than a quarter (about 21%) of the staff of the Headquarters of the EUROCORPS (HQ NRDC-EC) deployed in Strasbourg, (France), along with France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. With a similar entity and design to the HQ NRDC-SP, the Army has about 180 service persons assigned to the HQ NRDC-EC, of all ranks.

In addition to the participation by the Army in the three Headquarters mentioned, one set within the NATO Command Structure and the other two in the NATO Force Structure, the Excellence Centre Counter IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) is being created in Spain,
near the Engineers’ Academy in Hoyo de Manzanares, the NATO name of which is C-IED (Counter Improvised Explosive Device).

Its mission consists of contributing to improving the security of the allied nations and the security of the soldiers deployed in the field, reducing or eliminating the threat of attacks using IEDs. It will lie within the Command Structure of the Alliance, in the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), deployed in Norfolk (United States). This contributes an important element to transformation of the Alliance.

It shall report directly to the Chief of Defence (CHOD) as it is a joint command, with the participation of other bodies pertaining to the General State Administration. It will be under the command of an Army Colonel. Of the 50 staff foreseen, both civil and military and both Spanish and from the Alliance, about fifteen will be from the Army. NATO accreditation is foreseen at the end of 2010 and it is expected to obtain its Final Operative Capacity (FOC) in 2010.

The total Spanish commitment of staff assigned to the different Headquarters and Bodies of the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure of the Alliance now amounts to a figure close to 800 members, half in Spain and the other half in the rest of Europe and the USA.

5. Transformation

The Army started a continual, profound transformation, which consists of adapting to the new strategic scenario.

The organic structure of the Force has been modified to deal with that scenario and studies have commenced to transform the Headquarters and Force Support.

The main criteria on which the present transformation process is based are as follows:

- Establishment of an organisation of the Force that facilitates partial or total assignment to the CHOD for execution of operations;

- Increasing the flexibility of generation of operative organisations and facilitating joint action;

- Increasing the availability of the units, with complete personnel and material, adapting the operational capacities that provide for the new international environment;

- Assuring rapid response to international commitments with compositions of forces that provide visibility and specific weight, that are interoperational with our allies; well prepared, cohesive and capable of easy integration in higher military or civil organisations; and of integration with new players of increasing relevance within the theatre of operations;

- Within the more ample framework of transformation of the Armed Forces, to undertake reform of Force Support, adapting an organisation that may be sustained by the

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national and European industrial and corporate fabric, maintaining indispensable services to guarantee security for the support.

The transformation process has supposed, up to the month of May 2008, a change in organic dependence of approximately 15,500 military staff and 650 civilians, the dissolution of the Headquarters of the Manoeuvre Force and the reorganisation of eight Headquarters at the General and Lieutenant General level. This is in order to achieve a specialization in their duties of preparation and generation of forces, and, on the other hand, in NRF HQ operation and deployment.

Simultaneously, the Troop Headquarters in the Canary Islands have been transformed into a Light Infantry Brigade, the Mountain Troops Brigade to the Mountain Troops Headquarters, and four commands have been reorganised at Brigade level, which are the Air-transported Forces, the Campaign Artillery, Anti-aerial and Engineers Commands.

With regard to the organisation and deployment of the Force, the implementation of Royal Decree 416/2006 and of Ministerial Order 3771/2008 continues, to subsequently undertake the terms relevant to the Force Support and the Headquarters, in order to achieve fully operational units for immediate deployment, adapted to the strategic scenario.

According to the consideration of the Army as a future key instrument in national strategy and the presence of Spain overseas, it must be able to effectively carry out all the missions entrusted from combat to humanitarian aid. That Army, based on capacities, establishes different types of forces: Armoured and Mechanised Forces, without alternatives in the forthcoming 20 years; Light Forces, which are fit for combat on foot; and Medium Forces to carry out swift, decisive action.

From the lessons learned in recent conflicts, medium capacity units need to be made available that may act in crises in their initial moments, thus avoiding deployment of a larger number of forces and stripping the adversary of initiative by controlling the crisis through the swift effect. This effect states that one must not only arrive earlier, with air transportation, but with sufficient combat power.

In the event of the crisis control not being effective, these units will constitute the force to provide protection on entry to the Theatre of Operations for other more resolutive units, to achieve the decisive effect. The Medium Forces are, in terms of combat power and protection, a bridge between the heavy and the light units.

Definition of these Forces is intimately linked to development of platforms and vehicles, which adequately harmonise reduction of weight and dimensions with the required combat power and protection.

The general catalogue of contributions by the Army to International Organisations and Multinational Forces has been affected by the evolution of International Organisations, which are immersed in their own restructuring, and by the development and consolidation of such concepts as the NATO Response Force (NRF)

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7 “Army Brochure”, Army Staff Cabinet, Madrid, Spain (October 2009).
or the Battle Group (BG) of the European Union (EU). The contribution by the Army, that is permanent in nature, to the different NATO structures, globally, is as follows:

5. Response to the NATO Forces Planning System

Within the NATO Forces Planning System and the framework established by its planning cycles, the Army maintains, as part of the general contribution of the Spanish Armed Forces, the commitment defined by the capacities made available to the Alliance as a response to the Forces Planning and the Defence Planning Questionnaires (DPQs).

This commitment is materialised through undertaking the derivatives of the NATO Force Goal and the relevant designation of capacities in those DPQs, within the relevant requisites of Readiness Categories (RC) required in each case.

The assignment of the relevant units to the commitments arising from the DPQs as a consequence of the response to crisis situations is subject to processes of Force Generation and is thus regulated according to the criteria established in the Army availability plans.

In this process, one must bear in mind that fulfilment of the objects assigned does not act solely in the benefit of the Alliance, with which Spain maintains a collective defence commitment, but it also constitutes a reference with regard to identification of needs and availability of capacity to fulfil the Ambition Levels established in our own National Planning System.

At present, practically all the capacities of the Armies (HQs and units) are assigned to NATO in different degrees of availability.

NATO’s defence planning process has been modified to incorporate the concepts of the Comprehensive Approach. Once again, changes in NATO procedures, changes in which the staff of the Spanish representations (PERMREP, MILREP, NMR) has participated, shall have an impact on national and Army procedures.

Offering the NRDC-SP to the Alliance arises from the response by Spain to the NATO Force Structure (NFS), materialised through the relevant Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and Technical Agreements (TA) in 2002.

Royal Decree 416/2006 and Ministerial Order 114/2006 establish that the High Readiness Force Headquarters (HQ HRF) of the Army will be the sole Command able to constitute the Headquarters at EC / Division level required by the operational structure.

According to the terms foreseen in Royal Decree 2015/2004, dated 11 October, by which the Army created the HQ HRF, and the General Instruction 02/07 of the Army Chief of Staff on the “Organic Concept of the HQ HRF”, the HQ HRF will include a “National Component of the Headquarters of the NRDC-SP” that, together with personnel of the allied nations, will constitute the Headquarters of the NRDC-SP.

The Technical Agreement (TA) for Command and Control establishes that, in peacetime, the NRDC-SP will be under the Operational Command (OPCOM) of SACEUR.
Thus, the HQ HRF, regardless of its national commitments, is permanently constituted as NRDC-SP and its organic structure is able to respond to the requirements foreseen in the agreements signed with NATO (MOU and TA) in relation to the NRDC-SP. The main part of that contribution is made with personnel assigned to the National Component of the Staff of the HQ NRDC-SP. Likewise, the Army will provide the NRDC-SP with Units, which are “Units that form part of the HQ”, “Dedicated Units” and “Affiliated Units”.

The contribution by the Army to the HQ NDC-GR (Forces of Low Readiness) in Greece started in 2005 through assignment of personnel to the Headquarters and affiliation of an Infantry Brigade.

The HQ LCC – Madrid is set within the NATO Command Structure (NCS) as a Land Component Command. The Army maintains a particular relation with HQ LCC-Madrid arising from its location in Spain, from participation by Army staff at the latter Headquarters, the command of which is assigned to an Army General, as well as the commitments and support arising from the role Spain has as a Host Nation (HNS). As there are no permanent commitments with regard to contribution of units to this HQ, the possible contributions arising from Force Generation processes will adapt to what is foreseen in the availability plans of the Army.

From 1999, through successive responses to the NATO Defence Plan Questionnaire (DPQ), Spain has assigned forces of the Army, dependent on the Anti-Air Artillery Command (CAAAA), to the Integrated Air Defence System of that organisation (NATINEADS).

Spain maintains its commitment to participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF). It contributes, within the scope of the Army, through leadership, in the different rotations established by NATO, of the Land Component Command (LCC) with adequate capacities, constituted as an NRDC-SP, and of the Special Operations Component Command (SOCC), as well as by contribution of capacity to the rotations led by other General Headquarters assigned within NATO’s scope. Moreover, the Army also contributes to the NATO Response Force within the framework of participation in the EUROCORPS when that Headquarters acts as a Land Component Command (LCC) of the NRF. Contributions to the NRF do not constitute permanent contributions, as they are subject to the NATO Force Generation processes and are thus regulated according to the criteria foreseen in the Army Availability Plan.

6. Operations

The complexity of the present world has broken down the traditional borders between war and peace. Nowadays, most conflicts are located in an ample grey area where extreme violence coexists with the daily life of the citizens. Thus, operations in which the Spanish Army participates take place in complex situations of crisis or conflict, with multiple State and non-state players who may condition or even determine their outcome.

This complex, fluid security environment gives rise to new trials and challenges faced by the Armed Forces and, thus, the Army. They will not only have to respond swiftly to crises of a very distinct nature and intensity that may arise anywhere on the planet, but also, once

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9 “Doctrina para la Acción Conjunta de las Fuerzas Armadas” (Doctrine for Joint Action by the Armed Forces), *Defence Chief of Staff. PDC-01* (May 2009).
there, must perform a great variety of duties, autonomously, or in collaboration with multinational forces – from humanitarian aid to combat actions – against highly diverse adversaries, in any kind of environment whatsoever.

Spanish participation in operations and missions abroad has already reached the 20-year mark. It was in 1989 when the phase we call exterior operations began. The Spanish Armed Forces have actively participated in missions abroad continuously since 1991.

It is significant to remember that overseas operations and missions were carried out once Spain joined NATO. There is no doubt that all the experience of the Alliance in such operations amounted to a true benefit to the Army, especially all the aspects related to operating procedures, along with force projection mechanisms.

Each one of the operations in which the Spanish Army has participated has had its own idiosyncrasy, which has amounted to essential baggage and experience, to deal with the reality demanded by the international situation. In that period, the Army has taken part in multiple operations, covering the whole spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian operations to peace enforcement operations, acting alone or as part of multinational structures such as NATO, the European Union or the United Nations.

In fact, Spanish participation in foreign operations, particularly within the NATO framework, has been the driving force for change and our coming of age internationally. It has allowed us to recover our glorious tradition as an expeditionary Army, as well as to work with our partners and allies with full efficiency and operativity.

That is to say, during this time, as already mentioned, ample experience has been acquired, based on the lessons learned. These lessons continually drive preparation of the present contingents. Up to the present day, an approximate figure of 86,000 soldiers have been deployed on the diverse missions in which the Spanish Army has participated.

The command and control system for operations is regulated by the organic structure under the Chief of Army Staffs Command, which generates and prepares the force, and the operating structure, under the CHOD’s command, that projects the force, performs the monitoring and, when appropriate, leads the operations.

The Spanish Army now deploys forces in three operations: Operation “Althea”, organised by the European Union in Bosnia Herzegovina; the NATO Operation “ISAF” in Afghanistan, and Operation UNIFIL, organised by the United Nations in the Lebanon. For the purposes of this work, I shall only provide data of the NATO operations.

The mission in Kosovo, up to last 19 September, was based on maintaining a military presence to provide security and stability, in order to re-establish normal conditions in the region, maintaining constant support for other international operations in the area, especially the civil mission of the EU (EULEX) and the United Nations mission (UNMIK).

Spain immediately responded to the call of its allies to contribute to what was then called Operation Joint Guardian, now called Joint Enterprise, according to the mandate of the United Nations Security Council included in Resolution 1244 (1999). Since the operation began, more than 22,000 Spanish soldiers have participated in it, supporting the return of about 800,000 refugees, performing 60,186 patrols, covering more than 4.6 million kilometres and carrying out 245 missions to deactivate explosives. They have also worked on co-
operation projects to improve the living conditions of the local population, namely in the distribution of 1,010 tonnes of humanitarian aid, more than 10,000 health assistance instances, and 120 rapid impact projects, such as road works, electrical power line repairs, water channels and school reforms. 

The general mission of the present operation, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in Afghanistan is that of aiding the Afghan Government to exercise its authority through support for stabilisation and reconstruction of the country. The reconstruction is based on three fundamental pillars, which are security, aid for development and support for governance.

Although the Spanish Army has participated in the ISAF operation since it started in 2005, during the expansion process, Spain decided to concentrate its efforts on the Western Sector, under the Western Regional Command (RC WEST).

Personnel is deployed in three places. Firstly, in Kabul, at the Headquarters of the ISAF, with the national intelligence cell and a communications centre. Secondly, in Herat, with a company of the Manoeuvres Battalion of the RC WEST, a helicopter unit, 2 liaison and advice teams and a UAV Unit, as well as a national support element (NSE) and personnel from the HQ of the Regional Command. Thirdly, in Qala and Now, with a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) with the mission of creating a stable, safe environment to facilitate development of the reconstruction projects by the international community. During 2010, all the Army’s capacities deployed in RC WEST will be concentrated in Qala and Now.

At present, December 2009, the total personnel the Army has deployed on the ISAF operation is about 1000 service persons.

7. NATO Response Force (NRF)

The concept of the NATO Response Force (NRF) was approved at the Prague Summit, held in 2002, it consists of a set of technologically advanced, flexible land, air and sea forces with sustainable deployment capacity, ready to be quickly deployed wherever necessary after a decision by the Atlantic Council.

The High Readiness Force Headquarters made available to the NATO Force Structure, as well as other Headquarters of the nations, undertake the command of the Land Component of the NATO Response Forces according to the rotating shift agreed.

The essential objective of the NRF consists of acting as “catalyst” in the transformation of the capacities of the Alliance. The Forces of the nations committed to the NRF must undertake the effort of improving their capacities to achieve specific operational levels, in terms of efficiency and interoperability. The NRF reached its full operational capacity in October 2006.

The Spanish Army has expended a great deal on the NRF and, in fact, its participation in the different rotations has been one of the highest among the allied countries, both within the scope of the HQ NRDC – SP as well as the HQ NRDC - EC.

11 “Army Brochure”, op. cit.
In 2005, Spain led the LCC of NRF 5. After the evaluation process during the second semester of 2005 the HQ NRDC SP was in the standby period, being part of NRF 5 ready to be deployed anywhere at any time.

The disastrous earthquake in Pakistan provoked the deployment of NRF 5 in a relief operation. The forward CP was deployed under the Command of the DCOS OPS Spanish Major General to lead the land forces. More than 1,000 soldiers from different nationalities made up the Land Component of the NRF 5. Spain provided the LCC HQ as well as 370 soldiers deployed from different Spanish Units. The relief operation concluded on 11 January 2006.

In NRF - 12, which was operational during the first semester of 2009, the joint land force was under the command of HQ NRDC – SP. It had a Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) of 9902 soldiers, with coverage of 5182 (52.3%), so the contribution by the Spanish Army was 3922 soldiers, representing 75.7% of that coverage. The rest, 1260 soldiers, were provided by other nations.

To these one must add 150 members of the Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) as well as the National Support Element LCC/JLSG of 593. The total participation of soldiers by the Army amounted to 4665.

8. Preparation of the Force

The operations by the Land Forces range from local security tasks in a relatively benign area to collective defence against a large-scale aggression. Although the highest probability for the Army is to lead Crisis Response Operations, from Peace Support Operations to combat operations by the Alliance, the Land Forces must be trained for the demands of high intensity combat operations.

The lessons learnt due to the experience acquired in over more than 20 years of operations abroad, especially those performed within the scope of the Alliance, from the point of view of generation and preparation of forces, are as follows:

- The start-up of the availability cycle, permitting sequential matching of preparation, deployment and recovery of the units;
- Design of a C2 structure to facilitate relations between Spanish territory and operations zones;
- Detailed planning of contingent preparation – organisation, training and mustering phase;
- Design of a C2 structure to facilitate relations between Spanish territory and the operations zones;
- Reconnaissance of the operations zones prior to deployment;
- Acclimatisation of the force once deployed and continued training activities;
- Ample knowledge of local customs and practices;
Finally, the actual challenges under preparation:

- Crowd control, even excluding the National Police Force and the Civil Guard;
- The English language, which is fundamental for our Forces to work in a multinational environment;
- Boosting protection of the Force against the present asymmetric threats.

In order to deal with generation of all the units required by the CHOD, both in multinational structures as well as in operations zones, as well as guaranteeing adequate preparation of those forces, the Army has implemented the Availability and Training Sequence Plan that establishes an operating cycle lasting 24 months.

Each Brigade type unit rotates in that cycle, so it has 11/13 months in which it is dedicated exclusively to its organic preparation, 6 months when it is in available phase, being the base unit of any structure that requires a high level of availability, and 4/6 months in which it will generate the necessary contingents for the Operations Zone. Finally, there are 1 or 2 months for recovery after assignment.

This allows the units to know their medium term commitments, thus adapting their training to the operational requisites and facilitating measures related to morale, living standards and family conciliation.

Preparation of the Army units has continued to improve, in order to make them more efficient in land combat, both conventional as well as asymmetric, more apt for joint action and interoperable with those of our partners and allies.

Likewise, the availability process of the Land Force units has been improved, substituting the previous one based on generation of light and heavy Brigades, by implementation of availability cycles for the different organic units that has also been synchronised with their schedule of projection for peace support missions and training cycles. This has brought about a considerable improvement in the preparation and cohesion of organic units.

With regard to the Instruction and Training, the preparation has been fundamentally directed at being able to fulfil any mission that might be assigned outside Spain, to having the capacity to lead joint and multinational structures, and being able to collaborate with the Civil Authorities and with the Spanish National Police Force and the Civil Guard (FCSE- Spanish acronym).

Additionally, in line with real missions and capacities, the greatest efforts in instruction and training have been aimed at: Units constituting the NATO Response Force (NRF), especially NRF-5, NRF-9 and NRF-10, as well as preparation of NRF-12; constituent Units of the EU Battle Group; high availability units; and the NRDC-HQ SP.
9. Interoperability

It is essential for the Alliance Forces to have the ability to operate together. There are significant differences among the Land Forces of the Alliance, particularly regarding skills, organisation and equipment. However, multinational operations require a high level of standardisation. It is considered vital for all the forces to have a common understanding of the principles of NATO land combat operations and thus be able to apply the same doctrine.

The present degree of interoperability that it is necessary to attain for adequate integration in a combined operational organisation is directly proportional to the complexity of the operation to be carried out. That, in principle, does not imply that warfare operations are more complex from the point of view that concerns us.

Multinational forums, principally those of NATO, are considered to be the essential framework in establishing the bases for interoperability, although within these it is necessary to detail and perform in-depth analysis of the existing arrangements, which are usually minimum agreements, so that within a smaller environment of two or more nations, a solution to problems that it is difficult to overcome when dealing with all the allies at the same time may be found.

In the Spanish Army, the search for those standardisation details to achieve greater interoperability and integration of the units constitutes a constant orientation in all areas, although it is certain that, at present, doctrine, material and training are considered essential.

10. Reflections on the Army´s Future in the 21st Century

Joining NATO has undoubtedly led to the Army to its coming of age, both in European and International terms. The experience acquired since it joined the Alliance in the early 1980s has been extremely important.

The results of this experience and the lessons learned in the different operations have mainly been embodied in the fields of doctrine, force planning, operational planning, capacity planning, exchange of know-how, force generation, logistics, intelligence, along with development of leadership as an essential tool and the quality of the Army’s action.

Within such a context, lessons learnt in the different operations in which the Army has participated in the last two decades will have a decisive influence, both on the organic and operational structure as well as on command, planning, motivation and control of the Army in years to come. I shall present those that may provide some reflections concerning the evolution of the Army in the first quarter of the 21st Century, in two clearly distinct parts.

The first, mentions the features and characteristics, in the field of operations, capacity and personnel, on which the evolution of the Army in the coming years is to be based.

The second, is the close symbiosis, arising from the first, related to the main qualities and responsibilities of the members of the Army as significant members of Spanish society, which they serve.

Within the first part, in the operations environment, it is necessary to emphasise that the importance of the Army depends on its utility for the interests of Spaniards at large and, according to the Government’s directives, its most probable short and medium term use. Its consolidated place within the joint multinational scope and its consecrated vocation to projection are undeniable. More than 90% of the Army’s human resources are assigned to expeditionary units.

The preparation and fitness to undertake greater leadership in multinational operations, when the Government considers this as convenient, along with its willingness to undertake sacrifices and risks therein, must also be mentioned. Additionally, it is also important to emphasise the significant weight of land operations on the foreseeable scenarios the Spanish Army shall face, the full awareness of co-operation with agencies in operations, as well as the fact that all the Army’s units are affiliated or dedicated to international operations.

On the other hand, one must not forget the need to have sufficient personnel in the land units operations zones to maintain contact with the civil population. Battalions in the field, the “boots on the ground” concept. Crisis and peace restoring operations are eminently terrestrial and inter-agency.

Within the scope of capacities, the Army aims to attain an adequate size for joint capacities. It defines the Brigade as a “combat system”, aiming at ensuring that the Army’s effectiveness and efficiency be based both on the Force as well as on Force Support and prioritising protection of our soldiers in its acquisitions, setting basic needs to zero and new capacities, i.e. realistic, solid, forward-looking objectives.

With regard to the personnel field, “international affairs” constitute a general vocation for the Army. More specifically, the Army is in the world. Physical preparation and languages are society references and although technology is useful to the Army, the capacity of its men and women is even more so.

The Army is immersed in a process of permanent dynamic transformation that allows it to fulfil the missions assigned. Updating in preparation and organisation, new acquisitions and international participation by our units are aspects forming the major challenges to be faced.

The nature of the operations and the need to guarantee the best security conditions require adequate assignment of effective modern material. The Leopard tank and the Tiger combat helicopter, along with other acquisition programmes, such as the 155/52 mm. howitzer, the Spike medium range missile, or the Wheeled Armoured Vehicle (WAV) 8x8, provide a substantial increase in our capacities. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and the Multi-purpose Light Vehicles (LMV) Lynx and RG-31, in addition to contributing to that modernisation process, will increase protection of our soldiers.

It is now convenient to emphasise, on completing 20 years of Spanish participation in international missions, that the availability of our units to be used in all kinds of missions, along with the capacity to integrate in multinational general headquarters, have made Spain play an important role in the international framework.
The Army encourages the overall vocation and integration of operations with players who are not purely military, maintaining a level of participation in keeping with the specific weight assigned to our organisation due to the volume and missions concerned\textsuperscript{13}.

Complementing what has been stated up to this point, regarding a new, modern leadership oriented to mission, in keeping with the requirements of the new times, the qualities, responsibilities and action by the members of the Army will most probably be set within this Decalogue:

1. Being: Integrity, values, principles, virtues and ethical code;
2. Knowing: Profound knowledge and training;
3. Behaving: Exemplary behaviour;
4. Communication skills: Good communicator and transmitter, correct interpretation of political will;
5. Inspiration: Capacity to act in the face of the unexpected, adaptation, change, transformation;
6. Responsibility: To society, to the people, to the State and institutions. Capacity to manage social pressure;
7. Knowing how to live with change: Innovative, creative, seeing beyond the horizon. Controlling and creating the future, mastering transformation;
8. Integration of national and international interests. Action of the State as an actor in the international community;
9. New threats: Global vision of the geostrategic, multidisciplinary, multinational context. Profound integral training;
10. Legitimacy as an essence and foundation for military values: total support and backing by society, through honour, values, principles and virtues;
11. Leadership: Example, charisma, in-depth preparation. Leadership of forces and appropriate, efficient decision-making. Being flexible and versatile;
12. Integrating national interests with honour and fear in the human dimension of warfare, to annihilate the adversary’s willpower.

To sum up, in the coming years, the Army, taking into account that its transformation is fully bound to that of the Alliance, which guarantees it a pragmatic, balanced evolution and great experience acquired in diverse scenarios, will be effectively prepared to respond, in an efficient, credible manner, to the most modern and demanding requisites, both of our allies as well as those of the international arena.

\textsuperscript{13} “Army Brochure”, \textit{op. cit.}
11. Prospects on NATO’s Future

NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in early April 2009 has entrusted the Secretary General with the development of a new Strategic Concept, so now it seems appropriate to make a prospective approach – after listing the main threats and risks – to attempt to list and define the main parameters or indicators that will mark the future of the Alliance in the first quarter of the 21st Century.

Today, our nations and the world are facing new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their supply and cyber attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability, emanating from fragile and failed States, may also have a negative impact on the Alliance and international security.

I consider that some of the most important current challenges that will characterise NATO in the coming years, and that it will be necessary to establish or define in the new Strategic Concept, are the following: re-definition of the purpose and role of NATO; affirmation of its global orientation and regional focus; closer co-operation with the European Union; a new impulse for relations with Russia; reaffirmation and detailing its nuclear policy and strategy; intensification of its relations with international organisations; maintenance of the enlargement, reorganisation and increase of Partnership; taking China and India into account; and reforms of its structures.

Two peculiar and important challenges that will have an important impact on the Army’s employment and evolution, are the following:

Reform NATO’s structures. Allied capacities need to be flexible and deployable so that the Alliance may respond rapid and efficiently, wherever necessary, when there is a new crisis. Its structures must also be reformed in order for these to be made more simple and, at the same time, more effective.

New tasks for NATO. The following security issues and challenges appear to be particularly worth profound debate: proliferation, biological attacks, terrorism, organized crime, maritime security including piracy, the security implications of climate change as well as food, water and resources scarcity, and cyber security.

The implications deriving from the current and future challenges mentioned which NATO will have to face will be reflected in the Army’s new role to be characterised, among others, by the features that follow.

A more flexible disposition of land forces and with greater deployment, projection and sustainability capacities are required, in order to be able to face with greater rigour expeditionary operations, without overlooking that these forces will also be useful in the defence of allied territory.

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16 Idem.
It will be necessary to encourage efforts in new capacities in fields such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, strategic and tactical transport and multinational logistics.

A greater readiness is required in order for Alliance commitments to be materialised with the greatest rigour possible. Within the Alliance, interoperability will be a permanent goal.

The preparation and adaptation of the Units are required in order to respond with greater effectiveness to the new missions related to proliferation, biological attacks, terrorism, organised crime, energy security, cyber attacks, climate change and water or food shortages.

To continue participating, with a high presence, in rotations of the NATO Response Force (NRF) is desirable, as the best way to increase the Army’s levels of effectiveness and operational capacity, as well as being an important element in the Alliance’s transformation process.

With the horizon of 2025 in view, joint action and the comprehensive approach to conflicts will continue to be permanent reference points for the allies, understanding such an approach to be the convergence of military efforts with others of the same State or of those of non-governmental actors.

Another permanent reference point in the Alliance’s context is professionalism, based on solid training and a continuous updating thereof, materialised in the precise execution of the missions entrusted and in the effort towards excellence.

Likewise, also within the Alliance, a permanent reference point will be the need for evolution in a continuous and dynamic fashion in line with the speed of technological progress that will require designing and implementing new military capabilities, induced by the unceasing adaptation to the changes in the strategic scenario and to technological advances.

Lastly, another permanent reference is effectiveness as a whole and this can be attained by the continuous exercise of individual responsibility, respect for each professional’s sphere of decision, permanent availability - both individually and collectively - and the usual practice of the assigned commitments.

The constant improvement, fruit of experience, innovation and the capacity for adaptation, takes shape in the redesign of the organisational processes identified in order to attain significant advances in costs, effectiveness, speed and the quality of the service we render to society.

12. Conclusions

Following what has been explained above, with regard to the impact of NATO on the Spanish Army - on the basis of the reasons indicated at the beginning - , and to sum up, I consider that the most important aspects to emphasise are those listed below:
- The crucial influence, both direct as well as indirect, that NATO has had on the Army in all its fields of activity needs to be recognised, especially in the fields of personnel, organisation, training and operations.

- The important change in mentality that the Army has undergone as a consequence of entering the Alliance has fundamentally been in the field of operational structures, force projection, knowledge of languages, leadership, joint and combined spirit and multinationality.

- NATO provides the most important reference for development of the Army, providing the normal framework for action, and it is integrated in the doctrine, planning, interoperability, preparation and evaluation of its forces.

- The Army, in line with the present trends in employment, organisation and planning forces, is perfectly embedded in and participates fully in development and application of the concept of Comprehensive Approach as designed by the Atlantic Alliance.

- The greatest benefit has been the experience achieved in the operations. For the Army, this experience has been the driving force for change throughout its whole structure. In fact, this field is where it has learned most.

- As it has all its units affiliated/assigned to NATO and as it is one of the most outstanding participants in the NRF rotations, a true “catalyst” of the NATO transformation, the Army has achieved an excellent level of integration in the Alliance.

- Regardless of Spanish NATO membership, due to our geo-strategic position, in terms of the present and foreseeable security and defence environment, as well as in terms of our national security interests, the Army has adequate capacity for an independent response.

Looking ahead to the near future, among the most important implications for the Army that derive from our membership of NATO, together with the indicators of its evolution in the first quarter of the 21st Century, the following may be pointed out:

- In relation to its evolution, the Army is immersed in the transformation of NATO, participating in depth in its initiatives and activities, providing and receiving suggestions and proposals in order to be as efficient and effective as possible.

- Along with the Army’s aim to achieve greater protagonism in international operations, there is also its capacity to contribute its experience, knowledge, doctrine and theory in the field of military leadership, by exchange of information and proposals, within the European and allied environment.

- The Army must improve its skills to deal with the threats and challenges to security that have a direct impact on the territory of the Alliance, and that may appear at a strategic distance or nearer to allied territory.

- Some of the permanent references for the Army, with the 2025 horizon in sight, include: professionalism, joint action, a Comprehensive Approach to conflicts, a continuous and dynamic need to evolve, constant improvement and an intelligent dissemination of the Institution’s values.
Additionally, the most important and, indeed, key aspects for the Army in forthcoming years include: the human factor (of the combat soldier), the command structure, organisation, armament, material and equipment. The Army needs to persevere in all of these, as well as to identify the improvements necessary to act appropriately in widely differing conflicts.

Definitively, the Army in the first quarter of the 21st century is a tool of the State, one that is modern, agile, flexible, perfectly represented in NATO and the international environment, which is prepared in its mentality, and in staff and material terms, to respond with the greatest solidity, credibility and efficiency to safeguard and defend Spanish interests.

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ADDENDUM I

PRINCIPLES
“NEW COMMAND STYLE”

1.- RESPECT FOR PERSONAL DIGNITY
   Acting at all times with deep nobility and consideration for others.
2.- LEADERSHIP
   Development of cohesion and co-operation with subordinates for the prestige acquired through the example and preparation.
3.- TEAM SPIRIT
   Development of group cohesion to co-operate in convergence of efforts by the Army.
4.- RESPONSIBILITY & DELEGATION
   Exercising the responsibility the office involves and allowing subordinates the level of decision to which they are entitled.
5.- DISCIPLINE
   Implementing and demanding discipline with full conviction that it is a value that is equally binding for all.
6.- INITIATIVE & CREATIVITY
   Acting with anticipation and ingenuity, and encouraging this among subordinates.
7.- AWARENESS OF COMMUNICATION
   Maintaining true, appropriate communication in all areas, in keeping with security.
8.- PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE
   Performing professional duties at the highest level through solid training and spirit of service.
9.- ABILITY TO ADAPT
   Development of the ability to integrate and act on different missions and scenarios.
10.- PERMANENT EVOLUTION
    Maintaining an open attitude to drive the continual changes that affect the Army.

General FAURA, Madrid, 10 October 1997