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ENGAGEMENT OR COMPELLANCE. U.S. POLICY CHOICES IN THE NORTH KOREA CRISIS

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1.Introduction

The behaviour of the Bush Administration on North Korea has been quite moderate up to now. From the current declaratory policy of “zero tolerance” on terror and WMD, it could be thought that its policy would have been different. The 2002 National Security Strategy Document (NSSD), previous declarations and statements from President Bush and his aids, (“Axis of Evil”) and strategies developing aspects of the NSSD (for instance, National Strategy for Combat WMD) indicate an active and aggressive stand on this issue. However, there are some factors that probably inhibited Bush Administration from taking firmer positions up to now.

- US diplomacy has been giving its full attention to the Iraqi crisis.
- The Korean Peninsula scenario is quite different from the Middle East.
- DPRK’s WMD capacity related to South Korea called for a careful handling of diplomacy;
- DPRK’s posture on bargaining vis-à-vis United States, leaves out China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the postures of all these powers;

¹ Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI



- In a military crisis scenario, the rapid deployment of US reinforcement forces in the field would be difficult should the crisis break out during military operations in and the occupation of Iraq.

This article focuses on available strategies and the paths of possible action for the Bush Administration on the North Korea issue and their possible consequences. At the same time, it is intended to find out why the approaches chosen by the US Administration regarding Iraq and North Korea are different. The Bush Administration has a wide range of approaches to tackle the North Korea issue:

1. A pre-1994 Comprehensive Containment Policy maintained by the Bush I and Clinton Administrations.
2. A Limited Engagement Policy within the Containment Policy established by the Clinton Administration through the 1994 Agreed Framework.
3. A Comprehensive Engagement Policy, addressing DPRK's security necessities and a long-term plan for a peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
4. A Coercive Diplomacy strategy or Blackmail posture using isolation, economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure and a deterrence posture, including forces deployment and higher alert postures, in order to stop and/or oblige to abandon DPRK its nuclear program.
5. Military action. With reference to the previous point, due to the Pyongyang regime idiosyncrasy, those measures could trigger an immediate military response: they could be seen by Pyongyang as a first step for a pre-emptive attack. The Military action could be an operation in accordance with the 1994 Pentagon plans, a conventional counterforce attack and/or a limited nuclear strike. This could include the invasion of North Korea or the response to a conventional attack and invasion of South Korea by DPRK forces. This is the response to the provisions established in OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War for the US-ROK Combined Forces Command.

2. Framework Analysis

The analysis of both cases this article will use are the concepts of Compellance, Blackmail and Coercive Diplomacy. In this sense, Coercive Diplomacy and Blackmail are branches of Compellance:

- Compellance is defined as: *behaviour established to compel an adversary to carry out an action that do not want or stop doing something*². It implies coercive diplomacy, blackmail and, sometimes, even deterrence.,
- Coercive Diplomacy is defined as: *“efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action”*.
- Blackmail can be considered as an offensive use of coercive threats: an *effort to persuade an opponent to do something*³.

² Schelling, T. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard. Cambridge. (2nd Edition). 1980. p. 195.

³ George, A. and Simons, W. (ed) *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. Westview, Boulder, 1994. p. 7-8. Others authors use a different classification but here, I will use George's framework. See, for instance, Jakobsen, P. *Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*. Palgrave, MacMillan. NY. 1997. He starts from a concept of Strategic Coercion where Deterrence and Compellance are the main branches, and Blackmail and Coercive Diplomacy are sub-branches of Compellance. I will not enter i his debate on George's established



Concepts and strategies such as Deterrence, Reassurance and other non-military strategies will also be considered. After that, we will see what military approaches can be used in the process should a military crisis break out.

- Deterrence is *a strategy that threatens punishment or denial to prevent an adversary from taking unwanted action*;
- Reassurance seeks *to reduce the incentives adversaries have to use force by reducing fear and insecurity, often responsible for escalation to war*⁴;

References to Robert Jervis' and Charles Glaser's concepts on the Security Dilemma, will would be also useful as a useful tool to explain process and postures⁵.

This article will review the policies carried out in the two cases since the Bush Administration took office in 2001 and when they were inserted in the US Foreign Policy general framework. Secondly, we will explain why the Bush Administration has chosen different approaches for each case, above all, after 9/11. Then, I will stress why the Bush Administration has chosen a policy of coercive diplomacy in the North Korea case up to now. Finally, in spite of the election of this latter approach, we will evaluate if this path can be considered erroneous and if certain steps should be taken, even though at first they could seem correct on a crisis prevention approach. In this event, the development of events could result in a military crisis and war. If the Bush Administration adopts a concrete path of action on the Korean issue, not taking in account the perceptions, approaches and policies of the Pyongyang regime, even though this path response to a preventive approach, US policy could be condemned to carry out a pre-emptive military action, in the face of a North Korean invasion of South Korea, or even worse, in response to a nuclear first strike.

3. Bush Administration Security Policy

From the point of view of the Bush Administration National Security declaratory policy⁶, a set of conceptual approaches can be distinguished that are changing the core assumptions on US

differences between offensive and defensive point of views in Coercive Diplomacy. My aim is not to discuss in theory but give a policy analysis, alternatives and possible results. For this purpose, this article will consider "more offensive" Blackmail than Coercive Diplomacy.

⁴ See Morgan, P. *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*. Sage. 1977; Jervis, R. "Deterrence Theory Revised". *World Politics*. April 1979; George, A. and Simons, W. (ed) *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. Westview . Boulder. 1994.

⁵ Jervis, Robert .."Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, No. 2 (January 1978). The security dilemma arises as states take measures that other states perceive as being detrimental to theirs. See also Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," in *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997). Glaser posits two new variables—the presence of greedy states, and each state's perception of other states' motives, that affect impact the severity of the security dilemma. The importance of uncertainty lies on in knowing the size and nature of its security requirements.

⁶ The President's State of the Union Address. The United States Capitol. Washington D.C. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. January 29, 2002; President George W. Bush. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The White House. September 2002. Washington D.C; Condoleezza Rice discusses President's National Security Strategy. Wriston Lectures, Manhattan Institute. New York. Office of Press Secretary. The White House. October 1, 2002; President Bush. Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Academy. West Point, New York. June 1, 2002. Office of the Press Secretary. The White House. Washington D.C; National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. December 2002. The White House. Washington D.C; President Announces Progress in Missile Defense Capabilities. Office of Press Secretary. The White House. December 17, 2002; Missile Defense Operations Announcement. DOD News Release. Department of Defense. December 17, 2002; Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Department of



Foreign and Security Policy used during Cold War. This creates a new framework from which any analysis has to be done.

The National Security Strategy, NSSD, issued in 2002, is the evolution in the development of a truly new US Grand Strategy since the Cold War. The NSSD establishes new parameters but maintains certain characteristics from the Bush I and Clinton Administration approaches. In fact, these characteristics were already included in the Containment Policy, although conditioned by the Soviet threat and the global struggle between both superpowers⁷. The Containment Strategy and the Bush and Clinton projects established a posture of Primacy and Selective Primacy respectively⁸, which included the characteristics of Primacy posture:

- An international order favourable to US interests and values. This means international institutions, rule of law, democracy and free markets. The US would be the center of this system.
- To prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under its consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. This means technological and military superiority.

All of these are principles to be maintained after the Cold War. The Containment Grand Strategy also included the coordinated use of every political, economical, military and moral national resource to face the threat posed by the USSR. After the Soviet Union's collapse, the Primacy Strategy used uncertainty on risks and threats to US National Security, instead of the Soviet threat. It maintained the rest of characteristics. Following the 9/11 events, the Bush Administration substituted uncertainty by war on terror and mobilization of all the resources available to fight this threat, creating a truly new Grand Strategy.

As the first President Bush announced the creation of a New World Order in 1990⁹, drawing up a democratic and stable international system anchored on American values under a peaceful UN security structure, a set of principles were issued to structure a US strategic vision for the Post-Cold War world: a Collective Engagement approach and a Democratic Peace (this means the enlargement of the number of democratic nations)¹⁰. This approach was also followed and improved by the Clinton Administration as the core of its foreign policy:

Defense. September 30, 2001; NPR 2001. Special Briefing on Nuclear Posture Review. DoD News Transcripts. January 9, 2002. Richard Hass, Director of the Policy Planning Staff. "Defining US Foreign Policy in a Post-post-Cold War World". Remarks to the Foreign Policy Association, NY. April 22, 2002. US Department of State. President Bush. State of the Union Address. Office of Press Secretary. The White House. January 28, 2003. Richard N. Hass. From Reluctant to Resolute: American Foreign Policy after September 11. Remarks to the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs. June 26, 2002. Department of State. Washington D.C.

⁷ See García Cantalapiedra, David. *Una Estrategia de Primacia: la Administración Bush, las relaciones transatlánticas y la construcción de un Nuevo Orden Mundial 1989-1992*. UNISCI Papers nº 23-24. Madrid, 2002. For a wider review see García Cantalapiedra, David. *EEUU y la construcción de un Nuevo Orden Mundial: la Administración Bush, las relaciones transatlánticas y la seguridad europea 1989-92*. PhD dissertation. Department of International Studies. Faculty of Political Science. UCM. Madrid, 2001. p. 148-169

⁸ Ibidem, p. 11-12.

⁹ President George Bush. Public Papers. Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen Colorado. August 2, 1990. pág. 1190-1194; Toward a New World Order. Address by President Bush before a Joint Session of the Congress. September 11, 1990. US Department of State Current policy nº 1298

¹⁰ The concept of Enlargement and Democratic Peace responds to the Kant's concept of "permanent federation in a permanent enlargement".



"...ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and build a durable peace is support the advance of democracy elsewhere"¹¹. This was to be the theoretical framework for developing its Engagement and Enlargement Strategy¹²: "the successor of a doctrine of Containment must be a strategy of Enlargement, Enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies"¹³. This approach received harsh criticism due to the use of realism and liberalism alike: an old internationalist approach with bits of Nixon-Kissinger's geopolitical mechanisms using a Wilsonian rhetoric.

However, the neo-conservative influence on the Bush Administration pushed forward an ideological aspect in the new Grand Strategy beyond the Wilsonian concepts. In fact, this envisages a posture *à la Reagan*. The neo-conservatives from the Congress were pushing during the Clinton Administration for a hard-headed foreign policy. There are several examples: the 1995 "*Contract with America*"; articles in the *Foreign Affairs* journal like "*Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy*", or the creation of *Project for the New American Century* in 1997. From this last initiative a plan on US Defense policy was created, based on neo-conservative principles, and was supported by people like Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Peter Rodman, Jeb Bush, Dan Quayle, Fred C. Ikle, Francis Fukuyama, Zalmay Khalilzad, Eliot Cohen o Aaron Friedberg. A current example of the position making the case for this approach is Robert Kagan's, *Power and Weakness*¹⁴. Thus, the three pillars that support the NSSD were established by President Bush in his West Point address¹⁵. They are directly related to the three principles that conform the US Grand Strategy:

- To "defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants": War on terror, the first principle of the Grand Strategy.
- To "preserve the peace": through preventing any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.
- To "extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent": an international order according to US values.

According to these premises, this strategy establishes a strategy or approach to rollback terror (WMD, terrorist and tyrants), re-creating the Reagan approach of ***Peace through Strength***, restoring ***the militarization of US Foreign Policy***. This approach assumes the geo-strategic strategies of the Nixon-Kissinger era, the expansive conceptions of the Kennedy-Johnson era and the rhetoric of Wilsonianism (a rhetorical speech about Evil, Evil Empire, Axis of Evil) as an ideological aspect; a renovation of the Reagan Doctrine through the Bush Doctrine on rogue organizations, networks and states, and a reassessment of SDI throughout

¹¹President Clinton's State of Nation Message. New York Times. January 26, 1994. pág. A17. Also Owen, John. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace". *International Security*, vol 19, n° 2. Fall 1994. pág. 87-125

¹² President William Clinton. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House, July 1994. GPO, Washington D.C. 1994

¹³Anthony Lake. From Containment to Enlargement. US Department of State, vol.4, n° 39. September 27, 1993.

¹⁴ Kristol, W. and Kagan, Robert. "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy". *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1996. "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century," September 2000. A Report of the Project for the New American Century; Project for the New American Century. Statement of Principles. June 3, 1997. Robert Kagan and William Kristol. *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*. Encounter Books. San Francisco, 2000. Kagan, R. "Power and Weakness". *Policy Review*, n° 113. June-July 2002.

¹⁵ President Bush. Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Academy. West Point, New York. June 1, 2002. Office of the Press Secretary. The White House. Washington D.C.



MD. It is also important to assume the language of the NSSD. Since Reagan, a state of war has not been assumed in the NSSDs, when the objectives of defending and expanding peace were stated. In the NSSD of Clinton, a clear situation of peace, using enlargement and engagement to reinforce this situation can be found¹⁶. Moreover, the 2002 NSSD introduces a set of concepts that, although they do not appear clearly in the document, can be envisaged as core assumptions in the conduct of US Foreign Policy and Strategy.

To begin with, Deterrence and Containment, which have been the bedrock of US Strategic Policy since 1947, have been substituted by Compellence and Defense. The concept of Defense, related to Strategic Defense began to be reinforced after President Reagan unveiled the project of a Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. And strategically, Containment was not an adequate response to the problems in the security and defense environment after the Cold War¹⁷. Deterrence strategies were to be substituted by coercion strategies. This does not mean that Deterrence and Containment disappeared from strategic policy but that they would not be the center of the security realm anymore. But the concept of Reassurance is almost inexistent in the 2002 NSSD. There are only three lines in the NSSD about the concept of Reassurance after explaining pre-emptive action options¹⁸. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice explains and qualifies this action: *“this approach must be treated with great caution. The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light-to the United States or any other nation to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. Pre-emptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action”*¹⁹.

Rice also talked about Deterrence and Containment and she does not completely rule out both concepts because she still considers them useful in certain situations, but establishes that they are not the center of National Security Strategy: *“the National Security Strategy does not overturn five decades of doctrine and jettison either containment or deterrence. These strategic concepts can and will continue to be employed where appropriate. But threats are so potentially catastrophic...that they cannot be contained”*. Thus, she justified pre-emptive actions before a threat materializes or an attack: *“Extremists....are unlikely to ever be deterred. And new technology requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes imminent”*.

In this analysis it is essential to address the Bush Doctrine. The so-called Bush Doctrine is the evolution of the Reagan Doctrine in a Post-Post-Cold War context. This renovation links rogue organizations, networks and states, terrorism and WMD. All of them are valid objectives of the doctrine, which will be used to cover different policies and adequate strategies for every situation: for instance, a limited military operation in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda (terrorist network) and the Taliban (rogue regime and terrorist supporter); law

¹⁶ See President William Clinton. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House, July 1994. GPO, Washington D.C. 1994; "The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of Enlargement, Enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies". NSA Anthony Lake. From Containment to Enlargement. US Department of State, vol.4, nº 39. September 27, 1993.

¹⁷ For a review on the evolution of US strategic posture see García Cantalapiedra. *Una Estrategia de Primacía*. pág. 77. For a wider discussion see García Cantalapiedra. op.cit. note 6.

¹⁸ President George W. Bush. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The White House. September 2002. Washington D.C. pág. 15.

¹⁹ Condoleezza Rice discusses President's National Security Strategy. Wriston Lectures, Manhattan Institute. New York. Office of Press Secretary. The White House. October 1, 2002.



enforcement action in America and Europe against terrorist networks; international intelligence cooperation and sharing; military advisors in Philippines; WMD disarmament by regime change in Iraq through a military operation. But we will see later that, paradoxically, this Neo-Reaganite Doctrine received a major impulse during the first Clinton Administration with the creation of the “rogue states” doctrine in 1994.

President Bush established in West Point: *“We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorist and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent”*²⁰. Then, after the 9/11 events, the Bush Administration created the Bush Doctrine. The United States started the creation of a pre-emptive action policy against **NASTI: NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention**. *“If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will wait too long....Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action”*. The 2002 NSSD explains that US strategic thinking has reached the conclusion that it is impossible to deter or stop these threats in Western democratic societies: *“With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone a profound transformation”*. For the Bush Administration, deterrence and containment are not available strategies for this situation: *“we cannot let our enemies strike first....to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively”*²¹. A set of documents developing the NSSD as the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction or the National Strategy for Combat Terrorism has completed the process²².

4.US Policies on Iraq and North Korea. Different approaches?

Departing from the Clinton Administration policies, the Bush Administration has changed US policy in both cases:

- US Iraq Policy has changed from containment to regime change (rollback) through Compellance and Blackmail;
- In North Korea, from containment, limited engagement to coercive diplomacy (for the time being).

Both approaches had been created or, at least, projected, before 9/11. This event only advanced and speeded up a harder, clearer US position, above all, in the Iraqi case. The Dual Containment policy created during the Clinton Administration, based on the expression, “keep Saddam in his box”, with different approaches during his two tenures (Comprehensive Containment, Dual Containment, Limited Containment, Containment plus), was the basic US policy on Iraq up to 1998. But after the 1998 bombing, Republicans and Democrats prompted a posture of regime change, not progressively as it was thought with a Comprehensive Containment policy (destruction of the regime for its own contradictions, economic sanctions, military coup) as was first established by the Bush I Administration, but through coercive and even military actions (rollback).

²⁰ President Bush. Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Academy. West Point, New York. June 1, 2002. Office of the Press Secretary. The White House. Washington D.C.

²¹ NSSD 2002. chapter V. See p. 13-15.

²² National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. December 2002. The White House. Washington D.C. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. February 2003. The White House. Washington D.C.



Clearly, the most apparent difference between the approaches the United States has used toward Iraq and North Korea is an offensive-defensive stand: in the case of Iraq, the Bush Administration has been always offensive, with a compelling and coercive approach. Despite the positions before the UN Security Council on disarmament, the Bush Administration policy on Iraq, even at the 2000 presidential election and before, has always had an implicit regime change as the final objective. However, on the other hand, the behaviour toward North Korea has been more defensive, in the realm of coercive diplomacy, but neither with Iraq nor with North Korea, has Reassurance been used properly or at all.

4.1. Iraq: Compellance and Blackmail

Iraq has been one of the US Foreign Policy main objectives for decades and now it is one of the main fronts of the Bush Administration. This was the approach followed during the Presidential Campaign and also by the Neo-conservatives, prior to the War on Terror²³. It is not surprising, then, the policy to rollback Saddam Hussein's regime, creating a regime more friendly to the United States. Paradoxically, such an important issue is named only once (page14) in the 2002 NSSD, only related to WMD. However, the NSSD put Rogue states and terrorism at the same level.

The First Bush Administration did not established a clear posture about Rogue States in the early 1990s, even using only the term "outlaw" states. The term rogue only came after the Kuwait invasion by Iraq. In fact, the posture of the Bush I and Clinton Administrations was containment and "wait and see", hoping that the regime's own contradictions and sanctions would breakdown its resistance. In this sense, the objective always was to knock down Saddam, but not directly. This position was considered the most suitable because, in the short term, the United States did not want a power vacuum, allowing other powers like Syria or Iran to become the main powers in the area. Besides, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process took off through Madrid Conference and Oslo pacts, putting peace within reach. Any policy had to avoid disturbing the process. Yet, there have been remarkable changes in US policy since 1997. For the first time, the Clinton Administration launched, in March 1997, the possibility of using a rollback strategy in Iraq²⁴. The Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explicitly sought the removal of Sadam from power, although President Clinton articulated, in February 1998, a retreat to the limited containment posture of "Keep Saddam in his box".

Since the end of the Gulf War, the main approach on Iraq has been Containment. The Clinton Administration policy was essentially a continuation of the comprehensive containment policy that the Bush Administration had pursued toward Iran and Iraq after 1991. This was a policy of "Dual Containment. The enunciation of this posture came in a major address by Martin Indyk, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the NSC. Indyk, however, noted a significant difference of US objectives between the two cases: in the case of Iran, United States focused on the Iran foreign policy as supporter of terrorist groups or its efforts to acquire WMD. In the case of Iraq, the purpose was "to establish clearly and unequivocally that the current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime". The speech did not explicitly state that the US objective was regime change; but it repeated an earlier formulation

²³ Rice, Condoleezza. "Promoting the National Interest". *Foreign Affairs*. Vol 79, n 1. January/February 2000.

²⁴ Secretary of State Madeleine Albright." Preserving Principle and Safeguarding Stability". Remarks at Georgetown University. March 26, 1997.



that Washington sought full Iraqi compliance with US Security Council resolutions, on the assumption that Saddam could not meet those requirements while remaining in power. This constituted *an implicit policy of rollback*²⁵.

This policy received a clear and important support from the National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, in spring 1994. *Foreign Affairs* published a article called “*Confronting Backlash States*” in which Lake elaborated a detailed articulation of rogue states policy: “as the sole superpower, the United States has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community”. After the successful containment of USSR, the United States “now faces a less formidable challenge in containing the band of outlaws”²⁶.

However, the Dual Containment policy was considered insufficient in 1998 and it provoked a debate in two directions within and outside the US Government: a hard-line advocated by a Republican-dominated Congress and Neo-conservative outsiders, toward a explicit rollback posture. Even some legislative measures were taken, among them, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998²⁷. On the other hand, it was the Clinton Administration, including the Pentagon and the CIA, the UN Security Council and the Arab states, which favoured a limited containment policy, focused on deterring Saddam from regional aggression and denying him any means to threaten the countries in the area: “*Keep Sadam in his box*”.

Thus, the main argument from Neo-conservatives and some officials within the Bush Administration, was that the problem with Iraq was not the symptoms, WMD, but the regime, i.e., the cause: you cannot terminate an effect that is inherent in the characters and policies of a regime unless you terminate the regime itself. Although UN inspectors would have detected WMD and forbidden arms and missiles, and would have enforced the completion of the UN Security Council Resolutions, Baghdad would have had a free hand again to push forward its programs after the departure of UN inspectors if permanent caution and surveillance in the country were not maintained. Saddam’s regime would have pursued WMD programs, even secretly, as Pyongyang’s regime has done since 1997-98. Besides, there are two examples supporting this posture: the failure both of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000 and a military solution for the Iraqi case. The problem, in the end, is the dictatorial and closed regimes. Of course, this does not completely explain the policy if strategic, security and energy realms are not introduced into the equation²⁸. But by introducing these parameters, it is clear that the main objective was regime change. It was a consequent conclusion taking into

²⁵ Martin Indyk. “Challenges to US Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities”. The Soref Symposium. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Washington D.C. May 18-19, 1993. In the case of Iran, the focus was on objectionable Iranian external behaviour.

²⁶ Lake, Anthony. “Confronting Backlash States”. *Foreign Affairs* 73, n° 2 March-April 1994.

²⁷ Perle, Richard “No More Halfway Measures”. *Washington Post*, February, 8 1998. p. C1.; Khalilzad, Zalmay. and Wolfowitz, Paul. “We Must Lead the Way to Deposing Saddam”. *Washington Post*. November 9, 1997. p. C9. For a comprehensive review of available strategies in the Iraqi case see Clawson, Patrick L. (ed) *Iraq Strategy Review: Options for US Policy*. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Washington D.C. 1998; Public Law 105-338. *Iraq Liberation Act of 1998*.

²⁸ See García Cantalapiedra, David. “La política de EEUU en el Gran Mediterráneo-Asia Central: geoestrategia, petróleo y terrorismo”. Paper .Congreso Nacional sobre Seguridad. CEAS. Universidad de Granada, Octubre 2002.



account the comprehensive policy of Middle East restructuring planned by the Neo-conservative sector of the Bush Administration.

4.2. North Korea: Coercive Diplomacy, Blackmail or Engagement?

The US North Korean policy of Limited Engagement was established mainly because of the North Korea nuclear program and the DPRK's forces deployment along the De-militarized Zone (DMZ). But other sources must also be taking in account: the US Post-Cold War Grand Strategy, maintaining the US-Japan Alliance and the US-ROK Alliance in Asia, and China's vital interests in the Korean Peninsula²⁹. This included US interests in avoiding a new war but at the same time, keeping ROK safe from a DPRK invasion.

Coming from the Bush Administration I policy on North Korea, Containment strategy with engagement approach responded to a National Security Review carried out by an interagency committee in spring 1991. The three policy options were: to follow on Containment policy; an engagement approach, withdrawing nuclear forces from South Korea and reducing joint military exercises; and coercive diplomacy to compel Pyongyang to comply with NTP obligations³⁰. The Bush Administration I chose the engagement approach. It produced the Joint Declaration on the de-nuclearization of the Korea peninsula by both Koreas and the signing and ratification by Pyongyang of the IAEA safeguards agreements. However, the only US-DPRK direct meeting produced contention with Seoul and established a dangerous precedent: Pyongyang could consider itself as the valid representative regime for the whole Korea in a foreseeable future, as Kim il Song's strategy had done so during decades. Moreover, it permitted Pyongyang to think that, in the future, any negotiation should be established bilaterally with the United States. This allowed Pyongyang to force United States to agree a negotiation in 1993-94 on a bilateral basis.

The Limited Engagement policy (through the 1994 Agreed Framework) established by the Clinton Administration was an approach with the intention to reaching a final objective of peaceful unification, covered by the containment framework strategy established under the Bush I and Clinton Administration. Moreover, there were few alternatives, which were not acceptable paths: coercive diplomacy and/or military measures (pre-emptive attack, isolation, economic sanctions). However, the economic reasons that pushed Pyongyang towards this agreement have produced in the long term the contrary effect, because this engagement has created a fear in Pyongyang: the downfall of the regime due to dependency on foreign aid. Taking in account that the main objective of Pyongyang is the survival of the regime, even an engagement policy can create different effects from those wanted because of Pyongyang's misperceptions of US behaviour and the size and nature of its security requirements.

Still, the 1994 Agreed Framework was a bad agreement but better than nothing. Neither the Clinton Administration nor the Bush Administration liked it but, due to the situation in the Korean Peninsula, it was the only solution available. However, after taking office, the Bush Administration reviewed US policy toward the Korean Peninsula. The Department of Defense and the NSC considered the 1994 agreement as a rewarded blackmail. But after this review, the conclusion was that it could not be abandoned without something

²⁹ Eliot Kang, C.S. "North Korea and the US Grand Security Strategy". *Comparative Strategy*. 20, 2001.

³⁰ NSR 28. United States Policy toward North Korea Nuclear Weapons Program. February 6, 1991.



to replace it³¹. Basically, the first policy on North Korea of the Bush Administration came from the 2002 State of Union Address, when President Bush included DPNK in the Axis of Evil, although in June, 6, 2001, he had made the first statement on North Korea with the following objectives:

- improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities;
- verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports;
- and a less threatening conventional military posture³².

This approach, a “carrot and stick” strategy, tried to offer North Korea the opportunity of demonstrating the seriousness of its posture by improving bilateral relations. If North Korea would respond affirmatively and would take appropriate action, the United States would expand “efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps”³³. However, this policy was really designed to reducing Pyongyang’s WMD, missiles, and artillery positioned along the DMZ: in fact, Pyongyang maintains 70% of its 1.2 million armed forces within 90 miles of the DMZ³⁴. Since July 2001, the Bush Administration has given warnings on the suspension of the construction of the light water reactors if Pyongyang does not fulfill its obligations with IAEA. Partly, the US position was based on the CIA’s suspicion ever since 1998 about a secret Highly Enrichment Uranium program (HEU), and the fears that terrorists (above all Al Qaeda) could gain access to WMD. This means a significative departure from the Engagement policy: *the Bush Administration, at first, did not explicitly show a policy designed for a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula as a final objective, but a policy ready to terminate with Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities*. In this sense, the Limited Engagement policy was similar to Clinton’s Iraq policy: *keep Kim il Song-Kim Song-il in his box*, while waiting for a change in the situation of the regime (in one case, hoping for the failure, in the other, waiting for the unification).

But the Bush Administration has changed the pattern in both cases with different approaches: on the one hand, blackmail and military actions, and, on the other, coercive diplomacy, but without ruling out military action as a possible option: Secretary Powell on his trip to Seoul said to President Roh that “you cannot ever remove an option that is always available to you” though he opposes the idea that military force should be kept on the table. Besides, “the United States has no plans to invade North Korea”³⁵.

Pyongyang has been taking a set of initiatives to show a commitment of good intentions, but assymetrically. The measures taken by Pyongyang did not fulfill the

³¹ Laney, J. and Shaplen, J. p. 21.

³² Specially, the concentration of artillery and multiple rocket launchers within the range of Seoul. Statement of General Thomas Schwartz, Commander, US Forces in Korea. Senate Armed Services Committee. March 27, 2001

³³ Statement by the President Bush on North Korea. Office of the Press Secretary. The White House. June 13, 2001.

³⁴ Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander, CFC-US Forces in Korea. Senate Armed Services Committee. March 5, 2002; Statement of General Leon J. LaPorte, Commander, CFC-US Forces in Korea. Senate Armed Services Committee. March 13, 2003

³⁵ Secretary Colin L. Powell. Hyatt Hotel – Regency Ballroom. Seoul, Korea. February 25, 2003.



Washington requirements³⁶. Then, the Bush Administration considered the DPRK were trying to avoid complying with the points established by President Bush in July 2001. Then, after the discovery of the DPRK's HEU secret program in July 2002 by the CIA, which was not admitted until the Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's trip to Pyongyang in October 2002 (probably he carried with him evidence obtained by the CIA to show the North Korean officials that DPRK started to develop the HEU program in 1997-98), the United States stopped funding the light water reactor, and the KEDO Executive Board suspended in November, 15 2002, fuel oil shipments. And even though a military solution was discarded and a clear multilateral approach was adopted after the visit of Assistant Secretary Kelly, "the United States will not dole out any "rewards" to convince North Korea". According to the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the DPRK must change its behaviour abandoning its nuclear weapons program, dismantling the plutonium program, and its HEU program, cooperating fully with the IAEA and complying with NTP and the safeguards agreement³⁷.

The US policy has been introducing new elements since 2001. The US Policy established 3 main elements in mid-January 2003:

- to terminate the Agreed Framework;
- to assemble an international coalition to put pressure on North Korea;
- and to propose a dialogue with North Korea that focuses on actions by North Korea to end its nuclear program.

The propositions about the DPNK did not obtain "any reward" until the freeze of nuclear programs was repeated very clearly by Secretary Colin Powell during his trip around Asia in February: "Unless North Korea ends its program, it cannot expect the benefits of relationships with the outside world.... We had provided assurances that no one was thinking of invading or attacking North Korea. The United States and Japan agreed that these concerns and these conversations and discussions must be addressed in a multilateral context for the simple reason that it is not just a U.S.-North Korean problem, it's a problem that affects the entire region"³⁸.

5. Possible scenarios: Compellance, escalation and war

5.1. Asymmetries, perceptions and images

The greatest danger in the crisis is asymmetry of interests and of focus of both parts. Pyongyang has always pushed for a negotiation vis-à-vis Washington to recreate the past 1990 and 1994 scenarios, but the Bush Administration is focusing multilaterally on a resolution of the crisis precisely because it wants to avoid such a scenario.

Another asymmetry is the position of US policy and ROK "Sunshine" policy. Kim Dae-jung and now Roh Moo Hyun believe that the DPRK is changing to ensure the survival of its regime and South Korea's engagement policy will bear fruit. But the Bush Administration believes that Pyongyang has been cheating international agreements and the Agreed Framework since 1998. This induced a lack of confidence in an Administration with a hard

³⁶ Laney, J. and Shaplen, J. "How to deal with North Korea". *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2003. p 17.

³⁷ WMD Developments on the Korean Peninsula. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. February 4, 2003.

³⁸ Secretary Colin L. Powell. Press Conference. US. Embassy. Tokyo, Japan. February 23, 2003.



line already toward WMD, missile proliferation and rogue states. The consideration of the Agreed Framework as a bad agreement, the suspicion of the existence of a secret HEU program, and the Zero Tolerance approach on terrorism were opposed to the Sunshine policy. Even that position could be explained from a US domestic policy point of view: heightening tensions and expanding war on terrorism to justify increases in the US Defense budget and pave the way to win the 2002 November elections. But this posture on the North Korean case made no sense because there was already a crisis in progress in Iraq, and there was a lot of bargaining at the UN Security Council.

Nevertheless, to assure the survival of his regime, Kim Jong-Il could have maintained secret the HEU program not only as a mechanism of security, but also as a real position that would mean that DPRK had never had the intention of changing progressively. The perception of the Bush Administration due to the Bush Doctrine, reinforced by Kim Jong Il's Military Strategy on Korean Peninsula Reunification³⁹, was that the US would surely attack North Korea and, in order to survive, North Korea had to launch a first strike pre-emptively. Since the Bush Doctrine stresses that the Axis of Evil countries will not be tolerated anymore, there was nothing to lose for Pyongyang. A perception of a war in its own soil should push the DPRK to use WMD (not only nuclear forces) pre-emptively against South Korea, Japan and the United States.

5.2. Compellance scenario: Coercive Diplomacy and Blackmail.

By mid-March, the development of the crisis had introduced more elements into the *US posture that finally established a Coercive Diplomacy approach, which the Bush Administration had begun to assemble in July 2001*. Besides, one of the points behind this policy was to keep this issue under control until the end of the Iraq crisis:

- there will not be negotiations until the DPRK satisfied US concerns over nuclear program;
- warning on the prospect of economic sanctions. There were drafting plans but the position of China, Russia, Japan and the ROK against these plans have contributed to de-escalate these declarations
- proposing multilateral talks involving North Korea and interested countries, possibly under UN auspices; (Reassurance)
- progressive suspension of the 1994 Agreed Framework; heavy oil shipments were suspended in December 2002 in spite of Japanese and ROK's reluctance. This was also used by Pyongyang to justify the re-opening of Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The next decision will be whether to continue or suspend the two light water reactors. Bush Administration however has funded this project with \$3 million in the FY 2003 budget
- assembling an international coalition to pressure Pyongyang (China, South Korea, Japan and Russia); 5+5 framework proposed by Powell during his February 2003 trip to Asia.
- Ambivalence on US military option. Disavowing any intention to attack North Korea militarily but warning against any attempt by North Korea to reprocess weapons-grade plutonium. (Reassurance and/or Deterrence)

³⁹ Kim Myong Chol. "Kim Jong Il's Military Strategy for Reunification". *Comparative Strategy*, n° 20, 2001.



Paradoxically, the DPRK refused a multilateral approach, seeking bilateral bargaining vis-à-vis United States, up to 13 April 2003⁴⁰. This change is probably related to the US diplomacy with China and the quick end to the Iraq crisis and its consequences (regime change). On March 6, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a step to reassure Pyongyang, stated that the US Administration was considering reducing US Forces level in South Korea, withdrawing all or part of the US 2nd Infantry Division from the DMZ. And there has not been forces deployment and higher alert postures, although the stationing of B-52 in Guam and F-117 in South Korea as part of the annual Joint US-ROK Exercise Foal Eagle could be seen by Pyongyang as an aggressive movement or the beginning of a pre-emptive strike. (Security Dilemma-misperception)

Pyongyang has also played its cards. Despite its ambiguous acceptance of multilateral negotiations on April 13, a deliberately ambiguous statement from a spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry was issued on April 18: the English version said that Pyongyang was “successfully reprocessing more than 8.000 spent fuel rods at the final phase” and had informed the United States of what it was doing in early March. However, the Korean version said: “Nuclear activity had been going on successfully and its final phase to the point of reprocessing fuel rods”. The English version appeared to leave no doubt that Pyongyang planned to build nuclear warheads, especially after the war in Iraq. The statement in English also said that China’s presence in its requested bilateral talks would play “ a relevant role as the host state” while issues “related to the settlement of the nuclear issue will be discussed between the DPRK and the US”, downgrading the expectation on “multilateral negotiation” with the participation of China, to show no public concession although Pyongyang privately accepted it. This acceptance did not offer a pretext to the Bush Administration for breaking negotiations. Clearly, Pyongyang is using this ambiguity on reprocessing fuel rods as a bargaining chip. After conceding on multilateral talks, the North Korean regime has used a veiled threat of plutonium reprocessing to strengthen its position after the quick victory of the US-led coalition troops in Iraq. Still, analysts say that the DPRK had not actually begun reprocessing, but that they were prepared to. Despite this fact, the Bush Administration thinks that Pyongyang has crossed the line, elevating the crisis to a new level. But the United States attended the talks scheduled for 23-25 April in Beijing⁴¹, leaving the Pyongyang delegation hours earlier after stating that the DPRK indeed had nuclear weapons⁴². However, the Bush Administration keeps the diplomatic channel open, considering these talks as a first approach.

Meanwhile, different statements from the new ROK government officials, as National Security Adviser Ra Jong Il, and the ROK ambassador to the United States Han Sung Joo, stressed that a flexible attitude toward North Korea was necessary. At the same time, Pyongyang is playing other cards: first, North Korean officials telephoned South Korean officers at the border village of Panmunjom to propose Cabinet-level talks on April 27-29 in Pyongyang. North Korea often has tried to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States, by dealing with the two nations separately and saying that only Koreans can resolve tensions on the peninsula. In fact, on April 21, South Korea's Unification Minister, Jeong Se Hyun, accepted the North Korean offer in a telephone message. Secondly, the same day the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the Worker's Party of Korea

⁴⁰ North Korea hints it may allow others to join talks. IHT. 14 April 2003.

⁴¹ Richard Boucher, Spokesman. US State Department. Washington, DC. April 21, 2003.

⁴² Secretary Powell. Changing Dynamics in Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for US business and Policy. US Asia Pacific Council Symposium. Washington D.C. April 24, 2003. US Department of State.



jointly issued a call to all its citizens, which was carried in Pyongyang newspapers, to increase the country's defence capabilities. Pyongyang is also calling for the speeding up of the Korean peninsula reunification as the nation marks the 55th anniversary of its founding.

This event does not help the consideration of Pyongyang behaviour on a “good faith” basis, supporting opinions within the Bush Administration that the nuclear drive is designed to blackmail the US again into paying to end the programme. There are other opinions that consider that North Korea has decided that its security is only guaranteed by becoming a nuclear power. In this sense, this behaviour responds to the Glaser’s security dilemma posture: the DPRK is more likely to engage in a build-up beyond the means necessary to ensure its survival, and to opt for an offensive build-up. But the importance of uncertainty, then, comes not so much in being sure of the character of the adversary, but in knowing its size and the nature of its security requirements.

If the DPRK does not accept freezing its nuclear program and the other requirements of the US, the *Bush Administration will probably begin to assess a blackmail posture*, trying first to convince China about the necessity of putting pressure on steadily Pyongyang. Thus, the Bush Administration could carry out economic sanctions, including the ongoing suspension of heavy oil shipments, finally suspending the funding of the two light water reactors, and putting an end to the 1994 Agreed Framework completely, and reducing the ambivalence of the US military option, passing from a deterrence posture to a coercive deployment of US Forces through a reinforcement and augmentation of Air Force bombers and Navy CVBG’s in the area surrounding the Korean Peninsula, as the Pentagon and CENTCOM did during the Iraqi crisis.

Pyongyang already considers economic sanctions as an act of war. Thus, escalation to a military conflict would be likely even before carrying out this blackmail posture. Probably, any attempt by the Bush Administration to change the bargaining scenario will lead to a military scenario. Thus, a previous effort to achieve a common posture with China, Russia, Japan and ROK would be essential. China does not want a nuclear DPRK but neither does it want to impose economic sanctions on Pyongyang.

5.3. Military scenario: escalation, pre-emptive strikes and war

Some analysts believe the United States can strike without causing war on a wider scale, and they predict that the risks of lethal nuclear fallout from such a precision attack on North Korea's known nuclear sites may be minimal. But they are ignoring one critical problem: In 1994, when North Korea's program was restricted to three nuclear reactors plus the reprocessing of plutonium at Yongbyon, the US might have been able to effectively eliminate it through precision strikes. But now, the location of the HEU program is unknown. Thus, eliminating Pyongyang's complete nuclear production capacity through precision bombing is now very difficult, though it will be possible to terminate the short-middle term nuclear capacity posed by this installation.

The first target would be the plutonium reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. The only technological problem would be preventing the spread of radioactive fallout. And the good news for any such plan is that massive radioactive fallout is unlikely. A U.S. strike would almost certainly avoid dispersing more than a small fraction of North Korea's radioactive



materials, and even this fallout would be largely contained within Yongbyon. Technically, it is possible to destroy this capacity without causing major fires and using the collapse of the heavy concrete walls to trap most of the radioactive material in the rubble, thus avoiding serious fallout at distances far beyond the Yongbyon site itself. The other priority target would be North Korea's nuclear reactor, also at Yongbyon. But since North Korea refuelled its reactor with natural uranium before restarting it barely a month ago, the risk is greatly reduced. A direct attack on the reactor now, before it has been operating for very long with its fresh fuel load, might not spread very much high-level radioactive material: there would be no danger beyond North Korea's borders and no immediate radiation sicknesses or fatalities beyond Yongbyon.

The problem is still the potential of North Korean retaliation and the HEU program. The problem is the same as in Iraq, and, since, like a chemical plant, a centrifuge program consumes little electricity and can be physically small, American intelligence is unlikely to locate it. It is thus almost certain that any precision strike on North Korea's nuclear facilities will leave some of its uranium-enrichment program intact. Even could exist other undetected plutonium-reprocessing facilities outside Yongbyon. This was a crucial point of debate among American military planners in 1994. President Bush said on March 3 to reporters that if America's efforts "don't work diplomatically, they'll have to work militarily.", backing Secretary Powell remarks on military option as a negotiating tool. As the Korean crisis has escalated, more and more analysts--including some in the Bush administration--have begun arguing that a U.S. strike on North Korean nuclear targets may be worth the risk. In 1994, a pre-emptive attack on nuclear installations was a genuine alternative for achieving the same objective sought by diplomacy. But, according to this analysis, complete de-nuclearization of North Korea is impossible militarily short of occupying the North. Probably, military operations in Korea would be carried out following OPLAN 5027 Mayor Theater War for the US-ROK Combined Forces Command.

6. A Desirable Scenario: Engagement

6.1. A nuclear or non-nuclear North Korea

The conclusion of the North Korea crisis will be a nuclear or a non-nuclear North Korea, at best, or, at worst, an escalation to war:

- A nuclear North Korea:

+ A still no-military situation but critical scenario in middle-long term:

This will allow Pyongyang to periodically blackmail the United States, the ROK, and Japan. If Pyongyang maintains its nuclear and long range missile capacity, the NTP will mortally wounded and the balance in North-East Asia as well as security in the whole of Asia will be dangerously affected. This could push Japan, the ROK and/or Taiwan to obtain nuclear capacity, and this will create a nuclear arms race in Asia. At the same time, this will create a sense of vulnerability in China, after losing control of Pyongyang.

+ A military scenario will bring us escalation and, possibly, war:

- a pre-emptive strike against the nuclear facilities: as we saw above, this solution is not available without taking many risks.

- An attack/invasion from the DPRK armed forces responding to US-ROK preventive military measures as higher alert status and



- reinforcements or new deployments to the area: CVBGs, bombers and anti-missile Patriot batteries.
- US-ROK preventive/pre-emptive operations on North Korea Forces before a DPRK attack.
 - Nuclear/conventional scenario.
- A non-nuclear North Korea:
Should Pyongyang abandon its nuclear program, United States, the ROK, Japan, China and Russia could guarantee North Korea security as the first step that would permit the development of a whole de-nuclearized Korean Peninsula policy in order to achieve a peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

6.2.A conditioned Comprehensive Engagement Policy?

Correctly, the Bush Administration has mainly chosen, up to now, a multilateral and diplomatic approach in the North Korea crisis. But, probably, the Bush Administration policy ought to focus on developing a whole Korean Peninsula policy instead of focusing only on North Korea and mainly on its nuclear program, strengthening multilateral approaches in a similar-2+4 German reunification framework, reinforcing common positions with the ROK and Japan, pushing Beijing to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programs, and obtaining legal support from the UN Security Council and the IAEA.

However, a US-whole Korean Peninsula policy now could allow Pyongyang to think that its policy to push United States to other negotiations similar to those of 1990 and 1994 was correct, allowing them to try to blackmail once again to obtain advantages in order to sustain the regime without apparent concessions. From this point of view, the Bush Administration could suffer from the 1938 Munich Pact “appeasement syndrome”, if Pyongyang maintains a challenging position to US steps to de-escalate the crisis and negotiate a solution. Thus, a whole-Korean Peninsula policy could go ahead after, and only after, the DPRK abandons its nuclear program. This position is defended by different institutions and people, for instance, the Perry Report, an article from Henry Kissinger, some hearings at US Congress and articles in journals such as *Foreign Affairs*⁴³.

However, as these analyses also establish, any step toward ***this solution should be only taken after Pyongyang abandons its nuclear program***. The problem would be if Kim Song Il’s regime does not agree to abandon its nuclear program and does not permit the IAEA to monitor once again its nuclear installations. Some analysts such as the “hawkish” Victor Cha say that “the anticipated costs of unification are lower than we think. And the costs of a nuclear North Korea are much higher than we think”, above all for South Korea⁴⁴. But once Pyongyang plutonium production reaches a level beyond an international control capacity, the

⁴³ Review of US policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations. William J. Perry, U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State. Washington, DC, October 12, 1999; Henry Kissinger. La trampa de las negociaciones entre EEUU y Corea del Norte. ABC. 10 de Marzo de 2003. p. 18-19; An Agreed Framework for Dialogue with North Korea. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 6, 2003. Laney, J. and Shaplen, J. “How to deal with North Korea”. *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2003.

⁴⁴ Statement Pr. Victor D. Cha. Regional Implications of the Changing Nuclear Equation on the Korean Peninsula. Hearing before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 12, 2003. For an expanded version of his statement see Cha, V. “Focus on the Future, Not the North”. *The Washington Quarterly*. Winter 2002-2003



solution will probably lay in the military realm. However a military attack would be extremely costly to both sides.