In this speech on possible EU spaces for intervention I would like to emphasize from the beginning the difficulties I have because does not exist a clear picture of the European foreign and security interests.

The clarification of the role the EU wants to play as an international actor is another crucial issue.

The EU has been essentially a civilian actor in the international arena. For many years the EU tried to play an stabilization role using essentially financial tools.

Once the cold war ended there were many expectations regarding EU new possibilities and strategic direction it has to follow. However the experience of the last decade was really disappointing. The EU only achieved a weak and inconsistent foreign and security policy. The Western European Union did a lot of work but its policies were developed in a vacuum. There were too many different interests and a lack of accommodation among the EU states making difficult to give substance to the common foreign and security policy. This inertia still prevails.

In order to develop real crisis scenarios with some consistency, I would like to have a clear definition of the EU strategic concept. That is lacking. Let me first propose some common EU strategic interests.

The EU has a common interest in the maintenance of international peace and order. That is essential for the stability of international trade and economic investments. It implies that the EU has to be engaged in the maintenance of the world order given its worldwide economic interests.

In this regard the EU has to play a significant role in:

1.- Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
2.- The promotion of collective, regional security and a balance of power where needed.
3. The fight against terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking
4. The promotion of democratic institutions, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as the best guarantees for fruitful cooperation and predictability among the states.
5. The promotion of wealth, economic cooperation and good governance, helping to fight poverty in order to promote stability and predictability.

Besides, the EU has particular interests in:

1. The defense of its citizens,
2. The defense of its territories
3. The maintenance of communication links and free flow of goods, raw materials and energy supplies
4. Increasing capabilities for influencing events that can affect its security, stability and well-being.
5. Increasing freedom of movement in the international arena.

In this unpretentious and simple framework I will try to fit the possible crisis scenarios and spaces of intervention.

Of course the first priority for the EU is the defense of its territories and its own citizens. Traditionally the task of the defense of Western European territories was the task of NATO. Once the Soviet military threat disappeared, this task has been maintained in the NATO framework but the September 11 terrorist attacks have clearly shown that Europe has to rethink its own military defense when vital interests are at stake.

In the last few years there was a lot of rhetoric regarding European defense. Statements such as "Europe can not defend itself" can still be heard in different places and meetings. But the question mark is that, in theory, these kind of statements are not convincing. I can not extend myself here on the discussions I had in the last few years with my students on this topic. Summing up I can say that comparing the defense budget and the GNP of the EU countries with Russian GNP and defense budget, and with all the countries together in the southern European periphery they consider that the above statement is questionable. For them it is a question of changing the minds and priorities and of a profound reorganization and unification of defense in EU countries. At present there are no military threats and the EU relationship with Russia is better than ever. Other possible military threats coming from the Southern periphery of Europe are questionable. The incentives for WNID in the so called Greater Middle East are domestic and regional. Possible scenarios of a spill-over effect to Europe coming from a missile exchange there, are controversial. In general I can say that in the southern periphery of Europe the problem is not power but poverty and lack of good governance.

For increasing the capability of influencing events and greater freedom of movement the EU clearly needs not only political and economic and financial tools but power projection capabilities. Scenarios in this regard are too many because I consider that the EU has global interests and has to be a global actor. At present the EU has not clear policies defined for this task non all the military tools it needs for supporting these

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policies even in collaboration with other countries. The role of the European leaders in the definition and promotion of a coherent even modest EU foreign and security policy in the last few years is really disappointing\(^2\). The EU citizens do not deserve this.

Nowadays scenarios for EU crisis management are more related to former experiences in its geographical proximity. The serious consequences for the EU of the wars in the Balkans have shown the vital importance of keeping an eye on the periphery. The question of preservation of statehood and prevention of failed states is without a doubt the main priority for the EU crisis management. The stabilization of the Balkans, the existing possibilities of state failure in the Caucasus are the main important scenarios of possible intervention in this domain. In the Arab world, the possibility of failed states did not materialize. However in the medium term the present challenges to these states will become more difficult to manage taking into account what different studies forecast on environmental stress there.

In this context it is foreseeable the EU intervention for peace enforcement operations under the UN or OSCE mandate - in the case of the Caucasus - and in collaboration with other countries. In the Caucasus Russia’s collaboration is crucial for a successful operation. I do not foresee a possible intervention in the EU periphery without the previous acceptance of the legal authorities of the country or countries concerned.

In North Africa, as I said, I do not see clear scenarios of peace enforcement operations. It is very well known the rivalry existing between Morocco and Algeria, but it is out of consideration the possible intervention of EU in a regional dispute unless there is a previous agreement between the parties to accept the EU presence for freezing the conflict, separating the parties.

Other possible scenarios contemplated for years such as a Libyan-Tunisian crisis are now out of consideration.

On the Middle East, I can say that the EU can not underestimate the spill over effects of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian and Lebanon conflicts on its own territories and on the Mediterranean in general. At present I do not see any chances for the EU rapid deployment forces without the previous consent of the parties involved for the separation of parties in conflict. Other possible scenarios of intervention, even taking into account its importance for EU security and stability, are out of reach. The complexity of the situation, the vast military power of Israel and the weakness of the present UE rapid deployment forces prevent any military intervention for managing the conflicts such as we saw in Bosnia. To this must be added the different approaches existing between the EU - where the consensus on Middle East policies is not so easy --- and the US.

Military scenarios for Iraq, similar to those projected by the US are clearly out of reach for the EU for several reasons: The interests are nor similar, the EU approaches and policies are more nuanced, substantial evidence on WMD production is lacking, the consequences of a military intervention are not black and white such as it is

\(^2\) See recently Judy Dempsey : "Europe’s divided self" Financial Times 10, July 2002. The EU common policies regarding not only Central Asia or Asia and the Pacific but the closer Middle East are very weak or weak.
presented nowadays, and, at the end, the EU has not the military means for this kind of intervention.

The maintenance of communication links and free flow of goods, raw materials and in particular energy supplies is an objective that the EU alone cannot accomplish in toto nowadays. The EU can complement its approach to the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus developing the military dimension of cooperation and partnership—something that was not very well perceived in the last few years. Nonetheless it will be necessary other collaborations.

In general I can say that there are clear needs and possibilities of engagement for EU military forces in the EU periphery but always with the following preconditions: the agreement of the parties concerned and an international mandate. However the EU still has limited capabilities—putting aside non-military means—for influencing events that can clearly affect its security and stability and for maintaining all the communications links and assuring the free flow of energy supplies. It has to be done in collaboration.

The challenge for the EU is to developed a transatlantic dialogue and military means that avoids subordination to the US interests.

Possible scenarios of Humanitarian intervention and evacuation of nationals are too many not only in the EU periphery but also in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The EU has to create a pool of naval and air transport means for this possible events.

These are the most pressing scenarios for the EU. However I have also to stress the pressing need we have for the development of a credible EU engagement in the creation and maintenance of the world order, including the fighting against terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational mafias. Of course it has to be done in collaboration with the US and other actors such as Russia and Asia and the Pacific actors. All this constitute a real challenge for the EU as an original and global international actor, given its significant interests in many regions of the world. For doing that, it must develop, inter alia—fighting terrorism is in principle a police task—, credible coercive forces. Unfortunately the EU citizens do not have in this crucial time the Europeans leaders they deserve.

Conclusions

The European Union is presently confronted by several major challenges in terms of the future direction of its military, political and social integration. Particularly, the role that the European Union (EU) wishes to play on the international stage is a crucial issue that has yet to be fully defined. The EU has demonstrated a desire to become players in the international game. A common foreign policy with security as the prime focus to deal with the main security threats of terrorism, migration, environmental stresses and the changing world order must be developed by the EU for the advancement of the goals of increased integration and economic well-being of the citizens. This policy must address internal security and stability as well as the values of

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3 Operations for evacuating personnel and citizens can be very complex. It must be remembered the operations considered for evacuating citizens in the first years of the Algerian internal war.

the EU. The foreign policy of the EU should be separated into three general categories: internal security; peripheral security and global security. Essentially, internal security will deal with problems within the borders of the states by the individual countries, but preferably with a great deal of coordination between the states. The peripheral security issues will deal with areas of conflict along the European border and neighboring countries. Global security issues will focus primarily with international European areas of interest, both economically and politically.

1. Common Foreign Policy

The basis of all discussion must be a common foreign policy for the EU. It will give the EU the tools for effective prevention, and if necessary, intervention in order to promote stability on the international stage, restore peace post conflict and to defend the EU's interests and values abroad. It will serve as an effective tool to give Europe its own diplomacy separate from that of the rest of the Western world. The common foreign policy will make effective use of the rapid reaction force as ratified by the Petersberg Tasks and will reinforce the EU's basis of influence.

2. Internal Security

The main objective of the common foreign policy will be to defend the EU's territory and its citizens. While the internal security of each state will remain a national responsibility, coordination will be necessary to defend against the emerging threats of terrorism, migration, environmental stresses and the changing world order. Terrorism, while not a new issue for many member states of the EU, is an increasing problem, and will continue to threaten order and government. With global climate change will come the need for the drastic relocation of peoples as natural resources such as water and arable land become more scarce, and many of these populations will look to Europe for a home. These environmental stresses will also impact Europe itself, compounding the issue. The changing world order will reflect rogue states, the emergence of Asia as a world power, the collapse of states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and increasing poverty, which present obvious problems for the EU. The goal of the common foreign policy will be to provide an action, rather than a reaction to all these issues.

3. Stability

The common foreign policy will address both internal security and external stability. The main goal will be to promote stability amongst the economic interests of the EU, to prevent conflict and maintain security in the periphery. The Balkans are a classic example of the type of conflict that the EU will be forced to deal with. It is essential that the EU be capable of managing this type of conflict on its own, a point that was clearly illustrated during the Kosovo conflict. A more contemporary issue is the instability in the Caucasus, as well as the impending difficulties related to resources (gas & oil pipelines) in the region. Furthermore, this policy must reflect the other nations in this area in order for success to be achieved because until this point, Europe has paid but not played. In addition, North Africa may emerge as a potential threat within the next twenty years, due to resource (water) shortages and political instability. This will require both permanent observation of these areas and potentially intervention to restore order. Finally, the conflict in the Middle East must be dealt with, but this can only be achieved in partnership with the United States. However, before this can be achieved a solid policy must be developed.
4. Values

The essential values of the EU must be protected and promoted throughout the region. These values include democracy, basic human rights and international law as an alternative to the use of force. The actions listed above will also promote the visibility of the EU in the Middle East, and by extension the EU's influence. While these are secondary objectives of the common foreign policy, they are essential for the development of long term peace and prosperity for the EU and its surrounding states.

As the Minister of Defense, Michele Alliot-Marie mentioned in her opening statements to the conference, it is up to future generations to further develop the EU. Therefore, it is up to us to develop and apply this common foreign policy in collaboration with other global players for the benefit of the EU.

This is a brief summary of several hours of deliberation by the people listed below, and is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of the issue. However, it is a key starting point and presents the essential challenges facing the European Union.