

Naming and Fidelity of Truth: Rethinking Revolutionary Politics and Localizing, Delocalizing or Relocalizing the Void in Alain Badiou's Philosophy

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Abstract. This article explores the philosophy of Alain Badiou from the vantage point of the concepts of the localization, delocalization, and relocalization of the void as thematized through literary arts, religion, emancipatory politics, and the subject of psychoanalysis. In short, these moments around the void characterize the processes through which truth is processed and seen through their full realization by a philosophical engagement across the various conditions in which these truths occur. The localization of a void is the naming of an indiscernible element that is incommensurable to the rubric of constructible knowledge, sense and meaning which could saturate the space of truth. Thus, the naming that localizes the void acts as a subtraction of the invariant in the variance of situation such that across various points in space and time, we are still able to subtract the universal as the invariant not just as the fidelity to the localized truth but also as the resurrection of truth upon its relocalization at a different place and a different time. At its core, this article is concerned with truth, why truth is persistent, and why we have to struggle to articulate the truth that we are trying to be faithful to again and again with each instance that truth risks being covered-over and obscured.

Keywords: Alain Badiou; Truth; Psychoanalysis; Marxism; Literary Arts; Transfinitude.

[es] Nombramiento y fidelidad de la verdad: Repensar la política revolucionaria y localizar, deslocalizar o reubicar el vacío en la filosofía de Alain Badiou

Resumen. Este artículo explora la filosofía de Alain Badiou desde el punto de vista de los conceptos de localización, deslocalización y relocalización del vacío, tematizados a través de las artes literarias, la religión, la política emancipadora y el tema del psicoanálisis. En resumen, estos momentos en torno al vacío caracterizan los procesos a través de los cuales la verdad se procesa y se ve a través de su plena realización mediante un compromiso filosófico a través de las diversas condiciones en las que se producen estas verdades. La localización de un vacío es el nombramiento de un elemento indiscernible que es incommensurable con la rúbrica del conocimiento, el sentido y el significado construibles que podrían saturar el espacio de la verdad. Así, la denominación que localiza el vacío actúa como una sustracción de lo invariante en la varianza de la situación, de modo que a través de diversos puntos en el espacio y el tiempo, todavía somos capaces de sustraer lo universal como lo invariante, no sólo como la fidelidad a la verdad localizada, sino también como la resurrección de la verdad en su relocalización en un lugar y un tiempo diferentes. En el fondo, este artículo se ocupa de la verdad, de por

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qué la verdad es persistente y de por qué tenemos que luchar para articular la verdad a la que intentamos ser fieles una y otra vez con cada ocasión en que la verdad corre el riesgo de ser encubierta y oscurecida.

Palabras clave: Alain Badiou; verdad; psicoanálisis; marxismo; artes literarias; transfinitud.

Sumario. I. Introduction: Samuel Beckett as St Paul. II. Between Fidelities and Betrayals. III. Tracing Truth and Philosophy: Badiou's Analysis of Lacan and the Paradigms of Psychoanalysis. IV. Dude, Where's my Truth? V. Conclusion. References.

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I. Introduction: Samuel Beckett as St Paul

Alain Badiou's book *On Beckett* situates the Irish writer at the heart of philosophy, yet when taken in conjunction with Badiou's work on St Paul, a new element to the philosopher's thought comes forth. In short, *On Beckett* focuses on the role that *the name* plays in holding on to the truth of a disruptive event, while St Paul is read as a figure of resurrection, in that a dead truth from the past is brought into the present. Taken together, *the name of resurrection* terms a strategy for the role of the word in refiguring old truths in the present. This essay mainly considers Marxism and Psychoanalysis within this re-configuration, but the name of resurrection is not limited to these. However, Marxism and Psychoanalysis prove to be true test cases because of their varied intellectual histories and receptions.

The author Samuel Beckett was not only greatly influenced by philosophy¹² ¹³, but has been taken up by a number of key continental thinkers. In "Trying to Understand *Endgame*", written in 1961, Theodor Adorno sees Beckett's play as a representation of the struggle against stillness, which he reads as the struggle against death¹⁴. In *Glas*, just after quoting Beckett's novel *Malloy* (1951), Jacques Derrida includes a story about an American patient of psychoanalysis who, although speaking French perfectly, would consistently pronounce "vagin" as "vaguin"¹⁵. For Derrida, this indicates, when combined with the quote from Beckett, "the impossibility of conceiving or saying" a name properly¹⁶. Regarding Luce Irigaray, Beckett's work is an example of welcoming the complete other into our lives, which she sees as nothing less than "a new stage in our becoming humans"¹⁷.

While Badiou shares much with these thinkers, his reading of Beckett takes on a slightly different hue. In a discussion of the "meaninglessness" or "absurdity" of a scene from Beckett's novel *Watt* (1953), the *function* of

the senseless is foregrounded: a scene that is "separate from the closed universe of sense [...] awakens thought in a lasting manner [...] and demands its labour"¹⁸. However, this labor is not to give meaning to the scene, but rather to fix a name to the very separation of scene and sense:

naming does not seek any meaning at all, but instead proposes to draw an invented name out of the very void of what takes place. Interpretation is thereby supplanted by a poetics of naming that has no other purpose than to *fix* the incident, to preserve within language a trace of the incident's separation¹⁹.

Taken up under the rubric of "the localization of the void"²⁰ in the first section of this essay, naming is not the creation of new knowledge, as in the work of someone such as Pierre Macherey²¹, but is rather about the preservation of the separation of knowledge from sense.

The kind of naming that Badiou has in mind can be seen in the production of Beckett's play *Not I* (1972), a text not discussed in Badiou's book. The play consists of a single mouth speaking through a hole in a black curtain, a monologue full of ellipsis. Upon first reading, it makes little sense, starting with: "...out ...into this world ...this world ...tiny little thing ...before its time ...in a godfor— ...what? ...girl? ...yes"²². Yet upon close analysis, which is the kind of reading that Badiou applies to other texts of Beckett's, meaning becomes uncovered, and thus fixed. The phrase "out ... into this world" signifies birth, a "tiny little thing" is a child, "before its time" indicates a premature birth, and "what? ...girl? ...yes" means that a question as to the sex of the baby has been asked. Perhaps this is the reason that Badiou does not consider this play in his book: it performs the opposite function of his understanding of naming, in that it fills the void of the ellipses with meaning, rather than foregrounding the separation of sense and nonsense.

However, the title of the piece, *Not I*, indicates that something else is happening, which becomes clear during the actual performance of the play. In Beckett's preferred 1973 performance at the Royal Court Theatre, London, with Billie Whitelaw, the delivery of the lines

¹² S. Beckett, *Samuel Beckett's "Philosophy Notes"*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020.

¹³ J. Fletcher, "Samuel Beckett and the Philosophers", *Comparative Literature*, vol. 17, nro. 1, 1965, pp. 43-56.

¹⁴ T. Adorno, "Trying to Understand *Endgame*", *New German Critique*, 26, 1982, p. 150.

¹⁵ J. Derrida, *Glas*, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1986, p. 231.

¹⁶ J. Martell, "Derrida on Beckett or the Painful Freudian Mark". *Mosaic*, vol. 44, nro. 4, 2011, p. 98.

¹⁷ L. Irigaray, "The Path Toward the Other", en Gontarski S. E. y Uhlmann A. (eds.), *Beckett after Beckett*, Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2006, p. 50.

¹⁸ A. Badiou, *On Beckett*, Manchester, Clinamen Press, 2003a, p. 20.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

²⁰ A. Badiou, *Being and event*, New York, Continuum, 2007a, p. 432.

²¹ P. Macherey, *A Theory of Literary Production*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

²² S. Beckett, *Collected Shorter Plays*, London, Faber and Faber, 1984a, p. 216.

is so fast that there is no way a first-time audience member could ever pick up on the meaning²³. Thus the play is not about discovering the actual, narrative meaning of the text (which is there, with enough time for close reading), but rather enacts the event of *not knowing* the sense of the play. The way that the play is performed is the labor of separating nonsense from sense. The title of the text, *Not I*, is the name of such a separation. The title indicates that philosophy, as shown in the second section of this essay, is not only discursive, but is “an act”, an event, and this event is something that is not now present²⁴. As Badiou says in *On Beckett*: “The name will guarantee within language that the event is sheltered”²⁵.

However, when taken in conjunction with Badiou’s work on St Paul, the name is more than a shelter, it is a resurrection. *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* argues that the Pauline event (his sudden conversion to Christianity on the road to Damascus) has two consequences: first, that because this truth came to Paul all of a sudden, there can be no structural, legal, or axiomatic grounds for its taking place – it is totally subjective and cannot be turned into any law or formula²⁶; second, because Pauline truth is subjective, it does not come from anywhere – such truth is “diagonal relative to every communitarian subset; it neither claims authority from, nor [...] constitutes any identity”²⁷. It is this latter point, that truth does not come from any particular time or place, that leads to the universalism of the subtitle of the book²⁸.

Universalism is always connected to time and space (such as Badiou’s use of St Paul and the Tower of Babel are tied to a Eurocentric vision of the world)²⁹. Yet Badiou’s universalism is not the negation of particularity³⁰, but is rather reaching for a sameness rather than difference. The kind of name Paul represents is, as Jesus says to the Philipians,

“the name which is above every name”³¹. It is a truth not tied to a particular language or place, it is “a name from before the Tower of Babel” and yet it also has to circulate within the languages of the world that rose after the tower’s fall³². It is here that the third main point of this essay lies: the name of truth is an act of resurrection, of bringing out a truth from before language into the world of language. This is why, as quoted below, Badiou says that “for the interest of Christ’s resurrection does not lie in itself, as it would in the case of a particular, or miraculous, fact”³³. Instead, the resurrection reaches back to a pre-Christian truth, to a truth that exists before any particular circumstances, although our understanding of it cannot escape the particularities of expression.

However, what is this universal truth to which resurrection gives voice? According to Badiou’s student Quentin Meillassoux³⁴, resurrection is a part of a “divine ethics”, meaning a fundamental ethics of equality to all. The basic concept of divine ethics is that the minimal condition for justice is to be alive. Thus, in order to ensure justice for all, everyone, from the past, present, and future, must not be dead. Resurrection is therefore part of the universal truth of divine ethics³⁵. As outlandish as Meillassoux’s thesis may be, it indicates the strength of Badiou’s universalism: the fundamental condition for all (life) in order to address particular situations of injustice. For Badiou, the name is key for the resurrection of a universal truth because it is the name of the void before any particulars. In the words of Beckett, such names will enable us “to make possible a deeper birth, a deeper death, or resurrection in and out of this murmur of memory and dream”³⁶.

Now, the issue of the localization of void is determined by the notion of fidelity (or, conversely, betrayal) in Badiou’s work. For this reason, in this regard, we will ask ourselves how to rethink the fidelities and betrayals to emancipatory revolutionary projects based on Badiou’s work? This interrogation will naturally imply asking ourselves about Badiou’s notion of truth and how it is clarified in a dialogue with different registers where Marxism and psychoanalysis stand out.

²³ A 1990 BBC 2 documentary has a recording of a full performance: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4LDwfKxr-M>.

²⁴ A. Badiou, *Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy*, London, Verso Books, 2011, pp. 76-77.

²⁵ A. Badiou, *On Beckett*, op. cit., p. 59.

²⁶ A. Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003b. p. 14.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

²⁸ In *The Puppet and the Dwarf* (published the same year as Badiou’s book on St Paul), Slavoj Žižek has a similar reading of Pauline truth, arguing that: “the key dimension of Paul’s gesture is thus his break with any form of communitarianism: his universe is no longer that of the multitude of groups that want to «find their voice» and assert their particular identity, their «way of life», but that of a fighting collective grounded in the reference to an unconditional universalism” S. Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity*, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2003, p. 130.

²⁹ ¹⁸ Omar Acha’s concept of a “critical universalism” is a useful addition here, since it requires an insertion of incorporated local histories (not without antagonisms) into an indisputable integration of the globe. This integration is not that of an absolute spirit that “posits” its particular features as moments of up-ward evolution, but of one that posits them as crises, tensions, projects and alternatives. These are not derived from an uncontaminated alterity, but from the very contradictions of the global process that must deal infinitely with the subjects, situations and impossibilities immanent to a globalization without command. O. Acha, “The Places of Critical Universalism: Postcolonial and Decolonial Approaches in Context”, en C. Roldán, D. Brauer. y J. Rohbeck (eds.), *Philosophy of Globalization*, Berlín, De Gruyter, 2018, p. 105.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 110.

³¹ *Idem*.

³² *Idem*.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

³⁴ Meillassoux is more than Badiou’s student. In his introduction to Meillassoux’s *After Finitude*, Badiou says, “it would be no exaggeration to say that Quentin Meillassoux has opened up a new path in the history of philosophy, hitherto conceived as the history of what it is to know”. On Badiou and Meillassoux, see the first two chapters of Christopher Watkin’s *French Philosophy Today: New Figures of the Human in Badiou, Meillassoux, Malabou, Serres and Latour*. A. Badiou, “Preface”, en Q. Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, London, Continuum, 2008, p. vii; C. Watkin, *French Philosophy Today: New Figures of the Human in Badiou, Meillassoux, Malabou, Serres and Latour*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

³⁵ G. Harman, *Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2011, pp. 188-189.

³⁶ S. Beckett, *Collected Shorter Prose*, London, John Calder, 1984b, p. 111.

II. Between Fidelities and Betrayals

A contentious set of topics among Marxists are the questions of who is the true heir of Marxism and who is the true revolutionary subject. Depend on who one may ask, to put it somewhat crassly, we would be quick to find that some people find a number of betrayals at work in the adoption of revolutionary emancipatory projects. Some may locate the betrayal at the transition from Marx to Lenin, others may locate it at the deflation of the Spartakus League by the German social democratic party, others find Lenin betrayed by Stalin and Mao as a betrayal of Lenin. In any case, we find that there is some claim to continuity and discontinuity in all of these instances.

Alain Badiou's philosophy and its engagements with the political condition of philosophy offer an account of these continuities and discontinuities. This article aims to explore the nature of these continuities and discontinuities as they become manifest in political fidelities and betrayals through Badiou's oeuvre. At the heart of this exploration, the concept of "the localization of the void"³⁷ will inform our discussion of this topic.

For Badiou, philosophy is a common space for the various generic truth-procedures that act as the conditions of philosophy: science, art, politics, and love. This is to say that philosophy itself doesn't generate truths, however philosophy is the place where truths are seen all the way through to their consequences. Without philosophy, these different conditions collapse onto one another in declaring the dominance of one over the others by virtue of a suture, thus amounting to nothing more than disparate truths and domains. Philosophy weaves a de-suturing space for the invariance of truth as it is nonetheless concerned with the different sutures of each of its variant conditions in order to pronounce "the thinkable conjuncture of truths"³⁸.

To define "the localization of the void", it would help us to consider Badiou's *Being and Event* since there he provides an account of the universality of truth as a discontinuous tearing of a hole in the totality of the fabric of being, thus the titular event concerns the introduction of something new into being in a manner that the very fabric of being has to be rewoven in accordance to the consequences of this process. For example, our understanding of physics and what counts as being therein has been radically transformed the moment that we shift from the Newtonian paradigm of physics to the Einsteinian model. Analogously, such events are part of the other truth-procedures such as art transforming of our capacity to express, love introducing a radical difference when one falls in love and sees that love through, and politics refiguring the ways in which the collective can come together through revolutions. Therefore, the localization of the void is tied to the determinations of these conditions as their situation which acts as their encyclopedic totality, which is now confronted with an indiscernible element to account for.

The void must be thought as a pure point. Its localization is a process of punctuality of something indiscernible in a historical situation that stands at the edge of the void, as Badiou writes: "An event is always in a point of a situation... The event is attached, in its very definition, to the place, to the point, in which the historicity of the situation is concentrated"³⁹. In *Logics of Worlds*, Badiou provides a more robust theory of points from his phenomenological stand point whereby "A point [...] concentrates the appearing of a truth in a place of the world. Points deploy the topology of the appearing of the True"⁴⁰. Thus, the localization of truth holds a crucial place in Badiou's systematic philosophy.

While a truth may appear in one place, nothing stops it from dislocating itself into another location. This is most tangible when we think about emancipatory projects insofar as they take place in a variety of historical moments and geopolitical locations, thus space and time are only vectors for the punctuation of truth along their axis. At one moment, we may have localized the emancipatory project against the oppression and slavery of humanity as in the instance of the name of "Spartacus" around which a political body proclaimed: "We slaves, we want to and can return home". As a subject subjectivizes the event, it comes to nominate the event by making the indiscernible discernable and the inconsistent consistent in such a manner that this point in the situation has consequences for the situation as a whole, as Badiou writes, the proper name designates "the incorporation of the event into the situation in the mode of a generic procedure"⁴¹.

The subject sees the consequences of an event through by adopting a faithful subjective attitude towards the event. However, this doesn't mean that it is the only subjective attitude. In the instance of the proclamation made around the name of "Spartacus", we find reactionary attitudes denying and repressing the event as well as obscurantist attitudes which foreclose the possibility of such an event by making a saturated totality such as in the transcendental body of God. Thus, while a revolutionary fire may ignite the mobilization of faithful subjects, reactionary and obscurantist subject can extinguish the possibility that the revolutionary tries to introduce into the world.

Nonetheless, revolutions have continued and continue to happen. In the name of "Spartacus" alone, we find reactivations of these names by other revolutionaries from different places and times such as Toussaint-Louverture as well as Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. As Badiou writes: "together with the truth of which it is correlate [...] the subject whose name is «Spartacus» travels from world to world through the centuries. Ancient Spartacus, black Spartacus, red Spartacus"⁴². This reactivation of

³⁹ A. Badiou, *Being and event*, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

⁴⁰ A. Badiou, *Logics of worlds: being and event II*, New York, Continuum, 2009a, p. 409.

⁴¹ A. Badiou, *Being and event*, New York, Continuum, 2007a., p. 393.

⁴² A. Badiou., *Logics of worlds: being and event II*, op. cit., p. 65.

³⁷ A. Badiou, *Being and event*, op. cit., p. 432.

³⁸ A. Badiou, *Infinite thought*, London, Continuum Intl Pub Group, 2003c, p. 85.

truths is what defines resurrection as a subjective attitude. What we learn here is that, while we may have localized the void at one point and sought to make it consistent, the void may insist in in-consisting: “The insistence of the void in-consists as de-localization”⁴³. Nonetheless, it does not mean that we are not able to apprehend a truth just because we are dislocated from one point that localizes the void. Rather, at times that truth and its name may need to be resurrected by re-localizing them into another time and another place however singular they may be in the way that they appropriate that name and that truth⁴⁴.

This means that the delocalization and relocalization of truths hold no insignificant place in Badiou’s philosophy either. As Badiou writes in *Metapolitics*: “... the central activity of politics is the meeting is a local metonymy of its intrinsically collective, and therefore principally universal, being”⁴⁵. This metonymical dislocation mobilizes political sequences along a variety of indices such as the various adoptions of the name “Spartacus”, the transformations of Marxism along various different frontlines, and national banners that act as their “empirical indices”⁴⁶. In this weaving, we begin to unearth the oscillation between both the local and the global, the particular and the universal, the variant and the invariant, the discontinuous and the continuous, and so on.

When we talk about fidelity and betrayals in emancipatory projects, we walk a thin line in regards to what we may declare to continue the spirit of the movement or what discontinues its historical sequence as if they were mutually exclusive declarations. In some ways, the most orthodox fidelity to a truth may be in fact its true betrayal, whereas the seeming overt betrayal may be the true fidelity. In seeking the true revolutionary and the true Marxist, one can unwittingly spouse horrific violence as an attempt to eliminate the distance that keeps us away from the “real” Marxist through the scrutiny of suspicion. As Badiou writes to caution us:

All the subjective categories of revolutionary, or absolute, politics –“conviction”, “loyalty”, “virtue”, “class position”, “obeying the Party”, “revolutionary zeal” and so on– are tainted by the suspicion that the supposedly real point of the category is actually nothing but semblance⁴⁷.

On the other end, the seeming betrayal of Marxism may be crucial for reading the room of the situation that calls for emancipation. It is in this way that Badiou adopts a Maoist outlook to his Idea of communism, since the revolutionary subject had to be rethought of from the proletariat to the peasant in the instance of the Chinese revolution. In his commentary on the peasant movement in Hunan, Mao localizes an eventual site and

Lenin echoes such localization^{48 49}. Thus, for Badiou, fidelity is not strictly speaking a general disposition since it is always particular to its situation, thus we have no use for a generalized Marxist faith that the subject can adopt as ready-made.

Nonetheless in the context of the Idea of communism, Badiou argues that subjectivation acts as “the link between the local belonging to a political procedure and the huge symbolic domain of Humanity’s forward march towards its collective emancipation”⁵⁰. Fidelity is a conviction in the examination of situations that the subject is localized in⁵¹. And besides this historical situation, truth has an universal dimension in such a manner that it can be localized, delocalized, and relocalized without being paralyzed by this historical horizon where it punctuates itself. Between the finite and the infinite, this oscillatory movement in Badiou’s philosophy is properly transfinite and its stakes are absolute with respect with both the being of truth and its existential possibility. As he concludes “The Idea of Communism”:

By combining intellectual constructs, which are always global and universal, with experiments of fragments of truths, which are local and singular, yet universally transmittable, we can give new life to the communist hypothesis, or rather to the Idea of communism, in individual consciousnesses⁵².

III. Tracing Truth and Philosophy: Badiou’s Analysis of Lacan and the Paradigms of Psychoanalysis

Figures like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Lacan hold significant importance in Alain Badiou’s thought as anti-philosophers whose thought cannot be completely circumscribed within the field of philosophy. According to Alain Badiou, the hallmark of anti-philosophy is the following:

- (1) A deposing of the category of truth.
- (2) The recognition that philosophy cannot be reduced to its discursive appearance of propositions and that it is an act.
- (3) The move against the philosophical act to a radically new act⁵³.

Although each of Badiou’s anti-philosophers have contributed distinct ideas and perspectives that have influenced Badiou’s understanding of truth, philosophy, and the nature of ontology, this section will specifically focus on the contributions of Jacques Lacan. While Badiou was influenced by a type of singularity in Ki-

⁴³ A. Badiou, *Being and event*, op. cit., p. 77.

⁴⁴ A. Badiou, *Metapolitics*, New York, Verso, 2006, p. 33.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 142.

⁴⁶ A. Badiou, “The idea of communism”, en S. Žižek y C. Douzinas (eds.), *The idea of communism*, New York, Verso, 2010a.

⁴⁷ A. Badiou, *The century*, Great Britain, Polity, 2007b, pp. 52-53.

⁴⁸ M. Tse-Tung, “Report on an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan (March 1927)”, en M. Tse-Tung, *Selected readings from the works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1971, p. 28.

⁴⁹ V. I. Lenin, “Theses on the national and colonial questions”, en R. C. Tucker (ed.), *The Lenin anthology*, New York, W.W. Norton, 1975, p. 625.

⁵⁰ A. Badiou, “The idea of communism”, op. cit. p. 4.

⁵¹ A. Badiou, *Being and event*, op. cit., p. 233.

⁵² A. Badiou, “The idea of communism”, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵³ A. Badiou, *Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy*, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

erkegaard as faith, in Wittgenstein as the limits of language, and in Nietzsche as the act of creation of values and will to power, he has been influenced by Lacan's theories on the unconscious, the role of language, and the structure of desire challenge traditional notions of subjectivity and truth. Badiou considers Lacan as the last great anti-philosopher of modernity, valuing his insights into the nature of truth in the Real within psychoanalysis and the complex interplay between language, desire, and the unconscious.

Lacan's emphasis on the symbolic order and the construction of knowledge informs Badiou's understanding of truth as a process of subjectivation. As with all the anti-philosophers, it is by engaging with Lacan's ideas that Badiou seeks to uncover new avenues of thought, challenge established philosophical frameworks, and explore the nature of truth and subjectivity. Their contributions enrich Badiou's philosophical framework and provide a foundation for his unique approach to understanding truth and philosophy.

Badiou states that the "contemporary philosopher" is "he or she who has the courage to cross through, without faltering, the anti-philosophy of Lacan"⁵⁴ (Badiou, 2009, p. 144). Lacan's deconstruction of conventional notions of truth and the exploration of the unconscious challenged established philosophical frameworks. By reframing truth as an intricate interplay between language, *jouissance*, the Real, and the unconscious, rather than philosophical knowledge, the later Lacan of the 1960s and 70s fundamentally altered our understanding of truth within the context of psychoanalysis. While for Badiou, Nietzsche's philosophical act of life-affirmation consists in creating new values against reactive nihilistic ones, Lacan's act involves an eclipsing of knowledge through the traversing of fantasy. Nietzsche's act is archi-political, while Lacan's act is archi-scientific, in that it centers on the matheme. For Lacan, this means that psychoanalysis is not traditionally mathematic, but rather represented by the "impasse of the mathematizable"⁵⁵. The teachable or sayable aspect of the Real is represented in the matheme.

In Badiou's own thought, mathematics as set theory allows us to think coherently about the multiplicity of being which would otherwise be disseminated. Badiou is influenced by Lacan's view that the Real is beyond language, and mathematics offers a way for us to think through the Real. While philosophy is characterized by a love for truth, psychoanalysis brings attention to truth's weakness, a process that is known as castration. For Badiou, the philosopher's way to truth is "blocked" by mathematics, but "Lacan is the philosopher's plumber"⁵⁶. As for its relation to truth, Lacan's thought is not diametrically opposed to the category of philosophical truth but rather, Badiou contends that Lacan's work as an anti-philosopher lies in his ability to question and challenge existing philosophical assumptions, thereby pushing the boundaries of knowledge and truth in relation to

the subject. For Lacan, there is an aspect of being that cannot be fully known, and yet analysis is supposed to establish the knowledge of the truth about subjects, and consists in the mastery of language about truth. There is thus a tension in psychoanalysis that consists in the act where the analysand stops supposing that the knowledge that they take on is possessed by the analyst. In other words, for the psychoanalytic act to take place, the analysand must cease being a subject who is supposed to know, and to cease viewing the analyst as a teacher or one who imparts knowledge. Badiou states that in Lacan, "truth is always in an eclipse between supposed knowledge and transmissible knowledge"⁵⁷. Lacan also states that knowing about how to deal with the unconscious is not the same as absolute knowledge⁵⁸. For Lacan, the analytic act of treatment consists in raising the subject's impotence, which accounts for fantasy, to impossibility, which embodies the real. In other words, a person enters analysis because they are impotent in some way, and they are pushed against a wall of impossibility where they are left to make a choice. For Lacan, the Real is not known, but only de-monstrated. The de-monstration of the Real is carried out by a form of correct symbolization, and it is important to bring up the category of anxiety in this regard. Constraint is the formalization that constructs the impasse in which the Real is summoned as impossibility in analysis. Anxiety is characterized by the inability of a subject to correctly symbolize, a blockage of symbolization as they experience a surplus of the Real, and Lacan refers to it as a lack of lack⁵⁹.

The analyst's desire is a desire for the matheme, which is frustrated as it occurs at a tension between mastery and anxiety. One primary goal of Lacanian analysis is working through and treatment of the symptom, and this will lead to our discussion of love in Lacan and Badiou. A Lacanian *sinthome* is a symptom that has been disconnected from the unconscious and yet has been formed from it. It is a form of pure *jouissance* that lies outside meaning. Enjoyment is made possible in a subject's connection to their *sinthome*. In the last Lacan, there is a certain problematic aspect of the *sinthome* in that it leads a subject to become radically isolated from others and from the symbolic order, as in James Joyce, who found a *jouissance* in his *sinthomatic* relation to language⁶⁰. In the later Lacan, it is love that stands in for the isolation of the *sinthome* by allowing for a relation to the alterity of the Other⁶¹. We can compare Lacan's view of love to that of Badiou's. While for Lacan, love is predicated on a type of lack, and psychoanalysis is also predicated on a type of love as transference. For Badiou, love is a fundamental condition for the creation of new possibilities and the transcendence of one's own

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 76.

⁵⁸ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIV: L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à Mourre*, 1991a.

⁵⁹ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book X: Anxiety: 1962-1963*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007.

⁶⁰ J. Lacan, *The Sinthome, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXII*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016.

⁶¹ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIV: L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à Mourre*, op. cit.

⁵⁴ A. Badiou, *Conditions*, London, Continuum, 2009b, p. 144.

⁵⁵ A. Badiou, *Lacan: Anti-Philosophy 3*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2018, p. 95.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

limitations, and for Badiou, love gives way to a type of event⁶².

Lacan's concept of subjectivity revolutionizes our understanding of the self by challenging the conventional notion of an autonomous and self-contained individual subject. According to Lacan, the subject is not a fixed entity but rather a product of external influences, including social structures, cultural norms, and linguistic frameworks. In Seminars 1-3, he argues that our subjectivity is shaped and defined by the symbolic order, the network of language and signifiers that permeates our social and cultural environment. This paradigm shift in understanding subjectivity has profound implications for how we situate ourselves within broader contexts. It prompts us to recognize that our identities and experiences are not isolated or disconnected from the world around us. Instead, they are extimate, using the words of Lacan, and intricately intertwined with historical, cultural, and social factors that influence our understanding of ourselves and our place in society^{63 64 65}.

By acknowledging the influence of language, desire, and unconscious processes, we gain a deeper appreciation for the complexities of human existence. Language acts as a medium through which meaning is constructed, shaping our perception of reality and mediating our interactions with others. The Real is beyond language, and yet the full meaning of the Real lies in experience as deconstructed through the analytic act and mathematics. Desire, as a fundamental aspect of human experience, plays a significant role in shaping our motivations and actions. Lacan's perspective of truth encourages a more nuanced exploration of subjective experiences within the context of broader historical, cultural, and social factors. It invites us to critically examine the narratives and ideologies that shape our understanding of ourselves and our place in society.

By deconstructing established norms and challenging dominant narratives, we can gain a more accurate and authentic understanding of our own subjectivity. Moreover, Lacan's paradigm prompts us to recognize the entanglement of subjectivity with larger structures and systems of power. It highlights the ways in which social hierarchies, power dynamics, and cultural discourses shape and constrain our subjectivity. By questioning and interrogating these structures, we can strive for a more emancipatory and inclusive understanding of subjectivity that challenges oppressive systems and fosters social change. In essence, Lacan's paradigm of subjectivity invites us to move beyond an individualistic and isolated conception of the self. It compels us to consider the complex interplay between language, desire, and unconscious processes, and the ways in which they shape our understanding of ourselves as subjects. By sit-

uating ourselves within broader historical, cultural, and social contexts, we can gain a more profound awareness of our own subjectivity and actively participate in shaping a more just and inclusive society.

In conclusion, Alain Badiou's analysis of Lacan and his place as the last great anti-philosopher of modernity sheds light on the intricate relationship between truth, philosophy, and psychoanalysis. Lacan's views on knowledge and epistemology challenge traditional philosophical conceptions, emphasizing the role of language, desire, and the unconscious in shaping our understanding of truth. Furthermore, Lacan's paradigm of subjectivity opens up new possibilities for situating ourselves within time, space, and history, highlighting the interconnectedness between the individual subject and broader socio-cultural structures. Through Badiou's exploration of Lacan, we gain valuable insights into the rich tapestry of ideas that underpin the philosophy of psychoanalysis, inspiring us to continually question and redefine our understanding of truth and ourselves as subjects in the world.

IV. Dude, Where's my Truth?

In Susan Spitzer and Kenneth Reinhard's translation of *The Immanence of Truths*, we find a chatty, humorous Badiou recounting talking to himself, in the second-person, in an excerpt of the parodic, "cautious version" of his New Year's greetings that he introduces Chapter C8 –on "The Phenomenology of Covering-Over"– with⁶⁶. He here tells his audience that, preparatorily, I said to myself, speaking familiarly to myself, from one finite individual to another: "Dude, if you present your New Year's greetings to your seminar, just like that, to a bunch of people, many of whom you don't know, you'll be taking a risk. So you won't be safe. And so you won't be free"⁶⁷. Indeed, as Kurt Cobain once sang: "Truth, covered in security"⁶⁸.

What are we seeing here? This finite environment –or, these conditions: of the cautious address, or statement– that are delineated by Badiou in his exemplification, Noam Chomsky (however unlikely a bedfellow) has described well, famously, and plainly, laying out that:

The smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum –even encourage the more critical and dissident views. That gives people the sense that there's free thinking going on, while all the time the presuppositions of the system are being reinforced by the limits put on the range of the debate⁶⁹.

Chomsky is demonstrating to us the structuration of the *realm of opinion*, which Badiou (whilst recognising

⁶² A. Badiou, *In Praise of Love*, New York, The New Press, 2012.

⁶³ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book I, Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-1954*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1991b.

⁶⁴ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1991c.

⁶⁵ J. Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III, The Psychoses 1955-1956*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.

⁶⁶ A. Badiou, *The Immanence of Truths: Being and Event III*, London, Bloomsbury, 2022, p.199.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 195.

⁶⁸ Nirvana, "Lounge Act", en Nirvana, *Nevermind*, Los Angeles, Gefen, 1991.

⁶⁹ N. Chomsky, *The Common Good*, Berkeley, Odonian Press, 1998, p. 43.

that it's "a tricky one that... Philosophy may resist the content of opinions, but that does not mean it can ignore their existence"⁷⁰) so clearly, and clarificatorily, gives us the measure of at so many points, a first lovely and conversational example of which presents us with consequences of the controlled terrain that Chomsky diagnoses (before we enter into just why and how it operates as such). In their colloquy on Martin Heidegger, Badiou responds to Barbara Cassin:

I naturally contend that, under the present circumstances, we have to hold fast to truths, their existence, and their effects, given that the circulation and communication of opinions are turning the most important of our intellectual fetishes, "freedom of opinion," into the epitome of meaninglessness. Saying "Cassin and Badiou contend that" does in fact contrast, owing to a certain high-mindedness, with the friendly, congenial, humble "Barbara Cassin and her friend and colleague Alain Badiou would be quite happy to maintain, along with other people, and easily imagining that the opposite could just as well be maintained, the point of view that..."⁷¹.

Here we see (through Badiou's parodic concluding example) how –discursively; *ideologically*– the anti-freedom of a certain relativism parades under the name of "freedom" in this conjuncture, which resists the erection and promulgation of an(y) Idea; covers-over Truth, and its procedures; relativises the state of things to a point in which the ruling classes are taken to be of 'equal value' to the working classes; poverty of 'equal value' to wealth (accumulation); ownership of the modes of production to that of exploitation, within the utter cynicism of this "spectrum of opinion", which treats these "equal values" as something like its "protected identities", against which activists are thus set up as being (discriminatively) opposed. That is: by fixing in place the definitiveness (the *definitude*) of these disparities first –by establishing them, confectedly, as quilting-points of "the range of debate"– their "equal standing" (really, as signifiers emptied of all material content, or relation) can become championed (ultimately, by these fixers –whom the disparities benefit– themselves). When everything weighs the same, "all that is solid melts into air", to use Marx and Engels' famous phrase (to whom we will return momentarily). This operation is what Badiou terms "covering-over":

it creates false memories, cruel myths, and, ultimately, qualifies, determines, or modifies the historical significance of what has happened. Thus, covering-over is a long-term operation, a sort of poison infiltrating time. It is a steady disfigurement of what has taken place, with the result that this having-taken-place is forever unrecognizable⁷².

What gets covered-over is (*an*, or *an instance of*) infinity, or the (eternal) mark of its irruption; that is,

⁷⁰ A. Badiou, *The Meaning of Sarkozy*, London: Verso, 2010b, p. 7.

⁷¹ A. Badiou y B. Cassin, *Heidegger: His Life and His Philosophy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2016, pp. 13-14.

⁷² A. Badiou, *The Immanence of Truths: Being and Event III*, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-201.

that made through an *event*: it is (although often very forcefully, always only ever *partially* successfully) covered-over by operators of finitude, which Badiou describes the (set-theoretic) operations of in *The Immanence of Truths*:

It is important to note that finitude, here, is not reduced to static configurations. It is the process of destroying any potential infinity by means of finite constructions.

I suggested calling this procedure "covering-over"[.] We can now have a more precise ontological definition of it. A covering-over is the operation whereby an infinite multiplicity [...] is covered over by constructible sets[.] And even more precisely, it is a matter of determining the (ontological) conditions of possibility for covering-over. What, in a true universe, in the absolute universe, can prevent such and such an infinite multiplicity from being covered over by constructible sets? What *must* the absolute be in order for us to be able to restrict the fundamental operation of all oppression, namely, finite covering-over?⁷³.

Thus, since opening this subsection, we have proceeded from finitist exemplars of covering-over back through the structurations and operationality that underpin them, to the arena of (types of) infinity and the absolute, and irruptions of the immanence of truths, via *events*. It is over this last category that finite constructible sets get mobilized to cover its infinite multiplicities. This reading "back" from the phenomenology of covering-over's being-there to its ontological conditions is perhaps similar to the strategy of identification of root causes (and only thereafter effects that stem from them, in terms) of societal ills, which Badiou finds –and advocates for– in Marxian/communist analysis, via the usage of a "principal ultrafilter", that which, in set theory, goes beyond the simpler (and more insidious) mode of "principal filtration" –which allows in this example for the flourishing of opinions that covers-over said root cause– and that gets to the core of things: that which really gives rise to the particulars of a situation. Beyond these types of filtration lies the "non-principal ultrafilter", via which Badiou is able to get closer to the absolute, and its universality, and through which the infinity of such absoluteness and universality can be uncovered *immanently*-dialectically linking up with the external infinities, "extimately". As Badiou puts it:

In its theoretical analysis of social forms and their corresponding ideology, communism, which is supposed to get to the bottom of things, cannot be satisfied with simply noting a *filtering* of dominant opinions. It must above all ensure the analytical, intellectual promotion of the *principal ultrafilter*, Capital, beyond the simple obvious filter that constitutes bourgeois "modernity". It is in this sense that it "gets to the root" of things, that it is "radical". Marx's *Manifesto* consists largely in shifting from an analysis in terms of the principal *filter* (the vile acts and untruths of the dominant ideology and the concrete forms of bourgeois society) to an analysis in terms of the principal *ultrafilter*: Capital, its growth, its concentration,

⁷³ *Ibidem*, p. 389.

and its circulation as the unified core of an ultrafiltering of society as a whole⁷⁴.

Uncovering –via analyses “in terms of the principal *ultrafilter*”– brings us closer to what is really going on in the “fundamental operation of all oppression, namely, finite covering-over”, and thus drops hints at “what the absolute *must* be in order for us to be able to restrict” its coverings-over. This, in part, is what gets at the undiminishable relevance, interminable persistence, and always-revolutionary potential of Marx for Badiou, whose oeuvre in this respect Isabelle Garo interestingly characterizes by identifying the ways in which its “invocation of communism, along with the publication and wide distribution of books that articulate this identification, is always a political, constitutive gesture”, which, in her eyes, “manag[es] the exploit of converting itself into a robust, incisive philosophy that perseveres in maintaining the momentum of the revolution in its very absence”⁷⁵. In this respect –away from the economic ins and outs of Marx’s analyses (which Badiou clearly knows like the back of his hand, even if they do not become his main focus)– Marx and Marxism is an *always-resurrectable* force, or, indeed, *event*; and one to which he naturally maintains fidelity.

The notion of *resurrection* was invoked earlier in our article: let us return to it via the book on Saint Paul; in it, Badiou clarifies that resurrection “is not, in Paul’s own eyes, of the order of fact, falsifiable or demonstrable”, instead, Badiou emphasizes:

It is pure event, opening of an epoch, transformation of the relations between the possible and the impossible. For the interest of Christ’s resurrection does not lie in itself, as it would in the case of a particular, or miraculous, fact. Its genuine meaning is that it testifies to the possible victory over death, a death that Paul envisages[,] not in terms of facticity, but in terms of subjective disposition. Whence the necessity of constantly linking resurrection to *our* resurrection, or proceeding from singularity to universality and vice versa: “If the dead do not resurrect, Christ is not resurrected either. And if Christ is not resurrected, your faith is in vain” (Cor. I.15.16). In contrast to the fact, the event is measurable only in accordance with the universal multiplicity whose possibility it prescribes⁷⁶.

A subjective disposition that is *victorious over death*: this is so much (of) what Badiou’s project is about; that is, what this disposition can bring *to life* (see also, in regard to this, and in relation to Wilhelm Reich’s own *life drive*: Bristow, 2023⁷⁷). *Bringing to life*, in the double sense: of the fabled Christological *bringing-back-to-life* here, but also in that of how a certain infinity can irrupt into, and be brought out in, our finitude (for it is always already (t)here, although it gets covered-over, as much by that process’s societal operations as by its subject-

tive ones, and in their dialectic; as current, resurrecting moves towards a more *psychosocial* –or, dialectically materialist– clinical psychoanalysis are drawing out). Like Lacan’s “little bits of the Real”, Badiou emphasizes local irruptions of infinity –“infinite sets of finite subsets”– (specifically in relation to the category of event of politics here) in the third instalment of the *Being and Event* trilogy:

The real force of emancipatory action does not ultimately lie in a sort of massive infinity, a sort of totalizing mass movement, even if the eventual form of such movements is required. It results from the existence, everywhere, of meetings, cells, core groups, that can refract the general movement at the level of the life of the masses, promote the Idea everywhere, organize the largest rallies, monitor the government, train cadres, and so on. These unities are certainly extracted from the infinite ground of the general situation and are themselves potentially infinite in number, since they must exist everywhere in time and space, as much as possible. But each of them only contains a finite number of elements of the infinite situation. Thus, once the emancipatory force reaches its organizational stage, it is represented not by a massively infinite subset of the infinite set that is the situation but by an infinite set of finite subsets whose elements are extracted from the infinite “ground”⁷⁸.

This “ground” –and its “refractions”– could be said to provide for Badiou “the evidence of a complete infinity, its actual emergence”, which is “what ensures us that a truth creates, in a particular world, the possibility of participating, as a Subject, both locally and globally, in the absoluteness on which such a truth is based”⁷⁹. Thus, to the individual(ist) question, “where is *my* truth?” (from which –within the covered-over constructed set of finitude– is expected the personal mitigation of risk, deliverance from unsafety, and conferral of freedom), a universal answer is being perpetually motioned towards (always with the momentum of revolution; even in the absence of revolution): fundamentally, that truth *is* immanent, universal; unificatory/separatorily constituting us *as subject*, as is so precisely and presciently laid out in Badiou’s book on the theory thereof.

V. Conclusion

In this article we have started from the name and the name of the resurrection as that which sustains a truth. That is to say, of the naming not as that which carries meaning but to repair the incident, that is, to locate the emptiness of the event. Therefore, this implies the separation of knowledge from meaning or, if you will, of knowledge and truth. In this sense, it can be affirmed that “The name will guarantee within language that the event is sheltered”⁸⁰. However, the name is not only limited to being a shelter: it is also a resurrection, as ex-

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 300.

⁷⁵ I. Garo, *Communism and Strategy: Rethinking Political Mediations*, London, Verso, 2023, p. 51.

⁷⁶ A. Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁷⁷ D. Bristow, “In the Absence of Politics: A Matter of Life and Death Drive”, en N. Barria-Asenjo y S. Žižek (eds.), *Modalities of Political Jouissance*, London, Bloomsbury, forthcoming, 2023.

⁷⁸ A. Badiou, *The Immanence of Truths: Being and Event III*, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-279.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 366.

⁸⁰ A. Badiou, *On Beckett*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

emplified in the case of the figure of St. Paul. And such naming refers to a universal truth in the sense that it does not depend on any particular circumstance:

Ultimately, Paul's undertaking, which, in the final analysis, it is right to consider as a progressive innovation, consists in *making universalizing egalitarianism pass through the reversibility of an inegalitarian rule*. This at once allows him to avoid irresolvable arguments over the rule (which he assumes at the outset) and to arrange the global situation so that universality *is able* to affect particularizing differences in return: in this instance the difference between sexes⁸¹.

Now, the location of the void depends on an event, because the event, as a novel and undecidable whole, exhibits the void on which every situation is sustained. But the void must be thought of as a mere point, that is, as that which "concentrates the appearing of a truth in a place of the world"⁸². And for this same reason there is a variety of historical moments where it is possible for an event to be punctuated. Only when in these moments the event is named as such does the unfolding of the subjective consequences of a generic procedure take place. But these consequences are not always the same. On the one hand, there may be subjects who act in a manner consistent with the novelty of the event: such is the case of "fidelity" to it. On the other hand, there may be reactive subjects who deny the event and, moreover, obscure subjects who recognize the event, but only to annihilate it. It is here that authentic fidelity to the Marxist emancipatory project can be thought of. Given that each event emerges in a particular situation, it makes no sense to think of fidelity to an ahistorical concept of Marxism, which would become an orthodox and essentialist position. It is what Badiou names under the concept of disaster, a notion that always lurks in the name of communism (but which in reality must be thought of as a possible scenario):

This is what makes thinking the destiny of communism so difficult, what makes its disaster so clearly devoid of thought. Since this disaster is universally presented as a disaster of sense. The communist enterprise is designated as criminal less than it is as absurd, or in other words: as devoid of sense. In this judgement sense is imputed to the naturalness of the capitalist economy. The madness (*insensé*) of communism is that it aspired to subtract itself from the naturalness of sense, capitalist and parliamentary. Yet, we must, contrary to this common opinion, argue exactly the opposite. Communism was exposed disaster because Stalinism saturated politics with philosophemes, and thus with a disastrous excess of sense; which obliterated every truth, *because it presented sense itself as a truth*. The disaster was not a disaster of sense, but a disaster of truth through sense, under the effects of sense⁸³.

On the contrary, the properly Marxist fidelity is presented as immanently heretical, that is, adequate to each singular situation. In order to think truth in this new

sense, we can even make a contrast with Lacan, Badiou's teacher. Indeed, for both there is a relationship between truth and subjectification: "truth is always in an eclipse between supposed knowledge and transmissible knowledge"⁸⁴. That is to say, for the subjects who shape a truth procedure, truth always appears as something not to be known immediately but to be experienced in a militant way by questioning all already established knowledge that gave a previous stability to the subject.

But with this we also have the guideline to oppose the terrain of opinions. It is a fact that we live in the tyranny of opinion. We all give our opinion on everything, we are obliged to give our opinion and we live on the opinion of others. Nevertheless, taking up the Platonic gesture, philosophy must mark the clear boundary between truth and opinion. Faced with the relativism that all opinions are valid and that there is, therefore, no truth in the face of this wasteland of freedom and tolerance posed by capitalist democracy, philosophy must vigorously assert, all the more violently, that there are truths as the immortal parts of mankind:

True is the calling of the immortal part of men, of the inhuman excess that lies in man. Contemporary scepticism –the scepticism of cultures, history and self-expression– is not of this calibre. It merely conforms to the rhetoric of instants and the politics of opinions. Accordingly, it begins by dissolving the inhuman into the human, then the human into everyday life, then everyday (or animal) life into the atonicity of the world. It is from this dissolution that stems the negative maxim "Live without Idea", which is incoherent because it no longer has any idea of what an Idea could be⁸⁵.

Thinking from a properly philosophical point of view, which in Badiou's case is the point of view of mathematics, it is a matter of thinking truths as a "covering-over", as we can see in *The Immanence of Truths*. This shows the deep ontological conditions for the emergence of a truth. But it also presents a parallel with the Marxist analysis of the root causes of current social ills. This is only possible because beyond making a filter against the dominant opinions, which conceal the exploitative nature of capitalism, Marx performs an ultrafilter, which consists in elucidating the nature of capital as a valorization of value, that is, as an autonomous subject that places itself in the exchange value, in such a way that it informs the totality of social relations^{86 87 88 89 90}. And

⁸⁴ A. Badiou, *Lacan: Anti-Philosophy* 3, p. 76.

⁸⁵ A. Badiou, *The Immanence of Truths: Being and Event III*, *op. cit.*, p. 511.

⁸⁶ J. Ayala-Colqui, "Subjetividad y subjetivación en Marx: una lectura confrontativa a partir de Heidegger y Foucault". *Tópicos*, 61, 2021, pp. 109-144.

⁸⁷ J. Ayala-Colqui, "El nacimiento del «liberfascismo» y los distintos modos de gestión de la pandemia en América Latina". *Prometeica*, 24, 2022, pp. 182-199

⁸⁸ J. Ayala-Colqui, "El nacimiento del «ciberalismo». Una genealogía crítica de la gubernamentalidad de Silicon Valley". *Bajo Palabra*, 32, 2023, pp. 221-254.

⁸⁹ N. A. Barria-Asenjo, *et al.*, "Alain Badiou, el horizonte comunista más allá de la violencia: una mirada exploratoria al siglo XXI". *Revista Guillermo de Ockham*, 21(2), 2023a, pp. 385-396

⁹⁰ N. A. Barria-Asenjo, S. Žižek, B. Willems, A. Perunovic, G. Salas. y J. Ayala-Colqui, "Redefining the Common Causes of Social

⁸¹ A. Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁸² A. Badiou, *Logics of worlds: being and event II*, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

⁸³ A. Badiou, *Conditions*, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

it is here that we must locate the reason why Marxism is an always-resurrectable force: the resurrection of a truth that always involves upsetting the boundaries between the possible and the impossible. Marxism implies a resurrection of political truth insofar as it can bring to life. And in such an event the personal truth does not cease to be, at the same time, a universal truth. Moreover, communism must be situated here not as an *a priori*

truth to be imposed, a utopia to be built, but simply as a hypothesis that lies what will have been true in politics, that is, “the political name of the egalitarian discipline of truths”⁹¹. In this regard, it can be stated: “Militancy and fidelity are nothing other than the uncertain insistence of a possibility of transformation of the world, of the becoming-subject, of a possibility of multiple possibles”⁹². This, then, is Badiou’s lesson on revolutionary fidelity.

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⁹² N. A. Barria-Asenjo, et al., “Alain Badiou, el horizonte comunista más allá de la violencia: una mirada exploratoria al siglo XXI”, op. cit., p. 395.

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