THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS. COORDINATING "BADGES, BOOTS, SUITS AND SANDALS"*

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PALABRAS CLAVE

Seguridad, desarrollo, Reforma del Sector de la Seguridad.

RESUMEN

La necesidad de un nexo entre seguridad y desarrollo tanto en términos políticos como programáticos es, a día de hoy, imperativa. El acalorado debate de los años 90 sobre la relación entre seguridad y desarrollo ha extendido la opinión de que no puede haber seguridad sin desarrollo ni desarrollo sin seguridad. Es evidente que si los Estados colaboran en la creación de las condiciones para escapar de la espiral descendente en la que inseguridad, criminalización y subdesarrollo, se refuerzan mutuamente, las dimensiones socioeconómicas y de seguridad tendrán que ser abordadas simultáneamente. En este contexto bilateral y multilateral, actores gubernamentales y no gubernamentales han comenzado a considerar el reto de la inseguridad como una barrera para el desarrollo político, económico y social.

* The phrase "Bagdes, Boots, Suits and Sandals", refers to the police, the military, the diplomats and the development practitioners. The authors cannot take the credit for this phrase which was used during a Canadian hosted meeting on whole-government approaches in post-conflict contexts. The phrase underlines the challenge of whole-of-government actions, due to the real and perceived culture of difference between different government actors working together in post-conflict contexts.

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ABSTRACT

The need for a nexus between security and development both in policy terms and programmatic terms is now a given. Heated debate in the 90's about the relationship between security and development have set up a more widely view that there can't be security without development and development without security. It is increasingly clear that if States are to collaborate in creating the conditions to escape from a downward spiral wherein insecurity, criminalisation and under-development, they are mutually reinforcing, socio-economic and security dimensions must be tackled simultaneously. In this bilateral and multilateral context, governmental and non-governmental actors are beginning to see the challenge of insecurity as a barrier to political, economic and social development.

RÉSUMÉ

Le besoin d'un lien entre la sécurité et le développement tant politically comme programmatically speaking est, aujourd'hui, impérative. Le débat animé des années 90 sur la relation entre sécurité et développement a étendu l'opinion qu'il ne peut pas y avoir de sécurité sans développement ni de développement sans sécurité. Il est clair que si les États collaborent dans la creation des conditions pour échapper à la spirale descendante dans laquelle l'insécurité, la criminalisation et le sous-développement se renforcent mutuellement, les dimensions socio-économiques et la sécurité doivent être abordés simultanément. Dans ce contexte bilatéral et multilatéral, les acteurs gouvernementales et non gouvernementales ont commencé à examiner le défi de l'insécurité comme un obstacle pour le développement politique, économique et sociale.

Introduction

The need for a nexus between security and development both in policy terms and programmatic terms is now a given. Heated debate in the 90's about the relationship between security and development have set up a more widely view that there can't be security without development and development without security. The UN Report '*In Larger Freedom' (2005)* clearly endorsed this view, as other key policy documents did, including the *European Security Strategy (2005)* and the OECD DAC *Guidelines on Helping to Prevent Violence Conflict.* As it was

outlined in *Helping to Prevent Violence Conflict* "poverty and insecurity systematically reinforce each other and therefore, the response needs to address both simultaneously."[1] The international community have learned hard but valuable lessons from their recent efforts to prevent conflict and build peace in contexts as diverse as Timor Leste, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo. It is increasingly clear that if States are to collaborate in creating the conditions to escape from a downward spiral wherein insecurity, criminalisation and under-development, they are mutually reinforcing, socio-economic and security dimensions must be tackled simultaneously. In this bilateral and multilateral context, governmental and non-governmental actors are beginning to see the challenge of insecurity as a barrier to political, economical and social development.

While the need for coherence between security and development is evident at the normative level, 'the devil is in the detail,' insofar as the foundational and technical complexities only really come to the fore when security and development is operationalised. The diverse challenges that have to be tackled in post-conflict contexts - rebuilding or, in many cases, creating basic service provision -requires a diverse set of skills. The capacity required to rebuild health, education, security and justice services can rarely be found in one government agency or actor, and herein lies the challenge of coherence, coordination and harmonisation of international actions. As the sub-title of this chapter suggests, the different government departments bring with them perceived and real cultural differences. Each government actor has a different mandate, and brings different skills, approaches and capacity to the task. This chapter will explore the challenges (both interpretational and practical) inherent in ensuring a coherent approach to stabilisation and peacebuilding activities and will present a number of concrete recommendations that can enhance the impact of international support in these contexts. The question is posed whether the international community has the systems and capacity in place to be able to secure the peace and work effectively across the security-development nexus to ensure long-term and sustainable stability.

The interpretation challenges

What is security

One of the challenges facing the practical development of the security-development nexus is the fact that the notion of security differs from one context

1. OECD DAC, *Guidelines on helping to prevent violent conflict*, Paris, 2001, page 19.

to another and from one policy community to another. Some military and defence communities operating in conflict zones see security solely in terms of eliminating conflict and securing territory, often referred to as the 'clear, hold and build' strategy. The peacebuilding community operating in similar environments tend to focus more of the root causes of insecurity and the reform measures that need to be put in place to delivery security – notably through security sector reform operations. The core development community and poverty reduction practitioners are more likely to put the accent on human security – alongside the resource issues that trigger insecurity.

The understanding and values that different policy communities bring to the table in relation to the concept of security, makes the articulation of a coherent security and development policy difficult to develop and manage.

Development

The traditional development community and development agencies have been slow converts in seeing the need to synergise security and development. There are a number of reasons for this, including a core belief that the focus should be on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Secondly, development agencies and the development community have in the past tended to associate security more often than not with hard security, rather than with the type of crime, conflict and violence prevention activities that are in critical need in conflict and post conflict settings. Thirdly, development cooperation prioritises respect for local ownership and an apolitical approach when possible. There is a fear that linkage to the security dimension may damage relations between donors and local actors and may also overly politicise aid. Finally, the development cooperation community has sometimes felt that overzealous cooperation with the security community may negatively impinge on a development agency's mandate or budget, resulting in the 'securitisation of development'.

The politics of intervention

The move towards linking security and development followed on seamlessly in the post Cold War period from the rise of the democratisation agenda, that included elements related to a greater emphasis on human rights, the idea that state security should be based on human security and the part benign/part hubris call for greater international involvement in peacebuilding. Since then international donor intervention in conflict and post conflict settings has increased and responded to the 'new', 'post-modern' or 'network' wars that have

challenged political authority, governance, and the entire social fabric of conflict-torn states more directly than did earlier wars. Over the last fifteen years the donor response has become much more focused on intervening to support a viable and legitimate political authority, alongside core governance functions. Views vary considerably on this interventionist paradigm. What is clear is that donor intervention related to reform of security institutions or support for security on the ground is much more political and sensitive than that of interventions in the developmental realm. This presents a conundrum for the international donor community. It will always be less politically sensitive to intervene in a conflict or post conflict state as a development actor in support of core development projects, rather than as a security actor. The realm of security reform makes intervention much more complex and will require the putting in place of important confidence building measures between donor and partner on the ground, a trusting political dialogue between donor and partner and an in-depth understanding of the local political dynamics. For all this extra complexity, the security reform dimension is critical so as to support sustainable peace and challenge the spoilers that stand in the way of peace.

Defining the 'civilians' component

While the focus in immediate post-conflict and stabilisation phases is often focused on civilian-military coordination, less focus has been put on the fact that the civilian side of that equation is made up of a number of different actors representing different approaches, and bringing diverse skills and capacities to the task at hand. The civilians involved in post-conflict reconstruction include not only traditional development actors, but also police personnel, justice practitioners, human rights investigators and foreign affairs personnel, to name just a few. The role of these actors can also change significantly over time. Taking the police as an example, their role in a post-conflict phase can be as the executive authority, as in Kosovo or Timor Leste in 1999, where international police officers took on direct policing duties whilst providing 'training and equipment' to national counterparts so as to be able to hand over executive authority for security provision over time. With time and distance from the conflict, international police officers can play a more developmental role, acting as advisors or mentors to national counterparts in the reform, development or transformation of existing policing structures. This latter role requires not only technical expertise but also astute political awareness; given that reform of security and justice structures is a highly political issue. The different roles and different mandates from a stabilisation to a more development phase require a very different set of skills, capacity and approach.

The challenges

We see in different parts of the world that international actors are increasingly mixing security and developmental tools in order to support the building of a sustainable peace (notably in Haiti, DRC, Iraq and Afghanistan). Yet interestingly development ministries and agencies have been rather shy about getting involved in the security-development policy debate, with most OECD development donors neither having a clear policy nor a tool box on how to interact with their military counterparts. There are a whole host of reasons why this is the case. Firstly, working on security issues presents complex institutional and mandate related challenges. Secondly, the expansion of military and other security actors, into 'operations other than war and peacekeeping' has led to what some development actors see as the securitization of aid. Be it as part of a counter-insurgency tactic, psychological operations to win 'hearts and minds' of the local population, or for enhanced force protection, military troops have been sent to perform what contributing governments call humanitarian and reconstruction tasks in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Thirdly, some simply do not see a role for development actors in the civil-military debate, viewing it more as an issue for humanitarian and military actors.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

That said, we have witnessed in recent years the incremental bridging of the security development void. Security sector reform (SSR) as a policy and programmatic area has been the catalyst which has best helped bridge the security-development divide. SSR remains firmly part of the development discourse and viewed as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding tool. SSR views the security system through a governance lens, and recognizes that increasing the capacity of security and justice actors can have a disastrous effect if not accompanied by a requisite increase in the accountability and governance of that capacity. SSR is ultimately about ensuring that security and justice are recognised as critical public policy issues and as public goods. But developing an accountable and transparent security and justice system is an extraordinarily challenging task in any context, but especially so for governments and societies emerging from conflict or afflicted by an array of development challenges. SSR implies an ambitious re-alignment of power and greater public scrutiny of security actors, and as such is a highly political activity. With the increased use of military and police personnel in such development-oriented activities and contexts, the civil-military dialogue needs to include a discussion on whether security personnel, including both military and police personnel, have the necessary skills, the right approach or the capacity available to operate in more development environments. The challenge is how to ensure that technical knowledge on police and military issues

can incorporate development principles and clearly a developmental approach. The increased inclusion of military and police personnel in more developmental operations has also put a significant strain on 'troop contributing' countries to have such personnel available, with the right skills and prepared for deployment.

It would appear that the modality of bringing civilian and military, security and development together to stabilize and build peace in conflict and post conflict settings is here to stay, at least in the medium term. Therefore, the effectiveness of security-development modalities will need to be improved. Steps in this direction can be taken by responding to a number of critical questions, including overall vision, financing questions, staffing and coordination mechanisms.

Clarity of Vision, Purpose and Approach

In bringing security and development together practically through stabilisation or developmental operations, it is vital that an overriding vision guides the focus of work and actions on the ground. The development of a clear vision and the articulation of that vision on the ground will be key first steps. In this regard table 1 below is useful as it provides the clear and concise objectives of the UK Stabilisation Unit and in so doing provides the contours for any UK stabilisation mission mandate.

Table 1. The objectives of stabilisation – the 4 'P's

Prevent – or contain – violent conflict
This may require coercive as well as political intervention, whilst working towards addressing the causes of underlying tensions. It may also involve active pursuit of groups who refuse to take part in a non-violent political process.
Protect people, key assets and institutions
Where violence persists, a minimum precondition for stability is the provision of sufficient security for men, women and children to begin going about their daily lives and for government to function. This may be done by external military forces acting in support of local ones.
Promote political processes which lead to greater stability
The main aim is to achieve political settlements which make it in parties' interests to contest power and resources peacefully rather than violently.
Prepare for longer-term development
Stabilisation activities can profoundly affect the chances of successful social and economic development.

Source: Stabilisation Unit, Stabilisation Quick Impact Project Guide 2009

If a similar list were to be developed for security sector reform in more developmental environments, there would be some overlap on supporting political processes with regard to building consensus on the security and justice issues, but there would be some divergence when it comes to approach. A development approach puts a premium on local ownership, or supporting a nationally driven process rather than imposing a solution. It aims at building national capacity to take on tasks rather than implementing them directly. It calls for more support for dialogue, and facilitating participatory approaches. It ensures a balance between building operational capacity and the need for greater accountability and transparency. The goal oriented approach taken in the stabilisation phase, needs to give way to a more subtle approach and a lighter touch. Police and military personnel continue to face a challenge in moving from a goal oriented approach to one that focuses more on process and transferring skills.

Financing – greater flexibility and an ability to utilize ODA[2] and non ODA funding

Over the past 15 years, development assistance has come to play a more active role in addressing violent conflict, security and peacebuilding objectives. Politicians, policy makers and development practitioners alike now acknowledge that addressing security issues in the short and medium term is often a crucial precondition for longer-term, sustainable development. There is also widespread recognition that a closer and more coordinated working relationship between development, diplomatic and security communities is crucial in order to make progress on peace building efforts, and that a more integrated, policy coherent approach is needed to ensure that peace and security objectives are achieved before, during and after conflict.

One immediate challenge relates to the modalities for mobilizing the necessary finance to build and secure peace. The aid community can help mainly with funds that have a direct developmental objective, and thus count as ODA. All OECD DAC[3] members currently have commitments to increase either their total aid or parts of it, and many have set a date for achieving the UN ODA target of 0.7% of national income. ODA as presently defined excludes some tasks

2. ODA refers to Official Development Assistance – which is defined as those aid flows to countries, territories and multilateral organisations on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist). The purpose of ODA flows is the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; all flows must be concessionary in nature. There has been mush discussion in recent years as to what aspects post-conflict peacebuilding assistance is ODA eligible, see OECD DAC paper 'Is it ODA?' for an overview of this discussion http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf

3. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee is the principle body through which bilateral donors and multilateral organisations deals with issues related to co-operation with developing countries (see further www.oecd.org/dac).

which are not directly developmental but which many would agree are important prerequisites for establishing peace. Examples include providing non-UN mandated military help with decommissioning weapons after fighting has stopped, and training for military personnel so as to enhance discipline and good military practice. These are the type of tasks that are often carried out by military personnel.

Recognizing that there are large political and practical constraints preventing a further widening of the ODA criteria, some countries have introduced new operational modalities to ensure better coverage and financing of such security related activities. So far, Canada, the Netherlands and the UK have established pooled mechanisms where ODA and non-ODA budgets are combined. In addition, multilateral funds like the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), the EU Africa Peace Facility (APF) and EC Stability Instrument have been established with mandates that enable them to finance non-ODA expenditure. In terms of good practice, donors should ensure that a mixing of ODA and non-ODA funds should be made available to ensure effective civil military operations and to ensure coherence between development and security policy.

Build appropriate capacity, multi-disciplinary and quickly deployable teams under civilian leadership

As mentioned previously the increasing use of serving police and military personnel in development oriented tasks and missions has put a significant strain on contributing countries to have such personnel available and ensure they have the appropriate skill set. The challenge, especially with police personnel, is to have personnel available for international deployments without creating capacity shortages at home. Australia and Canada have taken the approach of establishing a standing police capacity for international deployments, thereby ensuring that they receive appropriate training but more importantly that they are out of day-to-day policing operations and are quickly deployable. As an alternative Norway always has around one per cent of its police personnel abroad at any one time and so has built that 'additional' capacity into its current force size to ensure that deployment abroad does not lead to the lack of capacity at home.

A number of countries have recognised different skills are required of those officers sent out as part of a peacebuilding mission, than those normally associated with their day to day tasks at home. An ability to work in a political environment is a clear pre-requisite, as is knowledge of development policy and programming. Other issues include how to build local ownership, build local capacity, mentor national actors, and develop management, planning and oversight capability.

Given the complex nature of the task required to build, reform or transform security and justice services and institutions, a number of countries have recognised the need to create multi-disciplinary teams. This is especially critical when you consider, for example, that the reform of policing institutions not only includes building policing skills but also the need to build management capacity and put in place appropriate policies and procedures for issues such as financial management and human resources management. Police reform also has to be placed within the broader SSR concept and as part of a broader peacebuilding effort.

Experience has shown that while military and police advisors are critical to the development of a multi-disciplinary team, given that these initiatives take place in a post-conflict, peacebuilding phase, it is important that multi-disciplinary teams are headed by civilian personnel. This is critically important given the political nature of reforms but also it sends the right message that military and security personnel should operate under civilian leadership and with a developmental approach. A number of countries have made efforts to develop a multi-disciplinary capacity through the establishment of rosters of experts. Rosters however are notoriously difficult to keep updated, and a multi-disciplinary capacity is only useful if it is easily deployable and if it shares a common approach or doctrine. This requires a standing capacity that trains together, develops shared analysis, a shared approach and has the ability to develop doctrine and incorporate good practice. The UK's Stabilisation Unit is a mix between a standing multi-disciplinary capacity, which is supported by an extensive roster, while the UN's Standing Police Capacity is an example of a sector specific standing capacity. The challenge with both of these formations is the ability to ensure real-time lesson learning and to collate, analyse and disseminate good practice.

Ensure coordination across government and the international community

Bringing security and development coherently together from policy to practice presents enormous coordination challenges. Security and development converge and intersect through a number of concentric circles, around issues such as humanitarian affairs, structural and institutional reforms, traditional development activities, counter-insurgency (COIN), counter-terrorism, and stabilisation. This reality presents a number of key coordination challenges at headquarters and in the field. While there is no silver-bullet template that can ably address all coordination challenges, as number of practical and feasible steps can be taken.

At headquarters level, specialised cross-government units can be put in place, such as the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in Canada

or the UK Stabilisation Unit. START through a Global Peace and Security Funding mechanism fills an important institutional and funding gap by allowing Canada to ensure a coordinated response in support of peace processes and mediation efforts, transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives, peace enforcement and peace operations capabilities, civilian protection strategies in humanitarian contexts, as well as work on landmines, small arms and light weapons and SSR.

The challenge remains how to ensure policy coherence at headquarters is translated into coherent and coordinated action in the field.

Recommendations

With evidence that there will be an increase in stablisation and peacebuilding missions both at a multilateral and bilateral levels there is a clear need for countries to act now to ensure that the international response can help prevent conflict, as well as act swiftly in the aftermath of hostilities.

The following recommendations are made:

- Development, diplomatic, military, and security actors should develop a joint policy and approach to supporting conflict prevent and peacebuilding efforts. A joint policy does not mean the amalgamation or erosion of the mandates of individual government actors, but identifies the limitation of the mandate of each actor and looks to utilise their capacity in a way that is a force multiplier. A joint policy alone however is not enough, what is required is concrete action to ensure coherence and coordination is enforced at field level.
- For this reason, the implementation of the policy should be overseen by a senior level cross-government working group, which has access to an independent source of funding not tied to any one government department. In addition, the working group should have access to a standing multi-disciplinary capacity that incorporates development, diplomatic, military and security personnel. The standing capacity and their deployable teams should be under civilian leadership. While the lead agency in-country can vary depending on the context, it may be the ministry of defence or foreign ministry during a stabilisation phase or either the foreign ministry or development ministry during a more peacebuilding oriented phase. What is essential is that the standard operating procedures of the cross-government working group and the standing capacity are founded on development principles and practices.

- Effort should be made to establish a funding mechanism which is flexible but also facilitates the use of both ODA and non-ODA funding. Such funding needs to be used strategically to reinforce efforts to both mitigate conflict and create the foundations for political, social and economic development to take root.
- Invest in the next generation of peacebuilders, both within the traditional development community but also more importantly within the ranks of the military, police and government services.