
HUMAN SECURITY BEYOND RESPONSABILITY TO PROTECT

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PALABRAS CLAVE

Seguridad Humana; Desarrollo Humano; Intervenciones y Asistencia; Responsabilidad y Protección.

RESUMEN

Más de una década y media después del final de la competencia bipolar, el concepto de seguridad humana sigue siendo un punto de discordia entre los que aceptan una amplia definición frente a una estrecha, y los que rechazan la idea por completo. Debates definitivos aparte, el amplio concepto de seguridad humana que este artículo sostiene, representa tanto un cambio conceptual como su uso operacional. Actualmente, la seguridad humana parece haberse convertido en un bien que los países occidentales tratan de proporcionar, mientras que los países del sur parecen no tenerla. Pero la seguridad humana no es, en última instancia, el problema del mundo en desarrollo del Sur, ya que el Norte podría resolverlo a través de intervenciones, asistencia financiera o una responsabilidad de protección.

ABSTRACT

More than a decade and a half later of the end of bi-polar competition, the concept of human security continues to be a point of contention between those who accept a broad versus a narrow definition and those who reject the notion altogether. Definitional debates

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apart, the broad notion of human security, this article argues, represents both a conceptual shift and an operational one. Now, human security seems to have become a good that western countries seem to provide, while countries of the south seem to lack. But human security is ultimately not meant to be the problem of the developing world of the South which the North could solve through interventions, financial assistance, or a responsibility for protection.

RESUMÉ

Plus d'une décennie et demie après la fin de la compétition bipolaire, la notion de sécurité humaine demeure un point de discorde entre ceux qui acceptent une définition large versus une stricte, et ceux qui rejettent l'idée totalement. Débats sur les définitions mis à côté, le concept général de la sécurité humaine que ce document fait valoir, est à la fois une utilisation conceptuelle et opérationnelle. Actuellement, la sécurité humaine semble être devenue un bien que les pays occidentaux tentent de proportionner, tandis que les pays du Sud ne semblent pas l'avoir. Mais la sécurité humaine n'est pas, en définitive, le problème du monde en développement du Sud; le Nord pourrait le résoudre grâce à l'intervention, une aide financière ou la responsabilité de protection.

Part I: Introduction to the Concept

Genesis of an Idea Whose Time Had Come

In 1994, the opportune moment of the end of the Cold War and the hopes for a peace dividend led to the public outing of the concept of human security in international policy circles through the UNDP Human Development Reports (HDRs). Describing it in short as 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want', Mahbub Ul Haq, the lead author of the 1994 HDR, sought to draw attention not just to levels of human development achieved, but to the security of gains made by focusing on downside risks such as political conflicts, wars, economic fluctuations, natural disasters, extreme impoverishment, environmental pollution, ill health, illiteracy and other social menaces. Human security was characterized as "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP, 1994: 23). The Report also identified seven overlapping and interdependent

categories of human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.

Yet, Mahbub Ul Haq was not the first to use the terms ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. They had already been introduced on January 6 1941 by President Roosevelt during his annual State of Union Address as part of his vision of a world founded upon four essential human freedoms: Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want and freedom from fear. From these four freedoms, two survived as global ideals, which the founders of the United Nations sought to address in an inter-dependent way through collective efforts in peace, security and development.

Connections between underdevelopment and security were already at the heart of the demands of the South since the mid-1970s, who, under the banner of Group of 77 in the United Nations, argued that a more stable and just world order demanded some level of equity, safety and rights. The response to their demands was provided in the Report of the Independent North/South Commission chaired by Willy Brandt, which raised “not only traditional questions of peace and war, but also how to overcome world hunger, mass misery and alarming disparities between the living conditions of rich and poor” (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980: 13). This was followed by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security, chaired by Olaf Palme, that raised the question of morality in the international economic and political systems, again placing threats other than military ones on the table, especially in the Third World, where it was argued that hunger and poverty were immediate challenges for survival (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982: 172). In 1987, the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (also known as the Brundtland Commission) highlighted the linkage between environmental degradation and conflict. By the early 1990s, the South Commission, chaired by Jules Nyerere, argued in its Report *Challenge to the South* that insecurity stemmed from poverty, de-institutionalization, environmental degradation and deficit of democracy (South Commission, 1990: 11).

The evolution of reports within the United Nations system shadowed geopolitical realities of their times. During the Cold War, the notion of security was generally understood in relation to the security of the state, in terms of preserving its territorial integrity and political sovereignty from military threats, and peace was understood as the absence of war (negative peace). The end of bi-polar competition precipitated powerful transnational actors – private companies, international organizations, NGOs and non-state entities –to become

relevant actors in international relations. Intra-state unrests and new wars, often fuelled by the socio-economic and political marginalization of certain strata of society, also became new threats to be dealt with. The notion of security was broadened to include not only the military and territorial security of a state, but also non-traditional threats such as economic and environmental degradation. These changes prompted policymakers and scholars to go beyond military defence of state interests and territory and to include welfare beyond warfare.

More than a decade and a half later, the concept of human security continues to be a point of contention between those who accept a broad versus a narrow definition and those who reject the notion altogether. Definitional debates apart, the broad notion of human security, this article argues, represents both a conceptual shift and an operational one. Conceptually, it has led to broadening ways that the notion of security is identified and addressed. Operationally, it has introduced a methodology that emphasizes the perspectives of and impacts on individuals and communities in how we understand, assess, plan, implement and evaluate policies, programs and projects. This article will argue that as a theoretical concept, human security embodies a number of added values for the fields of security studies and human development. As a normative and political concept, it was adopted as the basis of principled-based foreign policy by a number of governments and regional organizations. Yet, the concept has also become closely associated with certain norms in international relations, such as 'enlightened self interest' and 'responsibility to protect,' which deviate considerably from the original and broad understanding of human security as a universal notion based on equality and justice, applicable to all societies developing or industrialized alike.

In Defence of the Broad Over the Narrow Approach

Within a few years after its introduction in the UNDP Report, what was supposed to be a simple, noble, and obvious idea soon became engulfed in a definitional debate. A cacophony of political and academic debates in the past decade has centered on the definitions, their advantages and weak points, and on the changes that would be necessary to develop the theoretical and practical implications (see Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2006: Chapter 2). The two approaches to human security floating in the policy world and the myriad of academic definitions seem to reinforce the view that the 'truth' about definitions lies in the eyes of the beholder. Within the policy world, the minimalist approach to human security, i.e., 'freedom from fear', was adopted by the government of Canada, by the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *A Responsibility to Protect* (2001), and by the EU doctrine for Human

Security (2004). The maximalist approach is adopted by the UNDP, by the Government of Japan, and by the Commission on Human Security (2003).

The three different schools of thought surrounding the acceptability of the concept of human security and its definition can be categorized as such:

A first school, composed mostly of realist and neo-realist scholars, argues that human security lacks analytical rigor, and is consequently, at best as a “rallying cry” and at worst as unadulterated “hot air” (Paris, 2001: 88, 96). To this group, human security is not a new or analytically useful paradigm but a mere political agenda.

A second school, while accepting the term, insists on limiting it to a narrow definition focusing on ‘freedom from fear’ and factors that perpetuates violence. Proponents of the narrower version argue that a useful and workable definition should be restricted to threats falling under the realm of tangible violence (Owen, 2004), measured, for instance, by the number of battle related deaths. As their argument goes, broadening the agenda of threats to include poverty or food shortage for example would be the equivalent of making a ‘shopping list’ of bad things that can happen, making the concept unworkable (Krause, 2004: 367). As Roland Paris states, if human security includes a “laundry list” of threats, in the end, it “effectively means nothing” (Paris, 2001: 91). This school of thought does not reject the concept of human security but instead concentrates on direct threats to individuals’ safety and to their physical integrity: armed conflict, human rights abuses, public insecurity and organized crime.

A third school, of which this author belongs, argues for a broad definition, based on freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom from indignities, as essential for understanding contemporary crises. Defenders of the broad definition argue that instead of lamenting the lack of workable definitions, research should be concerned with ways in which definitions insisted on by security studies circumvent political, moral and ethical concerns in order to concentrate on relations of power (Grayson, 2004: 357). In this perspective, the lack of an agreed-upon definition is not a conceptual weakness but represents a refusal to succumb to the dominant political agenda. A broad definition is therefore critical to transforming the ethos and engaging in the ‘political’ act of raising questions that are peripheral to security studies.

They argue that even though adopting the narrow definition facilitates the researchers’ work, the reality of people’s lives means that threats like poverty or disease can have an equally severe impact on people’s lives and dignity as it does tangible violence. Thus, poverty, for example, is conceptualized as a human

security threat, not only because it can induce violence which threatens the stability of the state, but because it is a threat to the dignity of individuals. Proponents of the broad approach concentrate on understanding threats in every day lives, both direct and indirect, both objective and subjective, which come not only from traditional understandings of insecurity, but also from underdevelopment and human rights abuses. They agree that these concerns may sometimes be subjective, but to them it is nonetheless the subjective sense of the security of individuals that in the last analysis is of paramount importance (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2006).

The broad approach also argues for the universal applicability of the subject in regards to people's daily concerns – no matter where they live geographically. Relational, objective and subjective perceptions of insecurity persist as much, if differently, among inhabitants of Parisian suburbs as they do in Darfur. Urban violence, job insecurities, health epidemics, privatization of social delivery, militarization of societies, etc. that plague industrialized societies of the North are as much human insecurities as famine, wars, poverty, and genocides that characterize extreme situations of some countries of the developing or post-colonial world. That is why the broader approaches may not agree with some academic attempts to propose a threshold of degree of severity of threats to human life (Owens, 2003; Owen, 2004), which would then fail to recognize the insecurity felt by people in western welfare societies. Contextual analysis instead of quantitative absolute measurements better reflects the full meaning attributed to a life worth living.

The narrow approach to human security, when insisting on a threshold approach that separates between urgent threats such as those to survival that require immediate action, may forego long term strategy for short term action depending on the currency and will available for politicians to act. Yet, for advocates of broad human security approaches, the mere recognition of structural violence (Galtung, 1969) and threats to dignity require strategic planning, root cause analysis, preventive action, etc. Understanding dignity-related threats invites critical assessment of structural causes. In this regard, instead of basing themselves on the benefits of interventions in the name of “Responsibility to Protect”, they opt for a practice of prior engagement by the international community, long before interventions are supposed to take place in front of *fait accompli*, and in full recognition of the contributions of negative global politics and power asymmetries to the development of crisis in post-colonial and developing countries.

The broad version of human security sees itself as an ethical framework because of its focus on the broad needs and aspirations of individuals qua persons and because it extends the notion of ‘safety’ to a condition beyond mere

existence (survival and bare life) to life worth living, hence, welfare, well-being and dignity of human beings (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2006). Ultimately, the ethical position does not simply stem from a concern with a responsibility to protect others, but from instigating the notion of justice in international relations and international cooperation.

For the rest of this article, we shall use the broad approach to human security to examine the added values to other conceptual frameworks, the operational implications, as well as the ways that the concept has been politically manipulated before offering some thoughts on how to bring the ethical position back in international relations.

Part II: The Added Values to Other Conceptual Frameworks

Ethical and Methodological Rupture with the Realist School of Security Studies

In the same way that Mahbub Ul Haq and Amartya Sen's Human Development approach had come to debunk traditional views of economic growth, human security represents a similar ethical and methodological rupture with the existing conceptualization of state-based security in international relations. The human security debate postulates different answers to the three questions that have preoccupied security scholars: security of whom? Security from what? And security by what means?

Security of Whom?

Security theorists of the realist school have argued since the 1970s that unless threats have the potential to lead to violent conflict, endanger the integrity of the state, or involve the threat or use of the military, they should not be labelled as security concerns. Buzan's definition of security for example, based on survival, only recognizes existential threats as threats to security (Buzan et al., 1998: 21). Yet, a shift of attention to individuals in International Relations was gradually introduced by the liberal, constructivist, feminist and critical theorists. In the empirical world, the major failure of state-centered security was to not take into account that a large number of states today are partly or completely failing to fulfil their social contract to protect people (Mack, 2004). Thus human security's contribution to security studies is to designate the individual(s) rather than the state as the 'referent object' of security, although this does not abrogate the security of a state, which, in turn, has responsibilities towards providing for and protecting its citizens. With human security, the individual becomes the

ultimate actor taken into account: His/her security is the ultimate goal to which all instruments and peripheral actors are subordinated. This approach thus poses a moral challenge to Realism, for whom the moral argument is the *raison d'état* itself (Campbell & Shapiro, 1999). With human security, there no longer is a *raison d'état* beyond the *raison d'être* of the security of people. The approach offers the definition of an end point towards which all politics has to strive, i.e., the ethics of ultimate ends, which holds a transformatory potential for actors and institutions at all levels of international governance.

Security from What?

Because it concentrates on the survival, well-being and dignity of individuals, the human security approach recognizes menaces beyond violence to include a host of other threats together with their inter-dependence. Human security threats include both, objective, tangible elements, such as insufficient income, chronic unemployment, dismal access to adequate health care and quality education, etc., as well as subjective perceptions, such the inability to control one's destiny, indignity, fear of crime and violent conflict, etc. They can be both direct (those that are deliberately orchestrated, such as systematic persecutions) and indirect (those that arise inadvertently or structurally, i.e. under-investment in key social and economic sectors such as education and health care). The broad approach also postulates three assumptions about threats: that equal weight has to be given to under-development and human right violations as 'threats' alongside traditional insecurities, that threats are inter-linked and inter-connected, and that these linkages mean that instead of looking for priorities, the connections have to be sought out in order to make sure that interventions in one domain do no harm in others at worse, and multiply positive externalities at best.

Security by What Means?

Haq's major contribution to this question was a simple solution: Human security can be achieved through "development, not through arms." Sen and Haq's Human Development approach had proposed a methodological rupture from theories of development and economic growth by suggesting that the best strategy to increase national income was not to accumulate capital, but to develop choices and freedoms for people. Human security similarly claims that the best way to achieve security (both for the state and the international system) is to increase that of people. When the survival, well-being and dignity of the individual become the ultimate goal, constructs such as the state, the institutions of political democracy, and the marketplace are relegated to secondary status as simply means to achieve that goal. Hence, insecurity should not be dealt with through short-term military or policing solutions, but a long term

comprehensive strategy that abides by promises of development and promotion of human rights.

Human security is therefore both an ethical rupture with traditional security paradigms (by making the security of people and communities as the ultimate goal), and a methodological one (with the idea that by securing individuals first, the security of the state, the region and the international system can also be ensured).

Complementary Approach to Human Development

The human development approach, developed in 1990 by scholars such as Amartya Sen, Mahbub Ul Haq, Paul Streeten, Frances Stewart, and others, and propagated through the HDRs and the human security one, share a number of commonalities. Both shift focus away from instrumental objectives (economic growth and national security) to the role and conditions of human beings as objects and subjects of policies. They are both objectives (mapping out the final destiny) as well as a methodology (the road to get to the ultimate end through focusing on individuals).

Yet, for the authors of the 1994 *Human Development Report*, the distinction was the prevention of risks that was embodied within the human security concept: “In the final analysis, Human Security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, and ethnic tension that did not explode into violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human Security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity” (UNDP, 1.994). If human development is about well-being, human security concentrates on the security of development gains and a guarantor of the continuation of human development.

In the following table, the distinctions are laid out, based on the definitions of the characteristics of the two concepts as they appear in the *Human Development Reports*:

	Human development	Human Security
Definition, with emphasis on freedoms	Freedom to be what one wants to be and do what one wants to do (enhancement of capabilities and functionings).	Freedom from fear, from want and from indignities.
Goal	The end of development is about enlarging choices, opportunities and freedoms of people.	The goal of human security is to enable people to exercise these choices safely and freely, and to be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today will not be lost tomorrow.

	Human development	Human Security
Values	Well being, capabilities and functionings.	The insurance of this well being against threats and risks/Security/insurance/sustainability of development gains, as well as the conditions enabling choices to happen (i.e. physical safety).
Orientation	Moves forward, is progressive and aggregate: "Together we rise".	Looks at who was left behind at the individual level: "Divided we fall".
Policies and strategies	Growth with equity At the policy level, it means adopting economic growth policies but ensuring equity in distribution.	Downturns with security. Policy wise, HS requires public policies that "insure" the growth process, as well as those that concentrate on prevention, mitigation and risk management.
Policy principles	Empowerment, sustainability, equity and productivity.	Protection and promotion of human survival (freedom from fear), well-being and subsistence (freedom from want), and the avoidance of indignities (life of dignity).

In short, the added value of the human security approach to human development is to the focus on sustainability and stability of development gains as well as the emphasis on preparation for risks based on broader consideration of threats than just development related ones.

Part III: Operational Consequences

Beyond a conceptual shift in security thinking by placing individuals and communities at the center of analysis, the human security approach can also represent an operational shift by emphasizing on the perspective of individuals and communities in how we understand, assess, plan, implement and evaluate policies, programs and projects. As such, the approach proposes two essentially methodological frameworks: 1) an evaluative and normative approach and 2) a set of principles to be used as tool box for principled action

HS as an evaluative and normative approach

The human security approach identifies the objectives, or ultimate ends, to reach as well as a manner in which to evaluate outcomes. The success of policies and interventions is judged against their ability to ensure survival, livelihoods and dignity. In practice this means that when the goals of basic security (freedom from violence, conflict management, weapons control/disarmament, confidence-building

measures, etc.); well-being (improved living standards, economic opportunities, distribution of economic benefits etc.); and justice (rule of law, political rights and freedoms, participatory governance etc.) are achieved, *from the point of view of local communities*, an intervention is deemed as ‘successful’. Hence, the approach can be used to evaluate policy objectives and interventions against the needs and sensitivities of local populations. This requires an in-depth understanding of the expectations, needs and aspirations of populations concerned.

The operationalization of the human security approach further relies on two broad conceptions of goals to achieve. Essentially, eradicating threats to human insecurity requires policies that provide *protection* (against risks and through the provision of public goods) and *empowerment* (so that people become agents of securitizing their lives).

Protective frameworks recognize that people and communities are often threatened by events largely beyond their control: a financial crisis, a violent conflict, chronic destitution, infectious diseases, water shortages, and pollution from a distant land (CHS, 2003: 11). Protective measures are therefore the top down strategies that prevent risks while simultaneously building capabilities to mitigate them when they happen. For example, upholding rule of law, good governance, accountability and social protection instruments help create a more stable environment which enable people to be relatively confident that the freedoms they have today are not lost tomorrow. While states have the primary responsibility to implement such a protective structure, other entities such as international and regional organizations, civil society and the private sector can also play a pivotal role in shielding people from menaces,

But top down protection not being enough, mitigation against risks also depends on people’s ability to act on their own behalf and actively participate in protecting themselves when institutions fail to do so. The human security approach is therefore one that builds on strengthening the resilience of individuals and communities to conditions of insecurity. Normatively, this makes the approach an agency-driven one: It relies on providing ‘agency’ to individuals as subjects, as referents of security and ultimately, as providers of security. Thus, the normative objective lies in providing people with the opportunity to develop their own means of coping with human insecurity (Sen, 2000). In practice, it means not just ‘doing’ development or peacebuilding for others, or engaging local populations in a set of interventions, but allowing conditions by which responsibility is brought below actors through empowerment strategies. Empowerment has been defined in the *Human Security Now Report* as: “People’s ability to act on their own behalf – and on behalf of others” (CHS, 2003: 11). It refers then to processes that enable people to act as agents in their own right so as to identify

the main causes of their insecurities, find means to address them locally and actively participate in their implementation. Such an approach provides the opportunity for local implementation and ownership, which increase the likelihood of sustainability.

HS as a tool box for principled policy and programming

While human security, as a context specific and relative concept, avoids one size fit all prescriptions and concentrates more on the ultimate goals, a number of procedural principles are needed to guide and evaluate action. The human security approach proposes a set of five principles for both elaborating and evaluating programs and policies¹. These principles include:

People-centered: By putting the individual at the centre of analysis, the human security approach advocates the recognition of his/her role as both actor (agent) and subject (beneficiary) of policies, programs and projects. In practical terms, people-centered policies and programming for human security is based on an analysis of *needs* (as current and recurring deficits of the community or individuals), *vulnerabilities* (as structural issues /weaknesses that expose one to future risks and future challenges to security), as well as *capacities* (which include what exist that could prevent vulnerabilities if properly used/developed). At the community level, these for example include traditional practices, coping mechanisms, human and social capital, environmental resources, knowledge, and assets. These capacities and resources provide a foundation for empowerment strategies.

Inter-connected: Because threats to human security are mutually reinforcing and inter-interlinked in a domino effect both across sectors and across regions, their linkages should be understood in order to avoid negative harms while promoting multiplying effects of positive interventions. The approach recognizes that various threats can spread within a given country (with impoverished areas, for example, threatening the stability of more progressive ones), bleed into other regions (through massive employment migration, export of arms, environmental degradation, health epidemics, etc.), and negatively impact global security (through breeding discontented armed groups, drug exports, etc.). But similarly, the question of inter-connectiveness of threats is viewed from the way that these are mutually linked in a domino effect within the human geography:

1. A variation of the principles presented here were initially developed by the Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Hitomi Kubo, Center for Peace and Human Security, Sciences Po, and were further developed to their present form and published in the handbook *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, March, 2009, a collaboration between the Human Security Unit, OCHA and Tadjbakhsh, Kubo and Elianna Konialis.

health insecurity could lead to poverty, which could lead to education deficits, etc. Responses to insecurities stemming from environmental degradation could contribute to population movement into other fragile ecological settings, a deteriorating health situation, hunger, loss of livelihoods, and so on. The concept of ‘mutual vulnerability’, coined by Nef (1999), aptly describes the interconnectedness of systematically related security threats: Dysfunctionality in one sphere is structurally and sequentially expressed in other sub-systems and leads to a vicious circle of causes and effects. To operationally tackle these mutual vulnerabilities, an Inter-sectorality and Externalities Framework can be used to analyze the potential negative and positive externalities and the ultimate impact of interventions upon dynamics of other fields (see Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2006: Chapter 9).

The following table provides an example of how the Externalities Framework can be employed as an analytical tool, using the seven dimensions of human security identified in the UNDP 1994 report:

	Possible interventions and assistance in a human security field by international donors	Possible externalities on other insecurity domains	
		Positive outcomes in other fields	Negative potential outcomes
Economic security	E.g. Micro credit programmes meant for economic security.	Increase food production (food security). Communities saved from economic hardship less bent on fighting (political security), etc.	Competition among receiving and non receiving communities creates conflict (community insecurity). Women targeted for their increased income/power (personal insecurity), etc. State banks not able to cater to savings of rural communities (political insecurity for the state), etc.
Food security	E.g. Relief aid meant for increasing food security for communities.	Can increase economic security for communities who sell their ration (Economic security). Less rationale for conflict (political security), etc.	State is no longer accountable to the population but to foreign authorities (political insecurity as a result of illegitimacy). Aid is looted (personal insecurity). Aid decreases agriculture production (Economic insecurity of farmers), etc.

	Possible interventions and assistance in a human security field by international donors	Possible externalities on other insecurity domains	
		Positive outcomes in other fields	Negative potential outcomes
Health Security	E.g. (Re) building the health care system (health security).	Balance (re) attained in mortality/fertility rates (community and personal security). Jobs created (economic security), etc.	Replacement of the state's responsibility in providing healthcare (lack of trust in institutions, political insecurity). Sanitation not taken into account (environmental insecurity), etc.
Environmental Security	E.g. Installing environmental sound management practices.	Recovering wasted and polluted renewable resources (economic security). Increased production in agriculture (food security), etc.	Ignoring agricultural traditions (linked to community insecurity).
Personal Security	E.g. Law and order interventions, increased police programs and training (personal security).	Freedom from fear, want and indignity (with impacts on all human security concerns). Jobs created (economic security), etc.	Replacing the state (linked to political insecurity). Increased police presence (personal and community insecurity).
Community Security	E.g. Promoting demobilization.	Social harmony (leading to the security of all components). Creating jobs (economic security), etc.	Exacerbating tensions between communities.
Political Security	E.g. Support to transition to democratic practices.	Reduction of political exclusion phenomena (community security). Participation of communities (community and personal security), etc.	Imposing a particular type of governance system (linked to potential community and economic insecurities).

Adapted from Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2006, Chapter 9 and from the OCHA Handbook.

Comprehensive: Because threats are multi-dimensional and inter-connected, human insecurities cannot be tackled in isolation via fragmented stand-alone responses. Comprehensive security depends on coherent and simultaneous social, political, economic, environmental conditions and processes.

Context specific: Although the human security framework is universal, in that it is relevant to people everywhere, insecurities vary considerably across different settings and at different times. Interventions therefore need to be based on in-depth knowledge of the communities. Local situations also need to be contextualized within larger context to be sustainable.

Preventive: The human security approach insists on preventive measures which avert downside risks and mitigate their impacts from escalating (across insecurities) when they happen. An emphasis on early prevention rather than late intervention is a significantly more cost-effective way to deal, for example, with impoverishment, inequalities and social exclusion than with the potential consequences of societal collapse and war. The preventive aspect of programming for example can be developed and reinforced by a) early warning systems, b) analyzing and targeting structural root causes of insecurities, 2) targeting long term solutions which address structural and behaviour conditions, 3) emphasizing on developing capacities through empowerment.

Part IV: The Critical Perspective

What Human Security is Not: an Excuse for Enlightened Self Interest and for a Responsibility to Protect

It would seem, from the discussions above, that the concept of human security can be furthered when states adopt them as the basis of their principled based foreign policy. It would also seem that the principle of Responsible to Protect (RTP) doctrine, since its first conception in the 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), is the natural extension of the concept of human security in international relations.

After all, RTP seems to have posed an ethical responsibility for the international community to act on behalf of individuals in cases where states, weak or predator, cannot or do not protect individuals.

Yet, as the rest of this article will argue, the broad human security approach is neither compatible with enlightened self-interest (in other words, principled-based or value-based foreign policy), nor with the narrow way that the Responsibility to Protect norm has been elaborated. The implications of this uncomfortable association of the narrow version of human security with these norms and practices have been a reinforcement of the North/South divide in international relations.

In the Name of the “Other”: Enlightened Self-Interest and the Problem of Principled-Based Foreign Policy

Haq envisioned a future where “[h]uman security will be regarded as universal, global and indivisible.” (Haq, 1995: 115). In other words, it would apply equally to all people everywhere. Yet, his noble idea became increasingly used as a foreign policy tool, good enough for some people but not for others.

In 1996, Canada, debunking the broad approach of UNDP, concentrated instead on the goal of ‘freedom from fear’ (Axworthy, 1999). Much of Canada’s interest can be attributed to the efforts of Lloyd Axworthy, Foreign Minister from 1996 to 2000, who recognized the need to revamp Canada’s foreign policy with new measures to deal with post-Cold War problems: the situation of children caught in the war zones, the dangers of terrorism and the circulation of arms. To move this agenda forward, Canada relied on ‘soft’ power – including peace-building and peace-keeping, addressing these issues through rapid humanitarian interventions for which responsibility would be shared. The inclusion of human security in the foreign policy agenda of Canada was an attempt to combine a strong tradition of non-intervention with the ambition of playing a more important role in international affairs. Canada’s stance was also taken in response to the pressures exercised by a broad coalition of NGOs that, in formal partnership with the government and through Axworthy’s efforts, successfully lobbied for the adoption of the treaty banning landmines through the Ottawa process and for the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Japan’s interest in human security started in December 1998, in the context of the ‘Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,’ where then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi launched a Japanese foreign policy vision based on “comprehensively seizing all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life and dignity of human beings and strengthening efforts to confront threats”. The Japanese government initially endorsed the ‘freedom from want’ definition of human security based on Asian values. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the use of force to solve disputes, leaving Japan with self-defense forces only for international security purposes. Japan hence used its engagement in developmental assistance as a way to circumvent its military limitations, while at the same time, playing an important economic role in the region in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis. The Japanese human security policy took advantage of its expansive and popular Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) policy, which was useful for the economic growth in Asia, and potentially powerful as an argument for providing a seat for Japan in the UN Security Council. A contribution of approximately \$170 million to the Trust Fund for Human Security through the UN Secretariat cemented its status as an

important donor to ODA and reinforced the country as an economic power, not only regionally but internationally.

The adoption of human security as foreign policy principle was an opportunity for such ‘middle-power’ states to gain greater influence in the United Nations, and increased credibility on the international stage, particularly (in the case of Canada and Japan) vis-à-vis the United States. But a principled approach to foreign policy could not disengage with the functionality of national interest. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the 2004 Report prepared by a study group on Europe’s Security Capabilities at the London School of Economics which proposed a *Human Security Doctrine for Europe* to Javier Solana. The report claimed that “In an era of global interdependence, Europeans can no longer feel secure when large parts of the world are insecure” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004). It thus focused on ‘black holes’, regions in other parts of the world, including the ‘other’ Europe, which were generating many of the sources of insecurity that were said to impact directly on the security of the citizens of the European Union, and, by extension, to the national, traditional security of Europe. As the EU doctrine argued, Europe would then have a moral duty as well as an ‘enlightened self-interest’ to intervene ‘intelligently’ using civil-military special forces to render support to military and police control and to the rebuilding of political institutions. Human security in this approach was therefore conceived as a means to achieving state security ‘at home’, and to do so through a combination of military and civilian methods.

Adopting human security only for foreign policy however revealed a number of problems:

First, it implied that human insecurity was not a rich country’s problem, or that it was a problem that had already been solved, leaving the country to concentrate on citizens of ‘other’ countries. This thinking unveils a principle debate within the human security conceptualization, that of contentions around its universalist claim: Is human security ultimately a concept that had been born within the western political liberal model and has to be applied/measured against ‘issues’ of the South or is it a universal subject, also relevant for industrialized nations? A number of mostly Canadian and European scholars would argue for example that speaking about human security in the North would serve to trivialize the urgency of southern human security crises. Yet, whereas in absolute terms, the least secure people in Europe may enjoy high levels of human security in comparison to citizens of some other regions, in relative terms, those suffering poverty and marginalization in Europe, such as the Roma for example, or large pockets of unassimilated emigrants, may be just

as disadvantaged as those who suffer levels of poverty that are much more extreme in absolute terms. An assumption that a society with high GDP per capita is devoid of human insecurity cannot do justice to the Universalist principles of Haq who argued in the 1994 HDR that “Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor. The threats to their security may differ – hunger and disease in poor nations and drugs and crime in rich nations – but these threats are real and growing” (UNDP, 1994). Yet, the EU doctrine, for example, failed to talk about the pockets of poverty within its own countries, urban riots, the crisis of multi culturalism and damning immigration policies.

Second, a response based on enlightened self interest can be seen as a condescending ‘mission civilizatrice’ whereas some northern countries have the moral responsibility to engage in a ‘war on values’. The moral argument, not for ethical reasons by themselves, but weighed against self-interest, projects Europe for example as a ‘normative power’ that relies on noble liberal values, which are presumed to be needed and cherished by the ‘other’. At the same time, however, by neglecting to take the responsibility for causing many of the insecurities that lay in the periphery, this civilizing discourse can be condescending at the very least. When ethical concerns become a moral ground for chiding the human rights records of weak and incapacitated states while at the same time powerful nations engage in imposing damning conditionality for aid, for selective interventions and forced regime changes, for the imposition of democracy through military means, and for not addressing ills such as the asymmetrical use of force, the motivations for ethical concerns can become problematic.

Finally, the idea of human security as foreign policy may by itself be ineffective if it is not accompanied by a genuine national human security strategy. It ultimately portrays the assumption that the concept is suited for people in ‘other’ countries, but not good enough to be promoted as a domestic strategy. No country in the industrialized world, including Canada and Japan, adopted the concept of human security as a principle for national policy making.

Too Narrow for Comfort: Human Security and Responsibility to Protect

It was then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan himself who explicitly linked human security and interventions together, when in his statement to the 54th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in 1999, he made clear his intention to “address the prospects for human security and intervention in the next century.” Yet, the mistaken equation between human security

and the norm of Responsibility to Protect stems from a narrow understanding of the definition which insists solely on violence and human rights violations. In its essence and in its broad conception, the human security framework does not advocate a responsibility to *intervene to protect* but one *to engage in order to prevent*.

The international responsibility towards reacting to humanitarian emergencies in the name of collective security was for long debated in the context of humanitarian interventions, and the right or duty to intervene (Bettati & Kouchner, 1987). The shift of the debate away from the right of some states to intervene to the responsibility to protect by all states was first articulated through the Canadian supported International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. The Commission's final Report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, contented that where a population "is suffering harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." (ICISS, 2001). These principles were echoed in the report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004 which reiterated that "The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent" (High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004: proposition 55).

Contrary to fears, the Report of the ICISS was not supposed to endorse military interventions in the name of human security. It introduced the notion of responsibility to protect at the same time as a responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild, although the protection part took the lion's share of attention and details in the Report. The Report also tried to introduce a set of five principles in order to diffuse criticism that it was endorsing trigger-happy military interventions. These conditions included the principles of right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects and right authority. Yet, the launch of the Report in 2001 coincided with September 11, when world attention moved to the rapid reactive and preemptive strikes by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. The occupation of Iraq then led to even more suspicions of any doctrine that could be used to justify ill-conceived Northern-led military interventions in the name of security, national or human alike.

Apart from the circumstances of *realpolitik* that cast a shadow on the credibility of RTP in the aftermath of the War on Terror, from the point of view of

the broad approach to human security two sets of more conceptual critiques can be raised: One has to do with the notion of interventions in general, the other with the narrow approach encrusted within the RTP norm.

Interventions Under Any Name

The first critique echoes the one posed by proponents of the critical school and the post-colonial school of international relations. For critical theorists, the RTP norm has become an instrument for legitimizing and giving moral authority to new, more direct forms of Western intervention and regulation (Chandler, 2004). For post-colonial critics, external intervention, under any name, can hardly create a just world order for it sustains the existing asymmetry of power in international relations. After all, in conceivable imagination, the South can never muster the resources or the confidence to intervene in the North, even though a number of industrialized states, plagued by the downturns of economic globalization, are failing in their responsibilities to protect the jobs, welfare, social security and healthcare of their populations.

Since interventions can never be attempted against powerful states, international action in the name of human security risks turning into a prerogative of the strong against the weak. For developing countries, such an approach to human security has led to fears of interventions, on behalf of people, in domestic affairs which bypasses sovereignty. Developing countries argue that their states are often under pressure from aid conditionality, from structural adjustment programmes and from competition from trans-national actors and market forces, which collectively weaken their capacity to provide and protect their people.

No matter how much the RTP notion sought to put breaks on trigger happy interventions, its association with the needy's perspective meant that human security; when associated with RTP, has been seen in the South as yet another attempt by the West to impose its liberal values and political institutions on non-Western societies, an excuse for intervention in states' domestic affairs and for conditionality on ODA. As Hampson puts it, "Human Security as the North's development establishment understands it, is interventionist when it comes to the policies and practices of states in the South, but essentially *laissez-faire* and status quo regarding the role of the market and global governance arrangements" (Hampson & al, 2002: 169). In the aftermath of September 11, the designation, by mostly northern governments, of some countries as 'fragile, failing, or failed' and as a consequence 'dangerous' for international security, presents further discomfort for the association of RTP with the idea of human security, especially when the conceptualization of danger is linked to geo-political factors instead of genuine sufferings within nations.

Furthermore, military interventions by themselves often lead to more killings and suffering tends to exacerbate, rather than reduce, in the aftermaths of interventions. Wars, including interventions in the name of responsibility, not only have direct human costs but also indirect ones on the loss of livelihoods caused by the dislocation of economy and society (Stewart & Fitzgerald, 2000). From a human security point of view, war (whether it is just or unjust) is one of the main causes of human insecurity by itself.

Contentiously Narrow

The main criticism to the RTP approach is that it stems from a narrow definition of human security which solely emphasizes on extreme violations while ignoring other important fears and threats to every day life.

Because it was trying to find a common denominator to galvanize international response to crisis, the RTP Report concentrated on threats to survival, in other words, a narrow, freedom from fear approach to human security. The threshold criteria of the ‘just cause’ principle justifying intervention in the RTP Report were “large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape” (ICISS, 2001: para. 4.19).

In these criteria, the entire range of violations that inhibit livelihoods, well-being and dignity, as well as threats to survival caused from economic or environmental crisis were neglected. Among the seven categories of the 1994 HDR, for example, only personal, political and community insecurities were considered as threats grave enough to the “core of all human lives” to justify intervention, while economic, food, health and environmental security were overlooked. Yet, the broad conceptualization of human security takes into account threats other the usual politically induced one, such as poverty, famine, diseases and environmental disasters, either man-made or natural. Such threats may not be ‘existential’ in nature, but they matter to everyday life none-the-less. The international community may not be willing or capable to intervene to prevent them or protect people when they happen, but the *lack of political will for action* does not abrogate *the moral responsibility*, because these threats are equally devastating in every day lives of people.

In the final analysis, the RTP put inadequate focus on prevention and engagement, even though these two principles clearly featured in the ICISS Report. The Report’s primary objective was to provide practical and morally tenable

guidance to the why, how, and when of military humanitarian interventions. It focused on how to respond an urgent crisis, where large-scale loss of life was imminent or occurring. While it insisted that there was a complimentary responsibility to prevent and to rebuild after interventions had happened, it failed to recognize the real difficulties of devising and implementing comprehensive strategies for conflict prevention. The Report also failed to recognize the outcomes of economic pressures, such as adjustment' programmes imposed by conditionality, which often weaken the states' capacities to provide for the wants of their populations or manage conflicts when they do happen.

What Human Security Is: From Responsibility to Protect to Shared Responsibility to Prevent and Engage

From a human security point of view, ultimately, the criteria set out by the RTP failed to separate the humanitarian from the political rationale, and consequently to alleviate the fears of the motives, i.e., the 'ends' of interventions as well their means (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2006: 195).

The broad human security framework would instead seek the end point against which the 'good' of an intervention can be measured. In other words, actions are not considered right in themselves but are judged against their outcomes. The position is close to the 'simple truths' that Chomsky outlined: "The first is that actions are evaluated in terms of the range of likely consequences. A second is the principle of universality; we apply to ourselves the same standards we apply to others, if not more stringent ones" (Chomsky, 2006).

Thus, a key way in which true human security engagement can go beyond humanitarian/ military intervention would be to address a broader range of threats to individuals' security: not just their fears of survival but also their wants: not only acts of direct violence but also structural violence (Galtung, 1969: 170); and indeed threats to security that lie beyond the control of human beings. Concerns and responses to the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2004 Tsunami are steps in those directions.

Additionally, the focus of a broader human security engagement would be on prevention rather than dealing with crises that are already underway. For example, Hampson argues that human security could be a means of emphasizing the need "to address the serious distributional inequalities that arise from the operation of the global markets and the forces of globalization" (Hampson & al, 2002: 53). An example of engagement can be proposed in the way that the EU, as the stronger partner in trade with the developing world, has

a responsibility to take into account the human security impacts of its policies. The rise in international commodity prices could endanger the stability of people's lives, as could dumping of subsidized goods onto the markets of developing countries, destroying livelihoods along the way. Human Security engagement, instead of RTP, would mean putting developing at the core of trade policies, tackling the question of nuclear proliferation in Southern countries by the North through upholding their side of the commitments to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to eliminate gradually their own nuclear arsenals, and by setting a new code of conduct for arms sales to poorer nations, etc.

The correct understanding of the broad human security definition does not advocate the use of military force for humanitarian interventions. Instead, it argues for a responsible engagement of the international community based on shared responsibility for prevention rather than dealing with crises that are already underway. Delinked from the Responsibility to Protect norm, the human security agenda can be used as a concept to define new threats such as poverty, diseases, lack of education, the culture of impunity, uncontrolled population movements, global warming, small arms, etc. on the global agenda as alternatives to the current over-focus on terrorism, WMDs and threats emanating from so-called 'failed states'.

Part V: Conclusion: Embracing Moral Universalism Over Functional Utility

For Mahbub Ul Haq, Human Security was a call for "a new partnership between North and South", one which "will demand a new ethics of mutual responsibility and mutual respect" (1995). Yet, human security now seems to have become a good that western countries *seem* to provide, while countries of the south *seem* to lack. But human security is ultimately not meant to be the problem of the developing world of the South which the North could solve through interventions, financial assistance, or a responsibility for protection. Embracing the universality of the concept would mean the elaboration of domestic human security strategies and policies, even in Western societies threatened as they are by urban violence, job insecurities, health epidemics, privatization of social delivery, militarization of societies, etc.

Up to now, the human security discourse in international relations, when associated with principled based foreign policy and responsibility to protect, has tried to raise a utilitarian concern: As Badie notes, "[Human security] is not only an ethical discourse [...] it is also a utilitarian discourse" (Badie, 2001). Yet, the main challenge is not to try to convince state authorities that because

problems can cross national borders, it is in their national interests to act. Rather, the moral imperative for justice, even when self-interests are not at stake, needs to be brought back on the global agenda.

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