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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher">POSO</journal-id>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title specific-use="original" xml:lang="es">Política y Sociedad</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
      <issn publication-format="electronic">1988-3129</issn>
      <issn-l>1988-3129</issn-l>
      <publisher>
        <publisher-name>Ediciones Complutense</publisher-name>
        <publisher-loc>España</publisher-loc>
      </publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">https://doi.org/10.5209/poso.99134</article-id>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
          <subject>MONOGRÁFICO</subject>
        </subj-group>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Echoes Without Integration: Strategic Resonance and the Limits of Radical Right Transnationalism</article-title>
        <trans-title-group xml:lang="en">
          <trans-title>Ecos sin integración: Resonancia estratégica y límites del transnacionalismo de la derecha radical</trans-title>
        </trans-title-group>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes">
          <contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5515-3686</contrib-id>
          <name>
            <surname>Zanotti</surname>
            <given-names>Lisa</given-names>
          </name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff01"/>
          <xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor1"/>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes">
          <contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0009-0004-1726-9265</contrib-id>
          <name>
            <surname>Villalobos Machuca</surname>
            <given-names>Fabián</given-names>
          </name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff02"/>
          <xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor2"/>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes">
          <contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0009-0002-2802-084X</contrib-id>
          <name>
            <surname>Roldán Duque</surname>
            <given-names>Francisco</given-names>
          </name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff03"/>
          <xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor3"/>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff01">
          <institution content-type="original">Universidad Diego Portales</institution>
          <country country="CL">(Chile)</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff02">
          <institution content-type="original">Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile</institution>
          <country country="CL">(Chile)</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff03">
          <institution content-type="original">Universidad Diego Portales</institution>
          <country country="CL">(Chile)</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <author-notes>
        <corresp id="cor1">Autor@s de correspondencia: Lisa Zanotti: <email>zanotti-anderlonil@ceu.edu</email></corresp>
        <corresp id="cor2"> Fabián Villalobos Machuca: <email>fvillalobosm@estudiante.uc.cl</email></corresp>
        <corresp id="cor3"> Francisco Roldán Duque: <email>francisco.roldan_d@mail.udp.cl</email></corresp>
      </author-notes>
      <pub-date pub-type="epub" publication-format="electronic" iso-8601-date="2025-06-26">
        <day>26</day>
        <month>06</month>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>62</volume>
      <issue>2</issue>
      <permissions>
        <copyright-statement>Copyright © 2025, Universidad Complutense de Madrid</copyright-statement>
        <copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
        <copyright-holder>Universidad Complutense de Madrid</copyright-holder>
        <license license-type="open-access" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
          <ali:license_ref>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</ali:license_ref>
          <license-p>Esta obra está bajo una licencia <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</ext-link></license-p>
        </license>
      </permissions>
      <abstract>
        <p>This article investigates the formation of transnational networks within the radical right, examining ideological convergence across Latin America, Europe, and the United States. Analyzing speeches from key events such as the Madrid Forum, VIVA, and CPAC, we identify shared themes, framing strategies, and social boundary-making within radical right discourse. Employing a hybrid methodology that integrates automated coding with Large Language Models (LLMs) and manual categorization, our findings reveal a rhetoric that is cohesive yet adaptable to regional contexts, emphasizing national sovereignty, security, and cultural values framed against external threats from leftist ideologies and globalist elites. However, unlike historical left-wing transnational alliances that structured coordinated agendas and centralized strategies, these radical right networks lack formalized cohesion and centralized control. Instead, the radical right displays a form of selective transnationalism, with leaders strategically adapting foreign discourses when domestically beneficial while prioritizing national autonomy, resulting in a flexible and tentative rather than consolidated cooperation.</p>
      </abstract>
      <trans-abstract xml:lang="es">
        <p>Este artículo investiga la formación de redes transnacionales en la derecha radical, examinando la convergencia ideológica en América Latina, Europa y los Estados Unidos. A través del análisis de discursos en eventos clave como el Foro de Madrid, VIVA y CPAC, identificamos temas compartidos, estrategias de enmarcado y construcciones de límites sociales en el discurso de la derecha radical. Empleando una metodología híbrida que integra la codificación automatizada mediante Modelos de Lenguaje de Gran Escala (LLMs) con categorización manual, nuestros hallazgos revelan una retórica cohesionada, aunque adaptable a contextos regionales, que enfatiza la soberanía nacional, la seguridad y los valores culturales, enmarcados frente a amenazas externas de ideologías izquierdistas y élites globalistas. No obstante, a diferencia de las alianzas transnacionales de izquierda que consolidaron agendas y estrategias centralizadas, estas redes de la derecha radical carecen de una cohesión formalizada y control centralizado. En su lugar, la derecha radical exhibe una forma de transnacionalismo selectivo, donde los líderes adaptan estratégicamente discursos extranjeros cuando son ventajosos en el contexto nacional, priorizando la autonomía nacional, lo que lleva a una cooperación flexible y tentativa, en lugar de consolidada.</p>
      </trans-abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>radical right</kwd>
        <kwd>transnational networks</kwd>
        <kwd>ideological alignment</kwd>
        <kwd>discourse analysis</kwd>
        <kwd>LLMs</kwd>
        <kwd>framing strategies</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
      <kwd-group xml:lang="es">
        <kwd>derecha radical</kwd>
        <kwd>redes transnacionales alineamiento ideológico</kwd>
        <kwd>análisis de discurso</kwd>
        <kwd>modelos de lenguaje de gran escala</kwd>
        <kwd>estrategias de encuadre</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
      <custom-meta-group>
        <custom-meta>
          <meta-name>Summary</meta-name>
          <meta-value>: 1. Introduction. 2. Defining the radical right. 3. Transnational radical right networks and their expansion. 4. Data and methods. 5. Results and analysis. 6. Conclusions. 7. Bibliography.</meta-value>
        </custom-meta>
        <custom-meta>
          <meta-name>How to cite</meta-name>
          <meta-value>Zanotti, L.; Villalobos-Machuca, F.; Roldán Duque, F. (2025). Echoes Without Integration: Strategic Resonance and the Limits of Radical Right Transnationalism. Polít. Soc. (Madr.) 62(2), https://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rlog.99134.</meta-value>
        </custom-meta>
      </custom-meta-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
<body>
<sec id="introduction">
  <title>1. Introduction</title>
  <disp-quote>
    <p>“Muchas gracias, Presidente Javier Milei. Queremos agradecerle la
    inauguración de este evento tan importante para el futuro de la
    región. Le agradecemos todos los días las cosas que hace por el
    mundo, y le agradecemos mucho las alegrías que da a la gente en todo
    el mundo: en Venezuela, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Honduras, Paraguay,
    Colombia, Hungría, Estados Unidos, Italia, Uruguay, El
    Salvador…”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1">1</xref>.</p>
  </disp-quote>
  <p>This was how Santiago Abascal opened his address at the 2024 Río de
  la Plata Meeting of the Madrid Forum. These words are revealing for
  several reasons. Scholars have argued that, although radical rightwing
  parties share a common ideological identity, their agendas and
  political projects are deeply shaped by unique national contexts,
  which limits their ability to form transnational networks (Mudde,
  2019). Conflicting stances toward major powers, such as Russia and the
  United States, as well as differing views on international
  organizations, further complicate these alliances (Mudde, 2019). Yet
  today, ideological diffusion appears increasingly central to their
  strategy, signaling a shift from what was once viewed as a challenging
  task with limited prospects for success (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2024).
  This emerging landscape, exemplified by the establishment of the
  Madrid Forum in 2020 and the expansion of CPAC from an U.S.-centric
  event into a global platform for conservative leaders, contrasts with
  earlier views suggesting such international initiatives by the radical
  populist right were virtually non-existent—unlike the radical populist
  left, which had long consolidated transnational spaces such as the São
  Paulo Forum and, more recently, the Puebla Group.</p>
  <p>This paper investigates whether transnational networks of the
  radical right —such as those emerging through the Madrid Forum and
  CPAC— serve as platforms for convergence and centralized
  collaboration, potentially forming a “right-wing international”, or
  alternatively, if these gatherings primarily act as strategic tools
  for leaders in an attempt to bolster their domestic profiles,
  leveraging the international stage to reinforce their influence within
  their national political arenas.</p>
  <p>Our analysis draws on speeches by far-right leaders at CPAC, the
  Madrid Forum, and VIVA events from 2020 to 2024, selected for their
  prominence as central platforms for these
  leaders.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn2">2</xref> Examining these
  speeches allows us to identify commonalities and differences in their
  positions and agendas, offering comparative insights into the
  coherence and variability of their strategies across contexts
  Additionally, selecting the period from the founding of the Madrid
  Forum and the reconfiguration of CPAC in 2020 to the present provides
  a useful framework to explore shifts and alignments in the discourse
  of radical right leaders. This approach allows us to assess whether
  interactions at these events facilitate ideological exchange and
  alignment across diverse political contexts, capturing both
  convergences and distinctions in their agendas.</p>
  <p>To analyze the content of these speeches, we employed a hybrid
  methodology that combines automated coding and discourse analysis
  through Large Language Models (LLMs) with manual deductive
  categorization by humans. This approach enables both qualitative and
  quantitative insights, allowing us to identify thematic patterns,
  framing strategies, and distinctions in group dynamics across the
  dataset.</p>
  <p>This article is structured in six sections. The second section
  examines the characteristics and discourse of the radical right. The
  third section focuses on the formation of the organizations included
  in the study. The fourth section details the methodology employed,
  while the fifth presents the main results. Finally, the sixth section
  provides the article’s conclusions.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="defining_the_radical_right">
  <title>2. Defining the radical right</title>
  <p>Following the relevant literature, the radical right is
  characterized by a blend of nativism and authoritarianism (see Betz,
  1994; Ignazi, 1997; Mudde, 2007). Central to its platform is nativism,
  which promotes a narrowly defined national identity and advocates for
  a homogeneous cultural and ethnic population. This exclusionary
  perspective opposes pluralism, viewing “outsiders” as threats to
  cultural integrity and national unity, a theme that manifests through
  political stances against immigration, multiculturalism, and
  globalism. The radical right’s exclusionary stance does not simply
  stem from abstract principles but responds to perceived cultural and
  economic threats that challenge traditional norms and values.</p>
  <p>In addition to nativism, authoritarianism plays a key role in
  shaping radical right ideologies. In this context, authoritarianism is
  understood as a predisposition linked to a preference for a strictly
  ordered society, where social cohesion is maintained through adherence
  to normative values. This order is intrinsically normative, based on
  clearly defined rules and conventions that individuals within society
  are expected to follow (Adorno <italic>et al.,</italic> 1950). Central
  to this predisposition is a resistance to diversity; authoritarianism
  reflects an underlying discomfort with difference and variation within
  society, as these are perceived to threaten social cohesion and
  disrupt the normative order. This predisposition toward
  authoritarianism can transform into an active attitude of intolerance
  when it interacts with what is known as “perceived normative threat”
  (Feldman &amp; Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). Individuals who are
  predisposed to authoritarianism may remain tolerant under stable
  social conditions, but when faced with perceived threats to social
  norms —such as cultural shifts, immigration, or political instability—
  this predisposition is triggered, resulting in an intolerance toward
  those seen as contributing to the perceived disorder. This dynamic
  fosters support for policies and leaders emphasizing law, order, and
  strong social control, which become especially appealing within
  radical right movements as they exploit societal anxieties around
  instability and diversity (Zanotti, forthcoming).</p>
  <p>In recent years we are witnessing what Cas Mudde describes as the
  “fourth wave” of far-right politics, a period marked by the increasing
  normalization of far-right ideas. Mudde traces the historical
  evolution of the far right through four distinct phases, beginning in
  the post-World War II era. The first wave (1945-1955) consisted of
  neo-fascist organizations that directly inherited the ideologies of
  the 1930s and 1940s. These groups were marginalized in post-war
  European democracies, constrained by their associations with
  totalitarian regimes. The second wave, in the 1950s and 60s, saw
  far-right movements adopt a more varied blend of old fascist
  ideologies and emergent populist sentiments, although they continued
  to face significant barriers to mainstream acceptance. It was not
  until the third wave (1980-2000) that the far right began to modernize
  its image and expand its influence, with parties such as the National
  Front in France, the Freedom Party of Austria, and the Flemish Vlaams
  Blok in Belgium gaining footholds in European parliaments, albeit
  often in isolated roles without governmental power (Mudde, 2019).</p>
  <p>The beginning of the twenty-first century marked the onset of the
  “fourth wave”, characterized by the growing normalization and
  mainstreaming of far-right ideas. Mudde argues that this period is
  distinct in that far-right
  parties<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn3">3</xref> —particularly those
  aligned with the radical right— have achieved significant electoral
  success and have reshaped mainstream political discourse. The fourth
  wave has witnessed these parties become an electorally relevant
  political force in many European countries, where their stances on
  immigration, national identity, and cultural preservation are
  increasingly accepted as “common sense”. Mudde contends that this
  normalization reflects a shift in public perception, where far-right
  ideas and figures are now legitimate participants in mainstream
  debate. This normalization has extended globally, with far-right
  movements gaining traction not only in Europe but also across North
  and South America and parts of Asia (Mudde, 2019). Several factors
  have driven the normalization of far-right ideologies. Economic
  instability has weakened public trust in traditional political elites,
  providing fertile ground for far-right narratives that promise
  stability and protection for the “native” population. Additionally,
  perceived threats to national identity from globalization and
  multiculturalism have fueled exclusionary nationalist sentiments. The
  rise of social media has also been instrumental, allowing radical
  right leaders to circumvent traditional media barriers, amplify their
  messages, and shape public opinion directly. This fourth wave
  represents not just an increase in the popularity of the far right but
  a fundamental shift in public discourse, where ideas once considered
  extremist now resonate with larger segments of society.</p>
  <p>While rooted in Mudde’s (2007) classic definition of the radical
  right, this study acknowledges recent research questioning this
  framework’s universal applicability. Borges and Zanotti (2024), for
  instance, highlight that nativism is not a central dimension for most
  radical right parties in Latin America, where authoritarian and
  conservative discourses —often religiously based— prevail over
  ethno-national exclusion typical of Europe. This raises a key
  transnational question: can these actors constitute a single
  network?</p>
</sec>
<sec id="transnational_radical_right_networks_and_their_expansion">
  <title>3. Transnational radical right networks and their
  expansion</title>
  <p>Transnational political networks were, until recently, largely a
  leftist phenomenon. Latin America’s left, for instance, developed
  consolidated structures like the São Paulo Forum (f. 1990), enabling
  strategic coordination and significant policy influence across diverse
  actors during the region’s “left turn” (Kostiuk, 2019; Levitsky &amp;
  Roberts, 2011), later complemented by platforms like the Puebla Group
  (f. 2019). By contrast, the radical right historically lacked
  equivalent global cohesion.</p>
  <p>However, over the last decade —and particularly after 2019— there
  are signs of increasing transnational organization within the radical
  right, facilitated by forums such as Madrid Forum, CPAC, and VIVA.
  These organizations have played a crucial role in fostering
  ideological diffusion across borders, creating new opportunities for
  collaboration and mutual influence. The radical right now holds
  regular conferences, summits, and events where leaders from diverse
  national contexts meet, exchange ideas, and discuss shared goals.
  These platforms serve as conduits for a transnational identity that
  transcends national boundaries, allowing leaders to build a coherent
  narrative that can resonate across different political landscapes. One
  example illustrating this ideological diffusion is the case of José
  Antonio Kast, the Chilean leader of the Republican Party, who notably
  hardened his stance on immigration after interacting with Hungary’s
  Viktor Orbán at a transnational event. Previously, Kast had proposed a
  trench along Chile’s northern border with Bolivia to manage irregular
  migration. However, after visiting Hungary last year and observing
  Orbán’s border wall along the Hungarian-Serbian border —a prominent
  symbol of Hungary’s strict immigration policy— Kast shifted his
  position, asserting that a trench would be insufficient and advocating
  instead for a full border wall (Zanotti, 2024; Díaz, Rovira
  Kaltwasser, and Zanotti, 2023)<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn4">4</xref>.
  This convergence in rhetoric suggests that exposure to transnational
  radical right networks can catalyze shifts in domestic policy stances,
  with leaders adopting and adapting tactics from other contexts to suit
  local issues. Such exchanges indicate that ideological and rhetorical
  contagion may indeed be at play, with figures like Kast incorporating
  elements of Orbán’s hardline immigration approach into his own
  political platform.</p>
  <p>Beyond elite exchanges illustrating ideological diffusion, digital
  infrastructures are fundamental to the transnational far-right’s
  broader mobilization. Digital platforms serve as central spaces for
  shaping ideology, identity, and mobilization, enabling the formation
  of transnational imagined communities outside traditional media
  gatekeepers (Caiani &amp; Kröll, 2014). Modifying the scale and speed
  of political engagement, these media allow leaders to strategically
  influence public discourse through algorithmically favored content
  (Pérez- Curiel, 2020). Furthermore, online activity is increasingly
  linked to offline radicalization and political violence, with users
  rapidly adopting and spreading extremist language beyond originating
  online communities (Karell <italic>et al.,</italic> 2023; Ferrillo,
  2024). Network analyses confirm the formation of dense online clusters
  acting as echo chambers that reinforce ideological boundaries and
  foster antagonism through “us versus them” narratives (O’Callaghan
  <italic>et al.,</italic> 2013; Kluknavská &amp; Hruška, 2018).</p>
  <p>Yet, while there are emerging signs of transnational cooperation,
  significant challenges persist that hinder the formation of a truly
  cohesive international radical right alliance. Diverging stances on
  international alliances often prevent unified action. For instance,
  disagreements over alignment with global powers —such as differing
  perspectives on Russia versus the West— create rifts within these
  movements (Mudde, 2019). Additionally, ideological inconsistencies,
  particularly around the tension between nationalism and
  transnationalism, complicate sustained collaboration. Nationalist
  movements inherently prioritize sovereignty and self-determination,
  which can be at odds with the need for international alignment. The
  concept of transnational cooperation itself poses a paradox, as it
  requires a level of international unity that nationalist ideologies
  typically resist.</p>
  <p>Therefore, while these networks appear to facilitate ideological
  diffusion and rhetorical alignment, it remains to be seen whether they
  constitute a stable and cohesive transnational radical right alliance.
  The current landscape suggests that leaders draw selectively from each
  other’s strategies, adapting foreign approaches to their own national
  contexts while maintaining a strong emphasis on domestic priorities.
  This selective transnationalism indicates a tentative form of
  cooperation rather than a fully consolidated international front.
  Indeed, observing the trajectory associated with prominent figures
  like Donald Trump, his approach —even when participating in relevant
  international events— currently appears more oriented towards symbolic
  gains or domestic validation than towards building a deeply integrated
  or strategically coherent transnational network; substantial policy
  differences often persist even among leaders expressing alignment,
  highlighting that motivations are not primarily driven by a shared
  substantive agenda or the creation of a formal international
  apparatus. Our analysis will explore whether these organizations
  —Madrid Forum, VIVA, and CPAC— can indeed be considered true
  “internationals”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn5">5</xref> of the radical
  right or if their cooperation remains largely symbolic.</p>
  <sec id="madrid_forum_viva_and_cpac">
    <title>3.1. Madrid Forum, VIVA and CPAC</title>
    <sec id="madrid_forum_and_viva">
      <title>3.1.1. Madrid Forum and VIVA</title>
      <p>The Madrid Forum was established in 2020 with the signing of
      the Madrid Charter<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn6">6</xref>, an
      initiative led by the Spanish radical right political party Vox
      (Rama <italic>et al.</italic> 2021). This document outlines the
      organization’s foundational principles, primarily focusing on
      defending values perceived as under threat from leftist
      ideologies, globalism, and what they term “totalitarian”
      movements. Madrid Charter seeks to unify conservative and
      right-wing movements across the Spanish-speaking world, advocating
      for national sovereignty, cultural values, and traditional social
      structures. Since its inception, the Forum has positioned itself
      as a platform for right-wing political and social leaders
      committed to countering the perceived encroachment of the “far
      left”, viewed as a threat to Western democracies.</p>
      <p>In its formative years, the Madrid Forum concentrated its
      efforts on the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America. A central
      tenet promoted by the Forum is the concept of the “Iberosphere”,
      which constructs regions of Iberian heritage as a unified cultural
      entity rather than a geographic one. This notion advocates for the
      cohesion and homogenization of Latin American countries, even as
      it contradicts a traditional principle of far-right movements: the
      defense of national sovereignty against foreign influence (Mudde,
      2007). While endorsing a transnational outlook, the Madrid Forum
      simultaneously emphasizes the strict protection of national
      borders, introducing a paradox into its narrative.</p>
      <p>The Forum’s financial foundation is primarily supported by
      Fundación Disenso, a think tank aligned with Spain’s radical right
      party Vox and chaired by Santiago Abascal (Rama <italic>et
      al.</italic> 2021). This financial backing has been instrumental
      in the Forum’s transnational growth, solidifying its position as a
      significant platform within the radical right.</p>
      <p>Echoing the dualistic framework often employed by populist
      leaders and movements (Mudde, 2004), the Madrid Forum’s worldview
      segments global society into two opposing camps. On one side lies
      the adversary —”them”— represented by the radical left, which
      purportedly aims to undermine the rule of law: on the other side
      stands “us”, the defenders of liberal democracy, as embodied by
      the Charter’s signatories. The Forum presents itself as an
      alliance devoted to the “defense of freedom”, liberal democracy,
      and the rule of law. From the Forum’s perspective, the radical
      left represents an existential threat, purportedly supported by
      actors such as drug cartels and adversarial states like Russia,
      Iran, and China. Its rhetoric makes no distinctions within leftist
      ideologies; consequently, figures such as Gabriel Boric in Chile
      and Lula da Silva in Brazil are framed as posing the same threat
      as authoritarian leaders like Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and
      Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Moreover, the Madrid Forum associates
      left-wing transnational organizations, such as the São Paulo Forum
      and the Puebla Group, with interventionism in sovereign states by
      the international far left. Nonetheless, the Forum’s own promotion
      of a transnational agenda and the concept of the “Iberosphere”
      appear to challenge the principle of national sovereignty, a core
      value within far-right ideology (Mudde, 2019).</p>
      <p>Since its founding, the Madrid Forum has hosted three major
      events in Bogotá, Lima and Rio de la Plata which were attended by
      far-right leaders from both Latin America and Europe. However, the
      Forum’s activities extend beyond these events. The annual “VIVA”
      congress, organized by Spain’s Vox party, has become a pivotal
      platform for the Forum. Each year, international far-right figures
      convene at VIVA to endorse Vox and deliver speeches on
      contemporary social and political issues, thereby reinforcing the
      transnational bonds within this political movement.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="cpac">
      <title>3.1.2. CPAC</title>
      <p>The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) is
      organized by the American Conservative Union, a prominent
      association that has established itself as a leading force in
      promoting conservatism within the United States. The American
      Conservative Union is renowned for its lobbying influence in the
      U.S. Congress, positioning it as one of the most impactful
      organizations within American conservative politics (Diamond,
      1995; Parker, 2015).</p>
      <p>Since the inaugural CPAC event in 1964, it has evolved into one
      of the most significant conservative forums in the United States.
      However, with the election of Donald Trump, CPAC underwent a
      notable transformation in both tone and focus, reflecting shifts
      within the broader conservative movement (Lee, 2017). First, CPAC
      experienced an ideological shift in its content. Since 2017, when
      the conference focused heavily on the Trump administration, it has
      increasingly aligned with far-right perspectives, moving away from
      traditional conservative positions such as support for free trade
      and interventionist foreign policy. Second, there has been a
      notable transformation in both audience composition and the lineup
      of speakers. Whereas CPAC once primarily featured U.S.
      conservative leaders —such as governors, Members of Congress, and
      representatives from non-governmental organizations— the current
      roster highlights far-right international figures, including
      Italy’s PM Giorgia Meloni, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, Hungary’s
      Viktor Orbán, and Argentina’s Javier Milei, signaling a shift
      toward a more radical discourse. Finally, CPAC has embarked on a
      process of internationalization, evident not only through its
      selection of speakers but also through its geographic expansion.
      Although historically held within the United States, CPAC now
      hosts conferences in countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and
      Hungary. At these international events, the CPAC logo is modified
      to reflect the colors of the host nation, rather than the
      traditional U.S. palette.</p>
      <p>Although CPAC has a 60-year history, its recent transformation
      and alignment with far-right ideologies represent a notable shift
      in its orientation. Unlike the Madrid Forum, CPAC maintains a
      foundation in moral conservatism and foreign policy, which lends
      it a distinct agenda. Nevertheless, both organizations converge in
      their commitment to advancing and defending radical right-wing
      ideologies on a global scale.</p>
    </sec>
  </sec>
</sec>
<sec id="data_and_methods">
  <title>4. Data and methods</title>
  <p>This study investigates transnational alignment among radical right
  leaders by analyzing speeches delivered at VIVA, the Madrid Forum, and
  CPAC from 2021 onward—key platforms where these actors converge to
  articulate shared agendas. The corpus includes all publicly available
  speeches from official event channels, ensuring authenticity and
  representativeness. Transcriptions were generated using Whisper, an
  advanced ASR system trained on diverse multilingual data and were
  manually verified for accuracy.</p>
  <p>The text data were processed using the GPT-4o API, a large language
  model (LLM) that supports nuanced qualitative discourse analysis
  (Eloundou <italic>et al.,</italic> 2023; Zuiderwijk <italic>et
  al.,</italic> 2021; Espinoza-Bianchini, Zanotti &amp; Meléndez, 2023;
  Chew <italic>et al.,</italic> 2023; Fan <italic>et al.,</italic>
  2024). LLMs allow researchers to design prompts that systematically
  examine discursive content (Fagni <italic>et al.,</italic> 2021),
  offering greater efficiency and depth than traditional text analysis
  methods such as dictionaries (Rathje, 2024). The temperature was set
  to 0 to ensure replicability.</p>
  <p>This study contributes significantly to the emerging use of LLMs
  for qualitative framing analysis, enabling a deeper understanding of
  how narratives are constructed, audiences are mobilized, and
  ideological boundaries are drawn in transnational contexts.</p>
  <p>The analysis is structured around three dimensions, guided by
  tailored prompts:</p>
  <list list-type="order">
    <list-item>
      <p>Thematic Analysis identifies key programmatic themes through
      inductive coding, followed by a deductive alignment with
      theoretical frameworks to reveal ideological patterns across
      speeches (Appendix C, Prompt 1).</p>
    </list-item>
    <list-item>
      <p>Framing Analysis, informed by Goffman’s (1974) concept of
      framing, examines strategic uses of language and metaphor. We
      employ a hybrid approach: LLMs conduct initial coding, which is
      then verified and refined by trained analysts for contextual
      precision. This mixed approach enhances the reliability and
      interpretive depth of framing insights (Appendix C, Prompt 1).</p>
    </list-item>
    <list-item>
      <p>In-Group/Out-Group Dynamics are analyzed to delineate how
      leaders construct collective identities and adversarial
      categories. Prompts target references to allies and enemies to map
      ideological boundary-making (Appendix C, Prompts 2 &amp; 3). This
      enables a detailed analysis of how radical right leaders define
      political membership and threat.</p>
    </list-item>
  </list>
  <p>While LLMs offer scalability and pattern recognition, they can
  reproduce biases from training data (Zuiderwijk <italic>et
  al.,</italic> 2021). To mitigate this, we implemented: (a)
  low-temperature settings for output stability; (b) prompt engineering
  to guide theoretical focus; and (c) human oversight to ensure
  analytical rigor. This hybrid design balances automation with critical
  qualitative reflection, in line with calls for transparency and
  reflexivity in AI-assisted research (Espinoza-Bianchini <italic>et
  al.,</italic> 2023; Fagni <italic>et al.,</italic> 2021; Rathje,
  2024). Recent advances in LLM capabilities across languages and
  ideological domains further validate their use in mixed-method
  political discourse research (OpenAI, 2024; Eloundou <italic>et
  al.,</italic> 2023). This study thus leverages cutting-edge tools
  while maintaining critical distance and methodological robustness.</p>
  <sec id="dataset">
    <title>4.1. Dataset</title>
    <p>The dataset for this study was constructed by compiling speeches
    delivered by (radical) right leaders at prominent transnational
    events from 2021 to the present. Each speech serves as a distinct
    observational unit, allowing for a systematic examination of
    individual contributions within each event and providing a
    foundation to assess both rhetorical consistencies and divergences
    across diverse platforms and contexts. The dataset centers on three
    principal events recognized for convening radical right leaders from
    multiple regions: the Conservative Political Action Conference
    (CPAC), VIVA España, and the Madrid Forum. These events were chosen
    due to their prominence as arenas where radical right leaders
    articulate core themes, coordinate ideological agendas, and
    reinforce shared perspectives across national
    boundaries.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn7">7</xref></p>
    <p>The speeches were sourced from various locations within each
    event, capturing a spectrum of contexts, including CPAC Brazil, CPAC
    Mexico, and CPAC USA, as well as the VIVA España gathering and the
    Madrid Forum’s regional meetings in Bogotá, Lima, and Río de la
    Plata. In total, the dataset comprises 51 speeches: 4 from CPAC
    Brazil, 4 from CPAC Mexico, 8 from CPAC USA, 3 from VIVA21, 4 from
    VIVA22, 17<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn8">8</xref>from VIVA 24, 6 from
    Foro Bogotá, 1 from Foro Lima, and 4 from Foro Río de la Plata. A
    detailed table listing the speakers by event is provided in the
    Appendix, offering further insight into the dataset’s composition.
    Appendix A presents a summary table analyzing representative
    participation at right-wing events, with a particular focus on
    active contributors. To aid in analysis, representatives are
    categorized by region, highlighting countries and individuals with
    notable and recurrent involvement.</p>
  </sec>
</sec>
<sec id="results_and_analysis">
  <title>5. Results and analysis</title>
  <sec id="issues">
    <title>5.1. Issues</title>
    <p>To examine the primary issues and themes within the speeches of
    various representatives, a hybrid analysis was conducted, combining
    automated coding with manual categorization. This approach
    integrated automated coding using Large Language Models (LLMs) with
    manual qualitative analysis performed by the researchers. In the
    initial phase, an inductive analysis identified three central themes
    within the speeches. Subsequently, based on the categories generated
    by the LLM, these themes were grouped and expanded into broader
    categories, adhering to the principles of exhaustiveness and mutual
    exclusivity. This process yielded a total of ten categories. The
    categorization procedure is outlined in <xref ref-type="table" rid="T1">Table 1</xref>.</p>
    <p>An inductive analysis of the speeches delivered by radical right
    leaders followed by subsequent re-coding, reveals a pronounced
    division between domestic and foreign policy, culminating in a
    cohesive agenda centered on defending national identity and
    sovereignty. The identified categories highlight a range of topics
    prioritized by these leaders, which include a strong focus on
    National Sovereignty and Security (58 mentions), opposition to
    Socialism, Globalism, and Leftist Ideologies (54 mentions), and
    advocacy for Freedom, Rights, and Civil Liberties (39 mentions).
    Other significant themes include Cultural Identity, Values, and
    Heritage (36 mentions), Political Ideology and Governance (33
    mentions), and International Relations and Alliances (30
    mentions).</p>
    <p>Economic considerations are also notable, with Economic Policy
    and Sovereignty (28 mentions) underscoring a desire for economic
    autonomy, often linked to nationalistic goals. Additionally,
    Patriotism and National Pride (21 mentions) emerges as a key theme,
    expressing allegiance to national symbols and values. Issues of
    Justice and Social Responsibility (18 mentions) are addressed in
    terms of legal and moral integrity, while Media, Communication, and
    Public Discourse (15 mentions) reflects concerns over information
    control and narrative shaping. These categories reveal a coherent
    yet contextually adaptable agenda that reflects each leader’s
    particular national focus, allowing for resistance to perceived
    external threats while maintaining individual autonomy. This
    approach avoids a unified, transnational agenda and emphasizes
    sovereignty in both policy and ideological terms.</p>

    <table-wrap id="T1">
      <label>Tabla 1. </label>
      <caption>
        <title>Comprehensive categories and issues</title>
      </caption>
      <table border="1">
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th><bold>Refined Category</bold></th>
            <th><bold>Related Issues</bold></th>
            <th><bold>Mentions Count</bold></th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td>National Sovereignty and Security</td>
            <td>National Sovereignty, Security and Crime, Immigration
            and Border Security, Sovereignty and National Identity</td>
            <td>58</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Socialism, Globalism, and Leftist Ideologies</td>
            <td>Socialism, Globalism, Leftist Ideologies, Cultural and
            Ideological Conflict, Political Threats and Ideological
            Battles, Regional Security, Communism and Marxism</td>
            <td>54</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Freedom, Rights, and Civil Liberties</td>
            <td>Freedom of Speech and Civil Liberties, Freedom and
            Democracy, Political Freedom, Freedom of Expression,
            Constitutional Rights</td>
            <td>39</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Cultural Identity, Values, and Heritage</td>
            <td>Cultural Values, National Identity, Tradition and Social
            Structures, Cultural and Social Values, European Identity
            and Values, Defense of Traditional Values and Freedom</td>
            <td>36</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Political Ideology and Governance</td>
            <td>Political Ideology, Governance Challenges, Political
            Responsibility, Political Corruption, Political
            Strategy</td>
            <td>33</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>International Relations and Alliances</td>
            <td>International Solidarity, International Relations,
            European Unity, Global Alliances, Strategic Alliances</td>
            <td>30</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Economic Policy and Sovereignty</td>
            <td>Economy, Economic Reform, Economic Challenges, Economic
            Sovereignty, Energy Crisis</td>
            <td>28</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Patriotism and National Pride</td>
            <td>National Pride, Patriotism, National Unity, Political
            Unity and Direction</td>
            <td>21</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Justice and Social Responsibility</td>
            <td>Judicial Reforms, Justice and Social Values, Political
            Integrity, Social Justice and Redistribution</td>
            <td>18</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td>Media, Communication, and Public Discourse</td>
            <td>Media and Communication, Media Manipulation, Freedom of
            Expression, Government Overreach</td>
            <td>15</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </table-wrap>
      <p>Source: Own elaboration.</p>
    <fig id="F1">
      <label>Figura 1. </label>
      <caption>
        <title>Sankey’s Diagram of issues’ categories about main
          issues by region</title>
      </caption>
      <graphic mimetype="image" mime-subtype="jpg" xlink:href="media/image1.jpg">
        <alt-text>/</alt-text>
      </graphic>
    </fig>
    <p>Source: Own elaboration.</p>
    <p>The Sankey diagram illustrates that, although leaders from the
    three regions share thematic elements within radical right
    discourses, each region primarily engages with issues specific to
    its unique sociopolitical context rather than aligning around a
    cohesive transnational agenda. In Europe, discourses emphasize
    “National Sovereignty and Security” as well as “International
    Relations and Alliances”, reflecting anxieties over perceived losses
    of autonomy to the European Union and challenges posed by
    immigration. Notably, Europe has also spearheaded initiatives to
    establish alliances among radical right-wing leaders. In contrast,
    Latin American discourses focus on “Socialist Ideology, Globalism,
    and Leftist Currents”, along with “Patriotism and National Pride”.
    This orientation likely stems from a historical context marked by
    leftist government influence and a rejection of globalist policies
    perceived as external impositions. Also In Latin America, the
    radical right is notably characterized by a strong alignment with
    neoliberal principles, a trait that is less evident in Europe and
    the United States. This pattern suggests limited cross-regional
    influence, with the adoption of specific issues being shaped more by
    local conditions than by coordinated collaboration across regions.
    In the United States, the discourse is characterized by a strong
    emphasis on “Liberty, Rights, and Civil Liberties”, underscoring a
    defense of individual freedoms in response to perceived expansions
    of state authority—an issue that appears less central in the other
    regions. While the theme of “Cultural Identity and Values” recurs
    across all regions, this overlap appears more coincidental than
    reflective of direct influence or common objectives.</p>
    <p>In conclusion, the analysis reveals a form of “selective
    transnationalism”, where leaders incorporate ideas from other
    regions only when they resonate with particular domestic contexts,
    rather than fostering a cohesive network of mutual cooperation.</p>
    <p>In addition to the thematic fragmentation observed across
    regions, the expansion of the radical right’s discourse has been
    significantly facilitated by digital infrastructures, which allow
    messages to circulate rapidly and transnationally without requiring
    formal organizational coordination. Recent studies have shown that
    far-right actors strategically leverage social media platforms —such
    as Telegram, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter)— not only to amplify
    their narratives, but also to manipulate public perception through
    disinformation and algorithmic amplification (Benkler, Faris &amp;
    Roberts, 2018; Fielitz &amp; Thurston, 2019). These mechanisms of
    digital manipulation compensate for the absence of structural
    cohesion, enabling these movements to generate a sense of global
    resonance and ideological alignment. This suggests that the apparent
    ideological convergence we identify may not be the result of
    centralized coordination, but rather the outcome of effective
    symbolic diffusion across digital environments saturated with
    selective exposure and confirmation bias (Marwick &amp; Lewis,
    2017). Far from being marginal, this digital infrastructure
    functions as the connective tissue of what we conceptualize as
    <italic>selective transnationalism</italic>—a network of rhetorical
    synchronization, not institutional integration.</p>
    <fig id="F2">
      <label>Figura 2. </label>
      <caption>
        <title>Learning flow and issue connection among radical right
          leaders</title>
      </caption>
      <graphic mimetype="image" mime-subtype="jpg" xlink:href="media/image2.jpg">
        <alt-text>/</alt-text>
      </graphic>
    </fig>
      <p>Source: Own elaboration.</p>

    <p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="F2">Figure 2</xref> illustrates that while far-right leaders across various
    regions share certain thematic elements in their discourse, their
    interpretations and emphases differ according to regional contexts,
    reflecting both notable convergences and divergences. First,
    anti-communism and anti-globalism emerge as recurring themes in both
    Europe and Latin America. In Europe, leaders like Abascal and Meloni
    associate anti-communism and opposition to globalism to the defense
    of national identity against external influences, particularly from
    the European Union. In Latin America, figures such as Kast and Milei
    also oppose these ideologies, yet within a context of resistance to
    leftist governments and state intervention, linking these ideas to a
    defense of neoliberal economic principles.</p>
    <p>Second, the analysis of national sovereignty and international
    alliances highlights both points of convergence and region-specific
    distinctions. Leaders from each of the three regions —Abascal, Kast,
    Meloni, and Trump— emphasize the importance of safeguarding national
    sovereignty. However, in Europe, this sovereignty is primarily
    associated with resistance to supranational entities like the EU,
    whereas in Latin America, it aligns with economic autonomy and
    opposition to intervention from left-leaning initiatives such as the
    Puebla Group. In the United States, sovereignty is articulated
    through individual autonomy and control over media discourse, as
    seen in Trump and Gabbard’s critiques of media and political
    elites.</p>
    <p>Finally, cultural identity and national values are recurring
    themes across these leaders’ rhetoric, though priorities vary.
    European leaders focus on cultural preservation in response to
    migration and multiculturalism, whereas in Latin America and the
    United States, identity is shaped by the defense of traditional
    values and rejection of “leftist ideology”. These differences
    illustrate how the global far-right adapts shared themes to local
    contexts, revealing a complex, heterogeneous, and adaptive
    movement.</p>
  </sec>
  <sec id="framing">
    <title>5.2. Framing</title>
    <p>Our analysis identified central topics within right-wing
    discourse, each framed strategically according to speaker, event,
    and audience. Results are organized around (1) varied framings of
    the same topics and (2) consistent framings across different topics,
    with additional insights by event type to highlight each gathering’s
    unique focus. To capture the diversity in framing, we segmented the
    speeches based on event type— CPAC, VIVA and Madrid Forum. This
    allowed us to observe not only how leaders frame specific topics but
    also how these framings adapt according to event context and
    regional audience.</p>
    <p><italic>Topics with Multiple Framings</italic></p>
    <p>Non-elected bodies such as the judiciary as well as the
    opposition to leftist ideology form a cluster of topics that,
    although consistently critiqued in right-wing rhetoric globally,
    exhibit notable variability in framing<bold>.</bold> For instance,
    Jair Bolsonaro frequently frames the judiciary as an “obstructive
    force”, suggesting that left-leaning judicial bodies actively hinder
    conservative progress and collude with political opposition to
    undermine his agenda. Santiago Abascal, in contrast, often presents
    the judiciary as an institution “under siege”, threatened by leftist
    ideologies that, in his view, compromise judicial integrity and
    stability. Javier Milei emphasizes a more existential framing,
    describing leftist ideology within the judiciary as a direct threat
    to both individual freedom and national sovereignty. This framing
    positions right wing leaders as protectors of institutional
    integrity against what they perceive as ideological encroachments
    from the left.</p>
    <p>Freedom of speech and the defense of civil liberties is another
    topic subject to varied framing approaches, typically presented
    either as a “fundamental right under threat” or as an “essential
    liberty endangered by authoritarianism”. In the United States
    context, Donald Trump and Tulsi Gabbard emphasize freedom of speech
    as a right under siege by leftist policies and biased media,
    underscoring concerns about ideological suppression within U.S.
    institutions. Conversely, Bolsonaro frames this issue through a lens
    of authoritarianism, connecting the threat to state and global
    institutions that, in his view, aim to erode civil liberties and
    silence conservative voices. This distinction underscores how
    freedom of speech is adapted to local and international concerns
    about ideological control.</p>
    <p>Narcotrafficking is consistently depicted as a societal issue
    with corrosive effects, though the specifics of this framing vary.
    Abascal emphasizes narcotrafficking as a corrosive influence,
    linking it to broader threats like illegal immigration and
    globalism. This framing suggests a perception of narcotrafficking as
    a destabilizing force that goes beyond crime to undermine social
    cohesion. In contrast, the President of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele,
    presents narcotrafficking as a threat to national sovereignty,
    particularly within the Latin American context, where drug-related
    crime and transnational trafficking impact governance and security.
    Here, narcotrafficking is seen as a direct challenge to the state’s
    ability to maintain order and sovereignty. In the United States,
    tribalism and political polarization are frequently discussed, with
    significant framing differences. Gabbard describes tribalism as a
    “dangerous division”, warning of its capacity to weaken national
    unity. Trump, however, presents polarization as an “inevitable
    ideological clash”, positioning himself as the leader capable of
    unifying the nation by challenging a corrupt opposition. This
    contrast demonstrates how leaders might frame the same issue either
    as a negative force or as a necessary division that validates their
    leadership role.</p>
    <p>The Ideological Divide (Right vs. Left) is consistently portrayed
    as a “fundamental conflict”, with leaders such as Abascal,
    Bolsonaro, and Milei casting the political right movements as
    defenders of societal values against an existential threat posed by
    the left. Milei intensifies this framing by describing the divide as
    a “battle for the nation’s soul”, suggesting that the opposition
    embodies moral corruption and poses a direct threat to individual
    freedoms. This framing establishes a moral dimension to the
    ideological divide, encouraging audiences to view it as more than a
    simple political disagreement.</p>
    <p><italic>Framings Applied to Multiple Topics</italic></p>
    <p>Several framing strategies recur across multiple topics, each
    with distinct rhetorical purposes. Framing topics as threats is
    particularly prevalent, mobilizing conservative audiences by
    depicting essential values —such as freedom of speech, national
    sovereignty, and cultural integrity— as endangered by internal and
    external forces. Bolsonaro exemplifies this strategy, applying the
    “threat” framing across issues ranging from national sovereignty to
    freedom of speech, which he characterizes as under attack from
    leftist and globalist forces. This framing strategy fosters a
    defensive stance, encouraging supporters to protect these values
    against perceived encroachments.</p>
    <p>The framing of topics as corrosive influences is also widely
    applied, particularly to issues like narcotrafficking, socialism,
    and globalism. Abascal frequently connects narcotrafficking,
    socialism, and globalism under a common “corrosive” framing,
    suggesting that these forces weaken societal integrity and values.
    Milei similarly applies this framing to socialism, describing it as
    a threat to individual freedom and economic stability. This framing
    strategy positions conservative leaders as defenders against
    ideologies or influences that they argue erode societal
    stability.</p>
    <p>A third framing pattern portrays issues as fundamental conflicts,
    casting topics such as the ideological divide, national identity,
    and capitalism versus socialism as existential battles. By framing
    these issues as conflicts over the “soul” or “identity” of the
    nation, leaders like Bolsonaro, Abascal, and Milei position
    themselves as champions of national integrity against leftist
    ideologies that they argue threaten these core values. This framing
    strategy not only emphasizes the stakes of the political debate but
    also calls for committed support from conservative audiences.</p>
    <p>Finally, topics like the judiciary and political opposition are
    often framed as either under siege by leftist forces or as
    obstructive to progress. Bolsonaro frequently employs the
    “obstructive” framing, accusing the judiciary of blocking
    conservative policies and serving as an impediment to his agenda.
    Abascal and Milei often frame the judiciary as “under siege”,
    positioning themselves as defenders of these institutions against
    leftist encroachment. This framing casts the judiciary not as a
    neutral entity, but as a politically charged institution vulnerable
    to ideological manipulation.</p>
    <p>The distinct contexts of CPAC, VIVA, and Madrid Forum reveal
    specific emphases in framing, each tailored to resonate with the
    respective audience. CPAC events focus on threats to freedom of
    speech and the ideological divide, rallying U.S. conservatives to
    defend civil liberties against leftist censorship. At CPAC, leaders
    like Trump and Gabbard frame freedom of speech as fundamentally
    under threat, advocating for protective measures for conservative
    voices. In contrast, VIVA events emphasize national sovereignty and
    cultural values relevant to Latin American audiences. Leaders like
    Bolsonaro and Abascal frame narcotrafficking, socialism, and
    globalism as threats that erode societal stability, linking these
    issues to regional concerns. The focus on defending Latin American
    cultural and religious values from foreign and globalist influences
    is a recurring theme in VIVA, aligning with regional conservatism.
    The Madrid Forum prioritizes nationalism and ideological purity,
    with leaders such as Abascal and Milei portraying leftist ideologies
    and judicial institutions as direct threats to national sovereignty
    and cultural integrity. Madrid Forum serves as a platform for
    leaders to advocate for ideological purity, framing the defense of
    conservative institutions as essential to preserving national
    identity against progressive influence.</p>
  </sec>
  <sec id="outgroups_and_ingroups">
    <title>5.3. Outgroups and ingroups</title>
    <p>For the analysis of outgroups and ingroups, a specific prompt was
    developed to enable the AI to conduct an inductive analysis of the
    51 speeches, identifying who is classified as “us” versus “them”
    according to different radical right representatives. Through a
    combination of inductive (LLM-based) and deductive (human) coding
    and analysis, seven ingroup categories and nine outgroup categories
    were identified. Appendix B presents two tables summarizing the
    categories identified, with definitions and groupings based on the
    inductive analysis conducted by the model.</p>
    <p>After presenting and explaining the categories used to classify
    outgroups and ingroups, we proceed to analyze the most recurrent
    references (mentions) within the speeches examined for both
    categories (see Appendix B for an exhaustive list of the groups).
    Given that the radical right constructs its rhetoric primarily
    through the exclusion and identification of “others”, (Mudde and
    Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Zanotti, 2023; Zanotti,
    <italic>forthcoming</italic>) we find it pertinent to first analyze
    the outgroups before examining the ingroups to assess the coherence
    of their overall narrative.</p>
    <p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="F3">Figure 3</xref> illustrates the most frequent “outgroup” categories in
    the speeches of far-right leaders at events such as CPAC, the Madrid
    Forum, and VIVA, based on the most repeated mentions across a set of
    51 speeches. Each bubble represents a category, with its size and
    color corresponding to the frequency of mentions associated with
    that category.</p>
    <p>The data indicate that the category Socialism, Communism and
    “leftist ideologies” is notably prominent, with 53 mentions, making
    it the most frequent “outgroup” referenced in radical right
    discourse. This prominence suggests that communism and the left are
    perceived as central threats, positioned as the primary ideological
    adversaries within the radical right’s rhetoric. The significance of
    this category underscores the radical right’s approach, which not
    only opposes these ideologies but actively constructs a deeply
    anti-left and anti-communist discourse, elevating it above other
    local public policy concerns. This rhetorical strategy serves to
    simplify the discourse by shifting focus from internal issues to an
    external ideological enemy. This emphasis on the communist threat
    aligns with the broader rhetoric of the radical right, which
    frequently associates leftist ideologies with the erosion of
    traditional values and social destabilization, as noted in previous
    studies (see Zanotti, 2023; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2023). Beyond its
    national context, anti-communism serves as an effective discursive
    tool for the radical right to mobilize its base and foster
    transnational alliances. This is particularly evident in the
    discourses analyzed, which include leaders from diverse regions
    —Latin America, Europe, and the United States— all converging in
    their portrayal of the left as a shared threat. Consequently,
    anti-communism functions as a unifying element, connecting these
    leaders and enabling their messages to resonate with varied
    audiences, despite differing local contexts.</p>
    <p>“Globalism and International elites” (27 mentions) and “Media and
    Establishment” (24 mentions), and Corrupt Political Class/Caste
    occupy a secondary position in terms of frequency. Nevertheless, the
    presence of these categories reflects an anti-establishment
    narrative in which globalist elites and critical media are perceived
    as components of a power structure threatening national and
    traditional values. Together, these elements contribute to a
    discourse of oppression, framing the left, elites, and media as
    external forces conspiring against an authentic national identity.
    Additional relevant categories, such as “NGOs and International
    Organizations” (12 mentions) and “Environmentalists and Woke Agenda”
    (6 mentions), further reinforce this anti-establishment theme.
    International organizations and NGOs are portrayed as agents
    undermining national sovereignty, while environmentalists and the
    “woke agenda” are depicted as imposing progressive values that
    threaten traditional cultural norms and social cohesion. This
    framing positions these groups as part of a broader ideological
    challenge, one that seeks to reshape national identity and diminish
    the autonomy of conservative governance.</p>
    <fig id="F3">
      <label>Figura 3. </label>
      <caption>
        <title>Outgroups detected in the speech of radical right
          representatives</title>
      </caption>
      <graphic mimetype="image" mime-subtype="jpg" xlink:href="media/image3.jpg">
        <alt-text>/</alt-text>
      </graphic>
    </fig>
      <p>Source: Own elaboration.</p>

    <p>Overall, the prominence of anti-communism and criticism of the
    left in radical right discourses, surpassing other public policy
    issues, suggests a communications strategy crafted to mobilize
    followers through a unified ideological adversary. This
    transnational anti-left discourse enables the radical right to
    portray itself as the defender of traditional values and national
    sovereignty against an external ideological threat. By centering on
    critiques of communism, these leaders simplify the political
    narrative, sidestepping the complexities of specific local issues in
    favor of constructing a unified, global vision of the threats they
    face.</p>
    <p>All in all, the contemporary radical right discourse is
    structured around an anti-left and anti-communist axis, used not
    only to unify followers but also to forge alliances among leaders
    across different regions. This strategy allows the radical right to
    project a globalized narrative that, while disregarding many local
    issues, succeeds in constructing a shared threat narrative, thereby
    reinforcing its ideological stance on the international stage.</p>
    <p>Conversely, <xref ref-type="fig" rid="F4">Figure 4</xref> displays the most frequent “ingroup”
    categories in the speeches of radical right leaders. Notably, the
    category “Supporters and Allies of Specific Leaders/Movements”
    appears 53 times, underscoring the centrality of alliances with
    ideologically aligned figures and movements. This emphasis on
    forming a network of like-minded supporters reflects a vision of
    shared ideological struggle, where allies are seen as collaborators
    defending traditional and national values against perceived external
    and internal threats.</p>
    <p>The second most frequent category, “Patriots and National
    Identity” with 37 mentions, highlights the radical right’s focus on
    reinforcing a strong sense of national pride and cohesion. By
    associating patriotism and national identity with authenticity and
    the defense of sovereign interests, this approach resonates with
    audiences that prioritize national sovereignty and
    self-determination. This contrasts sharply with globalist or
    anti-national sectors, which are often portrayed as undermining
    these values. Another significant category is “Conservative and
    Right-Wing Movements” (26 mentions), signaling the importance of
    aligning with other conservative forces to uphold traditional
    ideologies. This category highlights the shared ideological
    foundation that the radical right establishes with other
    conservative actors, reinforcing a sense of belonging to a broader
    right-wing community that opposes progressive or secular ideologies.
    The category “Freedom and Defenders of Liberty” (22 mentions)
    emphasizes the radical right’s portrayal of itself as a defender of
    individual freedoms, often framing this struggle as one against
    authoritarianism, leftist oppression, or government overreach. In
    this context, the right to free expression and civil liberties are
    framed as under threat, resonating with audiences who see freedom as
    a core value at risk. “Religious and Christian Groups” with 14
    mentions, underscores the centrality of religious and moral values
    within the radical right’s identity.</p>
    <fig id="F4">
      <label>Figura 4. </label>
      <caption>
        <title>Ingroups detected in the speech of radical right
          representatives</title>
      </caption>
      <graphic mimetype="image" mime-subtype="jpg" xlink:href="media/image4.jpg">
        <alt-text>/</alt-text>
      </graphic>
    </fig>
      <p>Source: Own elaboration.</p>

    <p>This reflects a positioning as defenders of conservative morality
    and religious traditions, in opposition to secular or progressive
    trends perceived as threats. Scholarly work, particularly focused on
    Latin America, has highlighted that in contexts where immigration is
    less prominent, the radical right often politicizes traditional
    moral values as a cornerstone of its agenda. In the United States, a
    similar trend is observed, where the growing influence of
    evangelical churches intensifies the focus on conservative morality
    over other socio-political issues (Zanotti and Roberts, 2021; Boas
    2023; Payne <italic>et al.</italic> 2023; Rovira Kaltwasser and
    Zanotti 2023; Margolis 2020).</p>
    <p>The categories “Families and Traditional Values Advocates” (12
    mentions) and “Nations and Citizens” (25 mentions) further emphasize
    the radical right’s connection to social sectors regarded as
    foundational to the nation. These categories represent an appeal to
    family values and social cohesion as fundamental components of
    national identity, portraying the radical right as defenders of the
    social order against forces seen as destabilizing or morally
    corrupting.</p>
    <p>The emphasis on youth as part of the “Engaged Youth” category
    (subsumed within broader categories in the re-coding) reflects an
    attempt to secure generational continuity for radical right
    ideologies, framing young activists as part of a movement committed
    to the nation’s future. This narrative combines historical legacy
    with future aspirations, aiming to build a multi-generational
    support base.</p>
    <p>A comparison between these ingroups and outgroups reveals a
    coherent strategy of inclusion and exclusion in the radical right’s
    discourse. The outgroups —comprising leftist and communist
    ideologies, globalist elites, and critical media— are consistently
    depicted as ideological or external threats undermining the values
    and identity embodied by the ingroups. This constructed dichotomy
    between ingroups and outgroups enables radical right leaders to
    project a narrative of resistance and defense: ingroups represent
    the authentic bearers of national values, while outgroups are cast
    as destabilizing and anti-national forces. This narrative structure
    consolidates the discourse of the radical right by distinctly
    defining who belongs and who poses a threat. The alignment between
    the values of the ingroups and the portrayal of an external
    adversary legitimizes a defensive stance and mobilizes followers
    around a national and conservative identity. This flexible,
    context-specific messaging allows the radical right to adapt its
    appeal across diverse geopolitical settings, consistently framing
    ingroups as protectors of the nation and outgroups as existential
    threats. In essence, the figure illustrates a discourse in which
    ingroups are not only depicted as the true representatives of the
    nation but also as defenders of the values that the radical right
    seeks to uphold, sharply contrasting with outgroups, whose perceived
    threats justify and reinforce this cohesive identity.</p>
  </sec>
</sec>
<sec id="conclusions">
  <title>6. Conclusions</title>
  <p>This study explored the transnational networks of the radical right
  by analyzing speeches from VIVA, the Madrid Forum, and CPAC. Our goal
  was to assess whether these events foster ideological alignment across
  Latin America, Europe, and the United States. Through discourse
  analysis, we identified shared themes, rhetorical framings, and
  in-group/out-group distinctions that underpin a collective identity of
  resistance to perceived threats against national sovereignty, cultural
  tradition, and social order.</p>
  <p>To achieve this, we employed a mixed-method approach that
  integrates inductive and deductive analysis using Large Language
  Models (LLMs), which enabled efficient yet nuanced coding of
  ideological content. LLMs allowed us to identify patterns across a
  large corpus while ensuring theoretical alignment through manual
  verification. This method strengthens both the reliability and
  interpretive depth of discourse analysis in political
  communication.</p>
  <p>Our findings suggest that while there is a shared ideological
  foundation centered on nationalism, sovereignty, and anti-globalism,
  the radical right’s rhetoric remains deeply shaped by regional and
  national contexts. European leaders emphasize resistance to
  supranational governance (particularly the EU) and immigration, while
  Latin American figures focus on anti-leftist rhetoric rooted in
  historical legacies of socialism and interventionism. U.S. discourse
  prioritizes individual liberties and critiques of government
  overreach, reflecting distinct political traditions. These differences
  illustrate that ideological diffusion occurs through adaptation rather
  than homogenization.</p>
  <p>Crucially, our study finds no evidence of a fully consolidated
  international radical right alliance. Instead, what emerges is a
  pattern of selective transnationalism, whereby leaders adopt
  discursive strategies and ideological tropes from abroad that align
  with domestic political goals. These networks facilitate inspiration
  and strategic borrowing but stop short of forming a unified, centrally
  coordinated movement. This model of cooperation contrasts with
  ideologically centralized transnational movements like the Communist
  International, highlighting the radical right’s preference for
  autonomy over hierarchical coordination.</p>
  <p>Selective transnationalism is visible not only in shared rhetoric
  but also in how certain policy ideas circulate across national
  contexts. For instance, Chilean presidential candidate José Antonio
  Kast referenced Trump’s border wall and Orbán’s migration policies as
  inspiration (Díaz <italic>et al.,</italic> 2023).
  <xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn9">9</xref> Similarly, Bukele’s
  “mega-prison” in El Salvador has drawn attention from leaders like
  Javier Milei in Argentina and sectors of Chile’s
  right<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn10">10</xref>. These examples reflect
  rhetorical and symbolic resonance more than direct policy transfer,
  illustrating how radical right leaders use transnational references to
  bolster domestic legitimacy rather than to coordinate a unified policy
  agenda.</p>
  <p>Theoretically, this study contributes to the literature on
  transnational radicalism by offering a differentiated understanding of
  ideological convergence: one characterized by discursive overlap and
  mutual reference but constrained by nationalist priorities.
  Methodologically, it demonstrates how LLMs can advance political
  discourse research by enabling hybrid forms of large-scale qualitative
  and quantitative analysis.</p>
  <p>Future research should further explore how these ideological
  patterns evolve across other radical right platforms, especially as
  regional contexts shift. It may also be fruitful to examine how these
  actors engage with context-specific issues such as evangelical
  mobilization in Latin America or EU skepticism in Europe. Longitudinal
  studies could help assess whether the current flexible configurations
  solidify into more stable alliances or remain opportunistic networks
  of rhetorical affinity.</p>
  <p>Understanding these dynamics is crucial; indeed, some scholars are
  already grappling with this phenomenon. Forti (2024) characterizes it
  as a “reactionary international” with symbolic rather than structural
  unity, bound by anti-progressive and anti-globalist themes. Slobodian
  (2025) likewise argues that the radical right envisions a reordering
  of the international system through sovereignist logics rather than
  supranational coordination. Thus, rather than convergence around a
  common agenda, we observe discursive alignment that adapts to local
  political conditions, operating more as a strategic repertoire than as
  a fixed ideology. As Van Dijk (2024) argues, these narratives function
  as flexible ideological configurations, allowing the radical right to
  maintain resonance while preserving domestic autonomy.</p>
  <sec id="acknowledgments">
    <title>Acknowledgments</title>
    <p>Lisa Zanotti acknowledges the support of the Millennium Nucleus
    Center for the Study of Politics, Public Opinion and Media in Chile
    (NCS2024_007).</p>
    
  </sec>
</sec>
</body>
<back>
<fn-group>
  <fn id="fn1">
    <label>1</label><p>English translation: “Thank you very much,
    President Javier Milei. We want to thank you for inaugurating this
    very important event for the future of the region. We thank you
    every day for the things you do for the world, and thank you very
    much for the joys you bring to people throughout the world: in
    Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Paraguay, Colombia,
    Hungary, the United States, Italy, Uruguay, El Salvador...”.</p>
  </fn>
  <fn id="fn2">
    <label>2</label><p>Our empirical focus on Latin America, the US, and
    Europe acknowledges the radical right’s wider global presence.
    Notable regional variants, such as India’s BJP (Hindu
    ethnonationalism; Leidig &amp; Mudde, 2023), Turkey’s AKP (Islamic
    nativism; Balta, 2023), and emerging populism in sub-Saharan Africa
    (less networked; Nyadera &amp; Agwanda, 2019), fall outside this
    study’s scope, which examines transnational articulation via the
    Madrid Forum, VIVA, and CPAC.</p>
  </fn>
  <fn id="fn3">
    <label>3</label><p>“Far right” is an umbrella term encompassing two
    main ideological families: the “radical right” and the “extreme
    right” (Mudde, 2019). While both share characteristics like
    exclusionary nationalism, they traditionally diverge on democracy:
    the “radical right” operates within democratic frameworks but
    opposes core liberal democratic principles (such as pluralism and
    minority rights), whereas the “extreme right” openly rejects
    democracy.</p>
  </fn>
  <fn id="fn4">
    <label>4</label><p><ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://elpais.com/chile/2024-05-02/kast-propone-instalar-un-muro-en-la-frontera-chilena-con-bolivia-es-necesario-para-terminar-con-la-inmigracion-ilegal.html">elpais.com/chile/2024-05-02/kast-propone-instalar-un-muro-en-la-frontera-chilena-con-bolivia-es-necesario-para-terminar-con-la-inmigracion-ilegal.html</ext-link></p>
  </fn>
  <fn id="fn5">
    <label>5</label><p>The term “internationals” here draws a parallel
    with historical examples of more structured and ideologically
    cohesive transnational</p>
    <p>political alliances, such as the Socialist Internationals or the
    Comintern, as well as the more contemporary consolidated networks of
    the Latin American left mentioned earlier. It implies a level of
    strategic coordination, shared substantive agenda, and
    organizational coherence that goes beyond symbolic networking or
    ad-hoc ideological diffusion.</p>
  </fn>
  <fn id="fn6">
    <label>6</label><p>To see the Madrid Charter<italic>:</italic>
    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://fundaciondisenso.org/carta-de-madrid-en-defensa-de-la-libertad-y-la-democracia-en-la-iberosfera/">fundaciondisenso.org/carta-de-madrid-en-defensa-de-la-libertad-y-la-democracia-en-la-iberosfera/</ext-link></p>
  </fn>
  <fn id="fn7">
    <label>7</label><p>For the discourse analysis, a database has been
    generated containing the discourse, leader, event, prompts and
    results. The authors can be consulted for access to the
    database.</p>
  </fn>
  <fn id="fn8">
    <label>8</label><p>The high number of speeches from VIVA is because
    the dataset includes several short addresses by Santiago Abascal.
    For reasons of methodological transparency, these were kept as
    separate entries and not consolidated.</p>
  </fn>
  <fn id="fn9">
    <label>9</label><p><ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2025/04/01/la-estridente-retorica-en-seguridad-que-une-a-los-candidatos-presidenciales-de-la-derecha/">www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2025/04/01/la-estridente-retorica-en-seguridad-que-une-a-los-candidatos-presidenciales-de-la-derecha/</ext-link>
    ;
    <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://www.ex-ante.cl/las-claves-de-la-gira-de-kast-a-hungria-con-foco-en-inmigracion-y-en-politicas-pro-familia/">www.ex-ante.cl/las-claves-de-la-gira-de-kast-a-hungria-con-foco-en-inmigracion-y-en-politicas-pro-familia/</ext-link></p>
  </fn>
  <fn id="fn10">
    <label>10</label><p><ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://www.lasexta.com/noticias/internacional/milei-fija-bukele-construir-megacarcel-como-salvador_2024061766703dad8fd52100010e4560.html">www.lasexta.com/noticias/internacional/milei-fija-bukele-construir-megacarcel-como-salvador_2024061766703dad8fd52100010e4560.html</ext-link></p>
  </fn>
</fn-group>
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