Echoes Without Integration: Strategic Resonance and the Limits of Radical Right Transnationalism

This was how Santiago Abascal opened his address at the 2024 Río de la Plata Meeting of the Madrid Forum. These words are revealing for several reasons. Scholars have argued that, although radical rightwing parties share a common ideological identity, their agendas and political projects are deeply shaped by unique national contexts, which limits their ability to form transnational networks (Mudde, 2019). Conflicting stances toward major powers, such as Russia and the United States, as well as differing views on international organizations, further complicate these alliances (Mudde, 2019). Yet today, ideological diffusion appears increasingly central to their strategy, signaling a shift from what was once viewed as a challenging task with limited prospects for success (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2024). This emerging landscape, exemplified by the establishment of the Madrid Forum in 2020 and the expansion of CPAC from an U.S.-centric event into a global platform for conservative leaders, contrasts with earlier views suggesting such international initiatives by the radical populist right were virtually non-existent—unlike the radical populist left, which had long consolidated transnational spaces such as the São Paulo Forum and, more recently, the Puebla Group.

This paper investigates whether transnational networks of the radical right —such as those emerging through the Madrid Forum and CPAC— serve as platforms for convergence and centralized collaboration, potentially forming a “right-wing international”, or alternatively, if these gatherings primarily act as strategic tools for leaders in an attempt to bolster their domestic profiles, leveraging the international stage to reinforce their influence within their national political arenas.

Our analysis draws on speeches by far-right leaders at CPAC, the Madrid Forum, and VIVA events from 2020 to 2024, selected for their prominence as central platforms for these leaders.² Examining these speeches allows us to identify commonalities and differences in their positions and agendas, offering comparative insights into the coherence and variability of their strategies across contexts Additionally, selecting the period from the founding of the Madrid Forum and the reconfiguration of CPAC in 2020 to the present provides a useful framework to explore shifts and alignments in the discourse of radical right leaders. This approach allows us to assess whether interactions at these events facilitate ideological exchange and alignment across diverse political contexts, capturing both convergences and distinctions in their agendas.

To analyze the content of these speeches, we employed a hybrid methodology that combines automated coding and discourse analysis through Large Language Models (LLMs) with manual deductive categorization by humans. This approach enables both qualitative and quantitative insights, allowing us to identify thematic patterns, framing strategies, and distinctions in group dynamics across the dataset.

This article is structured in six sections. The second section examines the characteristics and discourse of the radical right. The third section focuses on the formation of the organizations included in the study. The fourth section details the methodology employed, while the fifth presents the main results. Finally, the sixth section provides the article’s conclusions.

2. Defining the radical right

Following the relevant literature, the radical right is characterized by a blend of nativism and authoritarianism (see Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 1997; Mudde, 2007). Central to its platform is nativism, which promotes a narrowly defined national identity and advocates for a homogeneous cultural and ethnic population. This exclusionary perspective opposes pluralism, viewing “outsiders” as threats to cultural integrity and national unity, a theme that manifests through political stances against immigration, multiculturalism, and globalism. The radical right’s exclusionary stance does not simply stem from abstract principles but responds to perceived cultural and economic threats that challenge traditional norms and values.

In addition to nativism, authoritarianism plays a key role in shaping radical right ideologies. In this context, authoritarianism is understood as a predisposition linked to a preference for a strictly ordered society, where social cohesion is maintained through adherence to normative values. This order is intrinsically normative, based on clearly defined rules and conventions that individuals within society are expected to follow (Adorno et al., 1950). Central to this predisposition is a resistance to diversity; authoritarianism reflects an underlying discomfort with difference and variation within society, as these are perceived to threaten social cohesion and disrupt the normative order. This predisposition toward authoritarianism can transform into an active attitude of intolerance when it interacts with what is known as “perceived normative threat” (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). Individuals who are predisposed to authoritarianism may remain tolerant under stable social conditions, but when faced with perceived threats to social norms —such as cultural shifts, immigration, or political instability— this predisposition is triggered, resulting in an intolerance toward those seen as contributing to the perceived disorder. This dynamic fosters support for policies and leaders emphasizing law, order, and strong social control, which become especially appealing within radical right movements as they exploit societal anxieties around instability and diversity (Zanotti, forthcoming).

In recent years we are witnessing what Cas Mudde describes as the “fourth wave” of far-right politics, a period marked by the increasing normalization of far-right ideas. Mudde traces the historical evolution of the far right through four distinct phases, beginning in the post-World War II era. The first wave (1945-1955) consisted of neo-fascist organizations that directly inherited the ideologies of the 1930s and 1940s. These groups were marginalized in post-war European democracies, constrained by their associations with totalitarian regimes. The second wave, in the 1950s and 60s, saw far-right movements adopt a more varied blend of old fascist ideologies and emergent populist sentiments, although they continued to face significant barriers to mainstream acceptance. It was not until the third wave (1980-2000) that the far right began to modernize its image and expand its influence, with parties such as the National Front in France, the Freedom Party of Austria, and the Flemish Vlaams Blok in Belgium gaining footholds in European parliaments, albeit often in isolated roles without governmental power (Mudde, 2019).

The beginning of the twenty-first century marked the onset of the “fourth wave”, characterized by the growing normalization and mainstreaming of far-right ideas. Mudde argues that this period is distinct in that far-right parties³ —particularly those aligned with the radical right— have achieved significant electoral success and have reshaped mainstream political discourse. The fourth wave has witnessed these parties become an electorally relevant political force in many European countries, where their stances on immigration, national identity, and cultural preservation are increasingly accepted as “common sense”. Mudde contends that this normalization reflects a shift in public perception, where far-right ideas and figures are now legitimate participants in mainstream debate. This normalization has extended globally, with far-right movements gaining traction not only in Europe but also across North and South America and parts of Asia (Mudde, 2019). Several factors have driven the normalization of far-right ideologies. Economic instability has weakened public trust in traditional political elites, providing fertile ground for far-right narratives that promise stability and protection for the “native” population. Additionally, perceived threats to national identity from globalization and multiculturalism have fueled exclusionary nationalist sentiments. The rise of social media has also been instrumental, allowing radical right leaders to circumvent traditional media barriers, amplify their messages, and shape public opinion directly. This fourth wave represents not just an increase in the popularity of the far right but a fundamental shift in public discourse, where ideas once considered extremist now resonate with larger segments of society.

While rooted in Mudde’s (2007) classic definition of the radical right, this study acknowledges recent research questioning this framework’s universal applicability. Borges and Zanotti (2024), for instance, highlight that nativism is not a central dimension for most radical right parties in Latin America, where authoritarian and conservative discourses —often religiously based— prevail over ethno-national exclusion typical of Europe. This raises a key transnational question: can these actors constitute a single network?

3. Transnational radical right networks and their expansion

Transnational political networks were, until recently, largely a leftist phenomenon. Latin America’s left, for instance, developed consolidated structures like the São Paulo Forum (f. 1990), enabling strategic coordination and significant policy influence across diverse actors during the region’s “left turn” (Kostiuk, 2019; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011), later complemented by platforms like the Puebla Group (f. 2019). By contrast, the radical right historically lacked equivalent global cohesion.

However, over the last decade —and particularly after 2019— there are signs of increasing transnational organization within the radical right, facilitated by forums such as Madrid Forum, CPAC, and VIVA. These organizations have played a crucial role in fostering ideological diffusion across borders, creating new opportunities for collaboration and mutual influence. The radical right now holds regular conferences, summits, and events where leaders from diverse national contexts meet, exchange ideas, and discuss shared goals. These platforms serve as conduits for a transnational identity that transcends national boundaries, allowing leaders to build a coherent narrative that can resonate across different political landscapes. One example illustrating this ideological diffusion is the case of José Antonio Kast, the Chilean leader of the Republican Party, who notably hardened his stance on immigration after interacting with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán at a transnational event. Previously, Kast had proposed a trench along Chile’s northern border with Bolivia to manage irregular migration. However, after visiting Hungary last year and observing Orbán’s border wall along the Hungarian-Serbian border —a prominent symbol of Hungary’s strict immigration policy— Kast shifted his position, asserting that a trench would be insufficient and advocating instead for a full border wall (Zanotti, 2024; Díaz, Rovira Kaltwasser, and Zanotti, 2023)⁴. This convergence in rhetoric suggests that exposure to transnational radical right networks can catalyze shifts in domestic policy stances, with leaders adopting and adapting tactics from other contexts to suit local issues. Such exchanges indicate that ideological and rhetorical contagion may indeed be at play, with figures like Kast incorporating elements of Orbán’s hardline immigration approach into his own political platform.

Beyond elite exchanges illustrating ideological diffusion, digital infrastructures are fundamental to the transnational far-right’s broader mobilization. Digital platforms serve as central spaces for shaping ideology, identity, and mobilization, enabling the formation of transnational imagined communities outside traditional media gatekeepers (Caiani & Kröll, 2014). Modifying the scale and speed of political engagement, these media allow leaders to strategically influence public discourse through algorithmically favored content (Pérez- Curiel, 2020). Furthermore, online activity is increasingly linked to offline radicalization and political violence, with users rapidly adopting and spreading extremist language beyond originating online communities (Karell et al., 2023; Ferrillo, 2024). Network analyses confirm the formation of dense online clusters acting as echo chambers that reinforce ideological boundaries and foster antagonism through “us versus them” narratives (O’Callaghan et al., 2013; Kluknavská & Hruška, 2018).

Yet, while there are emerging signs of transnational cooperation, significant challenges persist that hinder the formation of a truly cohesive international radical right alliance. Diverging stances on international alliances often prevent unified action. For instance, disagreements over alignment with global powers —such as differing perspectives on Russia versus the West— create rifts within these movements (Mudde, 2019). Additionally, ideological inconsistencies, particularly around the tension between nationalism and transnationalism, complicate sustained collaboration. Nationalist movements inherently prioritize sovereignty and self-determination, which can be at odds with the need for international alignment. The concept of transnational cooperation itself poses a paradox, as it requires a level of international unity that nationalist ideologies typically resist.

Therefore, while these networks appear to facilitate ideological diffusion and rhetorical alignment, it remains to be seen whether they constitute a stable and cohesive transnational radical right alliance. The current landscape suggests that leaders draw selectively from each other’s strategies, adapting foreign approaches to their own national contexts while maintaining a strong emphasis on domestic priorities. This selective transnationalism indicates a tentative form of cooperation rather than a fully consolidated international front. Indeed, observing the trajectory associated with prominent figures like Donald Trump, his approach —even when participating in relevant international events— currently appears more oriented towards symbolic gains or domestic validation than towards building a deeply integrated or strategically coherent transnational network; substantial policy differences often persist even among leaders expressing alignment, highlighting that motivations are not primarily driven by a shared substantive agenda or the creation of a formal international apparatus. Our analysis will explore whether these organizations —Madrid Forum, VIVA, and CPAC— can indeed be considered true “internationals”⁵ of the radical right or if their cooperation remains largely symbolic.

3.1. Madrid Forum, VIVA and CPAC

3.1.1. Madrid Forum and VIVA

The Madrid Forum was established in 2020 with the signing of the Madrid Charter⁶, an initiative led by the Spanish radical right political party Vox (Rama et al. 2021). This document outlines the organization’s foundational principles, primarily focusing on defending values perceived as under threat from leftist ideologies, globalism, and what they term “totalitarian” movements. Madrid Charter seeks to unify conservative and right-wing movements across the Spanish-speaking world, advocating for national sovereignty, cultural values, and traditional social structures. Since its inception, the Forum has positioned itself as a platform for right-wing political and social leaders committed to countering the perceived encroachment of the “far left”, viewed as a threat to Western democracies.

In its formative years, the Madrid Forum concentrated its efforts on the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America. A central tenet promoted by the Forum is the concept of the “Iberosphere”, which constructs regions of Iberian heritage as a unified cultural entity rather than a geographic one. This notion advocates for the cohesion and homogenization of Latin American countries, even as it contradicts a traditional principle of far-right movements: the defense of national sovereignty against foreign influence (Mudde, 2007). While endorsing a transnational outlook, the Madrid Forum simultaneously emphasizes the strict protection of national borders, introducing a paradox into its narrative.

The Forum’s financial foundation is primarily supported by Fundación Disenso, a think tank aligned with Spain’s radical right party Vox and chaired by Santiago Abascal (Rama et al. 2021). This financial backing has been instrumental in the Forum’s transnational growth, solidifying its position as a significant platform within the radical right.

Echoing the dualistic framework often employed by populist leaders and movements (Mudde, 2004), the Madrid Forum’s worldview segments global society into two opposing camps. On one side lies the adversary —”them”— represented by the radical left, which purportedly aims to undermine the rule of law: on the other side stands “us”, the defenders of liberal democracy, as embodied by the Charter’s signatories. The Forum presents itself as an alliance devoted to the “defense of freedom”, liberal democracy, and the rule of law. From the Forum’s perspective, the radical left represents an existential threat, purportedly supported by actors such as drug cartels and adversarial states like Russia, Iran, and China. Its rhetoric makes no distinctions within leftist ideologies; consequently, figures such as Gabriel Boric in Chile and Lula da Silva in Brazil are framed as posing the same threat as authoritarian leaders like Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Moreover, the Madrid Forum associates left-wing transnational organizations, such as the São Paulo Forum and the Puebla Group, with interventionism in sovereign states by the international far left. Nonetheless, the Forum’s own promotion of a transnational agenda and the concept of the “Iberosphere” appear to challenge the principle of national sovereignty, a core value within far-right ideology (Mudde, 2019).

Since its founding, the Madrid Forum has hosted three major events in Bogotá, Lima and Rio de la Plata which were attended by far-right leaders from both Latin America and Europe. However, the Forum’s activities extend beyond these events. The annual “VIVA” congress, organized by Spain’s Vox party, has become a pivotal platform for the Forum. Each year, international far-right figures convene at VIVA to endorse Vox and deliver speeches on contemporary social and political issues, thereby reinforcing the transnational bonds within this political movement.

3.1.2. CPAC

The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) is organized by the American Conservative Union, a prominent association that has established itself as a leading force in promoting conservatism within the United States. The American Conservative Union is renowned for its lobbying influence in the U.S. Congress, positioning it as one of the most impactful organizations within American conservative politics (Diamond, 1995; Parker, 2015).

Since the inaugural CPAC event in 1964, it has evolved into one of the most significant conservative forums in the United States. However, with the election of Donald Trump, CPAC underwent a notable transformation in both tone and focus, reflecting shifts within the broader conservative movement (Lee, 2017). First, CPAC experienced an ideological shift in its content. Since 2017, when the conference focused heavily on the Trump administration, it has increasingly aligned with far-right perspectives, moving away from traditional conservative positions such as support for free trade and interventionist foreign policy. Second, there has been a notable transformation in both audience composition and the lineup of speakers. Whereas CPAC once primarily featured U.S. conservative leaders —such as governors, Members of Congress, and representatives from non-governmental organizations— the current roster highlights far-right international figures, including Italy’s PM Giorgia Meloni, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, and Argentina’s Javier Milei, signaling a shift toward a more radical discourse. Finally, CPAC has embarked on a process of internationalization, evident not only through its selection of speakers but also through its geographic expansion. Although historically held within the United States, CPAC now hosts conferences in countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Hungary. At these international events, the CPAC logo is modified to reflect the colors of the host nation, rather than the traditional U.S. palette.

Although CPAC has a 60-year history, its recent transformation and alignment with far-right ideologies represent a notable shift in its orientation. Unlike the Madrid Forum, CPAC maintains a foundation in moral conservatism and foreign policy, which lends it a distinct agenda. Nevertheless, both organizations converge in their commitment to advancing and defending radical right-wing ideologies on a global scale.

4. Data and methods

This study investigates transnational alignment among radical right leaders by analyzing speeches delivered at VIVA, the Madrid Forum, and CPAC from 2021 onward—key platforms where these actors converge to articulate shared agendas. The corpus includes all publicly available speeches from official event channels, ensuring authenticity and representativeness. Transcriptions were generated using Whisper, an advanced ASR system trained on diverse multilingual data and were manually verified for accuracy.

The text data were processed using the GPT-4o API, a large language model (LLM) that supports nuanced qualitative discourse analysis (Eloundou et al., 2023; Zuiderwijk et al., 2021; Espinoza-Bianchini, Zanotti & Meléndez, 2023; Chew et al., 2023; Fan et al., 2024). LLMs allow researchers to design prompts that systematically examine discursive content (Fagni et al., 2021), offering greater efficiency and depth than traditional text analysis methods such as dictionaries (Rathje, 2024). The temperature was set to 0 to ensure replicability.

This study contributes significantly to the emerging use of LLMs for qualitative framing analysis, enabling a deeper understanding of how narratives are constructed, audiences are mobilized, and ideological boundaries are drawn in transnational contexts.

While LLMs offer scalability and pattern recognition, they can reproduce biases from training data (Zuiderwijk et al., 2021). To mitigate this, we implemented: (a) low-temperature settings for output stability; (b) prompt engineering to guide theoretical focus; and (c) human oversight to ensure analytical rigor. This hybrid design balances automation with critical qualitative reflection, in line with calls for transparency and reflexivity in AI-assisted research (Espinoza-Bianchini et al., 2023; Fagni et al., 2021; Rathje, 2024). Recent advances in LLM capabilities across languages and ideological domains further validate their use in mixed-method political discourse research (OpenAI, 2024; Eloundou et al., 2023). This study thus leverages cutting-edge tools while maintaining critical distance and methodological robustness.

4.1. Dataset

The dataset for this study was constructed by compiling speeches delivered by (radical) right leaders at prominent transnational events from 2021 to the present. Each speech serves as a distinct observational unit, allowing for a systematic examination of individual contributions within each event and providing a foundation to assess both rhetorical consistencies and divergences across diverse platforms and contexts. The dataset centers on three principal events recognized for convening radical right leaders from multiple regions: the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), VIVA España, and the Madrid Forum. These events were chosen due to their prominence as arenas where radical right leaders articulate core themes, coordinate ideological agendas, and reinforce shared perspectives across national boundaries.⁷

The speeches were sourced from various locations within each event, capturing a spectrum of contexts, including CPAC Brazil, CPAC Mexico, and CPAC USA, as well as the VIVA España gathering and the Madrid Forum’s regional meetings in Bogotá, Lima, and Río de la Plata. In total, the dataset comprises 51 speeches: 4 from CPAC Brazil, 4 from CPAC Mexico, 8 from CPAC USA, 3 from VIVA21, 4 from VIVA22, 17⁸from VIVA 24, 6 from Foro Bogotá, 1 from Foro Lima, and 4 from Foro Río de la Plata. A detailed table listing the speakers by event is provided in the Appendix, offering further insight into the dataset’s composition. Appendix A presents a summary table analyzing representative participation at right-wing events, with a particular focus on active contributors. To aid in analysis, representatives are categorized by region, highlighting countries and individuals with notable and recurrent involvement.

5. Results and analysis

5.1. Issues

To examine the primary issues and themes within the speeches of various representatives, a hybrid analysis was conducted, combining automated coding with manual categorization. This approach integrated automated coding using Large Language Models (LLMs) with manual qualitative analysis performed by the researchers. In the initial phase, an inductive analysis identified three central themes within the speeches. Subsequently, based on the categories generated by the LLM, these themes were grouped and expanded into broader categories, adhering to the principles of exhaustiveness and mutual exclusivity. This process yielded a total of ten categories. The categorization procedure is outlined in Table 1.

An inductive analysis of the speeches delivered by radical right leaders followed by subsequent re-coding, reveals a pronounced division between domestic and foreign policy, culminating in a cohesive agenda centered on defending national identity and sovereignty. The identified categories highlight a range of topics prioritized by these leaders, which include a strong focus on National Sovereignty and Security (58 mentions), opposition to Socialism, Globalism, and Leftist Ideologies (54 mentions), and advocacy for Freedom, Rights, and Civil Liberties (39 mentions). Other significant themes include Cultural Identity, Values, and Heritage (36 mentions), Political Ideology and Governance (33 mentions), and International Relations and Alliances (30 mentions).

Economic considerations are also notable, with Economic Policy and Sovereignty (28 mentions) underscoring a desire for economic autonomy, often linked to nationalistic goals. Additionally, Patriotism and National Pride (21 mentions) emerges as a key theme, expressing allegiance to national symbols and values. Issues of Justice and Social Responsibility (18 mentions) are addressed in terms of legal and moral integrity, while Media, Communication, and Public Discourse (15 mentions) reflects concerns over information control and narrative shaping. These categories reveal a coherent yet contextually adaptable agenda that reflects each leader’s particular national focus, allowing for resistance to perceived external threats while maintaining individual autonomy. This approach avoids a unified, transnational agenda and emphasizes sovereignty in both policy and ideological terms.

Table 1. Comprehensive categories and issues

Refined Category	Related Issues	Mentions Count
National Sovereignty and Security	National Sovereignty, Security and Crime, Immigration and Border Security, Sovereignty and National Identity	58
Socialism, Globalism, and Leftist Ideologies	Socialism, Globalism, Leftist Ideologies, Cultural and Ideological Conflict, Political Threats and Ideological Battles, Regional Security, Communism and Marxism	54
Freedom, Rights, and Civil Liberties	Freedom of Speech and Civil Liberties, Freedom and Democracy, Political Freedom, Freedom of Expression, Constitutional Rights	39
Cultural Identity, Values, and Heritage	Cultural Values, National Identity, Tradition and Social Structures, Cultural and Social Values, European Identity and Values, Defense of Traditional Values and Freedom	36
Political Ideology and Governance	Political Ideology, Governance Challenges, Political Responsibility, Political Corruption, Political Strategy	33
International Relations and Alliances	International Solidarity, International Relations, European Unity, Global Alliances, Strategic Alliances	30
Economic Policy and Sovereignty	Economy, Economic Reform, Economic Challenges, Economic Sovereignty, Energy Crisis	28
Patriotism and National Pride	National Pride, Patriotism, National Unity, Political Unity and Direction	21
Justice and Social Responsibility	Judicial Reforms, Justice and Social Values, Political Integrity, Social Justice and Redistribution	18
Media, Communication, and Public Discourse	Media and Communication, Media Manipulation, Freedom of Expression, Government Overreach	15

The Sankey diagram illustrates that, although leaders from the three regions share thematic elements within radical right discourses, each region primarily engages with issues specific to its unique sociopolitical context rather than aligning around a cohesive transnational agenda. In Europe, discourses emphasize “National Sovereignty and Security” as well as “International Relations and Alliances”, reflecting anxieties over perceived losses of autonomy to the European Union and challenges posed by immigration. Notably, Europe has also spearheaded initiatives to establish alliances among radical right-wing leaders. In contrast, Latin American discourses focus on “Socialist Ideology, Globalism, and Leftist Currents”, along with “Patriotism and National Pride”. This orientation likely stems from a historical context marked by leftist government influence and a rejection of globalist policies perceived as external impositions. Also In Latin America, the radical right is notably characterized by a strong alignment with neoliberal principles, a trait that is less evident in Europe and the United States. This pattern suggests limited cross-regional influence, with the adoption of specific issues being shaped more by local conditions than by coordinated collaboration across regions. In the United States, the discourse is characterized by a strong emphasis on “Liberty, Rights, and Civil Liberties”, underscoring a defense of individual freedoms in response to perceived expansions of state authority—an issue that appears less central in the other regions. While the theme of “Cultural Identity and Values” recurs across all regions, this overlap appears more coincidental than reflective of direct influence or common objectives.

In conclusion, the analysis reveals a form of “selective transnationalism”, where leaders incorporate ideas from other regions only when they resonate with particular domestic contexts, rather than fostering a cohesive network of mutual cooperation.

In addition to the thematic fragmentation observed across regions, the expansion of the radical right’s discourse has been significantly facilitated by digital infrastructures, which allow messages to circulate rapidly and transnationally without requiring formal organizational coordination. Recent studies have shown that far-right actors strategically leverage social media platforms —such as Telegram, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter)— not only to amplify their narratives, but also to manipulate public perception through disinformation and algorithmic amplification (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018; Fielitz & Thurston, 2019). These mechanisms of digital manipulation compensate for the absence of structural cohesion, enabling these movements to generate a sense of global resonance and ideological alignment. This suggests that the apparent ideological convergence we identify may not be the result of centralized coordination, but rather the outcome of effective symbolic diffusion across digital environments saturated with selective exposure and confirmation bias (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Far from being marginal, this digital infrastructure functions as the connective tissue of what we conceptualize as selective transnationalism—a network of rhetorical synchronization, not institutional integration.

Figure 2 illustrates that while far-right leaders across various regions share certain thematic elements in their discourse, their interpretations and emphases differ according to regional contexts, reflecting both notable convergences and divergences. First, anti-communism and anti-globalism emerge as recurring themes in both Europe and Latin America. In Europe, leaders like Abascal and Meloni associate anti-communism and opposition to globalism to the defense of national identity against external influences, particularly from the European Union. In Latin America, figures such as Kast and Milei also oppose these ideologies, yet within a context of resistance to leftist governments and state intervention, linking these ideas to a defense of neoliberal economic principles.

Second, the analysis of national sovereignty and international alliances highlights both points of convergence and region-specific distinctions. Leaders from each of the three regions —Abascal, Kast, Meloni, and Trump— emphasize the importance of safeguarding national sovereignty. However, in Europe, this sovereignty is primarily associated with resistance to supranational entities like the EU, whereas in Latin America, it aligns with economic autonomy and opposition to intervention from left-leaning initiatives such as the Puebla Group. In the United States, sovereignty is articulated through individual autonomy and control over media discourse, as seen in Trump and Gabbard’s critiques of media and political elites.

Finally, cultural identity and national values are recurring themes across these leaders’ rhetoric, though priorities vary. European leaders focus on cultural preservation in response to migration and multiculturalism, whereas in Latin America and the United States, identity is shaped by the defense of traditional values and rejection of “leftist ideology”. These differences illustrate how the global far-right adapts shared themes to local contexts, revealing a complex, heterogeneous, and adaptive movement.

5.2. Framing

Our analysis identified central topics within right-wing discourse, each framed strategically according to speaker, event, and audience. Results are organized around (1) varied framings of the same topics and (2) consistent framings across different topics, with additional insights by event type to highlight each gathering’s unique focus. To capture the diversity in framing, we segmented the speeches based on event type— CPAC, VIVA and Madrid Forum. This allowed us to observe not only how leaders frame specific topics but also how these framings adapt according to event context and regional audience.

Non-elected bodies such as the judiciary as well as the opposition to leftist ideology form a cluster of topics that, although consistently critiqued in right-wing rhetoric globally, exhibit notable variability in framing. For instance, Jair Bolsonaro frequently frames the judiciary as an “obstructive force”, suggesting that left-leaning judicial bodies actively hinder conservative progress and collude with political opposition to undermine his agenda. Santiago Abascal, in contrast, often presents the judiciary as an institution “under siege”, threatened by leftist ideologies that, in his view, compromise judicial integrity and stability. Javier Milei emphasizes a more existential framing, describing leftist ideology within the judiciary as a direct threat to both individual freedom and national sovereignty. This framing positions right wing leaders as protectors of institutional integrity against what they perceive as ideological encroachments from the left.

Freedom of speech and the defense of civil liberties is another topic subject to varied framing approaches, typically presented either as a “fundamental right under threat” or as an “essential liberty endangered by authoritarianism”. In the United States context, Donald Trump and Tulsi Gabbard emphasize freedom of speech as a right under siege by leftist policies and biased media, underscoring concerns about ideological suppression within U.S. institutions. Conversely, Bolsonaro frames this issue through a lens of authoritarianism, connecting the threat to state and global institutions that, in his view, aim to erode civil liberties and silence conservative voices. This distinction underscores how freedom of speech is adapted to local and international concerns about ideological control.

Narcotrafficking is consistently depicted as a societal issue with corrosive effects, though the specifics of this framing vary. Abascal emphasizes narcotrafficking as a corrosive influence, linking it to broader threats like illegal immigration and globalism. This framing suggests a perception of narcotrafficking as a destabilizing force that goes beyond crime to undermine social cohesion. In contrast, the President of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, presents narcotrafficking as a threat to national sovereignty, particularly within the Latin American context, where drug-related crime and transnational trafficking impact governance and security. Here, narcotrafficking is seen as a direct challenge to the state’s ability to maintain order and sovereignty. In the United States, tribalism and political polarization are frequently discussed, with significant framing differences. Gabbard describes tribalism as a “dangerous division”, warning of its capacity to weaken national unity. Trump, however, presents polarization as an “inevitable ideological clash”, positioning himself as the leader capable of unifying the nation by challenging a corrupt opposition. This contrast demonstrates how leaders might frame the same issue either as a negative force or as a necessary division that validates their leadership role.

The Ideological Divide (Right vs. Left) is consistently portrayed as a “fundamental conflict”, with leaders such as Abascal, Bolsonaro, and Milei casting the political right movements as defenders of societal values against an existential threat posed by the left. Milei intensifies this framing by describing the divide as a “battle for the nation’s soul”, suggesting that the opposition embodies moral corruption and poses a direct threat to individual freedoms. This framing establishes a moral dimension to the ideological divide, encouraging audiences to view it as more than a simple political disagreement.

Several framing strategies recur across multiple topics, each with distinct rhetorical purposes. Framing topics as threats is particularly prevalent, mobilizing conservative audiences by depicting essential values —such as freedom of speech, national sovereignty, and cultural integrity— as endangered by internal and external forces. Bolsonaro exemplifies this strategy, applying the “threat” framing across issues ranging from national sovereignty to freedom of speech, which he characterizes as under attack from leftist and globalist forces. This framing strategy fosters a defensive stance, encouraging supporters to protect these values against perceived encroachments.

The framing of topics as corrosive influences is also widely applied, particularly to issues like narcotrafficking, socialism, and globalism. Abascal frequently connects narcotrafficking, socialism, and globalism under a common “corrosive” framing, suggesting that these forces weaken societal integrity and values. Milei similarly applies this framing to socialism, describing it as a threat to individual freedom and economic stability. This framing strategy positions conservative leaders as defenders against ideologies or influences that they argue erode societal stability.

A third framing pattern portrays issues as fundamental conflicts, casting topics such as the ideological divide, national identity, and capitalism versus socialism as existential battles. By framing these issues as conflicts over the “soul” or “identity” of the nation, leaders like Bolsonaro, Abascal, and Milei position themselves as champions of national integrity against leftist ideologies that they argue threaten these core values. This framing strategy not only emphasizes the stakes of the political debate but also calls for committed support from conservative audiences.

Finally, topics like the judiciary and political opposition are often framed as either under siege by leftist forces or as obstructive to progress. Bolsonaro frequently employs the “obstructive” framing, accusing the judiciary of blocking conservative policies and serving as an impediment to his agenda. Abascal and Milei often frame the judiciary as “under siege”, positioning themselves as defenders of these institutions against leftist encroachment. This framing casts the judiciary not as a neutral entity, but as a politically charged institution vulnerable to ideological manipulation.

The distinct contexts of CPAC, VIVA, and Madrid Forum reveal specific emphases in framing, each tailored to resonate with the respective audience. CPAC events focus on threats to freedom of speech and the ideological divide, rallying U.S. conservatives to defend civil liberties against leftist censorship. At CPAC, leaders like Trump and Gabbard frame freedom of speech as fundamentally under threat, advocating for protective measures for conservative voices. In contrast, VIVA events emphasize national sovereignty and cultural values relevant to Latin American audiences. Leaders like Bolsonaro and Abascal frame narcotrafficking, socialism, and globalism as threats that erode societal stability, linking these issues to regional concerns. The focus on defending Latin American cultural and religious values from foreign and globalist influences is a recurring theme in VIVA, aligning with regional conservatism. The Madrid Forum prioritizes nationalism and ideological purity, with leaders such as Abascal and Milei portraying leftist ideologies and judicial institutions as direct threats to national sovereignty and cultural integrity. Madrid Forum serves as a platform for leaders to advocate for ideological purity, framing the defense of conservative institutions as essential to preserving national identity against progressive influence.

5.3. Outgroups and ingroups

For the analysis of outgroups and ingroups, a specific prompt was developed to enable the AI to conduct an inductive analysis of the 51 speeches, identifying who is classified as “us” versus “them” according to different radical right representatives. Through a combination of inductive (LLM-based) and deductive (human) coding and analysis, seven ingroup categories and nine outgroup categories were identified. Appendix B presents two tables summarizing the categories identified, with definitions and groupings based on the inductive analysis conducted by the model.

After presenting and explaining the categories used to classify outgroups and ingroups, we proceed to analyze the most recurrent references (mentions) within the speeches examined for both categories (see Appendix B for an exhaustive list of the groups). Given that the radical right constructs its rhetoric primarily through the exclusion and identification of “others”, (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Zanotti, 2023; Zanotti, forthcoming) we find it pertinent to first analyze the outgroups before examining the ingroups to assess the coherence of their overall narrative.

Figure 3 illustrates the most frequent “outgroup” categories in the speeches of far-right leaders at events such as CPAC, the Madrid Forum, and VIVA, based on the most repeated mentions across a set of 51 speeches. Each bubble represents a category, with its size and color corresponding to the frequency of mentions associated with that category.

The data indicate that the category Socialism, Communism and “leftist ideologies” is notably prominent, with 53 mentions, making it the most frequent “outgroup” referenced in radical right discourse. This prominence suggests that communism and the left are perceived as central threats, positioned as the primary ideological adversaries within the radical right’s rhetoric. The significance of this category underscores the radical right’s approach, which not only opposes these ideologies but actively constructs a deeply anti-left and anti-communist discourse, elevating it above other local public policy concerns. This rhetorical strategy serves to simplify the discourse by shifting focus from internal issues to an external ideological enemy. This emphasis on the communist threat aligns with the broader rhetoric of the radical right, which frequently associates leftist ideologies with the erosion of traditional values and social destabilization, as noted in previous studies (see Zanotti, 2023; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2023). Beyond its national context, anti-communism serves as an effective discursive tool for the radical right to mobilize its base and foster transnational alliances. This is particularly evident in the discourses analyzed, which include leaders from diverse regions —Latin America, Europe, and the United States— all converging in their portrayal of the left as a shared threat. Consequently, anti-communism functions as a unifying element, connecting these leaders and enabling their messages to resonate with varied audiences, despite differing local contexts.

“Globalism and International elites” (27 mentions) and “Media and Establishment” (24 mentions), and Corrupt Political Class/Caste occupy a secondary position in terms of frequency. Nevertheless, the presence of these categories reflects an anti-establishment narrative in which globalist elites and critical media are perceived as components of a power structure threatening national and traditional values. Together, these elements contribute to a discourse of oppression, framing the left, elites, and media as external forces conspiring against an authentic national identity. Additional relevant categories, such as “NGOs and International Organizations” (12 mentions) and “Environmentalists and Woke Agenda” (6 mentions), further reinforce this anti-establishment theme. International organizations and NGOs are portrayed as agents undermining national sovereignty, while environmentalists and the “woke agenda” are depicted as imposing progressive values that threaten traditional cultural norms and social cohesion. This framing positions these groups as part of a broader ideological challenge, one that seeks to reshape national identity and diminish the autonomy of conservative governance.

Overall, the prominence of anti-communism and criticism of the left in radical right discourses, surpassing other public policy issues, suggests a communications strategy crafted to mobilize followers through a unified ideological adversary. This transnational anti-left discourse enables the radical right to portray itself as the defender of traditional values and national sovereignty against an external ideological threat. By centering on critiques of communism, these leaders simplify the political narrative, sidestepping the complexities of specific local issues in favor of constructing a unified, global vision of the threats they face.

All in all, the contemporary radical right discourse is structured around an anti-left and anti-communist axis, used not only to unify followers but also to forge alliances among leaders across different regions. This strategy allows the radical right to project a globalized narrative that, while disregarding many local issues, succeeds in constructing a shared threat narrative, thereby reinforcing its ideological stance on the international stage.

Conversely, Figure 4 displays the most frequent “ingroup” categories in the speeches of radical right leaders. Notably, the category “Supporters and Allies of Specific Leaders/Movements” appears 53 times, underscoring the centrality of alliances with ideologically aligned figures and movements. This emphasis on forming a network of like-minded supporters reflects a vision of shared ideological struggle, where allies are seen as collaborators defending traditional and national values against perceived external and internal threats.

The second most frequent category, “Patriots and National Identity” with 37 mentions, highlights the radical right’s focus on reinforcing a strong sense of national pride and cohesion. By associating patriotism and national identity with authenticity and the defense of sovereign interests, this approach resonates with audiences that prioritize national sovereignty and self-determination. This contrasts sharply with globalist or anti-national sectors, which are often portrayed as undermining these values. Another significant category is “Conservative and Right-Wing Movements” (26 mentions), signaling the importance of aligning with other conservative forces to uphold traditional ideologies. This category highlights the shared ideological foundation that the radical right establishes with other conservative actors, reinforcing a sense of belonging to a broader right-wing community that opposes progressive or secular ideologies. The category “Freedom and Defenders of Liberty” (22 mentions) emphasizes the radical right’s portrayal of itself as a defender of individual freedoms, often framing this struggle as one against authoritarianism, leftist oppression, or government overreach. In this context, the right to free expression and civil liberties are framed as under threat, resonating with audiences who see freedom as a core value at risk. “Religious and Christian Groups” with 14 mentions, underscores the centrality of religious and moral values within the radical right’s identity.

This reflects a positioning as defenders of conservative morality and religious traditions, in opposition to secular or progressive trends perceived as threats. Scholarly work, particularly focused on Latin America, has highlighted that in contexts where immigration is less prominent, the radical right often politicizes traditional moral values as a cornerstone of its agenda. In the United States, a similar trend is observed, where the growing influence of evangelical churches intensifies the focus on conservative morality over other socio-political issues (Zanotti and Roberts, 2021; Boas 2023; Payne et al. 2023; Rovira Kaltwasser and Zanotti 2023; Margolis 2020).

The categories “Families and Traditional Values Advocates” (12 mentions) and “Nations and Citizens” (25 mentions) further emphasize the radical right’s connection to social sectors regarded as foundational to the nation. These categories represent an appeal to family values and social cohesion as fundamental components of national identity, portraying the radical right as defenders of the social order against forces seen as destabilizing or morally corrupting.

The emphasis on youth as part of the “Engaged Youth” category (subsumed within broader categories in the re-coding) reflects an attempt to secure generational continuity for radical right ideologies, framing young activists as part of a movement committed to the nation’s future. This narrative combines historical legacy with future aspirations, aiming to build a multi-generational support base.

A comparison between these ingroups and outgroups reveals a coherent strategy of inclusion and exclusion in the radical right’s discourse. The outgroups —comprising leftist and communist ideologies, globalist elites, and critical media— are consistently depicted as ideological or external threats undermining the values and identity embodied by the ingroups. This constructed dichotomy between ingroups and outgroups enables radical right leaders to project a narrative of resistance and defense: ingroups represent the authentic bearers of national values, while outgroups are cast as destabilizing and anti-national forces. This narrative structure consolidates the discourse of the radical right by distinctly defining who belongs and who poses a threat. The alignment between the values of the ingroups and the portrayal of an external adversary legitimizes a defensive stance and mobilizes followers around a national and conservative identity. This flexible, context-specific messaging allows the radical right to adapt its appeal across diverse geopolitical settings, consistently framing ingroups as protectors of the nation and outgroups as existential threats. In essence, the figure illustrates a discourse in which ingroups are not only depicted as the true representatives of the nation but also as defenders of the values that the radical right seeks to uphold, sharply contrasting with outgroups, whose perceived threats justify and reinforce this cohesive identity.

6. Conclusions

This study explored the transnational networks of the radical right by analyzing speeches from VIVA, the Madrid Forum, and CPAC. Our goal was to assess whether these events foster ideological alignment across Latin America, Europe, and the United States. Through discourse analysis, we identified shared themes, rhetorical framings, and in-group/out-group distinctions that underpin a collective identity of resistance to perceived threats against national sovereignty, cultural tradition, and social order.

To achieve this, we employed a mixed-method approach that integrates inductive and deductive analysis using Large Language Models (LLMs), which enabled efficient yet nuanced coding of ideological content. LLMs allowed us to identify patterns across a large corpus while ensuring theoretical alignment through manual verification. This method strengthens both the reliability and interpretive depth of discourse analysis in political communication.

Our findings suggest that while there is a shared ideological foundation centered on nationalism, sovereignty, and anti-globalism, the radical right’s rhetoric remains deeply shaped by regional and national contexts. European leaders emphasize resistance to supranational governance (particularly the EU) and immigration, while Latin American figures focus on anti-leftist rhetoric rooted in historical legacies of socialism and interventionism. U.S. discourse prioritizes individual liberties and critiques of government overreach, reflecting distinct political traditions. These differences illustrate that ideological diffusion occurs through adaptation rather than homogenization.

Crucially, our study finds no evidence of a fully consolidated international radical right alliance. Instead, what emerges is a pattern of selective transnationalism, whereby leaders adopt discursive strategies and ideological tropes from abroad that align with domestic political goals. These networks facilitate inspiration and strategic borrowing but stop short of forming a unified, centrally coordinated movement. This model of cooperation contrasts with ideologically centralized transnational movements like the Communist International, highlighting the radical right’s preference for autonomy over hierarchical coordination.

Selective transnationalism is visible not only in shared rhetoric but also in how certain policy ideas circulate across national contexts. For instance, Chilean presidential candidate José Antonio Kast referenced Trump’s border wall and Orbán’s migration policies as inspiration (Díaz et al., 2023). ⁹ Similarly, Bukele’s “mega-prison” in El Salvador has drawn attention from leaders like Javier Milei in Argentina and sectors of Chile’s right¹⁰. These examples reflect rhetorical and symbolic resonance more than direct policy transfer, illustrating how radical right leaders use transnational references to bolster domestic legitimacy rather than to coordinate a unified policy agenda.

Theoretically, this study contributes to the literature on transnational radicalism by offering a differentiated understanding of ideological convergence: one characterized by discursive overlap and mutual reference but constrained by nationalist priorities. Methodologically, it demonstrates how LLMs can advance political discourse research by enabling hybrid forms of large-scale qualitative and quantitative analysis.

Future research should further explore how these ideological patterns evolve across other radical right platforms, especially as regional contexts shift. It may also be fruitful to examine how these actors engage with context-specific issues such as evangelical mobilization in Latin America or EU skepticism in Europe. Longitudinal studies could help assess whether the current flexible configurations solidify into more stable alliances or remain opportunistic networks of rhetorical affinity.

Understanding these dynamics is crucial; indeed, some scholars are already grappling with this phenomenon. Forti (2024) characterizes it as a “reactionary international” with symbolic rather than structural unity, bound by anti-progressive and anti-globalist themes. Slobodian (2025) likewise argues that the radical right envisions a reordering of the international system through sovereignist logics rather than supranational coordination. Thus, rather than convergence around a common agenda, we observe discursive alignment that adapts to local political conditions, operating more as a strategic repertoire than as a fixed ideology. As Van Dijk (2024) argues, these narratives function as flexible ideological configurations, allowing the radical right to maintain resonance while preserving domestic autonomy.

Acknowledgments

Lisa Zanotti acknowledges the support of the Millennium Nucleus Center for the Study of Politics, Public Opinion and Media in Chile (NCS2024_007).

English translation: “Thank you very much, President Javier Milei. We want to thank you for inaugurating this very important event for the future of the region. We thank you every day for the things you do for the world, and thank you very much for the joys you bring to people throughout the world: in Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Paraguay, Colombia, Hungary, the United States, Italy, Uruguay, El Salvador...”.↩︎
Our empirical focus on Latin America, the US, and Europe acknowledges the radical right’s wider global presence. Notable regional variants, such as India’s BJP (Hindu ethnonationalism; Leidig & Mudde, 2023), Turkey’s AKP (Islamic nativism; Balta, 2023), and emerging populism in sub-Saharan Africa (less networked; Nyadera & Agwanda, 2019), fall outside this study’s scope, which examines transnational articulation via the Madrid Forum, VIVA, and CPAC.↩︎
“Far right” is an umbrella term encompassing two main ideological families: the “radical right” and the “extreme right” (Mudde, 2019). While both share characteristics like exclusionary nationalism, they traditionally diverge on democracy: the “radical right” operates within democratic frameworks but opposes core liberal democratic principles (such as pluralism and minority rights), whereas the “extreme right” openly rejects democracy.↩︎
elpais.com/chile/2024-05-02/kast-propone-instalar-un-muro-en-la-frontera-chilena-con-bolivia-es-necesario-para-terminar-con-la-inmigracion-ilegal.html ↩︎
The term “internationals” here draws a parallel with historical examples of more structured and ideologically cohesive transnational

political alliances, such as the Socialist Internationals or the Comintern, as well as the more contemporary consolidated networks of the Latin American left mentioned earlier. It implies a level of strategic coordination, shared substantive agenda, and organizational coherence that goes beyond symbolic networking or ad-hoc ideological diffusion.↩︎
To see the Madrid Charter: fundaciondisenso.org/carta-de-madrid-en-defensa-de-la-libertad-y-la-democracia-en-la-iberosfera/↩︎
For the discourse analysis, a database has been generated containing the discourse, leader, event, prompts and results. The authors can be consulted for access to the database.↩︎
The high number of speeches from VIVA is because the dataset includes several short addresses by Santiago Abascal. For reasons of methodological transparency, these were kept as separate entries and not consolidated.↩︎
www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2025/04/01/la-estridente-retorica-en-seguridad-que-une-a-los-candidatos-presidenciales-de-la-derecha/ ; www.ex-ante.cl/las-claves-de-la-gira-de-kast-a-hungria-con-foco-en-inmigracion-y-en-politicas-pro-familia/↩︎
www.lasexta.com/noticias/internacional/milei-fija-bukele-construir-megacarcel-como-salvador_2024061766703dad8fd52100010e4560.html ↩︎