



Country-level Variables and Imagined National Communities within EU-15 Countries

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Abstract. This study analyses to what extent there are similarities and differences between EU-15 countries with regard to their citizens' national identities; as well as the influence of country-level variables on identity patterns within clusters of countries. It uses different quantitative techniques and the European Values Study 2008 data release. First, clusters of countries are formed using identity variables. Next, country-level variables dealing with economic performance, politics, history and ethnic-cultural traits are operationalized and tested through categorical regression and discriminant analysis. Results confirm that there are clusters of countries with particular configurations of identity patterns and that country-level variables influence identity.

Keywords: national identity; cross-national comparison; EU-15; European Values Study; cluster analysis; discriminant analysis; categorical regression.

[es] Variables contextuales y comunidades nacionales imaginadas en los países de la UE-15

Resumen. Este estudio analiza las similitudes y diferencias entre los países de la UE-15 en cuanto a las identidades nacionales de sus ciudadanos; así como la posible influencia de variables contextuales sobre las configuraciones identitarias en conglomerados de países. Para ello se utilizan diferentes técnicas cuantitativas y los datos de la oleada 2008 de Encuesta Europea de Valores. En primer lugar se forman conglomerados de países usando variables de identidad. A continuación se operacionalizan variables contextuales de rendimiento económico, políticas, históricas, y étnico-culturales, cuya importancia para diferenciar los conglomerados formados previamente se contrasta mediante análisis de regresión categórica y análisis discriminante. Los resultados constatan que existen conglomerados de países con configuraciones identitarias suficientemente diferenciadas; y que las variables contextuales seleccionadas influyen sobre ellas.

Palabras clave: identidad nacional, comparación internacional; UE-15; Encuesta Europea de Valores; análisis de conglomerados; análisis discriminante; regresión categórica.

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1. Introduction

Different states in Europe (for example Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain) seem to suffer from a lack of legitimacy connected to weak feelings of national identity among their citizens. This is manifested in shifting legitimacies from the state-wide to the regional community which is quantifiable through survey data and observable, for example, in referendums (or attempts to hold referendums) in favor of independence from the current State. As Easton (1965) and other authors point out, the feeling of attachment to a political community gives it a kind of diffuse support that seems to be central to its survival and continuity (Smith, 1991; Dalton, 2004).

The literature on national identity and nationalism in Spain offers us some clues as to the variables that may currently influence the weakness of state-wide national identities. Thus, taking Spain as a case study, different authors describe it as an example of faulty national construction (Linz, 1973; Álvarez, 2000). Apart from historical roots that account for this failure, the more contemporary monopolization of patriotism by the Francoist regime explains an initial reluctance by leftist as well as rightist parties to explicitly develop Spanish patriotic feelings or national identity (De Blas, 1991; Mar-Molinero and Smith, 1996; Núñez, 2010; Quiroga, 2008). Although it seems that the Right has returned to an explicit reformulation of democratic Spanish patriotism more easily than the Left (Bastida, 2002; De Blas, 2003: 772; Mateo, 2005), the definition of Spain as a nation continues to be an object of political controversy, not only among nation-wide parties but also between these and regionalist/nationalist parties (Núñez, 2010). In summary, Spanish parties have not instilled consistent feelings of identification with Spain as a political community.

It has also been pointed out that exclusive Spanish national identity has decreased as regional and dual identities have increased, in parallel to the process of development of the Autonomous State and as a consequence of it (Díez, 1999; García, 2002; Mota, 2008). In this context also, regional parties have introduced

new dimensions of political competition in which Spanish national identity is not relevant or is even disputed (Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Libbrecht *et al.*, 2011).

If we look for these variables within a wider context, we find other countries among Spain's European neighbors that share some of the aforementioned characteristics and developments. Italy, Germany, Greece and Portugal share a similar past of monopolization of patriotism by fascist, authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Belgium, Germany and Italy have similar levels of decentralization. Regional parties also exist in other democracies, such as Italy, Germany or the UK. It is therefore reasonable to ask how similar the configuration of national identities is among European states, and how great the impact of these country-level variables is in those configurations. These are the main objectives of this article.

For this investigation, we use data from the last European Values Study release (2008). Using questions relating to individual feelings of belonging, national pride and the kind of imagined community (that is, the most important element of membership of the community), we cluster countries according to the answers of their citizens. We then profile countries according to variables mentioned above. Using this information we carry out discriminant analysis to test whether country-level variables are significantly different among the cluster of countries previously grouped together. We close this article by offering conclusions about similarities and differences between clusters of European countries and the importance of the country-level variables that seem to play a role in the configuration of identities.

2. National identity: a definition and its operationalization

In line with modernist and constructivist scholars, we define national identity as the individual feeling of belonging to an imagined political community (Anderson, 1991). As summarized by McEwen (2006: 31-32):

Nationhood (...) rests upon an inter-related subjective and collective dimension. The collective dimension concerns the shared meanings of what it means to be Scottish, British, Canadian, etc., while the subjective dimension is related to the individual's sense of identity and belonging, and the consent she may confer upon the nation with which she identifies.

This article is concerned with the subjective dimension of national identity, which is possible to measure through survey analysis, despite the debate on the most appropriate measurement (Ruiz, 2007).

As table 1 shows the operationalization of our first dependent variable (national identity) includes cognitive and evaluative levels (see Kaina and Krolewski, 2009). The cognitive level refers mainly to the feeling of territorial belonging: to which geographical group does the respondent think s/he belongs first of all. The evaluative level includes the strength of territorial bonding, as well as the type of elements that the respondent thinks of as the most important for the national community. These last items clearly refer to the concept of the nation as an imagined community (Anderson, 1991; Lepsius, 1994), and point towards two

ideal versions of a nation: either an ethnic-cultural community or a civic-political community (Smith, 1991; Máiz, 2003; Lepsius, 2004; Ichijo and Spohn, 2005).

Based on the different combinations of percentages of people who identify with each territorial level, the percentage of people proud of their nationality and the percentage of people who consider each of the different possible elements to be important in order to be truly national, we distinguished clusters of countries with similar configurations of national identity as a first step in our analysis.

Table 1. Operationalization of national identity (as a sense of belonging to an imagined community) in 2008 European Values Study

QUESTION (variable)	Wording	Scale	Dimension of dependent variable
Q69 (v253)	Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? (1, Locality or town where you live; 2, region of country where you live; 3, [COUNTRY]; 4, Europe; 5, the word as a whole).	Nominal	Sense of territorial belonging
Q72 (v256)	How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen? (*Filtered, asked only to citizens of [COUNTRY]). (1, very proud to 4, not at all proud).	Ordinal	Strength of territorial bonding
Q80 (v276-80)	Some people say the following things are Important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? (1, To have been born in [COUNTRY]; 2, To respect [COUNTRY]'s political institutions and laws; 3, To have [COUNTRY]'s ancestry; 4, To be able to speak [THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE] [NOTE: if more than one national languages, ask the national languages]; 5, To have lived for a long time in [COUNTRY]) (1, very important to 4, not important at all)	Ordinal	Imagined-shared elements within community

Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.

3. Theorizing and modeling the influence of country-level variables on individual identities

General theories about nationalism understand national identity as the basis for the emergence (primordialist or essentialist theories) or the building (modernist or constructivist theories) of nations, usually understood as nation-states (Ferri, 2013). They also contain implicit or explicit accounts of the factors believed to define or create national identity. We depart from these theories to tackle some of the variables that may explain different configurations of national identities in particular countries, trying also to model other specific explanations that have been given for particular states.

Perhaps the most evident variable to take into account would be the ethnic and cultural homogeneity among the people living within a country or state. For ethnic nationalism, people who share an ethnic origin and cultural characteristics are

usually understood as a nation; for primordialists and essentialists the nation pre-existed and explains the creation of the state. Modernist and constructivist theories reject this idea, arguing that nations are collectively imagined after and as a consequence of the invention of the state (Ferri, 2013: chapter 2; De Blas, 1984; Kedourie, 1985; Anderson 1991; Gellner, 1997; Lepsius, 2004). However, nations cannot be deliberately invented out of nothing. On the contrary, nations grow from the reinterpretation of pre-existing cultural traits and the reconstruction of previous ethnic links and feelings (Smith, 2004). Thus, different authors argue that the ethnic and/or cultural homogeneity of a people, usually understood/imagined as sharing blood linkages, common ancestors, language, religion, myths and/or symbols, are at the base of nationalism (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; 1994; Østerud, 1999; Smith, 2010). Although many of these ethnic and cultural variables could be operationalized independently, we think that the concept of the ethnic composition of majorities in the country, plus the percentage of immigration, could be considered as good proxies (at the same time maintaining the parsimony of the model). Our expectation would be that there is a positive correlation between the ethnic homogeneity of a country and the state-wide national identity. Religion however will be given a particular status within our analysis: classic models such as Rokkan's (1999) characterize distance to Rome as a relevant variable explaining the emergence of nations (really understood as the creation of nation-states). Thus, territories closer to Rome had more difficulty in becoming established as nation-states due to the universalistic and homogeneous leanings of the Catholic Church. Those other, more distant territories where Protestantism predominated found it easier to create their nation-states. Our expectation is that, nowadays, religion (Catholic and Protestant alike) has a minor influence, if any, on the creation or holding of state-wide national identities. We also test the influence of secularization on state-wide national identity.

A third variable to consider is the politicization of identities. Most constructivist scholars would agree that a collective understanding of the meaning of nationality is necessary to anchor the individual feeling of belonging to a nation. Political elites reinforce those meanings, developing and promoting definitions about who the people are and what it is "we" represent (Jaffrelot, 1993; Dekker *et al.*, 2003; Gellner, 1983; Ranger and Hobsbawn 1983; Smith, 2000). Thus, the politicization of identities has usually become a basis for nationalism and the demands of political independence (Breuilly, 1990; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1986; Linz, 1993; Hroch, 1985). Yet, Right and Left have progressed along different nationalist paths. From a historic point of view nationalism has been possible within rightist as well as leftist ideologies. However, the relations between nationalism and leftist parties have been more difficult and contradictory than with rightist parties. This is due to the ideological basis of the Left being more universalistic (Kasprzak, 2012) and of Marxist inspiration (Howell, 1986; Schwarzmantel, 2012). Nevertheless, the Left has re-elaborated new versions of the ethnic-cultural nationalism that are more inclusive, categorizing the concept of multiculturalism, that have been labeled as "constitutional nationalism", "pluralist nationalism", "constitutional patriotism" or "democratic patriotism" (Habermas, 1992; Bastida, 2002; Laborda, 2002; Müller, 2007; Máiz, 2003). In parallel, new contemporary versions of "social patriotism" (Field, 1992; Lim, 1995) and the "class nation" (Lepsius, 2004), on which the

concept of the nation as a political community put its emphasis on the ideas of equality and social justice, should be mentioned (Jackson, 2012; Ruiz and Navarro, 2015). Therefore, as regards Left-Right ideology, as a general concept, our expectation is that both might be equally related to the existence of nation-wide national identities, especially in the context of well-established states where only banal nationalist mobilization is expected to take place (Billig, 1995).

However, when we discuss the contemporary politicization of identities, the existence of sub-state nationalist or regionalist parties might be more important than the Left-Right leaning of citizens, especially in the case that they represent a criticism of the central state or demand more autonomy for the regions or localities (Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Libbrecht *et al.*, 2011; Hroch, 1985; Smith, 2000; De Blas, 1994). Therefore, we used the politicization of the centre-periphery cleavage in the political discourse (electoral programs) as a proxy for the politicization of identities. Our expectation is that there might be a negative correlation between the saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage and the state-wide national identity. This variable indicates that central features of the political community, such as its political-administrative structure, its cultural characteristics or its mutual solidarity obligations, are not unanimously accepted, but questioned, discussed and challenged. The stronger the saliency of this cleavage, the less clearly citizens will feel about their sense of belonging to the different proposals and traits of a political community.

As stated above, modernist scholars (Kedourie, 1985; Gellner, 1997; Harrison *et al.*, 1991; Caciagly, 2006) consider the political and economic modernization (the end of the political Old Regime and the development of industrialization) that ended with the creation of the modern nation-state to be the origin of national identities. In a similar vein, but from a more contemporary point of view, the development of modern welfare states brought an extension of economic, political and social rights that develop a sense of belonging to a group among whose members a sense of national solidarity was/is established as a consequence (McEwen, 2002; McEwen and Moreno, 2005; Keating, 2009). A particular application of this type of “instrumental” development of identity (Brass, 1979; Cinnerella, 1997) can also be found in the possible building of a European identity (Gabel, 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001; Olsen, 1996; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Fernández-Albertos and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2002) and also in the development of regional identities as a consequence of the decentralization of welfare regimes (McEwen and Moreno, 2005). Therefore we consider the hypothesis of instrumental identity, related to wellbeing, in fourth place. As proxies for modernization and welfare, we have considered the GDP of countries and its redistribution among their citizens (as redistribution is one of the main characteristics of welfare states).

Different authors have analyzed the effects of sub-state elections in forcing nation-wide political parties to “regionalize” their structure and tactics, in Spain (Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Libbrecht *et al.*, 2011), as well as in other countries (Houten, 2009; Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Brancati, 2008). Thus, whether it is due to the political manipulation of regional political elites or to the regionalization of welfare regimes (Mota, 1998: 5; 2008; Díez, 1999; Martínez-Herrera, 2002: 424-6; McEwen and Moreno, 2005),

decentralization has been related to the development of regional identities at the cost of state-wide national identities (Jiménez and Navarro, 2015). We put this idea to the test taking into account the level of political decentralization of countries as measured by the Regional Authority Index developed by Hooghe *et al.* (2010). Although we expect a negative correlation between RAI and state-wide national identity, we do not assume any directional causal relation.

Finally, we consider recent history, which has experienced a monopolization of patriotism by fascist, totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Although political elites develop and promote a shared meaning of the nation, the monopolization of patriotism implies limiting this concept through the addition of alien meanings such as particular ideologies, values, norms, support for a leader, etc., which simultaneously excludes those who do not share these added elements (Bar-Tal, 1997: 249). Particularly in the case of fascism (as well as rightist totalitarian and authoritarian regimes) in Europe, this monopolization has alienated the left from a positive idea of nationalism (Hobsbawn, 1996; Bal-Tar, 1997; Talshir, 2005; Ruiz *et al.*, 2013). Therefore our expectation is that there might be a negative correlation between having experienced the monopolization of patriotism by fascism, totalitarian or authoritarian regimes and the state-wide national identity.

Table 2 offers further details on the country-level variables modeled and their operationalization.

Table 2. Operationalization of country-level variables with possible impact in citizens' configurations of national identity

Variable	Indicator	Data
Ethnic majority in the country	Percentage of largest ethnic group, year 2000 approx. (depending on country).	Pan, Chistoph & Pfeil Beate Sibylle Pfeil (2003). <i>National Minorities in Europe: Handbook</i> . Austria: Braumüller.
Immigrant population	Crude rates of population change: net migration plus adjustment, per 1000 population, year 2008.	Eurostat <i>Data in focus</i> – 31/2009 (table 2; page 3).
Secularization of country	Percentage of population in the country not belonging to any religious denomination	2008 European Values Study, Q23 (v105)
Catholicism	Percentage of population in the country belonging to Roman Catholic religious denomination	2008 European Values Study, Q23a (v106)
Protestantism	Percentage of population in the country belonging to Protestant religious denomination	2008 European Values Study, Q23a (v106)
Leftist population within the country	Percentage of population in the country located between 1 and 4 in the ideological scale.	2008 European Values Study, recodification of Q57 (v193)
Rightist population within the country	Percentage of population in the country located between 7 and 10 in the ideological scale.	2008 European Values Study, recodification of Q57 (v193)

Variable	Indicator	Data
Politization of the centre-periphery cleavage	<p>Manifestos Project Dataset *Saliency 2008 (or previous closer election): percentage of discourse devoted to the centre-periphery cleavage in parties' electoral manifestoes, aggregated by countries. * Trend in politization: current (2008) saliency minus two previous elections' average saliency, aggregated by countries.</p> <p>Cleavage centre-periphery= =(302+601+608+ +301+602+607)* * Pervote/100</p>	<p>Volgens, Andrea Lehmann, Pola Merz, Nicolas Regel, Sven Werner, Annika with Lacewell, Onawa Promise Schultze, Henrike (2013). <i>The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)</i>. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).</p> <p>(https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/).</p>
Level of political decentralization	* Regional Authority Index (RAI), year 2006	<p>Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schaket (2010). <i>The rise of regional authority: a comparative study of 42 democracies (1950-2006)</i>. London: Routledge.</p> <p>(http://www.unc.edu/~gwmrks/data_ra.php)</p>
Gross Domestic Product	GDP per capita in PPPs (purchasing power parities), year 2008 (base EU 28 countries)	Eurostat webpage: tables, graphs and maps interface (TGM) (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu)
Economic equality (welfare)	Gini coefficient of equalized disposable income (source: SILC), year 2008.	Eurostat webpage: tables, graphs and maps interface (TGM) (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu)
Monopolization of patriotism	Experience of monopolization of patriotism (Bar-Tal definition). Bar-Tal, Daniel (1997). "The monopolization of patriotism", en Daniel Bar-Tal, Ervin Staub (eds.). <i>Monopolization of patriotism. Patriotism: In the Lives of Individuals and Nations.</i> : Nelson Hall, pp. 246-270.	Italy (1922-1943), Greece (1931-1946), Germany (1933-1945), Portugal (1933-1974), Spain (1939-1977).

Source: Authors.

4. The configuration of national identities in EU-15 neighbor countries: a cluster analysis

As a first step in our analysis, we test if Spain is a particular case among EU-15 member-states, or if there are other countries whose citizens' feelings toward the nation are similar. We work with aggregate data: the percentage of citizens who identify themselves primarily with each territorial level, the percentage of citizens proud of their national identity and the percentage of citizens who consider each of different elements to be important in order to be truly national, as shown in table 3. Looking at the percentage of people that identifies primarily with their country, the average for the EU-15 countries is 33 percent. Spain is below this average, but so are Germany, Sweden, Portugal and Denmark, Ireland, Austria and Italy; these last

three with percentages quite close to Spain. If we focus on regional identity, Spain, together with Portugal and Great Britain locate themselves above the EU-15 average (16%). As two further examples, consider the percentage of people who believes that have been born in the country is important to be truly national, with an average of 64 percent for the EU-15, and the percentage of people who thinks that having ancestor from the country is important to be considered truly national (53%). Spain is below these averages, but so are Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, Greece and Finland (in the case of born) plus Germany and Luxembourg (in the case of ancestors).

Therefore, the descriptive analysis of the variables (confirmed by Lavene's test) shows that variance is substantively different across countries, which is a fundamental requirement to carry on a cluster analysis. At the same time, table 3, clearly indicates that Spain shares different identity traits with other countries.

Cluster analysis allows us to group countries in such a way that those in the same cluster are the most similar among themselves, and the most dissimilar with countries in other groups. That is, countries within each cluster will be homogeneous (as much as possible, considering all the variables at the same time), while clusters will be the most heterogeneous among themselves. We carried out a non-hierarchical cluster analysis with the purpose of determine the number of clusters to be formed, and later on used a K-mean cluster analysis to establish the composition of each of the groups. Table 4 shows the configuration of these clusters.

The distance of each country to the centroid of the group in table 4 shows that, while Portugal belongs together with Great Britain and Greece in cluster one, this is the most dissimilar country among the three of them. Within the second cluster, Finland and France are the most dissimilar countries, while Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden and the Netherlands are quite close together. Spain belongs to the third cluster with Austria, Italy and Germany, this last country being the most dissimilar among them. Ireland, in the fourth cluster, is quite homogeneous. Table 5 helps us understanding how these four clusters were formed.

In the ANOVA table (table 5) variables with the largest F discriminates first and foremost among the clusters. As can be seen the type of imagined community has a clear impact on the formation of clusters, all items being statistically significant at the level of a 95% confidence interval. Table 5 shows that the importance given to have been born in the country is the most important variable discriminating among groups. As pointed in table 6, the importance attached to this fact mainly differentiates cluster number two, with lower percentage of people considering important the fact of have been born in the country, from the rest of clusters. The second most important variable is the importance attached to have ancestors, which differentiate, again, cluster two, with lower average of citizens giving importance to ancestors, from the rest (table 6). These two variables configure an ethno-cultural understanding of identities (a dimension based on the *jus sanguine*) that seem to be much less prominent among countries in cluster two than the rest.

Table 3. Percentage of citizens on each category of the dependent variable(a), by countries (European Values Study 2008)

	% local identity	% regional identity	% national identity	% European identity	% word-wide identity	% national proud	% important born in country	% important respect political institutions and laws	% important have ancestry	% important able to speak language	% important have lived in country
Germany	39,8	38,9	12,8	4,3	4,2	75,78	72,28	94,18	49,9	94,82	79,05
Ireland	59,7	12,5	23,6	1,6	2,6	98,72	45,89	95,82	43,46	87,97	63,52
Spain	46,6	16,2	25,3	2,3	9,7	92,65	45,5	97,52	40,41	98,13	50
Austria	24,7	35,8	27,4	6,6	5,6	89,27	62,77	97,65	50	89,24	77,55
Italy	45,5	11,4	28,9	4,8	9,4	87,38	46,66	98,47	39,79	96,54	54,48
Sweden	47,3	10,5	30,6	5,1	6,5	87,43	58,38	96,38	59,77	97,43	69,82
Portugal	43,8	16,4	31,5	2,3	6	94,87	73,75	95,21	65,59	96,97	73,11
Denmark	41,4	21,7	31,7	3,1	2	90,81	76,08	95,02	91,04	94,67	83,4
Northern Ireland	52,8	10	32,8	2,2	2,2	96,15	86,32	93,03	80,14	70,13	75,84
Luxembourg	29,2	9,3	33,3	20,6	7,6	91,61	75,69	97,25	45,07	92,14	75,91
Belgium	29,5	22,2	33,6	6,7	8	87,66	42,14	94,99	25,78	88,84	71,29
Great Britain	39,1	17,4	35,7	2,2	5,6	91,15	82,39	85,8	70,84	39,75	77
France	33,8	12,8	36,7	5,7	11	90,88	80,23	92,06	79,7	93,26	83,34
The Netherlands	40,7	8,6	37,3	5,2	8,2	86,06	74,28	93,57	55,01	92,15	74,26
Greece	32,6	14	46	2,6	4,8	94,68	49,51	96,11	36,81	97,27	76,5
Finland	19,7	12,5	56,6	6,5	4,8	93,25	47,93	94,31	21,8	98,9	47,22
Average (error)	39,13 (2,6)	16,88 (2,3)	32,73 (2,4)	5,11 (1,1)	6,14 (1,3)	90,52 (1,3)	63,73 (3,4)	94,83 (0,7)	53,44 (5,0)	89,26 (3,7)	70,77 (2,8)

(a) Variables were recoded and then aggregated by countries. Local, regional, national, European and word-wide identities were not transformed (Q69, v253 in table I). National pride (Q72, v256 in table I) was recoded as a dummy variable; percentage in the table corresponds to the sum of values very proud and quite proud. All other remaining variables, related to the relative importance of different elements to be truly national (Q80, v276-80 in table I), were recoded as dummies; percentages in the table correspond to sum of very important and quite important.

Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.

The importance given to being able to speak the country's language and respect political institutions and laws stand out as the third and four most important variables, respectively, for the formation of clusters (table 5). They discriminate mainly cluster four, with lower average on both variables, from the rest (table 6). In

contrast to the former two most important variables, these seem to ascertain a civic dimension of identity (an understanding based on the *jus solis*) which is less important in Ireland as compared to the rest of clusters.

Table 4. Composition of clusters (K-mean analysis)

COUNTRY	Cluster	Distance
Great Britain	1	14,151
Greece	1	16,119
Portugal	1	9,451
Belgium	2	13,984
Denmark	2	13,423
Finland	2	31,769
France	2	5,235
Luxembourg	2	16,128
Sweden	2	15,343
The Netherlands	2	18,366
Austria	3	18,697
Germany	3	24,679
Italy	3	19,054
Spain	3	14,754
Ireland	4	17,480
Northern Ireland	4	17,480

Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.

Most of the variables regarding the territorial sense of belonging are also significant. Being proud to be national is the fifth most important variable and distinguishes clusters two and three, with lower percentage of people sharing this feeling, from the rest. In decreasing order (table 5), local identity is less important in cluster four than the rest; national identity is lower in clusters three and four than in cluster one and two; and regional identity is higher in cluster three than the rest (table 6). Regional identity however is not statistically significant.

These results are plausible, which can usually be taken as proof of face validity and the first test of validity any kind of analysis must meet. However, cluster analysis has weaknesses, and discriminant analysis is frequently undertaken as a way to confirm the solution proposed by a cluster analysis. We followed this same path and carried out discriminant and multinomial regression analyses using the individual EVS 2008 database to further validate the results of the previous cluster analysis. We used the same identity variables (see table 1) and employed analytical

and cross-validation samples (50% of random cases) as well as bootstrap techniques to test the stability of our solution. We transformed non-normal variables into dummies and proceed with the analysis, although we acknowledge a moderate problem of heteroscedasticity for particular variables.

Table 5. ANOVA: Statistical significance of each variable on the differentiation of clusters

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Cuadratic mean	df	Cuadratic mean	Df		
% F_Territorial id.: Locality or town	245,505	3	76,219	12	3,221	,061
% F_Territorial id.: Region country	142,960	3	64,488	12	2,217	,139
% F_Territorial id.: Nation as a whole	194,707	3	66,188	12	2,942	,076
% Proud to be national	66,924	3	17,874	12	3,744	,042
% important born in country	1038,676	3	40,383	12	25,721	,000
% important respect political institutions and laws	26,264	3	4,622	12	5,683	,012
% important have ancestry	1608,515	3	89,705	12	17,931	,000
% important able to speak language	898,471	3	52,618	12	17,075	,000

Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.

Our discriminant analysis finds 3 canonical functions that explain 64, 21 and 15 percent, respectively, of the total variance among clusters of countries. As can be seen in table 7, the first function is defined mainly by the importance given to the fact of having been born in the country to be truly national, and distinguishes clusters 1 and 4 (closer to this first canonical function's centroid) from clusters 2 and 3 (table 8). The second canonical function is defined mainly by the importance given to having ancestry and to speaking the country's language to be truly national (however speaking the language was moderately heteroscedastic). It mainly differentiates clusters 1 and 3 from clusters 2 and 4. Finally, the last function is defined by the positive correlation with national identity and pride and negative correlation with regional identity (table 7). This function distinguishes cluster 3 from the rest, having a negative centroid in this function, countries in this cluster are characterized by having less national identity and pride and more regional identity than others (table 8). Despite the differences between both methods, these results roughly coincide with the way in which the K-mean procedure established the groups in the first place.

Table 6. Characterization of clusters on each discriminant variable: average value of discriminant variables for each cluster

Discriminant variables	Cluster			
	1	2	3	4
% F_Territorial id.: Locality or town	38,50	34,51	39,15	56,25
% F_Territorial id.: Region country	15,93	13,94	25,58	11,25
% F_Territorial id.: Nation as a whole	37,73	37,11	23,60	28,20
% Proud to be national	93,57	89,67	86,27	97,44
% important born in country	76,69	48,63	70,16	84,36
% important respect political institutions and laws	94,10	96,41	95,35	89,42
% important have ancestry	78,78	36,86	52,44	75,49
% important able to speak language	94,97	93,84	94,14	54,94

Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.

Table 7. Structure matrix of canonical functions

	Function		
	1	2	3
IMP_born	,517*	,386	-,237
ID_town	,234*	-,152	-,058
IMP_laws	-,177*	-,022	,034
IMP_speak	-,584	,716*	,045
IMP_ancestry	,625	,694*	,211
ID_country	-,109	,031	,620*
ID_region	-,007	,224	-,605*
NAT_pride	,147	-,017	,505*

Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.

A way to ascertain the goodness of fit in discriminant analysis is to compare how well are we able to predict the cluster of belonging using the discriminant functions as compared to using no information. Since we have four clusters, we could randomly assign 25 percent of our individuals to each cluster (equal probabilities) or we could assign a percentage of people proportional to the size of each group (unequal probabilities). Our discriminant functions are able to correctly classify 45,3% of the selected cases, and 46,5% of the validation sample. This represents an improvement over random assignment of cases to clusters. If we consider unequal

probabilities according to the number of cases in each cluster, our discriminant analysis significantly increases our capacity to classify cases in clusters 1 and 4 (by 41,7% and 34,7% respectively, as compared to random assignment). However, it does not increase this capacity at all regarding clusters 2 and 3.

Table 8. Clusters' centroids in each canonical function

FOUR_cluster_k.means	Function		
	1	2	3
1,00	,336	,397	,233
2,00	-,386	-,178	,123
3,00	-,022	,100	-,336
4,00	1,403	-,581	,010

Discriminant canonical functions non-typified evaluated on groups' mean.

Source: EVS 2008, own elaboration.

A logit multinomial regression run with the same dependent and independent variables confirms that all the variables are statistically significant (either for one or another cluster of countries). Its classificatory power is similar to that which we found through discriminant analysis: 47,9% of cases correctly classify on the whole, representing a significant improvement over random assignment for clusters 1 (50,7%, as compared to 21%), 2 (63,8%, as compared to 42%), and 4 (30%, as compared to 7%), but not for cluster 3.

In summary, our analysis shows that the four groups of countries formed by our k-mean cluster analysis of aggregated data are valid: the clusters of countries are significantly different in the identity variables introduced in the analysis. In fact, by knowing only the type of territorial identity and imagined community of an individual we can correctly assign that individual to a cluster of countries with a higher probability than assigning simply by chance. This means that Spain share identity characteristics with other EU-15 countries. However, are some of the particular explanations traditionally offered to understand the Spanish case also applicable to other countries? Are there contextual factors that correlate with this clustering of countries?

5. The impact of country-level variables on identities

As mentioned above, our main objective is to explore if these clusters of countries can be further explained by other aggregate country-level context variables. In other words, we would like to test whether country level variables do have an impact on individual national identities. Our main interest is just to test this, as a first approximation to the topic, not to measure the strength of the influence or compare it against other individual variables.

Table 9. Descriptive analysis of cluster of countries on profiling variables

		Cluster 1: Greece, Portugal, Great Britain	Cluster 2: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden	Cluster 3: Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain
ETNIA_MAY Percentage of ethnic majority in the country	Average	92,7649	81,2520	87,6420
	Standard deviation	6,55420	14,27117	6,53075
INMIG_2008 Percentage of immigrant population	Average	2,5625	5,7632	4,6835
	Standard deviation	1,20925	4,75797	3,60236
NOREL Percentage of population belonging to no religious denomination (secularization)	Average	19,5589	34,2666	28,3080
	Standard deviation	16,47631	12,74917	12,28809
CATHOL Percentage of population declaring a Roman Catholic religion denomination	Average	38,5698	49,0900	73,2568
	Standard deviation	41,04567	39,92274	22,22491
PROTEST Percentage of population declaring a Protestant religion denomination	Average	31,4185	41,7278	17,4759
	Standard deviation	27,55509	43,066818	22,55101
RIGHTPOP Percentage or population holding rightist ideology (7-10)	Average	24,3891	29,885	20,5597
	Standard deviation	4,38997	8,79414	5,85353
LEFTPOP Percentage or population holding leftist ideology (1-4)	Average	30,8350	31,4943	35,7292
	Standard deviation	5,88640	3,68142	8,86843
POLIT_2008 Politization of the centre-periphere cleavage-Saliency	Average	5,5292	5,8026	4,2846
	Standard deviation	,26213	2,41142	,91983
POLIT_trend Politization of the centre-periphere cleavage-Trend	Average	-1,4408	,7518	,3147
	Standard deviation	2,06121	2,39500	,39686
RAI_2006 Level of political decentralization	Average	7,6767	12,4220	23,5628
	Standard deviation	2,91122	8,31700	4,25178
GINI_2008 Economic equity (welfare)	Average	34,3770	26,9799	29,8555
	Standard deviation	1,03396	1,73682	2,08423
GDP_in_PPS_2008 Gross Domestic Product	Average	95,0559	143,9148	112,5721
	Standard deviation	14,85769	53,19962	8,52116
MONOPOL(*) Monopolization of patriotism	Average	,6617	0	,7714
	Standard deviation	,47319	0	,41999

(*) Monopol is measured as a dummy variable, with values 1, in the case of monopolization, and 0 in all other cases.

Source: As indicated in table 2, own elaboration.

Firstly, we performed a descriptive analysis of the previously formed clusters with regard to the new profiling variables that we detailed in table 2. However, although Northern Ireland was used in the previous cluster analysis, it turned out that there was no data for most of the new variables. We therefore decided to leave the cluster formed by Ireland and Northern Ireland out of the subsequent analysis. A descriptive analysis of these variables shows distinctive patterns for the three remaining clusters (table 9).

As can be seen, the homogeneity of the ethnic majority within countries is higher in cluster 1 than the rest. On the other hand the percentage of immigrant population is lower in cluster 1 and higher in clusters 2 and 3. Furthermore, the level of secularization is remarkably different between clusters 1 and 2. Meanwhile the percentage of Roman Catholics is significantly higher in cluster 3 than in clusters 1 and 2, and Protestantism mainly distinguishes cluster 2 from 3. As regards ideology, the percentage of rightist population seems to distinguish clusters 2 and 3 overall, while leftist ideology holders are slightly higher in cluster 3 than in clusters 1 and 2. The politicization of the centre-periphery cleavage seems to distinguish cluster 3, with a lower level of politicization than in clusters 1 and 2. On the other hand, a decreasing trend in the politicization of this cleavage distinguishes cluster 1 from the rest. The level of political decentralization is, on average, substantively higher in cluster 3 than clusters 1 and 2. In relation to economic and welfare variables, economic equality is slightly higher in cluster 2 than 3, and substantially higher than in cluster 1. Meanwhile the Gross Domestic Product distinguishes cluster 2, with substantially higher values than in clusters 1 and 3. Finally, the absence of monopolization of patriotism by fascist, authoritarian or totalitarian regimes distinguishes cluster 2 from the rest.

Confirming this descriptive analysis, an ANOVA test (assuming unequal variances of groups) shows that there is substantive variance between groups, as well as within groups. Robust mean comparisons show that the clusters' means for each variable are significantly different between groups. All of these also tend to reinforce the idea that the results of our previous cluster analysis are valid.

However, we want to confirm whether these country-level variables do in fact also correctly discriminate between the clusters of countries previously created. We proceeded in two steps. In the first place, table 10 shows the results of a Categorical Regression that should be interpreted only in the sense of which variables are relevant for distinguishing between clusters and the relative importance of independent variables with respect to each other. As can be seen, all the country-level variables included in the analysis are statically significant. However, economic equality (as an indicator of welfare) is the most relevant variable to distinguish between the clusters. It is followed in importance by the historic experience of monopolization of patriotism, with GDP in third place. All other variables, although statistically significant, contribute little to the explanation of the dependent variable (only the ethnic majority could be mentioned as being moderately important). As we shall see, the importance of these variables is confirmed in discriminant analysis.

As a second step, the discriminant analysis carried on distinguishes two discriminant functions that explain 75,5% and 25,5% of the variance of the dependent variable (the three clusters), respectively. Table 11 shows that the first

dimension is based in our proxy variable for welfare: GINI. There are other variables whose greater correlation is also with this first function but whose coefficients are lower and cannot be considered statistically significant. This first function distinguishes cluster 1 (more distant from the centroid of the function) from cluster 2 and 3 (closer). The second function is defined basically by the level of political decentralization together with the historical experience of the monopolization of patriotism, including other variables with low and insignificant coefficients, however. This function distinguishes cluster 3 (closer to the centroid of the function) from cluster 1 and 2 (more clearly from the latter).

Table 10. Categorical regression using clusters of countries as dependent variable

	Standardized coefficients		df	F	Sig.	Importance	Tolerance	
	Beta	Bootstrap estimation (1000) of standard error					After transf.	Before transf.
ETNIA_MAY	,322	,003	1	9986,025	,000	-,153	,128	,128
INMIGRA_2008	,200	,011	1	312,567	,000	,073	,045	,045
NOREL	,125	,021	1	33,913	,000	,054	,019	,019
PROTEST	-,514	,004	1	16786,329	,000	-,070	,321	,321
LEFTPOP	,882	,010	1	8155,466	,000	,010	,052	,052
POLIT_2008	,177	,006	1	881,546	,000	,009	,252	,252
POLIT_Trend	-,074	,007	1	110,259	,000	-,032	,114	,114
RAI_2006	,138	,017	1	62,913	,000	,026	,046	,046
GINI_2008	-,625	,012	1	2716,683	,000	,538	,048	,048
GDP_in_PPS_2008	,431	,015	1	875,893	,000	,202	,042	,042
MONOPOL	,668	,022	1	955,777	,000	,340	,015	,015

$R^2=,971$. Error stimation: 0,029

Variables were recodified before optimal scaling (see appendix).

Source: EVS 2008 and those indicated in table 2, own elaboration.

Choosing unequal probabilities for each group, the canonical functions improve the correct assignation of cases in 88% for cluster 1, 69% for cluster 3 and 53% for cluster 2.

In summary, both the qualitative regression and the discriminant analysis support the importance of each of the contextual factor introduced in the analysis. Thus, in relation to the theories posed before, we find clear evidence about the instrumental dimension of identities linked with the development of welfare state, and about the importance of political-administrative structures, the decentralization of states in particular. Especially interesting is the fact that the explanation of the Francoist contamination of identity in Spain do also seem to hold for other countries; that is, there is a correlation between having experienced the monopolization of patriotism by fascism, totalitarian or authoritarian regimes and the of percentage state-wide national identity exhibited by its citizens; meanwhile other variables such as the ethnic homogeneity of a country, religion and left-right ideologies correlates also with the state-wide national identity, although with minor influence on the creation or holding of state-wide national identities.

Table 11. Structure matrix of canonical functions

	Function	
	1	2
GINI_2008 Cuantificación	-,230*	,157
POLIT_Trend Cuantificación	,074*	-,006
ETNIA_MAY Cuantificación	-,073*	,064
NOREL Cuantificación	,067*	-,038
INMIGRA Cuantificación	,058*	-,017
MONOPOL 1-2 Cuantificación	,076	-,274*
RAI_2006 Cuantificación	,087	,259*
PROTEST Cuantificación	,007	-,094*
GDP Cuantificación	,070	-,090*
LEFTPOP Cuantificación	,017	,088*
POLIT_2008 Cuantificación	-,004	-,085*

Note: The analysis uses optimal scaling transformations of variables as implemented by the Categorical Regression procedure in table 10.

Source: EVS 2008 and those indicated in table 2, own elaboration.

6. Conclusions

In relation to the grouping of countries, our analysis has shown that EU-15 states exhibit significantly different patterns in the types of identity held by their citizens. Thus, there is a group of countries characterized by a relatively lower level of national state-wide identity holders as compared to the group of regional identity

holders. Not only is the percentage of national state-wide identity holders lower, but the strength of the bond (national pride) is weaker than in the other clusters of countries. In other words, despite the particular explanations about the exceptionality of Spain, it shares identity characteristics with its EU-15 neighbor countries. The cluster of countries where Spain belongs, according to our analysis, is clearly differentiated from others by the weaker links of their citizens with the nation and their stronger attachment to the region.

Notwithstanding, the importance of the type of imagined community is much more relevant for distinguishing cluster of countries than the percentages of citizens holding national and regional identities. Thus, an ethno-cultural conception of national identity as opposed to a civic understanding of national belonging is the first and foremost characteristics distinguishing among groups of countries (mainly cluster 2 from the rest). Only in the third place, does the percentage of people feeling attached to the nation and region, and the strength of such attachment, appear as an important element form discriminating countries. This, however, significantly distinguish cluster three, where Spain belongs, from the rest of clusters.

Regarding the contextual variables that may explains particular configuration of identities, all of them have shown their importance in our analysis. Thus, although identity is an individual attitude, our analysis also shows that it is not independent from certain country-level variables.

Economy and welfare, in the first place, appear to be relevant for distinguishing among cluster of countries. Equal distribution of income (GINI coefficient), as an indicator of welfare, is one of the most important variables that should be taken into account when explaining different patterns of identity. Although this finding partly supports the hypothesis of instrumental identities, cluster 1, with greater differences in the redistribution of income (table 9), shared some identity traits with cluster 2 and others with cluster 3 (table 6). Therefore, we cannot establish a direct relationship between the welfare of a country and its citizens' national identity at this moment. Our data however points toward and interesting direction that should be deeper explored in the future with longitudinal data and the appropriate multilevel design.

We find also empirical evidence for the importance of the political-administrative structure of the state in shaping national feelings. Thus, the level of political decentralization, as suggested by the literature, appears among the most relevant country-level variables with an impact on identity in our analysis. Furthermore, in a way not suggested by the literature, our discriminant analysis put together the decentralization of countries and recent political history of monopolization of patriotism by fascist, authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in some countries within the same dimension. In line with this finding, we confirm that cluster 3, where Spain belongs, formed by the more decentralized countries in our sample, which have furthermore experienced the monopolization of patriotism (table 9), also tend to exhibit lower levels of state-wide national identity holders, higher levels of regional identity holders and a lower level of citizens proud to be national (table 6). This, again, is nothing particular of Spain but a shared trend among a group of countries. Much less important, but also statistically significant, the politicization of the centre-periphery cleavage affects also national identities.

An interesting question to be tested in the future is the possible interaction effects between decentralization of countries and the politicization of this cleavage on national identities.

Certainly, other variables related to the ethnic homogeneity of the people as well as the percentages of immigration have also exhibited statically significant impact. But perhaps the most relevant conclusion here is, precisely, their modest influence as compared to economic and political-administrative indicators. Together with the minor importance of religion, this suggests a lowering importance of the ethnic-cultural definition of identities at the aggregate level of countries. That is, however, contradictory with the importance that individual citizens give to the fact of have been born, and to have ancestry, in the country. This apparent contradiction is an interesting thread for new research as well.

In the same line, ideology, compared to economic and political-administrative indicators seem to have a limited impact on the configuration of national identities, when considered at the aggregate level. It could be interesting to test if this is so the case more in some countries than in other; that is, to see if there is any interaction effects with other political-administrative characteristics of the countries: those included in this article as well as others.

To conclude, we have put to test in an exploratory way, some preliminary ideas and hypothesis regarding why national identities in Spain seem to be particularly weak. This has been done by a quantitative empirical, systematic and international comparison that has given us valuable hints about the importance of countries' contexts in shaping their citizens' national identities. This however, is a departing point, not a closing one. Our findings open up for questions more than they give us definitive answers. Having shown the plausibility and feasibility of this kind of analysis, we shall proceed with more specific designs to test the relative importance of individual and contextual factors. The inclusion of new countries as well as longer periods of times could also help improving our understanding of the impact of context on individual identities. These new analysis should take into account individual and contextual variables within multilevel models to try to clarify some apparent contradictions that emerge from our analysis, especially in the relative importance of ethnic-cultural or civic-political configuration of identities.

7. References

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