EDICIONES
COMPLUTENSE

Educating the English: the role of universities in tackling hate speech and Islamaphobia in post-EU-Referendum Britain.

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Abstract. This essay will examine the role of the Higher Education system in the UK, in educating students and communities about the concept of 'othering', and how they can combat ignorance of the benefits of multiculturalism and Freedom of Movement. Since the Referendum over membership of the EU (June 2016), hate crime and speech has soared in the UK –verbally and on social media– as have physical attacks on migrants and ethnic minorities. Recent research suggests that this increase has been fuelled by the language and images used in certain UK media.

This essay will therefore consider the impact of media 'othering' and what universities can, are, and might do to combat this rhetoric and action. It will consider current practices, policies, and posit future paths for Higher Education and governmental Education policy, in tackling xenophobia and Islamaphobia within the UK.

Keywords: UK, EU, Higher Education, Brexit, Hate

[es] Educando al pueblo inglés: el rol de las universidades a la hora den enfrentar el discurso del odio y la islamofobia después del referéndum del Brexit.

Resumen. Este artículo examinará el rol de las universidades británicas al educar tanto a sus estudiantes como a las comunidades que las rodean sobre el "otro", usando el multiculturalismo y el Movimiento por la Libertad para combatir la ignorancia hacia "el otro". Desde que tuvo lugar el referéndum del Brexit en junio de 2016, se han incrementado considerablemente el discurso y los delitos basados en el odio hacia el "otro" en el Reino Unido, tanto a nivel verbal como a través de los medios de comunicación social, por no hablar de las agresiones de carácter físico hacia inmigrantes y minorías étnicas. Los estudios más recientes sobre este fenómeno social indican que este incremento ha sido claramente avivado por las imágenes y el lenguaje exhibidos en los medios de comunicación británicos.

Por lo tanto, el objetivo de este artículo es considerar el impacto de los medios de comunicación en la conceptualización del "otro" y explorar qué están haciendo las universidades británicas para enfrentar esta retórica y acciones. Consideraremos prácticas y políticas actuales y las posibles alternativas que las universidades pueden adoptar, así como las políticas que el gobierno podría implantar para contrarrestar tanto la xenofobia en general como la islamofobia en particular a nivel nacional.

Palabras clave: Reino Unido, Unión Europea, educación terciaria, Brexit, odio.

1. The 'EU Referendum in Context'

It was in January 2013 that David Cameron, then UK Prime Minister, declared his intention to hold a referendum on the UK's relationship with the European Union. In a speech delivered at the Bloomberg headquarters, he detailed the Conservative party's intention –if re-elected– first to renegotiate that relationship, and then to call a referendum on that membership[2]. The *United Kingdom European Union Membership Referendum* (also known as the EU Referendum) was held on 23 June 2016 in the UK and Gibraltar, in order to gauge whether or not the electorate wished to continue the UK's membership of the EU, positing the question within

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[2]   See T. Oliver, *Understanding Brexit. A Concise Introduction* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2018), chapter 3 ('The renegotiation and referendum campaign'), esp. pp. 52-56.

a stark either/or framework: Leave or Remain. The EU referendum campaign began on 15 April 2016, with the result announced on Friday 24 June, the day after the referendum.

Voter turnout was 72.2%, with 51.9% of those who voted in favour of leaving (with a standard deviation of 10.4% across UK local authority areas).[3] Under-18s were not eligible to vote; of those 18-24 year olds who voted, 74% voted to Remain in the EU.[4] Concerns about immigration and 'the loss of a distinct national identity' were two significant factors influencing voters who chose 'Leave'.[5] Since then, studies have noted how fears articulated over immigration and multiculturalism were prominent among voters with lower levels of education (and no experience within Higher Education).[6] London, along with other large, multicultural cities with significant numbers of undergraduates and graduates, voted in the majority for 'Remain'.[7]

1.1. Hate Crime in the UK

Under UK law, a hate crime is defined as 'any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic.'[8] There are five centrally monitored strands of hate crime: race or ethnicity, religion or beliefs, sexual orientation, disability, and transgender identity. This article considers 'hate crime' within the first two categories.

Home Office statistical analysis of hate crime related to race/religion for 2014/15 re-veals 42,930 race hate crimes (82% of overall hate crime), and 3,254 (6%) in which religion was deemed the specific motivating factor.[9] This sentence had been deleted in the final version.[10] For 2016/17 –which includes the period surrounding the EU Referendum– figures revealed a significant increase. Racially-motivated crime had risen to 62,685 reported crimes (a rise of 27%), and 5,949 crimes for which religion was deemed the motivating factor (a rise of 35%).

As a Home Office report acknowledges, 'part of the increase since 2015/16 is due to a genuine increase in hate crime, particularly around the time of the EU Referendum in June 2016'.[11] The report also notes that some hate crimes could 'be motivated by hostility towards the victim's race and religion', and such crimes are duly accounted for in the providing breakdown, since '[a]round five per cent of hate crime offences in 2016/17 are estimated to have involved more than one motivating factor, the majority of these were hate crimes related to both race and religion.'[12] Specifically, the report's analysis details 'a clear spike in hate crime' during June and July 2016.[13] Further evidence reveals that such crimes have consistently risen in the aftermath of key events, such as the Lee Rigby[14] murder in July 2013, and the Charlie Hebdo[15] shooting in January 2015, with the highest recorded spike (nearly double that of the spike following Rigby's murder) occurring after the EU Referendum.[16] Greater nuance of these findings were reported by the Office for

3   S.O. Becker, T. Fetzer, and D. Novy, 'Who Voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-level analysis' in *Economic Policy*, 32 (2017): 601-650, at 611.

4   See S.B. Hobolt, 'The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent' in *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23 (2016): 1259-1277 and Hortense Goulard, 'Britain's youth voted Remain': https://www.politico.eu/article/britains-youth-voted-remain-leave-eu-brexit-referendum-stats/ [last accessed 1 August 2018].

5   Hobolt, 'The Brexit vote', p. 1273. See also N. Lee, K. Morris and T. Kemeny, 'Immobility and the Brexit vote', *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society* (2018): http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86367/ [last accessed 1 August 2018].

6   Ibid. See also Peter Moore, 'How Britain Voted': https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted/ [last accessed 20 October 2018].

7   See, for example, *Financial Times*, 24 June 2016: https://ig.ft.com/sites/elections/2016/uk/eu-referendum/ [last accessed 1 August 2018].

8   H. Corcoran, D. Lader and K. Smith, UK Home Office Statistical Bulletin, *Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15*, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/467366/hosb0515.pdf [last accessed 19 August 2018].

9   Corcoran, Lader and Smith, *Hate Crime* 2014/15 2.1 Prevalence and Trends

10   A. O'Neill, UK Home Office Statistical Bulletin, *Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2016/17*, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf [last accessed 19 August 2018]. 2.1 Prevalence and Trends (table 2).

11   O'Neill, *Hate Crime 2016/17*, 2.1, p. 4.

12   Ibid.

13   O'Neill, *Hate Crime 2016/17*, Table 2.2, p. 6.

14   Fusilier Lee Rigby of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, was attacked and killed by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale near the Royal Artillery Barracks in Woolwich, southeast London. For analysis of the motivations behind and impact of this case see T. McEnery, M. McGlashan and R. Love, 'Press and social media reaction to ideologically inspired murder: The case of Lee Rigby' in *Discourse and Communication* 9 (2015): 237-259; I. Awan and M. Rahman, 'Portrayals of Muslims Following the Murders of Lee Rigby in Woolwich and Mohammed Saleem in Birmingham: A Content Analysis of UK Newspapers' in *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 36 (2016): 16-31.

15   See J. Britton, *Muslims, Racism and Violence after the Paris Attacks* in *Sociological Research Online* 20 (2015): 1-6.

16   O'Neill, *Hate Crime 2016/17*, Figure 2.2.

National Statistics, which noted a direct correlation between hate crime against migrants and Muslims, and the outcome of the Referendum.[17] Another significant spike in hate crime (even higher than that recorded around the Referendum) occurred in the aftermath of the Finsbury Park Mosque attack on 19 June 2017.[18]

1.2. The Media and Hate Crime

Academic, political and journalistic concerns have been raised over the impact of newspaper headlines and articles in the lead up to and after the EU Referendum, and a variety of studies and campaigns were launched to consider any potential correlations between press editorials, the outcome of the Referendum, and the increase in hate crime. In August 2016, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism released their report, 'UK Press Coverage of the EU Referendum', which concluded that newspaper 'coverage was heavily skewed towards the Leave camp', with 'immigration' proving to be the most significant issue raised.[19] Academic research findings have reinforced the ways in which the UK press dominated and controlled much of public debate about EU membership. Paul Rowinski's assessment of prejudicial language in the UK media is a case in point:

> Initial linguistic analysis has established a discursive construction, prevalent in the mainstream mainly right-of-centre national newspapers in the weeks running up to the referendum, claiming to "take back our country"; "regain control"… the main conduit for the articulation of [these] notions is immigration. It is argued that never before in living memory have some

newspapers fed the public's hopes, fears and yes prejudice against Europe (and Europeans) to this extent. They have tapped into a selective collective memory, the resulting common sense presuppositions and ignorance. Some newspapers have acted irresponsibly, have damaged our democracy and played a pivotal role in creating the crisis we now face.[20]

As the 'fourth power (or estate)', the media in the UK and across the West 'has enormous impact' on public behaviour, as Joana Kosho detailed on the eve of the UK's EU Referendum. Immigration remains 'a complex phenomenon' but public 'knowledge, attitudes and the impressions on immigration are constructed by continuous information from the media' in the UK; her timely study noted 'negative discourse' as predominate across several news outlets, with 'negative terminology on immigrants focused on the key words like 'illegal', 'terrorist', etc.' having considerable impact upon public perception.[21]

Public and individual concerns were also raised on social media and galvanised during the aftermath of the EU Referendum. In August 2016, the Stop Funding Hate campaign was launched in the wake of the increase in hate crime, after the EU Referendum.[22] The campaign's aim is to persuade substantial companies with offices in the UK to desist advertising in (both on- and offline) newspapers that utilise headlines and language that have the potential to fuel hate crime. Three key newspapers targeted by the campaign, by way of example, are the *The Sun, The Daily Mail* and *The Express*, who regularly produce anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric, which demonstrably increased in the lead up to and after the Referendum.[23]

Responses to this persistent and increased anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric, includ-

17   O'Neill, *Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2016/17*. See also D. Devine, 'Hate crime did spike after the referendum – even allowing for other factors', *The London School of Economics and Political Science Blog*, 19 March 2018: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/19/hate-crime-did-spike-after-the-referendum-even-allowing-for-other-factors/ [last accessed 18 August 2018].

18   On 19 June 2017 Darren Osborne drove a van into pedestrians in Finsbury Park, London, near the Muslim Welfare House, 100 yards from Finsbury Park Mosque. One victim of the attack died, and at least nine others were injured. See: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42910051 [last accessed 21 August 2018].

19   D.A.L. Levy, B. Aslan and D. Bironzo, 'UK Press Coverage of the EU Referendum' (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism in association with PRIME Research, 2016), pp. 34-35; available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-11/UK_Press_Coverage_of_the_%20EU_Referendum.pdf [last accessed 22 August 2018].

20   P. Rowinski, 'Mind the gap: the language of prejudice and the press omissions that led a people to the precipice' (2016), available at: www.referendumanalysis.eu [last accessed 29 August 2018].

21   J. Kosho, 'Media Influence on Public Opinion Attitudes Toward The Migration Crisis' in *International Journal of Scientific and Technology Research* 5 (2016): 90.

22   I am grateful to Richard Wilson, the founder of Stop Funding Hate, for our discussions about hate speech in the UK media, and its ramifications for society.

23   According to the Audit Bureau of Circulations (UK), *The Sun* is the UK's largest-selling newspaper (circulation: 1,787,096), with *The Daily Mail* in second place (1,511,357). *The Express'* circulation in December 2016 was 335,271. (abc.org.uk)

ed The Body Shop: the company was persuaded by customer action and the Stop Funding Hate campaign to stop advertising with *The Daily Mail*, a decision that followed hot on the heels of a similar decision by Lego. The Body Shop released a statement saying that it had listened to concerns, and noting their own concerns about the newspaper's editorial stance: "We have always supported human rights –it is part of our Enrich Not Exploit Commitment– and when an editorial stance seems to go against that Commitment, we consider seriously whether we will support it."[24] No further adverts for The Body Shop occurred in *The Daily Mail* or *The Mail on Sunday* after 11 December 2016. Similarly in 2016, Specsavers Optical Group Ltd (a British optical retail chain) withdrew an advert from the *Daily Express* after pressure from the public and Stop Funding Hate complained that the newspaper was funding "fear and division".[25] (Their advert had appeared alongside the headline 'New Migrant Rush to Britain. Calais refugees in race from Jungle' [7 September 2016].)

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the *Daily Mail* have utilised their news portals to attack such campaign's against their lexical choices. *Daily Mail* columnist Guy Adams, did not pull any punches or word, in his article attacking Stop Funding Hate, as their campaign continued to make advances in public and business considerations throughout 2017. Adams used his online column to attack 'The real hatemongers: A tiny bunch of zealots called Stop Funding Hate are trying to gag Britain's free press. This exposé reveals the vile abuse and incitement to violence spewed out by THEIR supporters against Tories and Brexiteers'.[26] It is not difficult to identify his attempt to deflect accusations back upon his accusers; the lexical choice of 'zealots' adding a religious edge to the mix.

The *Daily Mail* has a demonstrable track record of openly attacking any establishment or campaign that appears to counter its regular anti-immigration, anti-Muslim rhetoric. This includes universities. Such articles include James Slack's 2011 piece, '40 UK universities are now breeding grounds for terror as hardline groups peddle hate on campus'.[27] The article strongly implies that universities were enablers of terrorism and the actual promoters of hate speech in British society. Universities have been quick to counter any such accusations made against them individually or collectively, and in 2015, following on from the launch of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, the Department for Education introduced specific 'Prevent' guidelines and requirements, to safeguard against any possibility of enabling terrorism on UK soil. Further revisions were made to this policy.[28] The *Daily Mail* did not pass comment on these measures.

Having examined a rise in hate crime in the UK in the wake of the EU Referendum, and the impact of media anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric, we will now turn our attention to the ways in which UK universities have responded to this rise in hate crime. First, we will examine the sector-wide analysis of the impact of hate crime on students in the UK, and what universities and students might do to tackle or prevent it on campuses and in society more widely. After this, we will explore the impact such assessments and guidance has had in real terms. (Section III will then posit ways in which universities could tackle both hate speech in society *and* in the media, and promote social cohesion and fact checking.)

2. Tackling Hate Crime in UK Universities: Calls for Change in 2016

Universities UK (UUK) is an advocacy organisation for universities in the United Kingdom. The president is now Julia Buckingham Janet Beer, the vice-chancellor of the University of

24   ee G. Bowden, 'The Body Shop Becomes Latest Company To Cut Ties With The Daily Mail Over 'Human Rights' Concerns: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ entry/body-shop-stops-advertising-in-thedailymail_ uk_58a5b563e4b037d17d2548a9.

25   *Aubrey Allegretti (15 September 2016). "Specsavers Apologises And Pulls Daily Express Advert After Customers' Revolt". Huffington post UK. Retrieved 4 November 2016.*

26   G. Adams, 'The real hatemongers…', *The Mail Online* (25 November 2017) available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/article-5115651/Stop-Funding-Hate-trying-gag-Britains-free-press.html [last accessed 29 August 2018].

27   J. Slack, '40 UK universities are now breeding grounds for terror as hardline groups peddle hate on campus' (which includes Brunel University), *Daily Mail*, 6 June 2011: https:// www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394625/40-UK-universities-breeding-grounds-terror.html [last accessed 18 August 2018].

28   HM Government, *Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and Wales* (2016); available at: https://assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445977/3799_Revised_Prevent_Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2-Interactive.pdf [last accessed 18 August 2018]. For reservations about this policy, see Henk Van Houtum and Rodrigo Bueno Lacy, cited below, n. 70.

Liverpool. Its mission is to support the work of universities and promote their interests, by providing information about best practice across the Higher Education sector. In 2015, the organisation set up a Taskforce to assess three key concerns: violence against women, harassment and hate crime affecting university students. The Taskforce met four times over a 12-month period, and considered a wealth of evidence presented by individual universities, the National Union of Students, and other organisations, such as Rape Crisis (https://rapecrisis.org.uk), Tell MAMA (https://tell-mamauk.org), the Union of Jewish Students (https://www.ujs.org.uk), and Stonewall (www.stonewall.org.uk). A findings report was issued in 2016, which presented recommendations on how to respond to and prevent these three key issues.[29] This section deals with the formation and recommendations of that report; 2.1 details their follow-on report about responses to and evidence for the implementation of these recommendations, one year later.

Chapter 1 of *Changing the Culture* situates the initiative within the 'UK Policy Context', and provides an 'Overview of the evidence considered by the UUK Taskforce'.[30] In a policy context, central to this inquiry was the UK government's own plan for tackling hate crime, *Action Against Hate*, which was released in July 2016, and updated in 2018.[31]

Crime and harassment as two key areas of concern for UK government policy. The UUK report also highlighted these concerns –along ith violence against women– as in need of assessment within universities, since '[u]niversities are a microcosm of society and therefore ffected by these same problems'.[32] UUK raised concerns about the lack of identification of student victims within governmental data but acknowledged its usefulness in revealing, for example, that London attacks frequently occur in areas of access to public transport and close to major thoroughfares. As such, it does provide universities with a variety of 'off campus' data, of which management could make students aware.

The UUK report raises a number of recommendations as to how universities can respond to harassment and hate crime (as well as acknowledging the intersectionality of hate crimes). These are, in the main, based on evidence presented by the above-named groups, as well as the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU), which examined student and staff experience within a university context. However, throughout the report, the recommendations frequently blur all three concerns (violence against women, harassment and hate crime), which can prove problematic, as we shall see. For example, the Executive Summary notes that the recommendations include: 'use of evidence-based bystander initiative programmes and facilitating a culture of zero tolerance. This activity will have knock-on benefits for wider society given the large numbers of students who progress through the UK's higher education system.'[33] The 'bystander nitiative' recommendation is inspired by research undertaken at the University of the West of England (UWE) in conjunction with Public Health England into violence against women.[34] As commendable as this is, the emphasis remains on violence against women, rather than all three concerns. This weighting, as we shall see, may inadvertently have had consequences for those in receipt of its observations and recommendations.

This merging of initiatives frequently emphasises sexual assault the primary concern, thereby developing more specific recommendations in this area, and reducing space given to the latter two categories. The length of dedicated analysis and discussion of violence against women is double that for harassment and hate crime combined.[35] Elsewhere, the

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[29]   Universities UK, *Changing the culture: Report of the Universities UK Taskforce examining violence against women, harassment and hate crime affecting university students* (October 2016); available at: https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2016/changing-the-culture.pdf [last accessed 2 October 2018].

[30]   HM Government, *Changing the Culture*, pp. 14-17 and 17-26 respectively.

[31]   HM Government, *Action Against Hate. The UK Government's Plan for Tackling Hate Crime* (July 2016); available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/543679/Action_Against_Hate_-_UK_Government_s_Plan_to_Tackle_Hate_Crime_2016.pdf [last accessed: 20 August 2018]. Their update – 'Two Years On' is available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748175/Hate_crime_refresh_2018_FINAL_WEB.PDF [last accessed: 21 August 2018].

[32]   HM Government, *Action Against Hate*, p. 17.

[33]   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture*, p. 5.

[34]   Fenton, R. A., Mott, H. L., McCartan, K. and Rumney, P. (2014). *The Intervention Initiative. Bristol: UWE and Public Health England*. Available at: www.uwe.ac.uk/bl/research/InterventionInitiative [last accessed 20 October 2018].

[35]   Chapter 4: 'Responding to Harassment and Hate Crime' is four pages in length; Chapter 5: 'Achieving a University-Wide Response to Incidents of Sexual Violence' covers eight pages. The same weighting is evidential throughout the whole of the report.

phraseology frequently elides harassment and hate crime: 'The Taskforce agreed at the outset that consideration should be given to addressing violence against women *as well as* harassment and hate crime.'[36] Similarly, the use of examples often only utilises findings in the first category: 'The evidence gathered by the Taskforce showed that some universities are already implementing high-level strategies to address violence against women, harassment and hate crime. One example is Durham University's Sexual Violence Taskforce…'[37] Overall, the report's conclusion is that universities need to take 'an institutionwide approach' to addressing all three areas of concern but the report itself gives primacy throughout to one of the three categories under scrutiny.[38]

For hate crime and harassment, the recommendations focus upon *recording* individual, distinct cases, since 'universities should be aware, and develop an understanding of, the intersectionality of incidents.'

> An incident of harassment or hate crime can be carried out on the basis of a number of different characteristics which a person presents, and the victim may feel attacked, offended or humiliated on the basis of any or all of these. These characteristics are also likely to interact and shape how a student victim responds to an incident of harassment or hate crime. It is therefore important to be aware and to respond to each incident and to each individual on the particular circumstances of the case. This can also have implications for how incidents are recorded. Recording systems therefore need to be effective enough so as to accurately capture the true nature of a particular incident. This will allow universities to monitor any trends that may indicate specific problems affecting their students.[39]

It is worth noting that for hate crime and harassment, the report focuses on the feelings of the student –the emotional response– rather than the fact that such attacks are criminal. This latent emphasis on feelings in these latter two categories concords with research undertaken by Jessica Gagnon. The recent increase in hate crime and (racially and religiously focused) harassment often receives different lex-

ical choices in official reports when describing student responses. In her examination of 'social construction of student activists and the limits of student engagement' Gagnon reveals the ways in which university responses to student concerns about nationalism and, in particular, the rise in hate crime after the EU Referendum, are often pushed to 'the edges of engagement' through constructs of emotion, rather than detailing their rights within the law or university policy.[40]

Changing the Culture was commissioned after the Conservative Party's manifesto declaration that an EU Referendum would take place but before it occurred. The report was issued roughly four months after the decision to Leave, and does accommodate the impact of the EU Referendum in one short section of Chapter 1, 'Setting the Scene: the Nature and Scale of the Problem' (section 53):

> Hate crime following the EU referendum
>
> The result of the UK referendum on membership of the European Union held in June 2016 coincided with an increase in the number of reported race hate crimes. The Metropolitan Police –the UK's largest police force– reported a rise in the number of incidents, with 599 race hate crimes reported between 24 June and 2 July 2016. This equates to an average of 67 reports a day, a rise of more than 50% on the previous average of 44. [n.52 in report] Nationally, figures for the days immediately following the referendum result suggested a 57% increase in reported incidents for the same days four weeks earlier. [n.53] Data published by the National Police Chiefs' Council in September 2016 showed a 49% rise in incidents in the last week in July when compared with the same week the previous year. The following week saw a 58% increase on last year to 1,787 recorded incidents. [n. 54] Following the result on 24 June 2016, the Muslim Council of Britain also compiled a dossier of reported racist and anti-Muslim incidents. The impact of this single event highlights the need for universities to be aware of, and responsive to, geopolitical events, and how particular student communities may be affected by them.

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[36]   [My emphasis.] P. 63.
[37]   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture*, p. 57.
[38]   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture*, p. 106.
[39]   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture*, p. 46.

[40]   J. Gagnon, 'Unreasonable rage, disobedient dissent: the social construction of student activists and the limits of student engagement' in *Learning and Teaching* 11 (2018): 82-108 (citation at 85).

n. 52: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/brexit-race-hate-crime-eu-referendum-met-policea7121401.html

n. 53: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/27/sadiq-khan-muslim-council-britain-warningof-post-brexit-racism

n. 54: http://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/tackling-hate-crime-remains-a-priority [news from the National Police Chief's Council]

It is interesting to note that notes 52 and 53 of the UUK report cite British broadsheet newspapers as their sources (*The Independent* and *The Guardian*), rather than any academic or governmental study. *The Guardian* is noted by Lecy, Aslan and Bironzo (cited above) as having been demonstrably pro-Remain during the lead up to and after the EU Referendum. Although not included in their study, *The Independent* is generally held to maintain editorials that align with the values espoused by *The Guardian*. By placing this information in a subsection it isolates this evidence for a rise in hate crime recommendations within the report, thereby making no recommendation as to how staff and students might guard against hate crimes motivated by the Leave result or, indeed, how to respond to them, or ways in which they might comprehend the motivating factors involved.

The report does include 14 Case Studies, which elucidate some of the initiatives undertaken to date in the UK, with one study (#3) considering evidence from the United States of America. Of these reports, nine deal with sexual assault, one on methodologies for tackling antisocial behaviour and discrimination in sport (#2), one identifying the benefits of working with police liaison officers (#8), and another on diversity and inclusion (#7). Case Study 7, the University of Manchester's online 'Report and Support' platform provides useful guidance on methodologies for reporting and reducing key antisocial behaviour, since 'everyone is responsible for ending bullying, harassment, sexual harassment and discrimination'.[41]

Case Study 6 is of particular interest to the parameters of this current essay. It is the only case study to make mention of the impact of information in the media. The study details Nottingham Trent University's 'Respect at NRU. Give it. Get it. Expect it.' This is a campaign created to launch the University's internal Dignity and Respect Policy. The Case Study details the rationale for the project:

> The policy sets out the university's commitment to an inclusive and positive environment and articulates the university's expectations regarding acceptable and unacceptable behaviours and the consequences of not adhering to the policy. It makes clear that all members of the NTU community are responsible for contributing to an environment free from unacceptable behaviours such as intimidation, harassment, bullying and victimisation. The policy applies to staff, students and visitors to the university.[42]

The policy was launched in 2015 and commenced with 'a multi-faceted communications strategy using social media, student newsletters and web pages, as well as communications from senior leadership.' This included: eNews to all staff, and 'student newsletter and web news articles'.[43] It is inferred that these web-based news articles refer to material released by the university, readily accessible on the internet; indeed: there are many such opportunities for accessing news about this initiative, providing clear guidance on policy and a positive response to an increasing problem with the UK.[44]

The main webpage for the initiative also provides access to clear guidelines on how to report a hate crime via the university or in combination with the Police.[45] It also provides straightforward access information for Student Support Services. The emphasis throughout is on the legal implications of such crimes, how to report an incident (as a witness or victim), and on support services for victims. Procedures for staff are also transparent. What we see here then a blended approach to prevention and response.

Having examined the aims and content of UUK's *Changing the Culture* initial report in 2016, published shortly after the EU Referendum, we will now consider the evidence for responses to their recommendations provided in their follow-up report. This report provides extensive analysis of the ways in which UK uni-

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41   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture*, p. 100.

42   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture*, pp. 98-99.

43   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture*, p. 99.

44   Nottingham Trent University, 'Respect at NTU. Give it. Get it. Expect it.': https://www4.ntu.ac.uk/equality-diversity-inclusion/policies-procedures/dignity-respect/index.html [last accessed 20 October 2018].

45   Nottingham Trent University, 'Practical support for students who have experienced a hate crime or incident': http://www4.ntu.ac.uk/student_services/individual_support/hate-crimes/index.html [last accessed 20 October 2018].

versities have responded to sexual misconduct, harassment and hate crime, during a period in which Article 50 was triggered, setting a two-year time period in which the UK and EU had to negotiate a deal (which was ultimately extended and enacted on 31 January 2020). During this period, it should be remembered, Brexit was front and centre in UK news media, and it is this period in which that increase in hate crimes was acknowledged, as detailed above.[46]

2.1. Universities UK follow-on report - 2017

Dame Janet Beer opens this follow-on report with her firm conviction that 'our universities have a significant role to play in driving cultural change to help combat the pernicious problem of harassment and violence in our society today.'[47] The Key Findings of the Executive Summary, however, report details that there remains much still to be done in responding to and preventing sexual misconduct, hate crime and harassment. The Executive Summary reveals how 'This study found elements of good practice in how providers are tackling sexual misconduct, hate crime and harassment, which others may find it helpful to know about and possibly learn from in developing their own approaches.' The report goes on to deliver a further set of recommendations, 'based on this good practice.'[48]

However, the Executive Summary also concedes that '[t]o date, the majority of higher education providers have focussed predominantly on tackling student sexual misconduct'.[49] The report elsewhere acknowledges this imbalance in more detail, which, for our present assessment of response and provision to tackle hate speech and its causes, is worth citing in full:

> Most higher education providers are focussed predominantly on preventing and responding to student-to-student sexual misconduct. A great deal of good emerging practice is evident in this area and UUK has been active both in its own well-received thought leadership in this area,

and in facilitating the sharing and dissemination of this emerging good practice across the sector. *Conversely, tackling hate incidents and crime and staff-to-student misconduct tend to have a lower priority, and policies and campaigns are less well-developed in these areas within most of the providers in this study –as is the data collected on these areas. A minority of providers plan to address either or both of these areas as a next stage* [my emphasis]. Other ongoing research and student campaigns on these areas are likely to continue raising awareness of these issues. *Both require further support and time to achieve the same step change and enhanced priority status within providers* [my emphasis] as that of student-to-student sexual misconduct.

'Student sexual misconduct has been the focus of our work which has been given special emphasis [since the publication of the Taskforce's report]. We do have processes for hate crime and harassment, we have always had these within equality statements'.– *Senior Sponsor: large, post-92 institution*

'Hate crime is the area lacking information on … there is an issue for students of not knowing where to report an incident to –is it the police or the university? There is also an issue of students from certain areas not coming forward… We need to create an environment where it is talked about.'– *Student President: large, post-92 institution*

'Student-to-student issues seem to be easier to deal with, I am only aware of anecdotal complaints against staff not of any detail.' – *Student President: large, research-intensive institution*

'We keep statistics on student misconduct, but we can't produce similar data on staff incidents…' – *Senior Manager: large, research-intensive institution*

Changing organisational culture takes time to become apparent and is difficult to measure. Higher education providers recognise that changes to policies and procedures must be backed up by addressing all the recommendations to achieve cultural change. However, many of the participants in this study have experienced considerable increases in the number of students disclosing recent or historic incidents of sexual misconduct. This is considered positively as evidence that students are more confident in coming forward due to the changes

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[46]   For a succinct explanation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which sets out the protocols for leaving the European Union, see Oliver, *Understanding Brexit*, pp. 136-37.

[47]   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On. An Assessment of strategies to tackle sexual misconduct, hate crime and harassment affecting university students* (March 2018); available at: https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2018/changing-the-culture-one-year-on.pdf [last accessed: 21 October 2018].

[48]   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, p. 10.

[49]   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, p. 7.

being made. There is some concern among larger institutions particularly of the need to have appropriate processes, procedures and staffing levels in place to support the potential sharp increase in the volume of disclosures.[50]

If effect, those responding to and summarising attempts at 'changing the culture' of hate speech within British society, have not prioritised it, have not given its consideration parity with sexual misconduct, and so concede that the 'culture' of hate rhetoric within UK society remains in need of further assessment and greater response – both from society as a whole and within the Higher Education system.

This is perhaps unsurprising. The initial report in effect prioritises addressing sexual misconduct through its presentational imbalance, and therefore could well have (unintentionally) precipitated such an imbalanced response.. The *One Year On* report does remain emphatic that the duty of care to students continues to demand that 'Higher education providers... ensure that their students have a safe environment in which they can live, work and study, and this applies whether they are physically on campus, in student accommodation, undertaking placements or overseas study, participating in sports or social activities away from campus, or studying online.'[51] This re-emphasis upon safety within and beyond campus is highly commendable but continues to fail in any detailed assessment of the root causes and locations pertinent to hate speech, hate crime, and harassment (in the parameters of this article: specifically crimes of anti-non-White-British, anti-non-English-Christian harassment and hate speech). As such, it is reactionary, rather than seeking preventative strategies in any comparable measure.

So if the emphasis is upon reacting to events that have occurred, what does it have to say about known increases in harassment and non-sexual crime during this period? Section 2.1.3 of the follow-on report ('The context since 2016') does provide some subtle indicators that the Taskforce are aware of particular types of inappropriate behaviours and crimes that have escalated since the EU Referendum but they are by no means explicit:

Since the publication of *Changing the culture* in 2016, UUK has developed a programme of work to support providers in implementing the recommendations. This includes promoting the recommendations at a range of external conferences, hosting its own annual conference and other events and developing resources to support, promote and disseminate innovative and good practice, including through a directory of case studies. In addition, UUK is supporting a range of specific initiatives, such as the provision of practical support on implementing the UUK/Pinsent Masons Guidance, and on tackling issues of staff-to-student sexual misconduct, *faith-based* [my emphasis] harassment and cyber-bullying. UUK has also developed a communications plan to promote a positive narrative about the role higher education providers are playing to prevent and respond to harassment in all its forms. The issues considered by the Taskforce's report continue to have a high profile due to extensive reports over the past year of gender-based violence and harassment within multiple sectors, particularly in sport, the entertainment industry and in public life, with consequent high levels of media coverage and public interest in this area. Higher education policymakers remain concerned about issues of sexual misconduct among students within the sector, and have also expressed their interest in better understanding issues associated with staff-to-student harassment. Additionally, there is a continued commitment to engage with race, religious and ethnicity-based harassment *alongside* [my emphasis] sexual harassment and gender-based violence. Other lobbying and campaign groups are also making an active contribution in this area.[52]

As emphasised above, The follow-on report turns 'harassment' into explicitly 'faith-based harassment', and notes that all forms of harassment should be addressed 'alongside' (presumably meaning with equal vigour) acts of 'gender-based violence' (which has now become more inclusive, and not solely reserved for violence against women).

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50 Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, pp. 22-23.
51 Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, p. 14.

52 Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, p. 16. 'UUK/Pinsent Guidance' refers to their joint document, *Guidance For Higher Education Institutions How To Handle Alleged Student Misconduct Which May Also Constitute A Criminal Offence* (October 2016); available at: https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2016/guidance-for-higher-education-institutions.pdf [last accessed 21 October 2018]. This document utilises the umbrella phraseology of 'violence against women, harassment and hate crime' throughout.

The report makes one explicit reference to 'Islamophobia', which is a quotation from a Students' Union Officer at a large post-1992 institution: 'It is hard to know what the issues are – we really don't know if there is Islamophobia or anti-Semitism on campus. We would like to know this.'[53] This example is grouped together with a Student Union Officer who reports an increase in disclosures, and a Student Support Officer, who raises concerns as to what happens with the data enclosed in disclosures. The specific point is not addressed, and there are no mentions ways in which to tackle a demonstrable increase in xenophobia, nationalism or specific incidents pertaining to the UK's rise in hate crime since the EU Referendum, despite the raising of this issue in the previous report. I would argue that this is a lost opportunity, to which I will return in Section 3.

The UUK follow-on report (in 'Governance') details 'how far advanced providers are in meeting the Taskforce's [2016] recommendations':

> However, only a small minority of providers in the sample report directly to the governing body on these aspects of student safeguarding. Project work in this area is often governed at a project specific level, rather than embedded in the existing governance structure of the institution, and in some instances, the working group or project team has been configured in an ad hoc way and is not part of formal governance structures. Often, the level of funding for additional resources is not high enough to require approval by the governing body. More commonly, the senior sponsor of the initiative or the chair of the working group will simply report on progress to a sub-committee of the governing body or of the academic board.[54]

These concerns over factors inhibiting any progress towards a tangible and meaningful change in culture also extend to 'Involving Students':

> Student voices tend to be collated through the design of campaign materials, performance as part of events, surveys in partnership with other institutions and internal surveys and focus groups comprising of participants with protected characteristics. There was little evidence

of the direct voices of victims/survivors of incidents of sexual misconduct and hate crime feeding into the development of preventative campaigns or new reporting and support arrangements, although most providers have established partnerships with expert referral organisations and the police and seek their advice. Many interviewees commented on the challenge of seeking the direct input of survivors into preventative and responsive approaches due to the highly sensitive nature of their experiences.[55]

This suggests that a nationwide strategy to examine the root causes and response mechanisms (for witnesses as well as victims) that could bring about real change through collaboration across university governance, in conjunction with the teaching staff and student body, remains a long way off. Was one year too quick a response time to witness any tangible improvement in tackling hate speech and crime?

To answer this question, it would be useful to compare Universities UK's follow-on report with that created by the UK government to its own 2016 report on tackling hate crime, not least because the UUK's report makes reference to it in its initial report. *The government's follow-on report, Action against Hate, took* longer to update its findings, releasing them in 2018, allowing two years for recommendations to be implemented (compared to just one year for UUK). The government's Hate Crime Action Plan attempted to tackle hate crime in society in response to the devastating impact 'on its victims, their families, communities and wider society'.[56] It was perceived to be so significant a problem within UK society, that it was assessed in isolation. Its follow-up report is part of an on-going strategy (in this instance, part of a four-year programme), which details five themes: 1) preventing hate crime by challenging beliefs and attitudes; 2) responding to hate crime within our communities; 3) increasing the reporting of hate crime; 4) improving support for victims of hate crime; and 5) building our understanding of hate crime.

The key phraseologies that distinguish this report from the tripartite approach taken by

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53   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, p. 38.
54   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, p. 28.
55   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, p. 30.
56   HM Government, Action Against Hate: The UK Government's plan for tackling hate crime – 'two years on' (September 2018); available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748175/Hate_crime_refresh_2018_FINAL_WEB.PDF [last accessed: 20 October 2018].

UUK is that the Hate Crime Action Plan explicitly details and provides for 'challenging beliefs and attitudes' and ways in which to understand what lies at the root of hate crime. As such, the 2018 *Action Against Hate* report details 'perpetrator motivations' for undertaking hate crime: Section 3.v seeks to raise the importance of understanding motivation as a means to responding to and preventing hate crime.[57] The UUK report and case studies discuss various crimes motivated by hate, without embedding the additional layer of inquiry into what motivates the hatred that is then acted upon. And this is the essential difference between the UUK approach and that of the Government: those representing the UK's research and teaching institutions do not propose undertaking research into the motivators of hate as a means by which they can better understand how to prevent or deal with it. Why might this be so?

I suggest that this swerve away from the source of such problems revolves around perceptions of 'Freedom of Speech' on campus and within wider society during and since 2016, the year of the EU Referendum, the election of Donald Trump, and the simultaneous mainstreaming of nationalist rhetoric. Previous events –such as those named above, including the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris– initiated a call to action by variance governance fora, including Universities UK, and articulating concerns about intolerance in the public sphere. In 2005, a collaboration was undertaken between Universities UK, the Equality Challenge Unit and SCOP (now known as GuildHE: www.guildhe.ac.uk), both of whom are involved in the *Changing the Culture* initiative.

Their ensuing report, *Promoting good relations: dealing with hate crimes and intolerance*,[58] tackles head on the role of universities in promoting citizens' rights and challenging hate speech within our communities. This report makes a crucial observation: 'by being places of debate universities are one of our most important pillars of civil society, and represent a safeguard against forces that divide and undermine society.'[59] It is these very forces –the motivators of hate speech and crime– which universities have a duty to examine and explain, not only to their student body and staff but to society more widely. After all, as detailed above, '[u]niversities are a microcosm of society and therefore affected by these same problems.'[60]

If universities are prepared to tackle and articulate the causes of hate speech, and not just the symptoms, the 'knock-on benefits for wider society' espoused in the 2016 report could rise exponentially.[61] Students educated in the reasons why hate speech happens have a better chance of tackling the root cause because they understand why people 'feel' disenfranchised, how they have been manipulated to fear and blame 'others' for their problems. And here we have two distinct levels of emotional response: those who have been misinformed and told untruths (or 'fake news') which have led them to hate others, and those whose racism has been engrained and established over a longer period, whose 'opinions' were merely reinforced by the rhetoric espoused by the likes of the Leave Campaign or the Trump administration.

We should not be helping students *respond* to hate speech *only*; we should seek means to empower them understand the available data and sources of mis- and dis-information, so that they can engage with others in ways that promote social cohesion, that assist their peers and their neighbours in (at the very least) comprehending the benefits of social cohesion, freedom of movement, and multiculturalism. I would argue that this initiative is what is lacking in the otherwise extensive and laudable reports *Changing the Culture* and *Changing the Culture: One Year On*. Change cannot truly be mastered if we do not identify, in particular, the online instigators of societal malady and provide people with access to skills and information by which they can address them proactively. We must seek and promote at the very least a meaningful, coordinated counternarrative, supported by demonstrable facts, before an individual or group acts on the hatred enflamed. Universities can play their part in this.

Until universities collectively respond to the outpouring of hate instigated by the rise and empowerment of nationalist rhetoric in the UK (known to have risen) since the EU Ref-

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[57] Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, pp. 19-20.
[58] Universities UK, *Promoting good campus relations: dealing with hate crimes and intolerance* (November 2005); available at: https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Pages/freedom-of-speech-on-campus.aspx [last accessed 22 October 2018].

[59] Universities UK, *Promoting good campus relations*, p. 11.
[60] See above, n. 31.
[61] See above, n. 32.

erendum, this societal problem will continue to haunt them. They must find a way to tackle head-on –in their own 'microcosm' communities– just why some people mistakenly correlate Freedom of Speech with the right to articulate hate. Until this is addressed, we risk continuing simply to wade at the shores of a sea of societal disfunctionality in Higher Education environments, as in society more widely. Blaming non-whites and 'foreigners' for the UK's problems *can* be articulated but Freedom of speech is not the freedom to articulate hate without consequences. Universities can empower students in prevention –both on campus and in their wider circles– if theytackle these bigger issues collectively.

Academic analysis of how such empowerment can be deployed does exist for the school sector. Building upon Held's 1997 theories of cosmopolitan democracy, by way of example, Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkey have developed the concept of 'cosmopolitan citizenship' to be taught in schools, as a means of 'strengthening democracy and enabling participation'.[62]

Universities UK have already issued an incisive report on Freedom of Speech on UK campuses in 2011. This report welcomes collaboration and engagement between universities and the Police, advocating for further 'liaison in respect of 'hate crime' recording between police, universities and local authorities.'[63] This same report looks back to the aforementioned 2005 UUK report into *Promoting good campus relations: dealing with hate crimes and intolerance*, and what research and work is yet to be undertaken to support inclusive rhetoric and action.[64] It is therefore perhaps surprising that the 2016 and 2017 reports into ways in which universities might change the culture surrounding violence against women, harassment and hate crime do not seek to build on their own, previous initiatives.

Changing the Culture.., One Year On does address the context for these three types of crime since 2016 (in Section 2.1.3). It does provide a useful summary of approaches to tackling all three issues across England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Whilst the report

itself does not make explicit reference to best practice in the three areas explored, it does provide an online link to a supplementary *Directory of Case Studies*.[65] This valuable directory details eight areas targeted for consideration:

–   Commitment from Senior Leadership and Ensuring an Institution-Wide Approach
–   Prevention of Incidents
–   Enabling an Effective Response: Reporting and Support Processes
–   Recording Incidents
–   Student and Staff Training
–   Effective External Relationships
–   Drawing on Good Practice
–   Online Harassment and Hate Crime

The 28 case studies provide tangible and important evidence of response and prevention strategies, which are outlined below in order to show the categories considered and the institutions involved. [66]

The full text of these case studies provides a wealth of detailed information about current practice in preventing and reporting violence against women, harassment and hate crime.

Sadly, the commissioned studies miss the opportunity to articulate and explore further the instigators of increased hate crime since 2016. None of them explore the ways in which hate for others is fuelled and magnified in an age of mass media –beyond its occurrence in social media. In this respect, Case Study 8 (Middlesex University– Awareness Raising and Toolkit) does acknowledge the role played by social media in disseminating positive responses which tackle hate crime and its impact. Section 3.8 ('Strategies for online harassment') in *Changing the Culture… One Year On* does provide comprehensive information on how to respond to such harassment in a university context.[67]

By comparison, the Government's *Action Against Hate* follow-up report (2018) details provision for greater understanding of the dangers posed by online platforms and by mis-

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62   A. Osler and H. Starkey, 'Extending the theory and practice of education for cosmopolitan citizenship' in *Educational Review* 70 (2018): 31-40 (citation at 32). See also D. Held, 'Globalization and Cosmopolitan Democracy' in *Peace Review* 9 (1997): 309-14.
63   Universities UK, *Freedom of speech on campus*, p. 20.
64   See above, n. 57.

65   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: Responding to Cases of Violence Against Women, Harassment and Hate Crime affecting University Studies. Directory of Case Studies* (July 2017); available at: https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2017/changing-the-culture-harassment-case-studies.pdf [last accessed: 21 October 2018].
66   Universities UK, *Directory of Case Studies*, pp.1-2 (Contents).
67   Universities UK, *Changing the Culture: One Year On*, pp. 44-45.

information spread via off- and online news sources. Their report emphasises the importance of '[c]hallenging prejudice in wider society, including the media' and declares their commitment to 'build[ing] our understanding of hate crime to ensure our policy can respond flexibly to challenges and concerns'.

These wider activities, aimed at challenging prejudice, include direct assessment of the UK's media as a source of misinformation and harbinger of hate-motivated crime:

> Given the media's role in influencing wider society, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will work with the Society of Editors, the Media Trust and the Independent Press Standards Organisation to update the 'Reporting Diversity' booklet. We will also continue our cooperation with the Independent Press Standards Organisation and the Cross Government Working Group to Tackle Anti-Muslim Hatred to devise training to help journalists have a better understanding of Islam. We aim to deliver these outputs by 2020.[68]

So how might universities undertake something comparable? The short answer is that extensive research on ways to tackle media complicity in the promotion of hate speech already exists, and could therefore be incorporated into studies, such as those undertaken by Universities UK. The following Section considers exempla of recent studies (some of which have come into print after the release of *Changing the Culture: One Year On*), and how they might assist future large-scale explorations of hate speech in UK society. It also explores the ramifications of what might be gained and what issues might arise by utilising such academic research in wider society and within student cohorts. Finally, it considers academic analysis of why we should be cautious of government initiatives to curb the airing of prejudicial views by English citizens in particular.

3. Educating the English – creating awareness of the root causes of hate speech and 'othering'.

So far we have explored only peripheral considerations of the concept of 'othering' and how it relates to hate speech and crime in a

UK context. 'Othering' is the term used for rhetorical strategies that seek to differentiate between one group who perceive themselves as superior to 'others', who are not like them. The technique is engaged as a means by which to oppress and discriminate against these 'other' groups. Usually this involves differentiating by race, nation, gender, culture, religion, or a combination of all of these characteristics. 'Othering' has existed in the 'media' of word and image since the rise of the European press in the late fifteenth century, and even earlier through manuscripts and visual and aural entertainments (such as drama and song). It is not a new phenomenon. Early modern studies proliferate with analysis of English promotion of 'othering' on the stage and page, and my own recent research has sought to draw parallels between early modern (from the period c. 1450-1750) and contemporary tactics to portray English Christian men and women as superior to any other race or creed.[69] The context may have changed but the rhetoric strategies and motivations resonate across the centuries.

So how do those who dislike –or *hate*– non-English races in a UK context define this hatred? What motivates or reinforces these opinions? Section I.2 (The Media and Hate Crime) above details proven correlations between 'othering' in the British Press, the Leave Campaign, and hate crime in British society. Elsewhere, academic study has considered the concept of White British as 'normal', other identities as 'abnormal', and the ways in which such rhetoric has fuelled hateful speech and action. Henk Van Houtom and Rodrigo Bueno Lacy's important study of the lexis of 'normality' clarifies this correlation – particularly within an English setting.[70] In their examination of the lexis of Brexit, Van Houtum and Bueno Lacy make an important observation: 'What is considered to be the norm and thus 'normal' is crucially dependent on the notion of normality and thus on the incompatability against which normality necessarily defines itself.'[71]

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[68]   HM Government, *Action Against Hate*, p. 12.

[69]   E. Evenden-Kenyon, 'Teaching European Early Modern Drama After the EU Referendum: the Impact of Brexit on Pedagogic Approach' in a Special Edition of *English: Journal of the English Association*, ed. Paul Frazer and Harriet Archer, vol. 68, Issue 261 (Summer 2019): 106-11.

[70]   H. Van Houton and R. Bueno Lacy, 'The political extreme as the new normal: the cases of Brexit, the French state of emergency and Dutch Islamophobia' in *Reflections: Extreme Geographies*, *Fennia* 195 (2017): 85-101.

[71]   Van Houton and Bueno Lacy, 'The political extreme', p. 87.

In an English context, they eviscerate the Leave Campaign's claims to be 'taking back control' of normal (read: White English) identity, values and borders as a 'curious blend of postcolonial grievance and imperial nostalgia':

The post-colonial grievance was recurrently evoked through the repetitive discourse of political emancipation. Nigel Farage – perhaps the UK's most famous exponent of xenophobia and Euroscepticism – and Boris Johnson – London's previous mayor turned prominent Eurosceptic – referred to the referendum's date as 'our independence day'.[72] This is an unexpected metaphor. Narratives of unjust oppression redressed through independence constitue the central trope of former colonies' national mythologies as well as the historical outrage fuelling decolonial theories.[73] Hence, it is surprising to find the same postcolonial grievances in the mainstream discourse of a country that is perhaps the epitome of European imperialism.[74]

One can see why citing such research might be 'problematic' for university Vice Chancellors in the present age of 'Research Excellence Framework'[75], 'Teaching Excellence Framework'[76], and

the recent introduction of the UK Government's Office for Students.[77] Governments do not like to be reminded of historic injustices – particularly in the wake of the recent Windrush Scandal.[78] But such research cuts to the heart of how and why 'othering' and hate speech occur. It also identifies those who are complicit in such rhetoric.

On the issue of Brexit as an instigator of increased xenophobia and Islamophobia, Van Houtum and Bueno Lacy also raise some uncomfortable truths that strike at the heart of UK academia's relationship with its Government:

The referendum was started by David Cameron, a liberal pro-EU Prime Minister who, by his own choice, decided to put the UK's EU membership to a referendum whose validity he did not even take the care of condition to either a representative voter turnout or a qualified majority. Cameron's promises to reduce immigration and to hold a referendum on the UK's permanence in the EU were his ways of appeasing populist xenophobes as well as Eurosceptics within his own party.[79]

Their assessment is both fearless and accurate. The Leave Campaign won by tapping into the grievances of a 'silent majority' – who resented multiculturalism – and gave them a voice through which to air their hostility towards non-White British citizens, immigrants, and, especially, Muslims, who are seen as having been allowed to infiltrate British borders. The irony is: the UK always has had control of its borders under Article 7 of the EU Citizen's Rights Directive, which enables member states to curb immigration; successive British governments have simply chosen not to enact it, and until now, UK universities have ultimately benefited from such decisions, at both a staff and student level.[80] The UK government has demonstrably continued to apply certain aspects

[72]   Here they cite: BBC News (24 June 2016), 'EU referendum: Farage declares "independence day"'; available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36613295 [last accessed 28 August 2018]; J. Stone, *The Independent* (21 June 2016), 'Boris Johnson says Thursday could become Britain's 'independence day''; available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-boris-johnson-independence-day-live-debate-bbc-vote-leave-brexit-remain-a7094531.htmp [last accessed 28 August 2018].

[73]   Here they cite: F. Fanon, *The wretched of the Earth* (Paris: La Découverte/Poch, 2017); W. Mignolo, *The darker side of the renaissance: literacy, territoriality, & colonization* (Ann Abor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

[74]   Van Houton and Bueno Lacy, 'The political extreme', p. 91.

[75]   The Research Excellence Framework is the successor to the Research Assessment Exercise (2008), and is an impact evaluation, which assess the research undertaken in British Higher Education institutions. The REF is undertaken by the four UK Higher Education funding bodies: Research England, the Scottish Funding Council, the Higher Education Council for Wales, and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland. See: https://www.ref.ac.uk/ [last accessed 22 October 2018].

[76]   'The Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes Framework' (TEF) has been introduced by the Government in England to recognise and encourage excellent teaching in universities and colleges.' HM Government, 'Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) – what you need to know': https://www.ucas.com/undergraduate/what-and-where-study/choosing-course/teaching-excellence-framework-tef-what-you-need-know [last accessed 22 October 2018]. See also HM Government, Office for Students, 'What is the TEF?': https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/advice-and-guidance/teaching/what-is-the-tef/ [last accessed 22 October 2018].

[77]   The Office for Students is a non-departmental public body of the Department for Education, and acts as the regulator and competition authority for the Higher Education sector in England. It was established by the Higher Education and Research Act in 2017, and came into existence on 1 January 2018. See: https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/about/ [last accessed 22 October 2018].

[78]   See *The Week* (2 November 2018), 'Who are the Windrush generation and how did the scandal unravel?': https://www.theweek.co.uk/92944/who-are-the-windrush-generation-and-why-are-they-facing-deportation [last accessed 4 November 2018].

[79]   Van Houtum and Bueno Lacy, 'The political extreme', p. 94.

[80]   See Directive 2004/38/EC, Article 7 – Right of Residence: www.eearegulations.co.uk/CitizensRightsDirective/By-Page/Article_07 [last accessed 4 November 2018].

of this rhetoric, particularly when referring to citizens from the other 27 EU states residing in the UK.[81] Since the policies towards EU nationals impact significantly on the UK Higher Education's own staff, it is little wonder that research into the lexis of government makes for challenging reading in certain quarters.

4. Conclusion

As I write this, the UK remains in what Mike Finn has usefully coined 'the Brexit moment': a juncture at which understanding the impact of English isolationism (past and present) affords opportunities for assessing how and what we research and teach, and for thinking about how students respond to, interpret, and contextualize political language and texts.[82] As such, I argue that there is an interior layer missing from the arguments detailed above, as to who can contribute to the tackling and prevention of hate speech in university settings. There is an (over?) emphasis on university management, welfare services, and students, which negates the extensive work being undertaken by and the resources available amongst the academics who actually teach and engage with students on a regular basis. In essence, some do not need to be commissioned per se; they are already doing this work.

Universities could and should look to their own and other Humanities and Social Science departments to assist in these initiatives by helping others understand the *causes* of hate speech, so that we can all better prevent and combat it – both on and off campus. As with the concept of cosmopolian citizenship posited by Osler and Starkkey (cited above), this 'Brexit moment' presents both the UK's government and universities with an opportunity: to add methodologies for understanding and debunking the rhetorical strategies of hate speech to the extensive (and otherwise impressive) series of case studies being undertaken– not least by Universities UK and the UK Government. In some instances, this requires self-analysis.

My own work advocates for a genuine exploration and partnership between teaching academics and students in a university setting. Great emphasis is laid upon the National Student Survey (NSS: https://www.thestudent-survey.com/) in English institutions because it has ramifications for institutional funding, and feedback from the Student Union is, of course, vital. Yet there remains space in the discussions about hate speech within society and within university communities for greater action in response to concerns raised by students. (The quoting but lack of specific response to student concerns raised above is a case in point.)[83]

Because much early modern English drama engages with a range of salient cultural and political tropes (othering and the language of empire), my recent pedagogic study scrutinised these tropes as useful vistas for classroom discussion and skill acquisition. English literary history became a means by which to facilitate student-led comprehension and discussion about recent political developments, not least the language of Brexit. More importantly, I addressed these issues within the university classroom precisely because students had raised these concerns; they wanted a means by which to explore these issues safely, to understand the root causes and longevity of such language, and to gain the transferrable skills by which to tackle hate speech whenever they encountered it.[84] Elsewhere, my research has examined faith demographics in the EU Referendum, the lexis of the Remain and Leave campaigns, and the demonising of 'others' in the UK press prior to and after 24 June 2016.[85] My research is therefore targeted at – and includes – both the academic and student community.

As such, these are just some examples of methodologies for targeting the root causes of hate speech in an English setting. (This research is explored in the pedagogic paper cited

81   N. Sigona, 'Theresa May's dog-whistle rhetoric on EU citizens jumping the queue…' ('University of Birmingham Research Perspectives'); available at: https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/theresa-mays-rhetoric-on-eu-citizens-jumping-the-queue-and-its-effects.aspx [last accessed 10 November 2018].

82   Mike Finn, *British Universities in the Brexit Moment. Political, Economic and Cultural Implications* (Bingley: Emerald Publishing, 2018).

83   See Section II.1.

84   Evenden-Kenyon, 'Teaching European Early Modern Drama After the EU Referendum', cited above, n. 68.

85   Elizabeth Evenden-Kenyon, 'Understanding voter faith demographics in the UK's EU Referendum and beyond': initial findings presented at *Faith in the Community* Conference, Rome, 22 November 2018. I am the UK Principal Investigator for the *Religious Communities in European Civil* Society Project, based at the Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft, Berlin. This report will be included in Volume II of the project's published output in 2019. See: https://www.uni-erfurt.de/forschung/forschungsprojekte/forschungsprojekte-religion/religious-communities-rc-and-civil-society-cs-in-europe/ [last accessed 4 November 2018].

above; the teaching was undertaken at Brunel University in London.[86]) Others have been discussed elsewhere in this article. Any deal brokered between the UK Government and the other 27 member states of the European Union puts the United Kingdom at risk of total devolution. Language matters. The concerns about a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland illustrates the risks involved.[87] Research that identifies any hint of inflammatory language in the Houses of Parliament based in London (as distinct from the National Assemblies) will inevitably prove to be challenging reading for any university or government departments intent on exposing such language at every level. But the practice of academia – and of governance – demands that we tackle the difficult questions, especially when they require introspection.

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[86] See above, n. 68. I am grateful to Jo Lakey, Research Manager at Brunel University's College of Business, Arts and Social Sciences, for confirming permission to publish details of my teaching at the College, and to my students for their willingness to discuss their studies and insights with me for this publication. (I am also grateful to my students for voting and awarding me College Lecturer of the Year, and University Lecturer of the Year, 2016-17, for my pedagogic and pastoral approach during our work together.)

[87] Gordon Anthony, 'Brexit and the Irish Border: Legal and Political Questions', *The Royal Irish Academy* and *The British Academy Brexit Discussion Policy Paper* (2017); available at: https://www.thebritishacademy. ac.uk/sites/default/files/BrexitandtheIrishBorderLegalandPoliticalQuestions_0.pdf [last accessed 4 November 2018].