Two Proposals to Argue about Rights

Abstract

It is common to invoke the language of rights to demand justice. However, resorting unreflexively to this language does not do good. In this article, I advance two arguments in favor of a more careful consideration of the notion of subjective rights. First, I rely on the distinction between the concept and the conception of a normative notion to specify the sort of investigation needed on the concept of rights and to point out the problems that overlooking it brings for practices of justice vindication. Second, I hold that to say that an individual or a collective has a right means that there are sufficient, albeit not absolute, reasons for someone to be charged to act in a way to contribute to the satisfaction of that right in a reasonable and defined way. This proposal of the concept of right is “independent” insofar as it allows the discussion of alternative conceptions of rights within a democratic society. It also articulates the idea that granting a right always involves considering the way in which duties and responsibilities are allocated within society and how its main institutions should work together