Epistemic injustice as a public-private emotion

Abstract

In this paper, we focus on the importance of epistemic injustices as public-private emotions in order to handle structural epistemic injustice. We start with Judith Shklar’s approach, who criticizes the traditional conceptualization centered on justice in which injustices occur as a failure of the model. We continue developing this perspective as we examine the question Miranda Fricker raises on epistemic injustice as structural injustice. We complement this conceptualisation with Sally Haslanger’s contributions. Then, following Sarah Ahmed’s approach, we focus on the social and at the same time individual dimension of emotions understood as social and cultural practices. From this approach, we highlight the epistemic value of emotions that are socially valued as negative, experienced mainly by marginalised bodies, whose knowledge has been historically undervalued by traditional epistemology. In this sense, we understand epistemic injustice as a public-private emotion. Finally, we add to this approach Raymond Williams’ proposal of the structures of feeling in order to deepen the structural character of emotions, specifically of epistemic injustice as a public-private emotions that emerge as epochal feeling.