


## Recognition and glory in Thomas Hobbes

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**Abstract.** The aim of this article is to problematize the relationship between the passion for glory and the dynamics of power in Hobbes. To this purpose, it examines how Hobbes presents the passion for glory, as a manifestation of the desire for recognition and superiority, constituting itself as a form of power acquisition. This connection highlights how glory transcends the desire for recognition, revealing itself as a fundamental driver for obtaining the appropriate means to establish security as a necessary guarantee for achieving a pleasant life. The hypothesis intended to be evidenced pertains to the idea that the attainment of a pleasant life is linked to the recognition of power exercised through the passion for glory, a necessary condition for achieving security. Thus, the passion for glory is presented not only as an element that amplifies conflict among men but also as a central component in the dynamics of power and recognition, which underpins that condition of security that encompasses the material and spiritual development of individuals.

**Keywords:** glory; honor; power; equality; recognition.

## Reconocimiento y gloria en Thomas Hobbes

**Resumen.** El objetivo de este artículo es problematizar la relación entre la pasión por la gloria y la dinámica del poder en Hobbes. Para ello, se examina cómo Hobbes presenta la pasión por la gloria, como una manifestación del deseo de reconocimiento y superioridad, constituyéndose como una forma de adquisición de poder. Esta conexión resalta cómo la gloria trasciende el deseo de reconocimiento, revelándose como un motor fundamental para obtener los medios apropiados para establecer la seguridad como una garantía necesaria para alcanzar una vida placentera. La hipótesis que se pretende evidenciar se refiere a la idea de que la consecución de una vida placentera está vinculada al reconocimiento del poder ejercido a través de la pasión por la gloria, una condición necesaria para lograr la seguridad. Así, la pasión por la gloria se presenta no solo como un elemento que amplifica el conflicto entre los hombres, sino también como un componente central en la dinámica del poder y el reconocimiento, que sustenta esa condición de seguridad que abarca el desarrollo material y espiritual de los individuos.

**Palabras clave:** gloria; honor; poder; igualdad; reconocimiento.

**Summary:** Glory, honor and value. Recognition, honor and power. Security and comfort give life. Conclusion.

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In *Leviathan*, Hobbes asserts that the potential hostility of the state of nature originates from three elements inherent to human nature: "competition, diffidence, and glory" (Hobbes, 1651/1968, p. 185). The first source of conflict emerging from human nature is competition, which drives men to assault one another in pursuit of gain. In turn, competition prompts the use of violence to dominate as many men as possible, subjugating them until no threat remains to each individual's power.

Diffidence, the second cause of conflict among men, results from the desire to ensure safety and secure means of defense. This diffidence leads men to develop strategies of attack and defense designed to address unfavorable future scenarios. From Hobbes's perspective, these strategies aim not only to preserve life by accumulating goods and power in the present but also to guarantee the acquisition of wealth and influence in the future.

Lastly, the third cause of conflict arises from the desire for glory, stemming from human passions.<sup>1</sup> The passion for glory is directly linked to the desire for recognition, which, by highlighting differences among men, disrupts natural equality and provides one man an advantage over others.<sup>2</sup> As Gary explains, "when one man's ability is acknowledged by another, that man places himself in a position of distinction relative to others" (1976, p. 273). Thus, glory establishes a point of distinction in which a man, by his difference, rises above what is common among others. In this context, a man may consolidate his reputation and use it as a means of subjugation, ensuring that the image ascribed to him supports his capacity to bring others under his power.<sup>3</sup>

Hobbes emphasizes that glory carries a distinct connotation from the concept of honor, as the latter is determined by one man's opinion of another's value. While glory is presented as the pleasure a man takes in perceiving that his own value is recognized, Hobbes defines "honor as the worth attributed to a man by others" (Hobbes, 1651/1968, p. 152). In *De Cive*, the concept of recognition is directly related to honor since "properly speaking, HONOUR (Honor) is nothing other than the opinion one has of the union of power and goodness in another person" (Hobbes, 1642/1998, p. 175).

This involves external recognition, a form of validation reflecting a man's perceived value in relation to another. The attainment of honor requires mutual acknowledgment among men, that is, the acceptance of one man's superiority or capability over another through the acquisition of power.

Nevertheless, while honor consists of this external recognition of a man's power, glory is constituted by the internal experience and pleasure derived from that recognition. Both honor and glory are passions that complement and converge through the elements of recognition and power, yet they differ in how they affect individuals. While honor reflects the value others attribute to a man, glory is the subjective satisfaction that arises when men perceive that this value is acknowledged and appreciated.

This article examines the passion for glory within the context of the grammar of power outlined in Hobbes's major works on moral and political philosophy. It seeks to demonstrate how the passion for glory, as an expression of the desire for recognition and superiority, constitutes a form of power acquisition, illustrating an intrinsic relationship between the pursuit of glory and the quest for recognition. This connection highlights how glory transcends mere recognition, emerging as a motive for attaining power and security in the state of nature.

The hypothesis to be evidenced pertains to the idea that achieving a pleasant life is tied to the recognition of power exercised by the passion for glory, which is a necessary condition for attaining security by overcoming the imminent conflict among men in the state of nature. Thus, the passion for glory is presented not only as a potential element of conflict among men but also as a central aspect of the dynamics of power and recognition that underpin the security condition necessary for men to "as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly[...]" (Hobbes, 1651/1968, p. 227). If, for Hobbes, glory is understood as a condition that promotes conflict by disrupting natural equality through the pursuit of superiority and recognition, it follows that such conflict is not limited to mere self-preservation. Instead, it reveals the human desire for a quality of life superior to that of others, underscoring an aspiration for power and superiority.

The initial focus is on the relationship between glory, honor, and value, grounded in Hobbes's understanding of superiority and recognition. The aim is to show that the passion for glory is intrinsically connected to Hobbes's conception of power, which is situated within a context of conflict and rivalry among individuals. To this end, the passion for glory is discussed as a human trait reflecting the effects of honor, evident in the way individuals establish comparisons and precedence over one another. Consequently, it is highlighted that the desire for precedence redefines the terms of power acquisition, as such power is measured as a value.

Subsequently, the concept of recognition of power or honor in Hobbes's perspective is problematized, being intrinsically tied to the idea of competition for power. The terms of natural equality are thus discussed, highlighting the tension caused by the ninth law of nature, which stipulates that all men must recognize others as equals in dignity and right. This involves examining why the passion for glory, tied to the recognition of power, reveals the human quest to transcend mere survival toward security. This security, beyond ensuring peaceful coexistence, constitutes the essential principle by which the commonwealth is established and instituted: *Salus Populi*.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, it is analyzed how the passion for glory, although it may intensify conflicts, transcends mere self-preservation and manifests the human desire to achieve recognition and comfort. In this sense, it is crucial to highlight that this dynamic demonstrates the centrality of security as the foundation for peaceful

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that competition and distrust are elements of reason.

<sup>2</sup> This finding shows that natural equality is insufficient to neutralize the differences perceived or imposed between men. The search for glory, associated with the desire for recognition and superiority, exacerbates these differences by transforming natural equality into a field of competition, where each person seeks to assert themselves as more capable or more worthy of respect..

<sup>3</sup> The pursuit of honor leads to the pursuit of external recognition, while the pursuit of glory implies an internal motivation that originates from the very perception of being recognized.

<sup>4</sup> What I intend to highlight is that the *Salus Populi* is not only about the physical safety of men, but also the general well-being of society, ensuring order, justice and prosperity.

coexistence and the material and spiritual development of individuals. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss how the sovereign should ensure security and promote conditions that allow citizens to preserve their lives with dignity, enjoying the freedom to exercise private rights guaranteed by the silence of the law.

### Glory, honor and value

In Chapter IX of *The Elements*, Hobbes asserts that the passion of glory consists “...is that passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the power of him that contendeth with us” (Hobbes, 1640/1928, p. 28). In this statement, the relationship between the passion of glory and the excess of one man's power over others becomes evident. From this perspective, the excess of power of one man over another not only signifies an advantage but also a means of asserting his superiority, accompanied by the satisfaction that this superiority promotes. Thus, it serves as an argumentative device through which Hobbes demonstrates the signs of superiority or preeminence of one man over another. Therefore, the signs that express glory, such as ostentation in words and insolence in actions, reflect a search for recognition and superiority through excess power.

In *De Cive* (1642/1998), Hobbes defines glory as a mental pleasure arising from a good opinion of oneself, distinguishing it from sensual pleasures, which are related to the senses and worldly conveniences. Everything considered good generates pleasure, whether in the sensory or intellectual realm, but ultimately, the pleasures of the mind tend to refer to glory. Thus, the pursuit of glory emerges as a central impulse in human nature, guiding actions and desires toward recognition and superiority.

Moreover, the comparative superiority among men, through the assertion of power, confirms the intrinsic need for recognition.<sup>5</sup> It is not simply about accumulating power due to superior abilities but about seeking recognition by which men strive to subjugate one another. According to Limongi, “we need the other to assert superiority over him” (2009, p. 92). Thus, the recognition of one man's power over another highlights the effects of honor, because, according to Hobbes: “to honour a man (inwardly in the mind) is to conceive or acknowledge, that that man hath the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth himself” (Hobbes, 1640/1928, p. 26).<sup>6</sup>

Honor, as an external evaluation, depends on one man's judgment of another and on how excess power is used. This statement highlights how Hobbes views value as something subjective and relational, not derived from an intrinsic essence of men, but from the perceived utility in power or the ability to achieve certain ends. However, the value or relevance of a man is linked to his price, that is, the quality attributed to him, evaluated and recognized by another. For Hobbes, the value of a man depends on an external appreciation, determined not by an intrinsic quality but by the value others assign him based on his perceived utility or power.

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes connects the concept of value with price: “The *Value*, or *WORTH* of man, is as of all other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power [...]” (1651/1968, p. 151). This association reveals a perspective in which the value of a man is not determined solely by his capacity to produce power but by how he uses it to meet the needs of others. The attribution of value transcends the intrinsic ability or power of the person to whom value is attributed, being shaped by the position, needs, and specific relationship the evaluator establishes with that power.

According to Hobbes: “The manifestation of the *VALUE* we set on one another, is that which is commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring” (1651/1968, p. 152). Honor is defined by the demonstration of recognition of value. This recognition functions as a mechanism of submission to a superior power, ensuring that the one who honors or glorifies does not become an obstacle to the judgment of other men regarding the use of excess power. As an instance of passion, glory translates the effects of honor through the comparison and precedence that men establish between each other.

From Hobbes's perspective, the value of a man is determined by how his power is estimated by others. However, this power requires the manifestation of honor, that is, the concrete expression of value by the one who claims it. Only through this manifestation can others recognize and legitimize it. In these terms, the manifestation of honor reveals that value corresponds to power, as the demonstration of power is how men make themselves honored. According to Limongi: “Thus, it is the very nature of power that changes. It ceases to be a set of effective qualities evaluated from its manifest signs, and becomes confused with these signs, by which it is exercised and progresses” (2009, p. 115).

Considering this, the relations of honor and value highlight a dynamic of power, in which the acquisition of reputation and honor is demonstrated by the progressive increase of power. This increase, in turn, reflects the desire for recognition, signaling an imminent contest, as the recognition of one man is determined by the conception of competition or acquisition of power. According to Hobbes, in *Leviathan*: “*Naturall Power*, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind [...]” (1651/1968, p. 150). The experience of power, that is, glory, consists of the excess of one man's power over others.

In Chapter X of *Leviathan*, Hobbes defines power: “The *POWER* of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good” (1651/1968, p. 150). In this conception, the possession of power means having the capacity to be the cause of actions that contribute to achieving what is considered a good. For Hobbes, such a good is something beneficial for the preservation or satisfaction of desires, representing a future benefit. However, under conditions where power is strictly finite, no limited degree of

<sup>5</sup> Power ceases to be merely a survival tool and becomes a symbol of status, conditioning human relationships to the relentless pursuit of validation and superiority.

<sup>6</sup> According to Slomp, it is a “social validation that confers legitimacy to the exercised power” 2007, p. 185).

power can guarantee the perpetuation of a body's movement, except by the uninterrupted desire to possess ever-increasing power.

The incessant accumulation of power is, therefore, a necessary condition for the preservation of life. For Hobbes, this is a rational condition, as maintaining force solely for defense provides only a temporary guarantee. Thus, the characterization of human nature according to Hobbes becomes evident, as that which is capable of representing ends for its actions, calculating the most appropriate means to achieve what it considers to be the good, that is, the maintenance of honor and glory in relation to other men.

### Recognition, honor and power

As previously expressed, from Hobbes' perspective, the conception of recognition of power or honor is linked to the idea of competition for power. As evidenced, the pursuit of recognition is essentially a pursuit of the recognition of power and, consequently, glory. This process becomes more complex in a context that Gary describes as "radical natural egalitarianism," in which men, driven by common goals of recognition and power, perceive others as potential threats –present or future– to their own interests in acquiring power and glory (Gary, 1976, p. 278).

Hobbes formulates the argument of natural equality based on an analytical resource that challenges appearances and senses, showing that, despite apparent differences, men possess a fundamental equality of faculties (such as strength, intelligence, and sagacity). This natural equality implies that no man can completely dominate another, for even the weakest, using intelligence and establishing strategic alliances, can overcome the strongest. Thus, Hobbes leads natural equality to its ultimate consequences, identifying two central aspects that underpin an equality of rights.

The first form is the equality of capacities, supported by experience. Despite individual variations in strength or intellect, these differences do not nullify the general capacity of men to achieve similar objectives. Experience demonstrates that the weaker man can overcome the stronger through strategies, alliances, and cunning, reaffirming natural equality as a valid principle, though not absolute. On the other hand, the second form is the equality of expectations regarding the satisfaction of desires. This equality stems directly from the equality of capacities, as individuals, considering themselves equally capable, also believe they are equally able to achieve their objectives. However, this equality of expectations is a source of conflict because the desired resources or objects often cannot be shared, resulting in direct competition. In this scenario, the impossibility of dividing or jointly using goods leads to subjugation or mutual destruction as a solution to the impasse.

In the state of nature, natural equality, characterized by the equivalence of capacities, establishes a precarious balance in which no man can completely dominate another. However, individual ambitions for glory and recognition symbolically break this equality. According to Slomp, "the quest for superiority and recognition not only intensifies rivalries but also perpetuates mutual insecurity, exacerbating the state of war of all against all" (Slomp, 2007, p. 188). Instead of pacifying tensions, natural equality amplifies conflicts, as incessant competition and the perception of mutual threat reinforce the desire for superiority and recognition among men. In these terms, according to Hobbes: "[...] by introducing that restriction upon themselves under which we see them live in states, it is the care for their own preservation and for a more satisfied life" (Hobbes, 1651/1968, p. 223).

In *De Cive* (1642/1998), Hobbes argues that this situation leads to the need for a common power to regulate human relations. This equality leads to uncertainty about one's own safety, since no one can expect protection from others or guarantee their own. This state of uncertainty generates a continuous conflict in which men, driven by fear and the desire for self-protection, are led to act preventively against others. This mechanism of preventive aggression, characteristic of the state of nature, reinforces the need for a common power that imposes limits on individual action and ensures the stability of human relations.

This tension is deeply influenced by the ninth law of nature, which dictates that all men must recognize others as equals in dignity and rights. As Kavka points out, "this law seeks to mitigate the conflicts of the state of nature, where natural equality, by allowing all men to harm each other, generates mutual insecurity and constant rivalries" (Kavka, 1983, p. 295). In this context, the recognition of another's power plays an ambivalent role: on one hand, it can exacerbate disputes by implying distinctions that violate equality; on the other, it can function as a mechanism of mediation, leading men to accept the authority of a sovereign who centralizes and neutralizes these disputes.

Nevertheless, natural equality, while generating tensions, also provides the foundation for peace and security among men. It is the recognition of the inherent contradictions in the pursuit of power and glory, combined with the recognition of natural equality, that justifies the need for a mutual agreement among men. This mutual agreement introduces a necessary restriction to overcome the state of war produced by the incessant pursuit of glory and recognition, as Hobbes aptly states: "[...] that restriction upon them under which we see them live in states, namely, the care for their own preservation and for a satisfied life" (Hobbes, 1651/1968, p. 223).

Regarding this matter, Kavka (1983) states:

It should be observed that if men are equal in capacity and hope, they must also be equal in fear, especially the fear of violent death at the hands of others. The equality of men as potential agents of violent death determines the equality of all as potential victims of violent death. Now, since self-preservation is a basic human end, the requirement of anticipation through force and cunning arises. It is through



force and cunning that one can confront a state where the threat of violent death at the hands of others is always present (p. 283).

This equality, according to fear, shows that, in the face of widespread distrust and the constant fear of being attacked at any moment, the best strategy for men to ensure their own preservation, according to Hobbes, is to anticipate the consequences. In this context, men seek to subjugate others to prevent them from becoming future threats. Anticipation, therefore, is not merely a strategic choice but a demand imposed by the necessity of preserving life.

However, the absence of a common power results in a profound displeasure with the company of other men. This displeasure does not arise from mere dissatisfaction with the presence of others but from the discomfort caused by the situation of widespread distrust. Thus, the state of nature is marked by a constant danger of imminent attacks, fueled by competition, distrust, and the quest for glory. It is, therefore, according to Hobbes, a situation in which the lives of men are “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (1651/1968, p. 186).

From this analysis, the following premises and conclusion derive: (1) If, for Hobbes, all men are finite and rational, constituted by vital and voluntary movements, which leads them to necessarily and rationally seek all the adequate means to preserve themselves in movement –that is, to remain alive and preserve their identity as finite and rational beings– and if, for this, they need to continuously increase their power to the point of triggering an unsustainable and contradictory situation to the preservation of life, as occurs in the state of war; (2) Then, it is rational to conclude that men must restrict or limit their natural liberty and their right to do whatever they deem appropriate to preserve their lives, proceeding according to the dictates of reason.

This rationality leads them to transfer their natural liberty and natural right to a common power strong enough to ensure the security desired by all and, with it, guarantee a pleasant life. In Slomp's perspective, “The passion for glory, intertwined with the recognition of power, thus reflects the human inclination to transcend basic survival needs and achieve a state of security” (2007, p. 190). Security, in this sense, is not merely a condition for peaceful coexistence among men, but a fundamental principle that sustains the very structure of the society forged by Hobbes: “*Salus Populi*” (“the people safety”) is the fundamental goal of establishing an “irresistible authority,” as Hobbes states in *Leviathan* (1651/1968, p. 81).

## Security and comfort give life

In *De Cive*, Hobbes asserts that human associations do not originate from love or consideration for others, but from the opposite: “All Society, therefore, exists for the sake either of advantage or for glory, i.e. it is a product of love of self no of love of friends” (1642/1998, p. 24). This perspective highlights the motivational artifice and self-interest of humans in preserving life. Thus, the association between men arises as a direct consequence of the need for self-preservation, evidencing an essentially self-interested stance aimed at achieving a pleasurable life. In other words, the actions of men are motivated by reasons that allow each individual to act based on the personal benefit they expect to gain from their actions.

The perspective of self-interest reveals humans' concern for their continued well-being, establishing the necessary and sufficient foundation for human action within Hobbes's philosophical and political project, according to Gauthier (1965). Thus, the selfish orientation of men presupposes a conception of reason in Hobbes related to the possibility of increasing individual well-being. In this sense, reason plays a fundamental role in the context of self-interest, functioning as a disposition that promotes self-preservation by suggesting rules that indicate the most effective means for the development of human potential.

In the context of the discussion on the establishment of the contract –both in *De Cive*, *Leviathan*, and *The Elements*– this aligns with the argument of psychological egoism, since both the contract and the law of nature aim to protect life and ensure the security necessary to achieve a good life. The difference between self-interested agreements and the contract lies in the fact that the “bargaining benefits” are sufficient to motivate the parties to fulfill what was agreed upon (Gauthier, 1979, p. 23).

According to Hobbes, in *De Cive*, no society can be great or lasting if it is founded on the vanity of glory, because glory, like honor, exists only in comparison and precedence. Thus, “the reason is that glorying, like honour, is nothing if everybody has it, since it consists in comparison and preeminence ...”, for each man has no value in his own right, independently of the recognition of others (Hobbes, 1642/1998, p. 24). Although mutual cooperation significantly increases the benefits of life, these benefits are often achieved more easily through domination than through association. Thus, it is hard to deny that if fear were eliminated, human nature would tend much more towards the pursuit of power than the building of societies (1642/1998).<sup>7</sup>

In these terms, glory is understood as an element that intensifies conflict, breaking the natural equality among men. Therefore, this conflict is not limited to the mere effort of preserving life, but reflects the human desire for a quality of life that distinguishes them from others. The desire for glory, as presented in the argument, plays an ambivalent role in the formation of the State. On one hand, it intensifies conflict among individuals, since it is not merely about self-preservation but also the pursuit of distinction and superiority, which fuels rivalries. On the other hand, this same desire, by generating a state of constant insecurity, ultimately reinforces the need for a sovereign authority capable of guaranteeing protection and stability.

<sup>7</sup> Although it is not part of the central discussion, it is worth highlighting that a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of glory can consider the distinction between potencies (power as an individual capacity) and *potestas* (institutionalized power). This relationship indicates that the search for glory is not restricted to a subjective characteristic, but is also realized in institutional structures and in the material exercise of political power.

Contrary to Cooper (2018), it is argued that the formation of the Hobbesian State has, among its objectives, the limitation of the desire for glory – a human impulse that often fuels conflict and instability.<sup>8</sup> In this context, the pursuit of glory reflects a dimension of human passions that goes beyond mere self-preservation, revealing a yearning for distinction and recognition. Hobbes suggests that this passion represents an advancement in his argument, for men do not seek only security but also conditions that allow them to fully enjoy life.

Thus, it is established that the goal of all vital and voluntary movement is not only the maintenance of life, but, as Ribeiro observes: Men do not want just to live – but also to have hope and comfort; and, once homicide and hunger are removed, their desire expands, aiming for more and more (1984, p. 114). However, among the objects that each man considers suitable for preserving life, some may be considered valid for this purpose and others not, that is, some are desired and others are not. Those desired objects, toward which human desire is directed, must therefore satisfy vital needs.

This argument strengthens the thesis that, while Hobbes recognizes the desire for glory may generate conflict, he also suggests that the pursuit of recognition and status is an inherent feature of human nature that does not vanish with the institution of the State. On the contrary, the Hobbesian State does not eliminate this passion but rather redirects it into forms of expression compatible with the recognition necessary for a good life.

According to Gauthier, “action [human action] is directed toward those objects whose effects intensify vital motion, and away from those whose effects hinder this motion” (1979, p. 23). Thus, desire is configured in human nature as the primary means of preserving life, being the force that rejects or pushes away anything that could be considered a threat to its preservation (p. 7). However, every desire has a final object, whose representation is considered as good. Therefore, if all human movement is mediated by representation, and since all movement of finite natural bodies tends toward the preservation of life, then every human movement aims at an object represented as a good.

The object whose representation is a good is that which each man judges suitable for the maintenance of his ultimate good. Thus, the fundamental objective of sovereignty is to establish the protection and security necessary for the comfort of life, with the sovereign responsible for fostering such conditions with the fewest laws possible.

For Hobbes (1651/1968):

The Final Cause, End, or Desire of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in Comon-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby [...] (p. 223).

Thus, the design of men consists in seeking a quality of life that allows them to enjoy existence without the constant fear of violent death. Although men naturally love freedom and dominion over others, this inclination is motivated by the need for survival and a pleasant life in a State that, without authority, would be marked by violence and insecurity. Security, according to Hobbes, should not be understood merely as the preservation of life in any condition, but as the guarantee of minimum comfort and dignity.

The commonwealth's effort to distribute power or authority among its constituent parts materializes in individual guarantees that ensure the necessary conditions for each man to preserve his life in the most appropriate and dignified way possible. These guarantees correspond to the civil liberty that each subject or citizen holds in relation to actions not regulated by civil law, such as “the liberty to buy and sell, or otherwise make mutual contracts; to choose one's residence, food, profession, and educate one's children as one sees fit, and similar things” (Hobbes, 1651/1968, p. 264). Regarding this, Strauss comments: “The State has the function, not of producing or promoting a virtuous life, but of safeguarding each individual's natural right” (1965, pp. 165-166).

The most significant aspect of this conception is that, in the context of Hobbes's political theory, the pair security/liberty gives rise to the configuration of a new model of man: the citizen. The citizen contrasts with the natural man, for while the former represents the realization of individuality and private life, safeguarded by a legal apparatus that favors the development of human potential, the latter reflects an intolerable condition in which these potentials are blocked by the incessant struggle for power.<sup>9</sup> The protected citizen, in turn, concretizes the typical relationships of a society oriented toward the common good, progress, and the improvement of living conditions.<sup>10</sup>

## Conclusion

<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the attempt to link Hobbes to the natural law tradition may downplay the innovative and disruptive aspects of his political philosophy. Unlike classical natural law theorists such as Aquinas and Grotius, Hobbes does not ground political order in a teleological conception of human nature, but rather in the necessity of an absolute sovereign to guarantee peace. Thus, by emphasizing the continuity between Hobbes and the natural law tradition, Cooper (2018) may be softening the radical character of the Hobbesian rupture – particularly regarding the relationship between power, obedience, and human passions.

<sup>9</sup> Authors such as Pettit (2008), Gert (2010) and Altini (2015) explore how Hobbes relates power and glory to material and institutional structures. Pettit, for example, highlights how Hobbes's conception of freedom is linked to political and institutional power, which implies that social recognition is not the only determining factor in obtaining glory. Altini investigates the connections between power, sovereignty and human nature in Hobbes, showing how the desire for glory is linked to self-preservation and the need for domination.

<sup>10</sup> According to Mattos Da Silva: “Regarding the absence of security, the natural condition of humanity encompasses the predominance of an unbridled pursuit of power, driven by individual passions and needs, without, however, consideration for others. This determination, therefore, exposes the rise of violent death imposed on individuals by widespread insecurity, leading to a belligerent condition opposed to peace and, consequently, to a fully satisfied life” (2023, p. 115).

Hobbes's analysis of the state of nature reveals that human conflict arises not solely from a desire for self-preservation, but from deeper passions –competition, diffidence, and glory– that shape the dynamics of power and recognition. The passion for glory, in particular, emerges as a key driver of human behavior, surpassing mere survival instincts and reflecting a deep-seated desire for superiority and acknowledgment from others. This drive for recognition disrupts natural equality, creating tensions and competition among individuals. However, this very passion, while fostering conflict, also points toward the fundamental human quest for security and a higher quality of life, which transcends the primitive struggle for survival.

As Hobbes suggests, achieving a peaceful and stable society –where individuals can live securely and contentedly– requires the establishment of a sovereign authority capable of maintaining order and safeguarding the recognition of individuals' rights. The sovereign, in Hobbes's view, must possess absolute power to ensure the preservation of peace and the prevention of civil war. Without such authority, individuals would remain locked in a constant struggle for recognition, driven by their passions, leaving them vulnerable to violence and insecurity.

Ultimately, the passion for glory underscores the intricate relationship between power, recognition, and security, highlighting the centrality of a well-organized commonwealth in ensuring both the material and spiritual well-being of its citizens. The establishment of a sovereign power thus becomes essential not only for the protection of life and property but also for the creation of a social order where individuals can achieve their aspirations, secure their dignity, and contribute to the common good. In this way, Hobbes's theory offers a profound insight into the human condition and the necessity of political authority in the pursuit of peace and prosperity.

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