Transcendental Freedom and its Discontents

  • Array Array Durham University
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Palavras-chave: Kant, Freedom, Transcendental Idealism

Resumo

This introduction briefly lays out the basics of Kant’s concept, transcendental freedom, and some of its discontents. It also provides an overview of the dossier itself, introducing Katerina Deligiorgi’s discussion of ought-implies-can, Patrick Frierson’s account of degrees of responsibility, and Jeanine Grenberg’s treatment of the third-person.

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Publicado
2018-12-18
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