Kant’s Conception of Conscience

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Array Array Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russian Federation Istanbul Esenyurt University, Turkey

Parole chiave: Immanuel Kant, moral judgment, conscience, moral anthropology, practical philosophy

Abstract

In this paper I provide a detailed account of Kant’s conception of conscience in order to answer a significant question that has recently arisen in the secondary literature: How should we understand Kant’s insistence on the infallibility of conscience? Some commentators have tried to make sense of the claim by suggesting that conscience is a special kind of moral judgment, while others have argued that it is a kind of feeling. My contention is that neither option is helpful in comprehending why and how Kant develops his ideas about conscience in this specific and peculiar way. I argue that the appropriate way to understand this conception is to establish its broader significance for Kant’s moral philosophy, together with his understanding of human moral agency.

Biografia autore

Array Array, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russian Federation Istanbul Esenyurt University, Turkey

Umut Eldem’s research interests are Kant, Heidegger, moral and political philosophy. This research was supported by the Russian Academic Excellence Project at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, Russia. I would like to thank the referee for his/her recommendations.

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