Life in Kant

Abstract

This study articulates the Kantian understanding of the concept of life through a transversal investigation of his work, from the pre-Critical writings to the mature period, positioning the debate around the distinction between animated and inanimate matter and examining references to the immaterial principle that vivifies matter. For Kant, life does not constitute a direct scientific object, configuring itself as a primarily metaphysical theme, accessible only through indirect approaches, analogies, and regulative principles. The philosopher consistently maintains the position that matter needs an immaterial principle for its vivification, establishing fundamental distinctions between organized and inorganic beings, where not every organized being is living: only animals, endowed with vis locomotiva, can be considered properly living, while plants remain as non-living organisms. Life is defined as the capacity for action of a being according to its representations, differentiating itself by the type of will, free will in the human case and arbitrium brutum in irrational creatures. In this sense, life, in its concrete dynamics, manifests itself through the constant play between pleasure and displeasure, constituting the only mode by which the subject can indirectly experience its own vitality.